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ABSTRACT 
 
he Russian Federation has declared that it will develop a Russian national seg-
ment of Internet which can be disconnected from the global Internet if need 
be. This project is related to the wider phenomenon of militarization and frag-
mentation of the Internet. The Russian national segment of Internet may not only be 
used a tool of political control, but as a closed national network it can be used to gain 
a strategic advantage in cyberspace. The aim of this thesis is to understand why Russia 
is creating a national segment of the Internet and how this segment, operating as a 
closed national network, could function. 
 
This thesis uses a modified neoclassical realist theoretical framework to argue that 
strategic cultural ideas give Russian military and security elites reason to pursue certain 
policies when confronted by an unpredictable and threatening new environment. 
States are able to control and shape cyberspace to their advantage using cyber power 
and the result of this strategy will be affected by strategic cultural ideas carried by the 
epistemic communities. Therefore, these ideas must be analysed in order to under-
stand how and why national segments of the Internet are being developed as real 
representations of a theoretical closed national network. 
 
This thesis argues that the ideas of an interstate struggle, digital sovereignty, strategic 
deterrence, asymmetric response, information superiority, unified information space, 
information-technological warfare, and automated command and control systems 
make the policies of the Russian elites reasonable and understandable. The need for 
political control of the Internet after 2011 and the definite change of the strategic 
environment in 2014 required a new strategy and, thus, new ideas were fitted to old 
ones to provide that strategy. The result has been a project to develop a national 
system of systems of information security and defence to defend Russia from infor-
mation-technological and psychological threats and to possibly gain an advantage over 
more technologically advanced adversaries. This system of systems offers flexible, 
centralised and hierarchical control of the national segment of the Internet in all the 
phases of interstate relations. In the information era, it offers a centralized and all-
seeing way to control the geographically vast Russian state, its society and economy. 
 
The Russian national segment of the Internet is also a manifestation of old Soviet 
ideas in a new context and, thus, demonstrates the continuity of historical ideas in 
Russian security thinking. Moreover, the system of systems is a Russian version of a 
closed national network, which can be used for further studying the strategic-level 
phenomena in cyberspace. Finally, this thesis argues for a critical re-evaluation of 
some of the premises of the Western research on Russian cyber strategy. 
 
Keywords: Russian Federation, national segment of the Internet, cyber warfare, stra-
tegic culture, neoclassical realism 
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
 
Digitaalinen Neuvostoliitto - Venäjän kansallinen internetsegmentti suljetun 
kansallisen verkon strategiskulttuuristen ideoiden muokkaamana ilmenty-
mänä 
enäjän federaatio on ilmoittanut kehittävänsä Venäjän kansallisen internetseg-
mentin, joka voidaan tarvittaessa irrottaa globaalista internetistä. Tämä pro-
jekti liittyy laajempaan internetin militarisoitumiseen ja fragmentaatioon. Ve-
näjän kansallinen internetsegmentti ei ole pelkästään sisäinen poliittisen kontrollin vä-
line. Suljettuna kansallisena verkkona sen avulla voidaan saavuttaa strateginen etu ky-
bertilassa. Tämän väitöskirjan tavoitteena on ymmärtää, miksi Venäjä rakentaa kan-
sallista internetsegmenttiä ja miten tämä segmentti ymmärrettynä teoreettisena suljet-
tuna kansallisena verkkona voisi toimia. 
 
Modifioidun neoklassisen realismin teoriakehyksen perustalta voidaan väittää, että 
strategiskulttuuriset ideat antavat järjellisen perusteen Venäjän sotilas- ja turvallisuus-
eliiteille noudattaa määrättyä politiikkaa kohdatessaan ennalta-arvaamattoman ja uh-
kaavan uuden ympäristön. Teorian mukaan valtiot kykenevät kontrolloimaan ja 
muokkaamaan kybertilaa omaksi edukseen käyttämällä kybervoimaa. Tämän strate-
gian lopputulokseen vaikuttavat strategiskulttuuriset ideat, joita kantavat episteemiset 
yhteisöt. Näin ollen strategiskulttuurisia ideoita pitää tutkia, jotta ymmärretään, miten 
ja miksi kansallisia internetsegmenttejä kehitetään teoreettisten suljettujen kansallisten 
verkkojen ilmentyminä. 
 
Tämä väitöskirja väittää, että valtioiden välisen kamppailun, digitaalisen suverenitee-
tin, strategisen pidäkkeen, asymmetrisen vasteen, informaatioylivoiman, yhtenäisen 
informaatiotilan, informaatioteknologisen sodankäynnin ja automatisoitujen johta-
misjärjestelmien ideat tekevät Venäjän eliittien politiikan järkeenkäyväksi ja ymmär-
rettäväksi. Tarve kontrolloida internettiä vuoden 2011 jälkeen ja selkeä muutos Venä-
jän strategisessa ympäristössä vuonna 2014 edellyttivät uutta strategiaa ja näin ollen 
uusia ideoita sovitettiin vanhoihin sopivan strategian laatimiseksi. Tuloksena oli pro-
jekti kansallinen informaatioturvallisuuden ja -puolustuksen järjestelmien järjestelmän 
kehittämiseksi Venäjän puolustamiseksi informaatioteknologisilta ja -psykologisilta 
uhilta sekä etuaseman hankkimiseksi teknologisesti kehittyneempiin vastustajiin näh-
den. Järjestelmien järjestelmä tarjoaa joustavan, keskitetyn ja hierarkkisen kontrollin 
kansallisesta internetsegmentistä kaikissa valtioiden välisten suhteiden vaiheissa. In-
formaatioaikakaudella se tarjoaa myös keinon kontrolloida Venäjän laajaa valtakuntaa, 
yhteiskuntaa ja taloutta keskitetysti ja kaikkinäkevästi. Venäjän kansallinen internet-
segmentti on vanhojen neuvostoaikaisten ideoiden ilmentymä uudessa kontekstissa ja 
todistaa historiallisten ideoiden jatkuvuutta venäläisessä turvallisuusajattelussa. Lisäksi 
järjestelmien järjestelmästä tehtyjä havaintoja voidaan käyttää kybertilan strategisen 
tason ilmiöiden jatkotutkimukseen ja läntisen Venäjään kohdistuvan kybertutkimuk-
sen taustaoletusten kriittiseen uudelleen arviointiin. 
 
Avainsanat: Venäjän federaatio, internetin kansallinen segmentti, kybersodankäynti, 
strateginen kulttuuri, neoklassinen realismi  
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Note on transliteration and translation:  
 
With the exception of some commonly occurring names, Russian words are translit-
erated according to the Library of Congress system. The titles of documents and spe-
cific noteworthy concepts are given in translated form with transliterations. Unless 
otherwise indicated all translations are by the author. 
  
iv 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
A2/AD  Anti-Access/Area-Denial 
AI  Artificial Intelligence 
AS  Autonomous System 
ASU Automated System of Command and Control/Manage-
ment 
ASAT  Anti-Satellite 
BGP  Border Gateway Protocol 
C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelli-
gence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
CERT  Computer Emergency Response Teams 
CI  Critical Infrastructure 
CII  Critical Information Infrastructure 
CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States 
CNA  Computer Network Attack 
CND  Computer Network Defence 
CNE  Computer Network Exploitation 
CSIRT  Computer Security Incident Response Teams 
CSTO  Collective Security Treaty Organization 
DCO  Defensive Cyber Operations 
DIKW  Data-Information-Knowledge-Wisdom hierarchy 
DDoS  Distributed Denial of Service attack 
DNS  Domain Name System 
DODIN Department of Defence (of the U.S.) Information Net-
works 
EEU  Eurasian Economic Union 
EIP  Unified Information Space 
ESPD  Unified Data Network 
EU  European Union 
FPE  Foreign Policy Elites 
FSB  The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation 
FSO  The Federal Protective Service of the Russian Federation 
FSTEK The Federal Service for Technical and Export Control of 
the Russian Federation 
GosSOPKA Government System for Detecting, Preventing and Elimi-
nating the Effects of Computer Attacks 
GRU (G.U.) Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forced 
of the Russian Federation 
GS  The General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces 
IAB  Internet Architecture Board 
IANA  Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 
ICANN  Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
ICT  Information Communication Technology 
IESG  Internet Engineering Steering Group 
IETF  The Internet Engineering Task Force 
IO  Information Operation 
IR  International Relations (a school of) 
IRR  Internet Routing Registry 
v 
IoT  Internet of Things 
IXP  Internet Exchange Point 
ISOC  Internet Society 
ISP  Internet Service Provider 
ITU  International Telecommunications Union 
IW  Information Warfare 
KGB  Committee for State Security 
LEO  Low-Earth Orbit 
LPWAN   Low Power Wide Area Networks 
MFA  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 
MGU  Moscow State University 
MGIMO  Moscow State Institute of International Relations 
Minkomsviaz’ Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and 
Mass Media of Russian Federation 
MPLS  Multiprotocol Label Switching 
MOD  The Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation 
MTSS  Multiservice Transport Network 
MVD  The Ministry of Interior of the Russian Federation 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NDMC  National Defence Management Centre 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization 
NCR  Neoclassical Realism 
NCW  Network Centric Warfare 
NKTsKI  National Coordination Centre of Computer Incidents 
NOC  Network Operation Centre 
NSUD  National System of Information Management 
NTIA National Telecommunications and Information Admin-
istration 
OATsSS  Integrated Automated Digital Communication System 
OCO  Offensive Cyber Operations 
OPK  The Defence-Industrial Complex 
ORI  Register of Information Dissemination Organizers 
OSCE  Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
PLC  Programmable Logic Controllers 
POTS  Plain Old Telephone Networks 
RFC  Request for Comments 
RFP  Russian Foreign Policy 
RIR  Regional Internet registries 
RKTsKI  Regional Coordination Centres of Computer Incidents 
RMA  Revolution in Military Affairs 
Roskomnadzor Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Telecom, 
Information Technologies and Mass Communications of 
the Russian Federation 
SCADA  Supervisory control and data acquisition systems  
SCO  Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
SDN  Software Defined Network 
SOC  Security Operation Centre 
SORM System (of technical means) for Operative Investigative 
Activities 
vi 
SIW  Strategic Information Warfare 
SVR  Foreign Intelligence Service  
TCP/IP  Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol 
TLD  Top-Level Domain 
TsMUSSOP Centre for Monitoring and Managing Public Communica-
tion Networks  
TTsI  Technical Centre Internet 
UN GGE UN Group of Governmental Experts on Information Se-
curity 
WCIT  World Conference on International Telecommunications 
WTO  World Trade Organization 
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KEY CONCEPTS 
 
he key concepts used in this thesis are presented and briefly explained below 
to assist the readability of the thesis. The formulations given below are neces-
sarily brief and explicit. The contested nature of some of the concepts is 
acknowledged and thus the references given below indicate the Chapter where the 
concepts are introduced from previous studies, defined or derived. 
 
Closed national network. A state-controlled segment of the Internet that can be 
technically disconnected from the global Internet. Chapter 3. 
 
Cybernetics or kibernetika. A science based on studying control and communica-
tion in complex systems, i.e. goal-directed machines, living organisms, and society. 
Chapters 3 & 4. 
 
Cyberspace. A man-made and governed global domain within the information envi-
ronment whose distinct and unique character is framed by the use of electronics and 
the electromagnetic spectrum to create, store, modify, exchange, and exploit infor-
mation via interdependent and interconnected networks using information-commu-
nication technologies. The Russian concept of information space includes the infor-
mation infrastructure, systems, information as well as the users and their interaction. 
Chapter 3 & 5. 
 
Cyber power. An ability that empowers an actor to influence others in or through 
cyberspace and to control and shape cyberspace to its advantage according to its pref-
erences. The Russian concept of cyber power is an abstract idea based on control of 
systems and information, effectiveness, efficiency and resilience, and measurable ma-
terial and human potential. Chapter 3 & 5. 
 
Cyber resilience. The ability to anticipate, withstand, recover from, and adapt to 
adverse internal and external conditions of systems that include cyber resources. The 
Russian concept consists of the ability of communication systems and networks to 
operate according to specifications under internal and external disturbances and to 
return to their initial state. Chapter 3 & 6. 
 
Cyber security and defence. The former refers to measures to protect computer 
systems, networks, and information from intentional or unintentional harm. The lat-
ter refers either to protective systems or functions explicitly designed against mali-
cious attacks or to defensive military actions in cyberspace. Chapter 3. 
 
Cyber warfare. The use of force based on cyber power in or through cyberspace with 
a coercive intent to make political gains in the context of the continuum of interstate 
relations. The Russian concept of information-technological warfare includes cyber 
or computer warfare. Chapter 3 & 5. 
 
Cyber strategy. Ways to use means based on power to produce effects in or through 
cyberspace for some end. These ends, ways, means and power derive their character-
istics from cyberspace but might have effects outside it. The Russian understanding 
T 
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of issues related to cyber strategy are incorporated in the wider concept of strategic 
planning and information security. Chapter 3 & 5. 
 
Cyber asymmetry. A disproportional and exploitable offensive and defensive ad-
vantage of a nation closing its networks over a nation that has kept its national net-
works open. A related concept is structural cyber asymmetry which is a property of 
cyberspace produced by shaping it through technology, governance, norms, and pol-
itics. Chapter 3. 
 
Defence and security elites. A group of people making decisions on state policy 
and use of force and responses to perceived threats. Chapter 2. 
 
Digital territory. An analytical concept which refers to the material, functional, nor-
mative, and political elements of cyberspace. It enables the visualization and mapping 
of hardware, software, infrastructure, interconnections, information, human re-
sources, protocols, services, policies and norms. Chapter 3. 
 
Epistemic community. A network of individuals or groups sharing values, and prin-
cipled and causal beliefs with an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge 
within their domain of expertise and a common policy project. Chapter 2. 
 
Information warfare. Actions aimed at destroying, degrading, and exploiting the in-
formation systems and information of adversaries while protecting own systems and 
information. This includes both kinetic and non-kinetic means. The Russian concept 
of information warfare has technological and psychological aspects. The latter con-
sists of computer attacks, electronic warfare, electromagnetic attacks, guided kinetic 
weapons and exotic weapons. It has a geopolitical, systemic, and operational varia-
tions. Chapter 3 & 5. 
 
Internet. A global network of interconnected networks sharing compatible protocols 
of communication and enabling the sharing of information and services. Part of cy-
berspace. Chapter 3. 
 
Internet governance. Policies and administration related to the technology which 
are necessary to keep the Internet operational and the norm-building and regulation 
related to the relationships and interaction of the users of the Internet. Chapter 3. 
 
National segment of the Internet. A portion of the Internet infrastructure and ser-
vices which resides on a state’s territory and under its sovereign jurisdiction. A real 
representation of a theoretical closed national network. Chapter 5. 
 
Power ministries. A number of federal ministries, services, agencies and directorates 
that have armed personnel and militarized formations under their command or are 
authorized to use violence to respond to threats to national security. Chapter 4. 
 
RuNet. RuNet refers to a relatively closed, online environment that is based on the 
Russian language but also includes a social aspect. It is the sociocultural basis of the 
Russian segment of the Internet. Chapter 5. 
 
ix 
Siloviki. Group of active duty or retired but still influential officers of the ‘power 
ministries’. Chapter 4. 
 
Sovereignty. A state’s autonomous and exclusive authority over its territory and a 
recognized position by other states in the international system. The Russian concept 
of sovereignty includes different spheres of sovereignty, for example, economic, tech-
nological and information. Chapter 2 & 5. 
 
Strategic cultural ideas. Causal beliefs and sometimes principled beliefs held by 
people representing epistemic communities and, consequently, defence and security 
elites about the threat and use of force, and about how the means and ends fit together 
in issues concerning state security interests. In this thesis these include the concepts 
of interstate struggle, digital sovereignty, strategic deterrence, asymmetric response, 
unified information space, information superiority, information-technological war-
fare, and automated command and control systems. Chapter 2. 
 
Strategic effect. The effects of a military use of force that have a direct relationship 
with policy goals or have political consequences. Conversely, an enabling effect does 
not directly achieve the objectives of war. The concept of enabling is sometimes used 
interchangeably with ‘force multiplier’. Chapter 3. 
 
System of systems. A complex system composed of multiple interconnected sub-
systems able to achieve results beyond the capabilities of the individual subsystems. 
The subsystems have their own functions are capable of operating on their own. 
Chapter 3. 
 
West/Western. ‘The West’ denotes the United States of America and its political and 
military allies which were opposed by the Soviet Union and its allies during the Cold 
War from the late 1940s until 1989/1991. In the period after the Cold War the West 
and Western refer to the United States of America, Canada, Western Europe, Aus-
tralia and New Zealand, including collective institutions of NATO and the European 
Union. It also refers to academic circles writing in English-language journals pub-
lished by institutions located in the above mentioned countries. Chapter 3. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come 
from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the 
past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty 
where we gather. […] We will create a civilization of the Mind in Cyberspace. May it 
be more humane and fair than the world your governments have made before. 
– John Perry Barlow (1947–2018), Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, February 
8, 19961 
 
You should simply always bear in mind that such is the reality created by the Amer-
icans. They are the ones who did it. You know that it all began initially, when the 
Internet first appeared, as a special CIA project. And this is the way it is developing. 
– Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin (1952–), Media Forum of Independent Local and Regional 
Media, April 24th, 20142 
 
We are engaged in a long-term strategic competition with China and Russia. These 
States have expanded that competition to include persistent campaigns in and through 
cyberspace that pose long-term strategic risk to the Nation as well as to our allies and 
partners. 
– The United States Department of Defence, Cyber Strategy – Summary 20183 
 
1.1 Background and previous research 
 
he dream of a free, or even anarchical, Internet has passed as some states, 
great powers among them, are carving out sovereign-territory-based blocks of 
cyberspace, and international IT firms are creating ecosystems centred around 
their proprietary systems, platforms and ‘terms of service’.4 The multi-stakeholder 
governance model of the Internet is increasingly being challenged by a model based 
on multilateral state control. The digital markets are being divided by monopolistic 
companies as data itself is being localized, based on the concepts of citizenship and 
state jurisdiction. This process has been referred to as the ‘splintering’, ‘fragmentation’ 
or ‘balkanization’ of the Internet.5 
                                              
1 Barlow, John Perry. A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace. Davos, Switzerland February 8, 1996 
[Online]. Available: https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence [Accessed: 6th August 2018]. 
2 Kremlin.ru. Media Forum of Independent Local and Regional Media, President of Russia’s Official Web 
Portal, April 24, 2014 [English] [Online]. Available: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20858 [Ac-
cessed: 13th July 2019]. 
3 The United States Department of Defence. Cyber Strategy – Summary 2018 [Online]. Available: https://me-
dia.defense.gov/2018/Sep/18/2002041658/-1/-1/1/CYBER_STRATEGY_SUMMARY_FINAL.PDF [Ac-
cessed: 3rd May 2019]. 
4 DeNardis, Laura. The Global War for Internet Governance. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014; 
Musiani, Francesca, Cogburn, Derrick L., DeNardis, Laura and Levinson, Nanette S. (Eds.) The Turn to Infra-
structure in Internet Governance. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016; Milton Mueller. Will the Internet Frag-
ment? Sovereignty, Globalization, and Cyberspace, Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2017. 
5 Drake, William J., Cerf, Vinton G. and Kleinwächter, Wolfgang. Future of the Internet Initiative White Paper. 
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The reason for the changing character of cyberspace is that it is a domain of human 
activity. Human beings create it and act in and through it. Cyberspace is a man-made 
and malleable environment.6 For example, Nazli Choucri and David Clark have de-
scribed it as “a new arena of human interaction”7 and Jan-Frederik Kramer and Ben-
edict Müller have used the term “cyberization of international relations [IR]” to refer 
to the way cyberspace has become an indistinguishable part of international politics.8  
According to scholars such as Martin Libicki and Joseph Nye Jr., states are increas-
ingly interested and required to consider cyberspace as a domain of politics and war-
fare.9 The regulation and governance of the Internet are thus becoming an issue of 
great power politics.10 Consequently, what can be controlled and shaped can be con-
verted to power through human action guided by historical ideas. 
 
Already in 2011 Chris Demchak and Peter Dombrowski proposed a concept of 
‘Cyber Westphalia’ for understanding how states delineated borders and reaffirmed 
state sovereignty in cyberspace. They foretold that states succeeding in this project 
could wield military cyber power more effectively than those that fail to create neces-
sary laws and organizations. Demchak and Dombrowski were optimistic in that they 
saw Western nations having a material and technological advantage in this competi-
tion.11 However, there is no reason why the advantage might not go to those states 
who are willing to tightly delimit and control their national networks and restrict the 
flow of information irrespective of technological challenges or economic difficulties.12 
Moreover, Patricia Vargas-Leon has argued that the ‘shut-down’ practices of some 
states, i.e. the disconnection of mobile and Internet networks in times of domestic 
                                              
Internet Fragmentation: An Overview.  World Economic Forum, January 2016. [Online] Available: 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_FII_Internet_Fragmentation_An_Overview_2016.pdf [Accessed: 
9th August 2018]. 
6 Libicki, Martin. Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar. Santa Monica: RAND, 2009; Sheldon, John B. The Rise of 
Cyberpower. In Baylis, John, Wirtz, James J. and Gray, Colin S. Strategy in the Contemporary World (4th ed.) 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, 301-319; Bryant, William D. International Conflict and Cyberspace 
Superiority: Theory and Practice. New York: Routledge, 2016. 
7 Choucri, Nazli and Clark, David D.  Who controls cyberspace? Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 69, No. 
5 (2013), 21-31, 22. More precisely a domain of politics and interaction. Cf. Choucri, Nazli. Cyberpolitics in 
International Relations. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2012. 
8 Kremer, Jan-Fredrik and Müller, Benedikt (eds.) Cyberspace and International Relations: Theory, Prospects 
and Challenges. Heidelberg: Springer, 2016, xi. 
9 Libicki, Martin C. Cyberspace in Peace and War. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2016; Nye, Joseph. The 
Future of Power. New York: Public Affairs, 2011. Cf. also Perry, Jake and Costigan, Sean S. (eds.) Cyberspaces 
and Global Affairs. Surrey: Ashgate, 2012. 
10 Tikk, Eneken and Kerttunen, Mika. Parabasis. Cyber-diplomacy in Stalemate. Norwegian Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, 2018 [Online]. Available: https://nupi.brage.unit.no/nupi-xmlui/bitstream/handle/ 
11250/2569401/NUPI_Report_5_18_Tikk_Kerttunen.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [Accessed: 6th May 
2019]. 
11 Demchak, Chris and Dombrowski, Peter. Rise of the Cybered Westphalian Age. Strategic Studies Quarterly, 
Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring 2011), 32-61. 
12 Kukkola, Juha. Russian Cyber Power and Structural Asymmetry, 13th International Conference on Cyber 
Warfare and Security (ICCWS), 8-9 March 2018, Washington DC, USA. Cf. also Kukkola, Juha. Cyber asym-
metry – Towards new strategic thinking? In Kukkola, Juha, Ristolainen, Mari and Nikkarila, Juha-Pekka. Game 
Changer: Structural Transformation of Cyberspace. Riihimäki: Finnish Defence Research Agency, 2017, 131-
188. 
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disorder, demonstrate that the control over the flow of information is a beneficial 
tool in the hands of authoritarian regimes.13 
 
The theoretical musings of Demchak, Dombrovski, Vargas-Leon and others are cur-
rently being put into reality by the Russian Federation. It has tried to achieve com-
prehensive state control over the Internet from the beginning of the third term (2012–
2018) of President Vladimir Putin. In 2014 the Russian Security Council declared that 
Russia would seek to create the ability to disconnect the Russian Internet from the 
global Internet.14 This declaration was followed by the Information Security Doctrine 
in 2016, which stated that Russia would protect its sovereignty in the information 
space and develop a national system for the management of the Russian segment of 
the Internet.15 In 2017 Russia adopted the Law on Critical Information Infrastructure 
which made it mandatory for public and private actors to protect certain critical ob-
jects of the Internet residing on Russian territory and to connect these systems to a 
cyber security system controlled by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Fed-
eration (FSB).16 The National Program of Digital Economy adopted and comple-
mented in 2017–2018 declared that Russia would achieve ‘digital sovereignty’ in 2020. 
Finally, in 2019 president Putin signed the so-called Law on Sovereign Internet, which 
will, if fully implemented, create a truly unified, resilient, and secure Russian segment 
of the Internet which can be disconnected from the global Internet by the order of 
the government.17 The Digital Economy Program and related laws could, in principle, 
great a state-led and controlled digitalized Russian economy and society. As will be 
shown, this was something already dreamed of by the Soviet era scholars of cybernet-
ics. 
 
In previous research the above described Russian process of taking control of the 
national segment of the Internet has been mainly interpreted as a domestic affair and 
an attempt to ensure authoritarian political control over the Internet. This is the eman-
cipatory view taken by many human rights organizations such as Russian Agora and 
Western Freedom House.18 However, there are other views. Andrei Soldatov and Ir-
ina Borogan have researched the birth of the Russian Internet and emphasised the 
                                              
13 Vargas-Leon, Patricia. Tracking Internet Shutdown Practices: Democracies and Hybrid Regimes. In Musiani, 
Francesca, Cogburn, Derrick L., DeNardis, Laura & Levinson, Nanette S. (Eds.) The Turn to Infrastructure in 
Internet Governance. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, 167-188. 
14 Совет Безопасности РФ. Заседание Совета Безопасности Российской Федерации по вопросу «О про-
тиводействии угрозам национальной безопасности Российской Федерации в информационной сфере» 
1 октября 2014 года [Online]. Available: http://www.scrf.gov.ru/news/allnews/831/ [Accessed: 16th May 
2019]. 
15 Указ Президента РФ от 5 декабря 2016 г. N 646 “Об утверждении доктриныинформационной без-
опасности Российской Федерации” [Online]. Available: http://rulaws.ru/president/Ukaz-Prezidenta-RF-
ot-05.12.2016-N-646/ [Accessed: 21st March 2019]. 
16 Федеральный закон от 26.07.2017 N 187-ФЗ “О безопасности критической информационной инфра-
структуры Российской Федерации” [Online]. Available: http://www.consultant.ru/document/ 
cons_doc_LAW_220885/ [Accessed: 21st March 2019]. 
17 Распоряжение Правительства РФ от 28.07.2017 N 1632-р “Об утверждении программы "Цифровая 
экономика Российской Федерации" [Online]. Available: http://static.government.ru/media/files/ 
9gFM4FHj4PsB79I5v7yLVuPgu4bvR7M0.pdf [Accessed: 16th May 2019]; Федеральный закон от 01.05.2019 
№ 90-ФЗ “О внесении изменений в Федеральный закон ”О связи” и Федеральный закон ”Об инфор-
мации, информационных технологиях и о защите информации” [Online]. Available: http://www.con-
sultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_323815/ [Accessed: 8th May 2019]. 
18 Агора. Свобода интернета 2018: делегирование репрессий [Online]. Available: https://meduza.io/ 
static/0001/Свобода-интернета-2018.pdf [Accessed: 1st March 2019]; Freedom House. Freedom in the 
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role of the security services and the KGB mentality in ‘the taming of the Internet’ and 
thus the historical continuity in the Russian approach to security issues.19 Another, 
historical-cultural view is offered by Julian Nocetti who has argued that the idea of 
state sovereignty has influenced the Russian understanding of the Internet. In this 
view, Russia is thus trying to build virtual borders in cyberspace through internal pol-
icies and external norm-building diplomacy.20 According to Nocetti, the Russian pol-
icy is in principle defensive and considers the Internet as a soft power tool.21 The 
importance of the concept of sovereignty was already pointed out by Margarita Jaitner 
and Jari Rantapelkonen in 2013 when they argued that “the Russian information pol-
icies follow a distinct line of thought and focus, namely on sovereignty and independ-
ence in every possible aspect…”22 Moreover, Nocetti’s views on the norm-building 
aspect are confirmed by Eneken Tikk and Mika Kerttunen who have traced Russia’s 
efforts to push through its version of global Internet governance in the context of the 
United Nations Group of Government Experts on information security (UN 
GGE).23  
 
Russian policies have also been studied from the viewpoint of the economy and in-
ternal security. Carolina Vendil Pallin has described how state control over the inde-
pendently developed Russian Internet has been achieved through the direct or indi-
rect control of Internet companies by the state since Russian authoritarianism reas-
serted itself in 2012.24 She has also provided an up-to-date overview of the Russian 
state policies related to the Internet.25 Moreover, Katri Pynnöniemi has tracked the 
development of the Russian concept of critical infrastructure from the concept of 
emergency situations, through critical objects to infrastructure. In her work Pynnö-
niemi notes that recent development of the concept has focused on cyber vulnerabil-
ities.26 Thus Russia’s policies are not entirely isolated from current Western trends 
concerning the protection of ‘critical information infrastructure’, however this is de-
fined.   
 
The above presented research is largely based on the view that the Russian Internet 
policy is largely a political, cultural and governance issue. However, since the annex-
                                              
World 2018 – Russia. [Online]. Available: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/russia [Ac-
cessed: 25th March 2019]. 
19 Soldatov, Andrei and Borogan, Irina. The Red Web. The Struggle Between Russia's Digital Dictators and 
The New Online Revolutionaries. New York: Public Affairs, 2015; Soldatov, Andrei. The Taming of the Inter-
net. Russian Social Science Review, Vol. 58, No. 1 (January–February 2017), 39-59; Soldatov, Andrei and 
Borogan, Irina. The New Nobility: The Restoration of Russia’s Security State and the Legacy of the KGB. New 
York: Public Affairs, 2010. 
20 Nocetti, Julian. Contest and conquest: Russia and global internet governance. International Affairs, Vol. 91, 
No. 1 (2015), 111-130. 
21 Nocetti, Julian. Cyber Power. In Tsyganov, Andrei P. Routledge Handbook of Russian Foreign Policy. Lon-
don and New York: Routledge, 2018, 182-198. 
22 Jaitner, Margarita and Rantapelkonen, Jari. Russian Struggle for Sovereignty in Cyberspace. Tiede ja Ase, Vol. 
71 (2013), 64-89, 83. 
23 Tikk & Kerttunen 2018. 
24 Vendil Pallin, Carolina. Internet control through ownership: the case of Russia. Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 33, 
No. 1 (2017), 16-33. 
25 Vendil Pallin, Carolina. Russian information security and warfare. In Kanet, Roger E. Routledge Handbook 
of Russian Security. London and New York: Routledge, 2019, 203-213. 
26 Pynnöniemi, Katri (ed.) Russia´s Critical Infrastructures - Vulnerabilities and Possibilities, FIIA Report 35, 
2012. 
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ation of Crimea in 2014, the alleged Russian offensive cyber and information opera-
tions have produced vast amounts of Western research on Russian views and tech-
niques of information warfare.27 As will be argued in Chapter 4 of this thesis, these 
interpretations are largely based on the works of Mary Fitzgerald and Timothy L. 
Thomas. Especially Timothy Thomas has provided the English-speaking audience 
with a window into the Russian military strategic thinking through multiple accounts 
based on primary sources starting from the 1990s. In his latest text, Thomas argues 
that “Russia is motivated by dangers and threats to its information space, whether 
they be political, economic, military, diplomatic, or other” and that it continues to 
search for asymmetric means to counter its enemies.28 Dmitry Adamsky has also an-
alysed Russian strategic thinking on information warfare and argued that the infor-
mation struggle is central to the Russian doctrine and that it is holistic, unified, and 
uninterrupted in its nature.29 Kier Giles is perhaps one of the most well-known cur-
rent scholars on Russian information warfare although his ideas are largely based on 
Thomas.30 Giles has especially warned about using Western concepts in analysing 
Russian thinking. He argues that Russian thinking diverges decidedly from the West-
ern ideas on cyber and information warfare. 
 
The main premise around which Western theories about Russian information warfare 
coalesced in 2016–2018 was that the Russians did not use the concept of cyber but 
instead differentiated between technological and psychological information warfare. 
Moreover, they had somehow devised a holistic, integrated, continuous and centrally 
controlled method of strategic-level information warfare to destabilize their oppo-
nents, i.e. the West.31 Thus, Vendil Pallin states that Russia “sees information warfare 
as an integrated entity, where propaganda, electronic warfare and IT operations are 
all used simultaneously.”32 More recently, Katri Pynnöniemi has argued that Russia is 
actively defending itself through an asymmetric approach which includes a wide spec-
trum of information means to prevent and neutralize threats.33 It could thus be argued 
that the Russian ‘information offensive’ is seen by Western scholars as a part of the 
strategic defence by an actor which is distinctly different from the West. The problem 
is that this line of thought has led to serious misconceptions, for example, during the 
Cold War.34 Moreover, ‘holists’ and those emphasizing culturally and ethnically pri-
                                              
27 For example, Google Scholar produced 40 hits on “Russian information warfare” between the time range 
2000–2013 and 790 between 2014–2019 in 17th November 2019. Cf. Also NATO library guides 
(http://www.natolibguides.info/library/find/library_pubs). 
28 Thomas, Timothy. Russia’s Expanding Cyber Activities: Exerting Civilian Control While Enhancing Military 
Reform. In Blank, Stephen J. (ed.) The Russian Military in Contemporary Perspective. Carlisle Barracks, PA., 
U.S. Army War College Press, 2019, 491-574. 
29 Adamsky, Dmitry (Dima). From Moscow with coercion: Russian deterrence theory and strategic culture, 
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 41, No. 1-2 (2018), 33-60. 
30 This is apparent in Giles, Keir. Handbook of Russian Information Warfare. Fellowship monograph 9. Rome: 
NATO Defence College, 2016. 
31 Giles 2016a; Adamsky 2018; Nocetti 2018; Thomas 2019, Jonsson 2019. 
32 Vendil Pallin 2019, 211. 
33 Pynnöniemi, Katri. The Asymmetric Approach in Russian Security Strategy: Implications for the Nordic 
Countries, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol 31, No. 1 (2019), 154-167. 
34 Cf. Garthoff, Raymond L. Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine. Washington D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1990; Gray, Colin, S. War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Stra-
tegic History. New York: Routledge, 2007. 
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mordial distinctive features of Russian thinking disregard the fact that Western mili-
tary theories have adopted holistic ‘complex adaptive systems’ as their primary build-
ing block since the early 2000s.35 
 
The importance the Russians put on information as a military strategic issue is re-
flected in the works by Roger N. Dermott, Jakob W. Kipp and Tor Bukkvoll.36 They 
and others have argued that Russia is deeply interested in Western models of Network 
Centric Warfare (NCW) and is constructing its own version of this doctrine. Moreo-
ver, Julian Cooper and Andrew Monaghan have pointed out the role of strategic plan-
ning in Russian strategy.37 Following their logic, Russia’s Internet policy should be 
incorporated in its national economic and military planning, which aims to produce 
security, economic prosperity, and power. This top-down, centrally state controlled 
comprehensive approach to information and technology issues has its roots in the 
Soviet era political culture, which has been researched by Ilmari Susiluoto, Slava Ger-
ovich and Benjamin Peters. One of their main arguments has been that the Soviet 
version of the science of cybernetics heavily influenced the way in which the Soviet 
Union tried to build its national networks.38 They implicitly argue that it is possible 
for a state to construct its networks according to historical and cultural ideas, and thus 
the future of the Internet might not be homogenous. Moreover, in a recent study, 
Valeriano, Jensen and Maness have proposed that the United States, Russia and China 
have differing cyber strategies and understandings of the use of cyber power, which 
might be the result of differing strategic cultures.39 Thus, cyberspace is what we as 
encultured human beings make of it. This logic is compatible with the idea that Russia, 
like the Soviet Union before it, is trying to find a culturally and historically bound way 
into something called modernity.40 
 
The issues of defence and threat are also present in Martti J. Kari’s doctoral thesis 
“Russian Strategic Culture in Cyberspace”, written in parallel to this study, in which 
                                              
35 Cf. Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Department of Defence. Planner’s Handbook for Operational Design, 
January 2011 [Online]. Available: https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pams_hands/ 
opdesign_hbk.pdf [Accessed: 24th January 2020]. 
36 McDermott, Roger N. The Transformation of Russia’s Armed Forces. Twenty Lost Years. New York: 
Routledge, 2015; Kipp, Jacob W. ‘Smart’ Defense. From New Threats: Future War from a Russian Perspective: 
Back to the Future after the War on Terror, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2014), 36-
62; Bukkvoll, Tor.  Iron Cannot Fight – The Role of Technology in Current Russian Military Theory, Journal 
of Strategic Studies, Vol. 34, No. 5 (2011), 681-706. 
37 Cooper, Julian. What If War Comes Tomorrow: Who Russia Prepares for Possible Armed Aggression, RUSI, 
Whitehall Report 4-16, 2016; Monaghan, Andrew. Power in Modern Russia. Manchester: Manchester Univer-
sity Press, 2017. 
38 Susiluoto, Ilmari. Suuruuden laskuoppi: Venäläisen tietoyhteiskunnan synty ja kehitys [Arithmetic of great-
ness: The birth and development of the Russian information society]. Juva: WSOY, 2006; Gerovitch, Slava. 
From Newspeak to Cyberspeak: A History of Soviet Cybernetics. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2002; Peters, 
Benjamin. How Not to Network a Nation: The Uneasy History of the Soviet Internet. MIT Press: Cambridge, 
2016. 
39 Valeriano, Brandon, Jensen, Benjamin and Maness, Ryan C. Cyber Strategy: The Evolving Character of Power 
and Coercion. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. 
40 Sakwa, Richard. The Soviet collapse: Contradictions and neo-modernisation. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 
Vol. 4, No. 1 (2013), 65-77; Kivinen, Markku Kivinen and Cox, Terry Cox. Russian Modernisation—A New 
Paradigm. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 68, No. 1 (2016), 1-19. 
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Kari uses the concept of strategic culture to explain the Russian cyber threat percep-
tion and Russia’s response to cyber threats.41 Kari uses a content-analysis-based 
grounded theory to create a “model of Russian cyber threat perception and response 
to that threat”. This model is based on computerized analysis of 140 official Russian 
government documents. He then argues that central elements of Russian strategic 
culture, i.e. “a sense of vulnerability, the concept of permanent war and the narrative 
of the besieged fortress, a Clausewitzian belief in the use of force, and a fear of exter-
nal and internal enemies” can be identified as a list of preferences which guide the 
Russian cyber threat perception and responses to threats.42 However, Kari’s coding 
of Russian cyber threat perceptions is based only on official published government 
documents, which is a limited view. Moreover, his view of the central paradigm of 
Russian strategic culture is based on previous, mainly Western, studies. Additionally, 
he does not explain how he has come to choose the elements of the paradigm. This 
leads him to argue that the Russian strategic culture in cyberspace revolves around 
the concept of a ‘besieged fortress’ even though he does not critically analyse the 
concept and its historical and contextual roots. Additionally, as Kari conflates strate-
gic preferences with behaviour, i.e. responses to cyber threats, his claim of ‘explaining’ 
observed behaviour can be considered suspect. Interestingly, although Kari does not 
state that he explores the development of threat perceptions and responses, he nev-
ertheless offers such a summary in his conclusions. Here he differs from those such 
as Andrei Soldatov, who have placed the start of the Russian ‘taming of the Internet’ 
around 2012 and attributed it to reasons connected to internal policies.43 
 
A more ‘unorthodox’ and intriguing interpretation of Russian motives has been of-
fered by Mari Ristolainen and Juha-Pekka Nikkarila from the Finnish Defence Re-
search Agency who proposed in a conference paper written in December 2016 that, 
instead of political objectives, the Russian regime might be, in fact, aiming at achieving 
a military advantage in cyberspace.44 They referred to Russia with its disconnected 
Internet as a ‘closed network nation’, and argued that when its relationship to open 
network nations was analysed through the basic elements of combat power, the closed 
network nation would indeed have an upper hand. As a research officer from the 
National Defence University, I was invited to comment on the paper by Ristolainen 
and Nikkarila, after which, during the period of 2017–2019, we have written over a 
dozen articles together, individually or with other contributors on the subject of the 
Russian national segment of the Internet and its military implications. This multidis-
ciplinary, interdepartmental academic research project has produced two published 
collections of conference papers titled: Game Changer: Structural Transformation of 
Cyberspace, and Game Player: Facing the Structural Transformation of Cyberspace 
and is still producing further research.45 
                                              
41 Kari, Martti J. Russian Strategic Culture in Cyberspace Theory of Strategic Culture – a tool to Explain Russia´s 
Cyber Threat Perception and Response to Cyber Threats. JYU Dissertations 122. Jyväskylä, Jyväskylän yli-
opisto, 2019. 
42 Kari 2019, 89. 
43 Soldatov 2017. 
44 Nikkarila, Juha-Pekka and Ristolainen, Mari. ‘RuNet 2020’ – Deploying traditional elements of combat power 
in cyberspace. Presented in the International Conference on Military Communications and Information Sys-
tems (ICMCIS), Oulu, Finland, May 15.-16., 2017. 
45 Kukkola, Ristolainen & Nikkarila 2017a; Kukkola, Juha, Ristolainen, Mari and Nikkarila, Juha-Pekka. Game 
Player. Facing the structural transformation of cyberspace. Finnish Defence Research Agency Publications 11. 
Riihimäki: Finnish Defence Research Agency, 2019. 
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In the conference papers we examined Russian policies, laws and the writings of the 
Russian information security theorists and concluded that Russia was shaping the 
strategic-level cyber battlefield to gain an asymmetric advantage through a closed na-
tional network. By disconnecting its national segment of the Internet Russia would 
gain a disproportionate and exploitable advantage in situational awareness, decision-
making, and freedom of action.46 As the asymmetry was based on the properties of 
cyberspace, I decided to call it structural cyber asymmetry.47 Furthermore, by pursuing 
a cyber security policy related to an authoritarian state control over the Internet, Ris-
tolainen, Nikkarila and I argued that Russia was shaping the entire nature of the In-
ternet in a way that challenged the way it was governed and perhaps even the whole 
value base of the so-called Western world-order48. We continued our studies by fur-
ther examining the nature of the Russian segment of the Internet and digital sover-
eignty, the nature of structural cyber asymmetry, and the ideas behind it, by conduct-
ing a mathematical analysis of cyber asymmetry, and even examining how wargaming 
could be used to understand how closed national networks worked.49 
 
This thesis and its research aims and objectives are inherently tied to my research with 
Ristolainen and Nikkarila. I first started this work as an attempt to solve the riddle of 
how the Russian state viewed and used cyber power as a tool of military strategy, but 
as time has passed, knowledge has been accumulated, and realities have been estab-
lished, I decided to concentrate on the phenomena of the closed national network. 
We had argued that this kind of state controlled, and disconnected segment of the 
Internet would provide an asymmetric advantage, but we had not truly asked why Rus-
sia was pursuing this kind of network and how it would function. I felt that it was important to 
understand what the reasons behind the policies of the Russian regime were, what has 
made the Russian regime to choose those policies, and how a theoretical concept of 
a closed national network corresponded to real-life phenomena. 
 
Moreover, throughout our research, Ristolainen, Nikkarila and I have argued that 
there has been something elementary missing in the current Western cyber and mili-
tary strategic research on Russia.50 We mostly based our arguments on the regrettably 
scarce use of primary, Russian language sources in that research.51 Additionally, the 
view of Russia as an aggressive, revisionist troublemaker and antagonist to Western 
                                              
46 For more on the theoretical background cf. Chapter 3. 
47 Kukkola 2017a & 2018a. 
48 Cf. Definitions. More precisely the term refers to a contested and admittedly political concept of the post II 
World War international political and economic system based on the power of the United States and its allies 
and some supposedly universal and modern values such as democracy, human rights, domestic and interna-
tional rule of law and liberal economics. (Gill, Stephen. Power and Resistance in the New World Order (2nd 
ed.) New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008; Kundnani, Hans. What is the Liberal International Order? GMF, 
Policy Essay No. 17 (2017) [Online]. Available: http://www.gmfus.org/publications/what-liberal-interna-
tional-order [Accessed: 15th July 2019]; Stuenkel, Oliver. Post-Western World: How Emerging Powers Are 
Remaking Global Order. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016). 
49 Kukkola, Ristolainen & Nikkarila 2017 & 2019. 
50 This was first claimed by Mari Ristolainen (Ristolainen, Mari. Should ‘RuNet 2020’ be taken seriously? Con-
tradictory views about cyber security between Russia and the West. In Scanlon, Mark and Le-Khac, Nhien-An 
(eds.) Proceedings of the 16th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security (ECCWS), Dublin, Ireland, 
June 29.-30., 2017, 370-379). 
51 A noteworthy exception is Oscar Jonsson whose book on the Russian understanding of war was published 
in November 2019 when this thesis was already under review (Jonsson, Oscar. The Understanding of War. 
Blurring the Lines between War and Peace. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2019, 33-34). 
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states and values did not really contribute to a scientifically neutral discussion.52 Fur-
thermore, it seemed that Cold War era mirror-imaging of the enemy did little to fur-
ther the understanding of how the Russians truly view cyberspace, cyber power, cyber 
warfare or strategy.53 There was also the question of the interaction of Western and 
Russian ideas, that is, who had learned from whom and did it matter?54 Thus, I de-
cided to complement the research on Russian policies with a strategic cultural ap-
proach. More precisely, I wanted to investigate what kind of strategic cultural ideas made Rus-
sian policies reasonable and how they affected the shaping and control of the Russian national segment 
of the Internet in the case of creating a closed national network. I explicitly wanted to concen-
trate on individual ideas, not culture, as culture is quite a contested and amorphous 
concept.55 I especially wanted to analyse as wide as possible a range of primary Rus-
sian sources myself, avoiding the ‘idolatry’ and authority-bound approach, which only 
repeats ‘self-evident’ truths and offers them as new research. Thus, I also made the 
decision to include original sources in this report for others to use and reflect upon, 
even though the manuscript may at times be demanding to read and somewhat 
lengthy. 
 
I also felt that our previous research and my thesis required a robust theoretical basis. 
The mere listing of Internet laws, programs and projects was not enough. I wanted to 
offer a theoretical explanation for why states choose to shape cyberspace in certain ways and what the 
role and essence of cyber power is in all of this. Clearly, states are approaching cyberspace 
more and more as a sphere of action, interest and security. Cyberspace to me seemed 
to be a material and objective reality that state elites understand through various ideas 
and shape them accordingly. Thus, the basic theoretical argument is that the strategic 
environment in which state elites operate motivates them to behave and legitimize 
their actions according to strategic cultural ideas offered by groups of professionals 
and specialists, i.e. epistemic communities. By examining these ideas, it is possible to 
interpret the reasons for the policies promoted by the state defence and security elites. 
Because these understandings and ideas have long roots, it is necessary to examine 
how the legacy of the Soviet Union might still be felt in the way the Russian state 
approaches the Internet. Moreover, the Russian state policy is so multifaceted and 
multidimensional that some kind of systematic synthesis is required to make sense of 
it. 
 
Against this background, I have chosen to examine the closed national network, cy-
berspace, power, warfare, and strategy as theoretical cross-cultural phenomena largely 
                                              
52 Cf. Chapter 4 and also Jonsson 2019. 
53 During the Cold War the Soviet views on the possibility of a nuclear war was a source of confusion and 
debate between game-theorists and ‘culturalists’. The Russian and Chinese views on cyber warfare have reig-
nited this discussion and whether there are or are not grounds to claim that the military strategic culture affects 
the making of strategy. (Gray, Colin. Soviet nuclear strategy and new military thinking. In Leebaert, Derek and 
Dickinson, Timothy (eds.) Soviet Strategy and the New Military Thinking. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 1992, 28-54; Lindsay, Jon R., Cheung, Tai Ming and Reveron, Derek S. China and Cybersecurity. Espio-
nage, Strategy, and Politics in the Digital Domain. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015; Mizokami, Kyle. 
How the Pentagon Exaggerated Russia’s Cold War Super Weapons. The National Interest, June 5, 2016 
[Online]. Available: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-the-pentagon-exaggerated-russias-cold-
war-super-weapons-16468?page=2 [Accessed: 14th July 2019].) 
54 As shall be argued in the following chapters, whereas Western scholars have usually kept quiet about their 
borrowing of Russian ideas, Russians have, to the contrary, developed their ideas in open discussion with West-
ern ideas, although, arguably in the spirit of ‘creative plagiarism’. 
55 Cf. Chapter 2. 
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based on Western theorizing to be able to offer some comparable and generalizable 
knowledge. I then investigate a particular Russian understanding of these concepts to 
offer a more inclusive, comparable, and comprehensive interpretation of them. This 
approach provides an understanding on how Russian culture and history guide its 
approach to warfare and modernity. Furthermore, I want to take a critical look at how 
the Russian cyber policies have been interpreted in the West. Ultimately, I hope to 
provide an explanation of why the dream of late John Perry Barlow never materialized 
and humankind has yet again managed to transform one sphere of life into a domain 
of state control and ultimately, war. 
 
1.2 Research purpose and objectives 
 
The aim of this thesis is to understand why Russia is creating a national segment of the Internet and 
how this segment, operating as a closed national network could, function. My research problem 
has two parts, theoretical and analytical. The theoretical part examines the role of 
ideas in strategy making, and the related concepts of cyberspace, cyber power, cyber 
warfare, cyber strategy, and a closed national network. The analytical part examines 
the Russian strategy to control and shape a part of cyberspace into ‘a national segment 
of the Internet’ as a real case of a state creating a closed national network. In a ques-
tion form the research problem is presented as: How do strategic cultural ideas give reason 
to the Russian Federation’s strategy to control and shape a part of cyberspace into ‘a national segment 
of the Internet’, how does this segment function in a context of conflict and what does it say about 
closed national networks? By answering this problem, I aim to provide an increased un-
derstanding of Russian strategic thinking on cyber issues and its current policies and 
provide a case study of a closed national segment that can be adopted for comparative 
research on other networks and nations. 
 
I intend to find answers to my research problem’s theoretical and analytical part by 
answering six auxiliary research questions or subproblems, which also provide the 
structure of the thesis. These are: 
 
A. What is a strategic culture and a strategic environment and how do strategic 
cultural ideas come to affect strategic state behaviour? 
B. What is cyberspace, cyber power, cyber warfare and cyber strategy and how 
do states use cyber power to achieve military ends and political objectives? 
C. How is cyberspace shaped by utilizing cyber power and what is a closed na-
tional network? 
D. What are the Russian strategic cultural ideas of: interstate struggle, digital sov-
ereignty, strategic deterrence, asymmetric response, information superiority, 
unified information space, information-technological warfare, and automated 
command and control systems and how they have developed? 
E. How do the strategic environment and strategic cultural ideas provide reasons 
for the Russian strategy of  shaping and controlling a part of  cyberspace into 
a national segment of  the Internet? 
F. What is the Russian national segment of  the Internet and how does it func-
tion? 
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These subproblems are informed by four theory-based premises, which are compre-
hensively explained in Chapters 2 and 3.  The first is that the changes in a state’s 
strategic environment and strategic cultural ideas affect the way state elites develop 
strategies by making some actions reasonable. The second is that cyber power enables 
states to shape cyberspace into a closed national network and control it. The third is 
that Russia is shaping cyberspace to control a part of it as a national segment of the 
Internet through a strategy which is reasonable in the context of strategic cultural 
ideas. The fourth premise is that the Russian national segment of the Internet corre-
sponds to the theoretical concept of a closed national network and thus could provide 
a strategic advantage. The research purpose and objectives of this thesis are admittedly 
informed by a critical view of the current state of Western cyber research on Russia.56 
Moreover, they are directed towards building an interpretive understanding and no 
causal, positivist explanations are offered in this study. The analytical part of the re-
search problem of this study thus forms a case study of a closed national network.  
The case being the Russian national segment of the Internet.57 
 
This thesis’ treatment of the theoretical part of the research problem is based on ear-
lier Western or English-language scholarship. For example, the ideas of Laura De-
Nardis, Chris Demchak, Martin Libicki, Joseph Nye Jr., Daniel Khuel and David Betz 
and Tim Stevens on cyber governance and power are crucial to my own theorizing.58  
I hope to add to their knowledge by using their ideas to analyse contemporary and 
real manifestations of the Russian thinking on the Internet and its consequences. This 
is justifiable as my research strives to study the same objective and material reality that 
Russian officials and scholars are facing.59 Moreover, this thesis is based on earlier 
research conducted by myself, Ristolainen and Nikkarila. That research is not dupli-
cated here but it is updated and refined where necessary. When using material from 
earlier research I will refer to either Game Changer or Game Player books.60 The theo-
retical part is therefore an attempt to adapt existing IR theory and cyber security con-
cepts to the study of a new phenomenon, i.e. a closed national network—the nexus 
being cyber power and its use by states. 
 
                                              
56 By this I mean an emphasis on the study of actual or potential aggressive and offensive Russian behaviour 
against Western states in cyberspace in Western academic and policy circles, usually based on English-language 
secondary sources. For example cf.  Jensen, Benjamin, Valeriano, Brandon and Maness, Ryan. Fancy bears and 
digital trolls: Cyber strategy with a Russian twist, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2019), 212-234; 
Blank, Stephen. Cyber War and Information War ál la Russe. In Perkovich, George and Levite, Ariel E. (eds.) 
Understanding Cyber Conflict: Fourteen Analogies. Georgetown: Georgetown University Press, 2017, 81-98; 
Geers, Kenneth (ed.) Cyber War in Perspective: Russian Aggression against Ukraine. Tallinn: CCDCOE, 2015. 
Moreover, cyber security itself is recognized as dependent of the knowledge practices of different communities 
(Dunn Cavelty, Myriam and Andreas Wenger. Cyber security meets security politics: Complex technology, frag-
mented politics, and networked science, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 41, No. 1 (2020), 5-32). 
57 Cf. George, Alexander L. and Bennett, Andrew. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004; Van Evera, Stephen. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1997; Bennett, Andrew and Elman, Colin. Qualitative Research: Recent Devel-
opments in Case Study Methods. Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 9 (2006), 457-458. 
58 Cf. Libicki 2009 & 2016; Kuehl, Daniel T. From Cyberspace to Cyberpower - Defining the Problem. In 
Kramer, Franklin D., Starr, Stuart H. and Wentz, Larry K. Cyberpower and National Security. Washington, 
D.C.: National Defence University Press, 2009, 24-42; Betz, David and Stevens, Tim. Cyberspace and the State: 
Toward a Strategy for Cyberpower. Adelphi Series, Vol. 51, No. 424 (2011); Nye 2012; DeNardis 2014; Dem-
chak & Dombrowski 2011. 
59 On the philosophical foundations behind this claim Cf. Chapter 2. 
60 Kukkola, Ristolainen & Nikkarila 2017 & 2019. 
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The analytical part of this thesis is to a large degree founded on the work done by 
Raymond Garthoff, Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, David Glantz, Willian 
Odom, Mary Fitzgerald, Timothy Thomas, Julian Cooper, Andrew Monaghan and 
Dmitri Adamsky, who have done a remarkable job in analysing the different elements 
of Russian strategic thought. I also refer to the research done by Petteri Lalu, Katri 
Pynnöniemi and Pentti Forsström on Russian operational and strategic thought and 
thus aim to add to the Finnish discussion on Russian military thinking. Moreover, 
Slava Gerovich, Benjamin Peters and Ilmari Susiluoto have provided an invaluable 
analysis of the Soviet ‘kibernetik’ thinking which I use to contextualize my own his-
torical approach.61 
 
The analytical part concentrates, firstly, on the writings of the Russian civilian and 
military scholars in the time period from the late 1950s up to 2019, and, secondly, on 
the official policies of the Russian defence and security elites in the time period of 
2000–2019.  The reasons for these limitations are as follows. Firstly, as will be argued 
in Chapter 2, strategic cultural ideas are carried by epistemic communities and are 
adopted from them by the decision-making elites. Thus, the ideas promoted by the 
communities must be analysed in the period before any visible change in the policies 
of the elites. To understand the historical roots of the strategic cultural ideas the time-
period from the 1950s to the end of the 1990s is chosen as a background timeframe 
for analysis because it includes the adoption of cybernetic ideas as the basis of Soviet 
science, and the first and second Soviet Military-Technological Revolutions, and the 
beginning of the third.62 During this timeframe, the terms still influencing the Russian 
language on computers and networks were adopted for official use.63 Additionally, 
the  Soviet Union was faced with a technology-based arms race in relation to the 
United States64, and the Russian ‘information society’ began to develop which led to 
                                              
61 Adamsky, Dima. The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in 
Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel. Stanford, Caroline: Stanford University Press, 2010; Fitzgerald, 
Mary C. Marshal Ogarkov and the New Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs. Alexandria, Virginia: CNA, 1987; 
Thomas, Timothy L. Russian Views on Information-Based Warfare. Airpower Journal – Special Edition 1996, 
26-35; Lalu, Petteri. Syvää vai pelkästään tiheää: neuvostoliittolaisen ja venäläisen sotataidollisen ajattelun läh-
tökohdat, kehittyminen, soveltaminen käytäntöön ja nykytilanne. Näkökulmana 1920- ja 1930-luvun syvän 
taistelun ja operaation opit [Deep or just dense: Soviet and Russian military thinking, development, application 
in practice and current situation. From the viewpoint of the theory of the 1920s and 1930s deep battle and 
operations]. Doctoral thesis. NDU Publication series 1, Department of Tactics, 3/2014. Helsinki: National 
Defence University, 2014; Forsström, Pentti. Venäjän sotilasstrategia muutoksessa. Tulkintoja Venäjän sotilas-
strategian perusteiden kehityksestä Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen jälkeen. opit [The Russian military strategy under 
change. Interpretations on the development of the fundaments of the Russian military strategy after the fall of 
the Soviet Union]. Doctoral thesis. NDU Publication series 1, Research Publication No. 32. Helsinki: National 
Defence University, 2019; Pynnöniemi 2019a; Gerovitch 2002; Peters 2016; Susiluoto 2006; Cooper 2016; 
Monaghan 2017. 
62   Sushentsov, Andrei. The Russian Response to the RMA: Military Strategy towards Modern Security Threats. 
In Collins, Jeffrey and Futter, Andrew (Eds.) Reassessing the Revolution in Military Affairs: Transformation, 
Evolution and Lessons Learned. New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2015, 112-131; Gerovitch 2002; Adamsky 
2010; Glantz, David M. The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union: A History. Abingdon, Oxon: Frank Cass, 
1992; Frank, Willlard, C. and Gillette, Philip S. (Eds.) Soviet Military Doctrine from Lenin to Gorbachev, 1915-
1991. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1992; Kokoshin, Andrei A. Soviet Strategic Thought, 1917-
91. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1998; Odom, William E. The Collapse of the Soviet Military. 
New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1998; Westad, Odd Arne. The Cold War: A World History. 
London: Penguin Random House, 2017. 
63 Susiluoto 2006; Peters 2016; Gerovitch, Slava. InterNyet: why the Soviet Union did not build a nationwide 
computer network. History and Technology Vol. 24, No. 4, (December 2008), 335–350; Gerovitch 2002. 
64 Sushentsov 2015; Adamsky, Dima. Through the Looking Glass: The Soviet Military-Technical Revolution 
and the American Revolution in Military Affairs. Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2 (2008), 257-294; 
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the formative years of the first Information Security Doctrine in 1997–1999.65 The 
basic premise is that the strategic cultural ideas analysed in this study were formed 
during this period so that the elites could employ them in 2000–2019. 
 
Secondly, the presidency and premiership of Vladimir Putin (2000–) was arguably a 
clear break from the somewhat chaotic period of Boris Yeltsin.66 It has been the end 
of the ‘Time of Troubles’ (or smutnoe vremia) after the collapse of the Soviet Union.67 
Thirdly, between 2000 and 2019 several changes occurred in the strategic environ-
ment in Russia, which could have affected its policies towards cyberspace, and the 
Internet.68 Fourthly, during the time-period of 2000–2019 the Russian Internet devel-
oped rapidly, was ‘tamed’, and, according to some, militarized.69 Consequently, this 
period offers a good timeframe to analyse how the changing environment has forced 
the state security and defence elites to adopt and adapt old ideas to new unknown and 
possibly threatening situations. 
 
1.3 Theory, structure and methodology 
 
This thesis belongs to the field of international relations (IR)70 and more precisely to 
the multidisciplinary field of Strategic Studies.71 The focus of Strategic Studies is the 
study of the use of force as an instrument of policy from a theoretical and practical 
                                              
Adamsky 2010; Wolfe, Audra J. Competing with the Soviets. Science, Technology, and the State in the Cold 
War America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013. 
65 Thomas 1996; Thomas, Timothy I. Russia’s information warfare structure: Understanding the roles of the 
security council, Fapsi, the state technical commission and the military, European Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 
(Spring1998), 156-172; Heickerö, Roland. Emerging Cyber Threats and Russian Views on Information Warfare 
and Information Operations. Stockholm: FOI, 2010; Soldatov & Borogan 2010; Soldatov & Borogan 2015. 
66 Sakwa, Richard. Russian Politics and Society (4th ed.) London and New York: Routledge, 2008; Lo, Bobo. 
Russia and the New World Disorder. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2015; Myers, Steven Lee. 
The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin. New York: Vintage Books, 2015; Cadier, David and 
Light, Margot. Russia’s Foreign Policy: Ideas, Domestic Politics and External Relations. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015. 
67 Blank, Stephen J. The Sacred Monster: Russia as a Foreign Policy Actor. In Stephen, Blank J. Perspectives 
on Russian Foreign Policy. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), 2012, 25-194 [Online]. Available: 
http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub1115.pdf [Accessed: 29th October 2018]. ‘Time of Troubles’ is not 
used in this thesis as an analytical concept. It refers more to a perception of time and history that actual chron-
ological events. On the concept of ‘smutnoe vremia’ cf. Kåre, Johan Mjør. Smuta: cyclical visions of history in 
contemporary Russian thought and the question of hegemony. Studies in East European Thought, No 70 
(2018), 19–40; Petersson, Bo. The eternal great power meets the recurring times of troubles: twin political 
myths in contemporary russian politics. European studies, No. 30 (2013), 301-326. 
68 Cf. Chapter 6. 
69 Soldatov 2017, 39-59; Агора. Россия. Свобода интернета 2016: на военном положении [Online]. Avail-
able: https://meduza.io/static/0001/Agora_Report_2017_Internet.pdf [Accessed: 8th August 2018]. 
70 In this thesis I use the term International Relations to denote the discipline of study of international relations 
to separate it from the object of that discipline i.e. international relations. (Cf. Dunne, Tim, Kurki, Milja and 
Smith, Steven. International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (4th ed.) Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013, v). 
71 On Strategic Studies cf. Baylis, John, Wirtz, James J. and Gray, Colin S. Strategy in the Contemporary World 
(4th ed.) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, 1-6; Mahnken, Thomas G. The Future of Strategic Studies. 
The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2003), x-xviii. 
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perspective.72 It has a close and somewhat strained relationship with security studies73, 
which takes a broader and more critical view on security issues, and to military stud-
ies74, which deals with operational and tactical issues, or pedagogical and psychological 
issues. Strategic Studies was established during the Cold War and afterwards it has 
faced extensive criticism from multiple directions. It has been accused of being amoral 
in its search for the efficient use of force, nuclear force in particularly.75 Additionally, 
it has been charged of misunderstanding the nature and character of war, of  being 
state-centric and ethno-centric, of not taking social and cultural forces and historical 
change seriously, and of being generally theoretically barren.76 This criticism has led to 
a certain amount of self-reflection and infighting between ‘strategists’ but not to the 
end of Strategic Studies.77 To be clear, Strategic Studies is not a theoretical school and 
has not produced explanative or constitutive theories in the social scientific sense.78 It 
primarily offers a conceptual framework which is based on the study of historical phe-
nomena.79 
 
I will address the shortcomings of the philosophical and theoretical side of Strategic 
Studies in Chapter 2 where I will construct a theoretical framework for this study. In 
that Chapter, I will adopt a form of ‘realist analytic pragmatism’ as my philosophical 
approach. Basically, this means that reality exists and can be studied on a case-by-case 
basis in its social and historical context and scientific truth, and generalizations are the 
                                              
72 Jordan, D., Kiras, James D. Lonsdale, David J., Speller, Ian, Tuck, Christopher, Dale, Walton. Understanding 
Modern War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 17-22. According to Robert Ayson ”[S]trategic 
studies has been focused primarily on the role of armed force in the context of security challenges that arise from 
the nature of the international system of political relations.” (Ayson, Robert. Strategic Studies. In Reus-Smith, 
Christian & Snidal, Duncan (2010): The Oxford Handbook of International Relations. Oxford University Press: 
Oxford.  558-575, 571). 
73 Vennesson, P. Is strategic studies narrow? Critical security and the misunderstood scope of strategy. Journal 
of Strategic Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3 (2017), 358 - 391; Williams, Paul D. (ed.) Security Studies: An Introduction 
(2nd ed.) New York: Routledge, 2013; Miller, Benjamin. The Concept of Security: Should it be Redefined? The 
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2 (2001), 13-42; Smith, Steve. The increasing insecurity of security 
studies: Conceptualizing security in the last twenty years, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1999, 
72-101. 
74 On Military Studies Cf. Williams, Alison J., Jenkings, Neil K., Rech, Matthew F. and Woodward, Rachel. The 
Routledge Companion to Military Research Methods. New York: Routledge, 2016. 
75 Strachan, Hew. The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective. New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2013, 41; Vennesson 2017, 359; Mahnken 2003, x. 
76 Creveld Van, M. The Transformation of War. New York: The Free Press, 1991; Keegan, J. A History of 
Warfare (2nd ed.). London: Pimlico, 2004; Kaldor, Mary. New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global 
Era (3rd edition). Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012; Hammes, T. X. The Sling and the Stone: On War 
in the 21st Century. St Paul: Zenith Press, 2006; Smith 1999. 
77 Gray, Colin S. Modern Strategy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999; Strachan, Hew and Herberg-Rothe, 
Andreas. Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009; Mahnken, Thomas 
G. and Maiolo Joseph A. Strategic Studies: A Reader, Routledge, New York, 2014; Sloan, Elinor C. Modern 
Military Strategy: An introduction. New York: Routledge, 2012; Milevski, Lucas. The Evolution of Modern 
Grand Strategic Thought, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016; Strachan 2013; Freedman, Lawrence. The 
Revolution in Strategic Affairs. The Adelphi Papers, Vol. 45, No. 379, 2006. 
78 Cf. Gray 1999; Freedman, Lawrence. Strategy: A History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013; Strachan 
2013. Caveat to this claim are the game-theoretical and rationalistic models produced by, for example, the 
RAND corporation during the Cold war. Cf. Klinger, Janeen M. Social Science and National Security Policy. 
Deterrence, Coercion, and Modernization Theories. Cham, Switzerland, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. 
79 “In this bewildering world, the search for predictive theories to guide strategy has been no more successful 
than the search for such theories in other areas of human existence.” (Murray, Williamson, Knox, MacGregor 
and Bernstein, Alvin (eds.) The Making of Strategy: Rulers, State, and War. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009, 645). 
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product of the judgement of the scientific community. Then I will introduce the neo-
classical realist (NCR) theory of IR which attempts to explain state behaviour through 
both internal and external variables. As the original version is mainly interested in ma-
terial power and foreign policy, I amend it with the ontological and epistemological 
premises of the Constructivist theory of IR. I will also add to it my own interpretation 
of the concept of strategic culture to build a theory that supports the study of ideas 
and the shaping of cyberspace by state defence and security elites for military purposes. 
Consequently, the theory will legitimize the study of cyber issues in the context of 
Russian strategic thought through the writings of scholars, or epistemic communities, 
as well as official documents such as strategies, policies and laws and news about real 
events. This is important as the Russians do not use terms with a ‘cyber’ prefix in 
official legal or policy level documents and instead use the term ‘information’. As will 
be demonstrated in Chapter 4 and 5 this terminological difference does not mean that 
the Russians would not be thinking and writing about the same objective reality. Po-
litical and intentional use of certain terms are, however, a different issue. 
 
Proceeding from my IR theoretical approach, in Chapter 3, based on previous cyber 
security and warfare scholarship, I will construct definitions for the concepts of cy-
berspace, cyber power, cyber warfare, cyber strategy, and closed national network as 
descriptions of real objects or processes. Thus, the concepts might be understood, 
created and used differently by different actors, but still have an objective, independ-
ent substance and effects. A nuclear bomb is still a nuclear bomb, and a router is still 
a router whatever we might think of them. Most importantly Chapter 3 presents a 
theory on how cyberspace is shaped through cyber power, how this shaping is a dis-
tinct way to use power, and how this way relates to the concept of strategy in the 
context of threats and the use of military force. A closed national network is one of 
the results of this kind of use cyber power, and because strategy is informed by stra-
tegic cultural ideas, all closed national networks are, by definition, different. Ulti-
mately, Chapters 2 and 3 provide answers to the subproblems from A to C. 
 
Chapter 4 introduces the strategic cultural ideas chosen for analysis in this study. It 
uses the concepts defined in Chapter 3 to interpret certain Russian terms or words as 
denoting/signifying the same real phenomena.80 The ideas have been chosen because 
they appear frequently in the current official and unofficial Russian texts which relate 
to issues which Western sources would call cyberspace, cyber power, and cyber war-
fare. They have also been noted by previous scholars and/or seem to have had tem-
poral persistency in the Russian discourse.81 Thus, through a preliminary reading of 
Russian texts and Western research on Russian information and cyber warfare and by 
observing ideas related to the Russian discourse on the developing digital society and 
economy, I have chosen a group of ideas that I argue offer a comprehensive under-
standing of the Russian thinking about cyberspace, power, warfare and strategy. This 
process has been admittedly hermeneutical and thus is not free of personal bias or 
potentially failed interpretations. The chosen ideas are interstate struggle (protivo-
                                              
80 To put it simply, terms signify concepts which indirectly relate to real world objects (Chandler, Daniel. Se-
miotics. The Basics. New York and London: Routledge, 2007, 16-17). 
81 On the concept of discourse cf. Milliken, Jennifer. The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A 
Critique of Research and Methods. European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 5, No. 2 (June 1999), 
225-254. 
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borstvo), digital sovereignty (tsifrovoi suverenitet), strategic deterrence (strate-
gicheskoe sderzhivanie), asymmetric response (asimmetrichnyi otvet), information 
superiority (informatsionnoe prevoskhodstvo), information-technological warfare 
(informatsionno-tekhnicheskaia voina/bor’ba), automated command and control sys-
tems (avtomatizirovannaia sistema upravleniia), and unified information space 
(edinnoe informatsionnoe prostranstvo). I will present the arguments for choosing 
these ideas in Chapter 4. 
 
My overall argument is that the above-presented terms have persistent historical mean-
ings attached to them. Their contemporary terms and formulations are consistently 
and often used in the texts produced by modern Russian military and civilian scholars 
and in official policy documents. It is probable that there exist other causal and prin-
cipled Russian beliefs82 on cyber issues, but I argue that I have chosen the most influ-
ential strategic cultural ones, and I claim to be able to show that the chosen ideas are 
persistent and central to interpreting how the Russians understand cyberspace and 
warfare in its context. Nevertheless, if my analysis brings forth other important ideas, 
I will acknowledge them and incorporate them into my analysis. Moreover, I am aware 
that I might miss some ideas altogether because of the way I have chosen my sources 
or conducted my analysis. There is also the possibility that the sources I use do not 
reflect genuine Russian thinking. This is not a problem because I do not strive for a 
deductive nomological causal explanation.83 Further research may well complement 
my study. I also recognize that there has been interaction between Soviet/Russian and 
foreign (such as Western or Chinese) ideas, but I shall partially set this issue aside as it 
would be a study subject of its own. However, I will note the cases where I think that 
the Russians have adopted ideas from the outside. This is critical for understanding 
how Russian ideas themselves have developed. 
 
Chapter 4 is structured around the analysis of the chosen strategic cultural ideas in the 
period of late 1950s up to the year 2000. It is based on an inductive content analysis 
in which I interpret the substance of the ideas from previous studies and primary Rus-
sian sources.84 The method used to collect the sources in Chapter 4 and 5 is based on 
the appearance of particular Cyrillic words, or English-translated versions of them, 
                                              
82 Causal beliefs are about means and ends—they provide an understanding of the world and guidelines for 
achieving goals in this context. Principled beliefs consist of values and attitudes describing right and wrong and 
proscribing appropriate behaviour. (Tannenwald, Nina. Ideas and Explanation: Advancing the Theoretical 
Agenda. Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 7, No. 2 (Spring 2005), 165–173; Tannenwald, Nina and Wohlforth, 
William C. Introduction: The Role of Ideas and the End of the Cold War. Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 7, 
No. 2 (Spring 2005), 3–12). 
83 D-N law: An explanation is only valid if it invokes a law which covers all the cases of the phenomena to be 
explained (Wight, Colin. Philosophy of Social Science and International Relations. In Carlsnaes, Walter, Risse, 
Thomas and Simmons, Beth A. (eds.) Handbook of International Relations. London: SAGE Publications, 2005, 
23-51, 41-42). 
84 Here a content analysis refers to reading sources using the terms related to the strategic cultural ideas as a 
means to discover the meanings attached to those terms. The reading involves such an amount of texts pro-
duced by certain sources designated as belonging to the subject of the study that no more new meanings are 
found, i.e. saturation is achieved. This is not a formal process involving coding or statistics—it is qualitative 
and interpretive process. In this thesis a content analysis is a method of interpretation and understanding 
through texts to gain as comprehensive understanding of an idea in its historical context as possible. 
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denoting the presence of strategic cultural ideas in primary sources or secondary stud-
ies.85 Although this is a crude method for collecting material, the over 1,000 Russian 
language sources analysed in this thesis should  provide a level of certainty that a nec-
essary limit of saturation has been achieved. During the analysis I provide the historical 
context for the ideas and provide an overview of the Soviet ‘kibernetik’ thinking from 
which many of the ideas are derived. I do not strive to achieve a historical analysis—
only a preliminary understanding of the ideas and a proof of their existence and nature 
before the 2000s. In both Chapters 4 and 5 I will present short descriptions and biog-
raphies of the institutions and writers producing the texts in footnotes, which enables 
me to make arguments about the sources of ideas and the relationship between epis-
temic communities and the elites. 
 
Chapter 5 continues the analysis of strategic cultural ideas in the period of 2000–2019. 
This chapter aims to examine what kinds of ideas were present when the Russian 
policy towards cyberspace changed after 2011 and the state began to increase its con-
trol over the national segment of the Internet. The analysis is based on an inductive 
content analysis, but it analyses a wider group of sources than in Chapter 4. It intro-
duces the Russian concept of strategic planning to help understand the process of 
making national strategy in Russia and to understand how ideas might end up as part 
of policies. Accordingly, the highest-level strategic planning documents are analysed in 
this chapter to examine the interaction of epistemic communities, ideas, and elites. 
After I have analysed the strategic cultural ideas, I present an interpretation of the 
Russian understanding of cyber power, cyberspace, cyber warfare, and strategy. This 
is an abductive86 exercise in which my theory and concepts meet my interpretation of 
Russian ideas. I then summarise the development of strategic cultural ideas and exam-
ine the composition and role of epistemic communities related to cyber and infor-
mation security issues. Chapters 4 and 5 provide answers to subproblem D and pro-
vide the basis for answering subproblem E because the interpreted substance of stra-
tegic cultural ideas is used in Chapter 6 to analyse how the ideas resonate with Russian 
policies and thus have perhaps provided reasons for adopting them. 
 
Chapter 6 provides answers to the thesis’ subproblems E and F. The Chapter is mostly 
based on an exercise of a loose process tracing87 in which I firstly follow the develop-
ments in Russia’s strategic environment between 2000 and 2019 to demonstrate that 
there was cause for a clear change in the perceptions of the defence and security elites 
                                              
85 The Cyrillic versions of the words used in the collection of material were: противоборство, цифровой 
суверенитет, стратегическое сдерживание, асимметричный ответ, информационное превосходство, ин-
формационная техническая война / борьба, автоматизированные системы управления, единое инфор-
мационное пространство and their derivatives.  There are several issues related to the translations of these 
Russian words into English and they will be discussed accordingly in the following chapters. 
86 In this thesis abduction is understood as interpreting social and material reality though interaction between 
existing theories and concepts and data to produce new understanding of a phenomenon. Cf. Chapter 2. 
87 “[Process tracing] involves the detailed study of a case to determine whether or not the hypothesized causal 
variables were present and/or reached the thresholds specified by the theory being tested; whether they were 
temporally linked (and appropriately sequenced) with any hypothesized intervening variables and the changes 
in the dependent variable that one is trying to explain; and whether there is evidence that the purported causal 
mechanism, and not other factors, actually brought about those changes.” (Ripsman, Norrin M., Taliaferro, 
Jeffrey W. and Lobell, Steven E. Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Relations. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2016, 132; Mahoney, James. Process Tracing and Historical Explanation. Security Studies, 
Vol. 24, No. 2 (2015), 200-218; Tannenwald, Nina. Process Tracing and Security Studies. Security Studies, Vol. 
24, No. 2 (2015), 219-227; Waldner, David. Process Tracing and Qualitative Causal Inference. Security Studies, 
Vol. 24, No. 2 (2015), 239-250). 
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in 2011–2014.88 A new and threatening change in Russia’s international environment 
required the ‘fitting’ of new and old strategic cultural ideas to find ways to reasonably 
answer the new challenges. This part includes an analysis based on the news, reports, 
statistics and previous studies of the development of the Russian Internet, the inter-
national system, and cyberspace as real material or social phenomena. Secondly, I will 
analyse the international treatises, strategies, policies and laws that have been formed 
by the Russian government to tackle the new security issues brought forth by the 
changes in the strategic environment. I analyse the documents in a chronological or-
der to demonstrate that they were adopted in synchronization with the changes in the 
strategic environment. Here official documents are considered to be representative of 
the will and beliefs of the elite, although their intentional political use is also noted. I 
will also take note of the different actors participating in this process of making and 
implementing strategy to better understand how Russian cyber strategy is made. I will 
limit myself to official declarations and news from established Russian sources and 
will not speculate on Russian offensive capabilities or actors. Thirdly, I will examine 
the civilian and military information systems and networks that the Russian regime is 
building or directing the private sector to build. These are approached as the practical 
results of making strategy and thus they reflect the ideas driving the strategy. I will 
use Russian news, reports, statistics, publications of various organizations and military 
journals as sources representing objective reality, although I retain a critical view of 
the declarations about the developments and the actual state of different systems. 
Fourthly, the question of how the national segment as a closed national network could 
function is answered through a synthesis of Russian and Western ideas. I will present 
a model of the Russian national segment of the Internet as a system of systems of 
information security and defence in a continuum of interstate relations in the context 
of military threats to understand how a closed national network could function. This 
cross-cultural, theoretical concept aims to make Russian strategic thinking under-
standable and offers a model or a framework to analyse other national segments. 
Moreover, this approach highlights the continuity of Russian thinking and the Soviet 
legacy it imposes upon the efforts to digitalize Russia. This is purely an abductive 
theoretical construct and it is not offered as a representation of a true object or an 
example of genuine Russian thinking. It is however an interpretive model that makes 
sense in the context of strategic, Russian, cultural ideas. It also provides a systemic 
synthesis of Russian strategic thinking instead of just listing separate laws and pro-
grams.  
 
Finally, Chapter 7 provides a summary of the thesis main findings and a conclusion. 
The main emphasis is on demonstrating how the strategic cultural ideas and Russian 
                                              
88 The research on the influence of epistemic communities starts by discovering some interesting policy change 
in the past. It then backtracks to study what kinds of communities had corresponding or competitive ideas or 
subcultures before the policy change was initiated. External events and decision-makers, as well as interpreta-
tions of and initial reactions to them are examined to understand what the policy change was a reaction to. 
Then, the way in which epistemic communities package their ideas, i.e. develop statements, is studied and how 
different statements compete on public forums, including media. This debate might take place long before the 
elites discover they have a need for a new policy. After that, the process of how the elites choose from the 
statements or subcultures available is examined through policy documents and official statements by the elite. 
The actual interaction between communities and elites might be opaque, particularly in autocracies. Conse-
quently, the implementation of a chosen policy is observed to see if it corresponds to the ideas one or another 
epistemic community had. (Libel, Tamil. Explaining the security paradigm shift: strategic culture, epistemic 
communities, and Israel’s changing national security policy. Defence Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2016), 137-156). 
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policies have interacted, facilitated by epistemic communities, over time and in a cer-
tain strategic environment to produce a national segment of the Internet as a reason-
able strategic answer to perceived challenges. I will also provide critical reflections on 
this project and its possible future as well as on the nature of closed national networks. 
Furthermore, I will discuss the broader issue of the Russian understanding of cyber-
space, power, and warfare. I will also reflect upon my own research and possible av-
enues of further research. 
 
1.4 Sources 
 
I use previous Western scientific-philosophical writings on IR, and neoclassical realist 
and constructivist IR theoretical texts, and research on strategic culture and cyber 
security and warfare in Chapters 2 and 3. The material consists mainly of monographs 
published by leading scholars and articles published in peer-reviewed IR, political sci-
ence and Strategic Studies journals.89  I have used article databases such as the EBSCO 
Military & Government Collection, JSTOR Arts & Sciences and Taylor & Francis 
Strategic, Defence & Security Studies to ensure that I have included a comprehensive 
and current scholarship on international relations, strategy, and cyber security issues 
as best as possible up to January 2019. I have added some more recent sources as they 
appeared during and after the review process of my manuscript from August to De-
cember 2019.  
 
The collection and selection of sources in both Chapters 4 and 5 is based on my 
theoretical arguments in Chapter 3, according to which there are separate although 
tightly connected epistemic communities discussing Russian policies towards cyber 
or information space.  ‘Tightly’ is a qualitative modifier indicating that many of the 
people who write publicly about cyber or information security issues have similar 
backgrounds in military or security services. I have chosen the sources listed below 
based on the premise that the members of these communities publish their ideas in a 
group of military and other journals, and that either the writers or their products reach 
the elites. I have complemented the journals with monographs published by individ-
ual writers who I have deemed to be influential, as they have either been referred to 
in other works or have held important advisory positions in the Russian government. 
Because of how I have chosen my source material I will not be able to analyse all 
communities and all ideas. For example, civilian technology experts and academicians 
publishing in regional journals are not included. Nevertheless, I claim that the material 
allows me to capture some of the most important communities and ideas possibly 
influencing the defence and security elites.90 However, it must be kept in mind that 
                                              
89 The journals include among others Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Journal of Strategic Studies, Security 
Studies, International Affairs, Survival, European Security, World Politics, Political Science Quarterly, Contem-
porary Security Policy, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, International Organization, Connections, 
Strategic Analysis, Comparative Strategy, Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists, Problems of Post-Communism, 
Baltic Defence Review, Journal of Information Warfare, International Studies Quarterly, International Security, 
European Journal of International Relations, International Studies Review, among others. 
90 My argument is based on Fitzgerald 1987a; Fitzgerald, Mary C.  Marshal Ogarkov on Modern War: 1977-
1985. Alexandria, Virginia: CNA, 1987; Thomas, Timothy. Russia – Military strategy: Impacting 21st Century 
Reform and Geopolitics. Fort Leavenworth, KS: FMSO, 2015; Thomas, Timothy. Kremlin Kontrol: Russia’s 
Political’ Military Reality. Fort Leavenworth, KS: FMSO, 2017; Adamsky 2008 & 2010; Bukkvoll 2011; Nocetti 
2015; Marten, Kimberly. The ‘KGB State’ and Russian Political and Foreign Policy Culture, Journal of Slavic 
Military Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2 (2017), 131-151; Bateman, Aaron. The Political Influence of the Russian Security 
 
20 
not much is known about the theoretical thinking of the Soviet or Russian secret 
services, and that knowledge about Soviet strategic thought is still based on testimo-
nies, declassified military journals and interviews.91 My analysis of strategic cultural 
ideas is based on strictly open and public sources. 
 
The Russian language primary source materials for Chapter 4 and 5 were initially cho-
sen by searching through the EastView Russian Military & Security Periodicals data-
base, the Russian eLibrary database and the Electronic Dissertation Library of the 
Russian State Library using key words deducted from the strategic cultural ideas.92 I 
also searched the databases of declassified Cold War era documents of the CIA and 
some others for translated secret Soviet material.93 Thus, the source material includes 
both the available basic and top-secret versions of the Military Thought journal.94 
After analysing the initial findings in the context of previous studies, the databases 
were explored again to collect the final set of source material. Lastly, this set of sources 
was complemented with sources indicated by the previous research on Russian IW 
but not found in the above-mentioned databases. A second set of sources is a collec-
tion of monographs which were chosen because they were referred to multiple times 
in the journal articles or because their writers have participated as experts on the for-
mulation of Russian cyber/information policy.95 Some articles from these same writ-
ers have also been chosen to add more depth and actuality to the quite theoretical 
monographs. Consequently, much of the source material comes from the people as-
sociated with the Russian Academy of the Military Sciences and other various military 
academies, various military research centres, and State Universities who write in the 
leading military and information security journals and who have had some connection 
                                              
Services, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3 (2014), 380-403; Skak, Mette. Russian strategic 
culture: the role of today’s chekisty. Contemporary Politics, Vol. 22, No. 3 (2016), 324-341; Soldatov & 
Borogan, 2010 & 2015; Haslam, Jonathan. Near and Distant Neighbours. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015; Garthoff, Raymond L. Soviet Leaders and Intelligence: Assessing the American Adversary During the 
Cold War. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015. 
91 The most current history of Russian secret services is a proof of this statement. Cf. Haslam 2015.  
92 Key words were: кибер*, информацион*, асимметр*, сетев*, сетецентрическ*, автоматиз*, управлени*, 
противоборств*, суверенитет* and сдерживани*. The main journals used as sources are the Bulletin of the 
Academy of Military Sciences (Вестник Академии военных наук), the Military Thought (Военная Мысль), 
the Red Star (Красная звезда), the Military Industrial Courier (Военно-промышленный курьер), the Nezavi-
simaia Gazeta - Military Review (Независимая газета - Военное обозрение), the Information wars 
(Информационные войны), the Bulletin of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (Вестник 
МГИМО) and some others.  EastView [Online]. Available: https://www.eastview.com/ [Accessed: 16th July 
2019]; Electronic Dissertation Library (Russian State Library) [Online]. Available: http://sigla.rsl.ru/ 
search.jsp?e=Cp1251&c=14i&i18n=ru&s= [Accessed: 5th December 2018]; Научная электронная 
библиотека [Online]. Available: https://elibrary.ru/defaultx.asp [Accessed: 16th July 2019]. 
93 University of Texas Libraries [Online] Available: https://guides.lib.utexas.edu/c.php?g=524005&p= 
3584595 [Accessed: 5th December 2018]; Central Intelligence Agency Library [Online]. Available: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/historical-collections [Accessed: 5th December 2018]; Wilson Cen-
ter – Digital Archive [Online]. Available: https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collection/37/end-of-the-
cold-war/2 [Accessed: 5th December 2018].  
94 Cf. Lalu, Petteri and Kivimäki, Veli-Pekka. The leading Russian Military journal Voennaia mysl’ available in 
the EastView digital database. The Finnish National Defence University Department of Warfare Series 3: 
Working Papers No. 15, 2019 [Online]. Available: https://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/173304/ 
Lalu%26Kivim%C3%A4ki_VoeannaiMysl_database_web.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [Accessed: 28th De-
cember 2019]. 
95 The writers are, among others, I. Ashmanov (И. Ашманов), A. A. Efremov (А.А. Ефремов), A. Kondrat’ev 
(А. Кондратьев), S. I. Makarenko (С. И. Макаренко), A. V. Manoilo (А.В. Манойло), I. Panarin (И. 
Панарин), S. P. Rastorgyev (С.П. Расторгуев), L. V. Savin (Л.В. Савин), A.A. Streltsov (А. А. Стрельцов), 
and V. N. Tsygichko (В.Н. Цыгичко). 
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to the defence and security elites of the Russian Federation in the time frame of 2000–
2019. The guiding principle in choosing the source material has been saturation—not 
a total and comprehensive representation—because no amount of time would be 
enough to analyse all that the Russians have written about information or cyber secu-
rity.96 The earliest of these sources are from the 1950s and the most recent from the 
late 2019. 
 
A third set of sources are the official government documents, strategies, policies and 
federal laws, of the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation.97 The documents have 
been chosen based on their place in the hierarchy of official security documents, the 
importance that previous research has given to the documents, and their relation to 
the subject of cyber or information security.98 Every strategy, policy and law from the 
period of 2000–2019 concerning the cyber or information security is included in the 
analysis.99 Some important documents from the early 2020 have also been included. 
Although speeches and statements by foreign and security policy elites could be con-
sidered a legitimate source of analysis I shall, nevertheless, omit them almost com-
pletely and concentrate on strategies, policies and laws because it is through these that 
cyberspace is shaped—through administration, planning, and resource allocation not 
so much by the statements Vladimir Putin or people around him. 
 
In Chapter 6 I will almost exclusively use previous studies or news to track the devel-
opment of the strategic environment of Russia. Previous studies quite often provide 
data on both real events and the interpretations of the Russian decision-making elite 
of the events. Furthermore, they use sources that complement the ones used in this 
study, i.e. statements of the elites, media and public opinion and economic data. 
Sources on the Russian segment of Internet and its systems consist of a multitude of 
news, reports, statistics, and statements. I will use news services such as TASS, RIA 
Novosti and Izvestiia, which could be considered non-independent, but also RBK, 
Kommersant and Vedomosti, which at least try to remain semi-independent, and 
Meduza, Novaia Gazeta and Roskomsvoboda, which are definitely critical of the Rus-
sian regime. I shall also use public statements, reports and other publications by the 
                                              
96 Journal articles or monographs based on mathematical modelling are not included in this study. I do not have 
the required competency to examine these models. In the context of the era of 2000-2018 one group that is left 
out are the private sector lobbyists with commercial interest and the second are the ‘technopeople’ i.e. engineers, 
programmers etc. The third group are the active representatives of security services and others who do not 
publicly publish their ideas but may still write memorandums etc. which affect the elites. The fourth and perhaps 
the most important group are some of the private think-tanks such as the Medvedev era liberal INSOR think 
tank and the Putin era anti-liberal Izborskii Club and forums such as the Valdai Club. I have included some 
NGOs that directly and actively engage in information security issues but have tried to otherwise avoid think 
thanks whose main audience are foreign experts and governments. (Cf. Vendil Pallin, Carolina and Oxenstierna, 
Susanne. Russian Think Tanks and Soft Power. FOI, August 2017 [Online]. Available: https://www.foi.se/ 
rapportsammanfattning?reportNo=FOI-R--4451--SE [Accessed: 5th April 2019].) 
97 A list of webpages and databases is provided at the end of the Bibliography. 
98 The main documents are the National Security Concept of 1997 and 2000, the National Security Strategies 
of 2009 and 2015, the Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation of 1993, the Military 
Doctrines of 2000, 2010 and 2014, the Foreign Policy Concepts of 2008, 2013 and 2016, and the Information 
Security Doctrine of 2000 and 2016. 
99 The Law on Strategic Planning lists the main national strategic planning documents and it has been used to 
collect the middle and lower level implementation documents analysed in Chapter 6. (Федеральный закон от 
28.06.2014 N 172-ФЗ (ред. от 31.12.2017) “О стратегическом планировании в Российской Федерации” 
[Online]. Available: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_164841/ [Accessed: 26th March 
2019]). 
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Russian military, government, institutions and private companies to investigate the 
nature of Russian information networks and systems. Throughout the thesis I make 
a conscious choice to use as many Russian-language primary sources as possible to 
offer some new substance to the Western debate on Russian cyber strategy. 
 
1.5 Research limitations and self-reflection 
 
I have already discussed some of the limitations of this thesis above. Here I will reflect 
on some more normative issues. Firstly, I am a Finnish military officer writing about 
Russian cyber strategy in the context of the threat or use of force and thus I am aware 
of my own cultural and political biases. I try offer as an objective interpretation of the 
Russian strategic cultural ideas and Russian policies as I can. Secondly, I am highly 
aware of the possible Western cultural bias inherent in IR research and theories (and 
Strategic Studies) as IR is a predominantly Northern American -Western discipline and 
its theories are very much based on interpretation of American-European history.100 
The theories of IR and Strategic Studies are induced from temporal experiences and 
might not be transferable in time. What Thucydides said about Athens and Sparta, is 
not directly translatable to the United States and Russia or China—to say nothing 
about cyberspace.101 Moreover, theories might travel poorly between cultures and to 
use Western concepts to study Russian thinking might be considered problematic. My 
argument is that we all inhabit the same reality and there is knowledge to be gained by 
comparing our understandings. Some concepts are needed to initiate this comparison. 
I choose to start this comparison from the West, and then advance to the Russian side. 
I accept that my theory and concepts might lose their connection to the material and 
social reality as time passes.102 This is in fact the case, as during the writing of this 
thesis the Russians began to adopt the term cyber into their official vocabulary. 
 
Thirdly, I have made a conscious decision not to discuss the literature on alleged Rus-
sian offensive cyber operations or information-psychological operations. This is be-
cause this study does not examine offensives or operations and concentrates on the 
defensive information-technological aspects of the Russian IW. Fourthly, I also rec-
ognize that many of the documents I analyse are part of the diplomatic and strategic 
signalling, agenda setting, and are meant for domestic audiences to legitimize the pol-
icies of the elites. Nevertheless, I approach these documents as genuine expressions 
of worldviews, beliefs, interests, and intentions. Moreover, in Chapter 6 I analyse doc-
uments which are meant for implementation, and their effects can be observed in the 
allocation of resources, making of laws, and construction of information systems and 
networks. Thus, ideas materialize. Many of the Russian scholars whose texts I analyse 
in Chapters 4 and 5 write for semi-propagandistic purposes or at least to promote 
their own interests. This does not present a problem as the thesis examines ideas 
                                              
100 Darby, Philip. A Disabling Discipline. In Reus-Smith, Christian and Snidal, Duncan. The Oxford Handbook 
of International Relations. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2010, 94-105. 
101 On the uses of Thucydides Cf. Misenheimer, Alan Greeley. Thucydides’ Other “Traps” The United States, 
China, and the Prospect of “Inevitable” War. Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, 2019. 
102 I argue that the analysis of strategy or international relations is based on pragmatic knowledge. As such, I 
acknowledge that this thesis is not only an academic effort but also an attempt to make sense of the strategic 
behaviour of the Russian Federation. I also acknowledge that my study is connected to a certain political and 
historical context, to the resurgence of great power competition in the 2010s, and as such is itself a historically 
bound endeavour. 
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about reality, not reality itself. Furthermore, I use such a large mass of sources that 
no single view becomes too prominent. However, I do acknowledge that some mili-
tary and civilian academicians have taken part in preparing national security docu-
ments and the relationship between their texts and official policies might be complex 
and political.  
 
Fifthly, many of the concepts used in the thesis are ‘essentially contested concepts’.103 
They have no agreed meaning and their definitions might carry political and cultural 
connotations. Culture is one such a contested concept as are concepts related to cy-
berspace, power and warfare.104 Thus, I try to be as precise as I can in defining and 
using these concepts. Sixthly, my qualitative and interpretive methodology based on 
the pragmatic philosophy of science makes issues about reliability moot. The validity 
of this thesis is based upon the judgement of the scientific community. Thus, as I 
proceed with my analysis, I strive to compensate for the lack of rigorous, positivistic 
method with sharp, logical and critical thinking. Finally, as the Russian project to 
shape and control its national segment of the Internet is still ongoing, this thesis will 
not provide the final word on the issue. 
                                              
103 Collier, David, Hidalgo, Fernando Daniel and Maciuceanu, Andra Olivia. Essentially contested concepts: 
Debates and applications. Journal of Political Ideologies, Vol. 11, No. 3 October 2006), 211–246. 
104 On contested nature cf. Lango, Hans-Inge. Competing academic approaches to cyber security. In Friis, 
Karsten Friis and Rinsmose, Jens (eds.) Conflict in Cyber Space. Theoretical, strategic and legal perspectives. 
New York: Routledge 2016, 7-26. 
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2  
NEOCLASSICAL REALISM AND STRATEGIC CULTURE 
 
or its loose theoretical framework, this thesis adopts a tailored version of ne-
oclassical realism (NCR), which is a school of IR. In this chapter I position 
my study in the theoretical field of IR and at the same time construct my the-
oretical framework. I start by presenting my philosophical and metatheoretical prem-
ises and then move on to examine the IR schools of realism and constructivism whose 
interaction has produced NCR as a school of IR. I then move on to examine the basic 
premises of NCR, which will form the basis of the theoretical framework of this the-
sis. I continue with an overview of the role of ideas and power in IR theory so that I 
can modify NCR for the needs of this study. Furthermore, I examine the theory of 
strategic culture so that I can draw together ideas, power and the use of force. I con-
clude this chapter by presenting a synthesis that will provide an NCR-based theoreti-
cal framework for this thesis. In the next chapter I will further develop my theoretical 
framework by introducing the key concepts of cyberspace, cyber power and cyber 
warfare. Additionally, I will integrate these concepts in the theoretical framework 
through the concept of strategy. 
 
2.1 Philosophies of sciences 
 
According to Steve Smith “The study of international relations has classically focused 
on the analysis of the causes of war and the conditions of peace.”105 The definition of 
the IR is however contested for many reasons, politics of science being not the least 
among them.106 One reason that the definition of IR is so contestable is its disciplinary 
history, which has been under a constant review for the last 30 years. Traditionally 
IR’s disciplinary history is understood through ‘debates’ between various theoretical 
positions, sometimes called ‘paradigms’ or ‘research programs.’ In some accounts 
these ‘debates’ have been seen as discourses about the scientific nature of IR, and in 
others more emphasis has been given to the historical context and to the change of 
international system or practical knowledge required by the clientele of IR.107 The 
view shared by many textbooks is that there have been at least three maybe four great 
                                              
105 Dunne, Kurki & Smith 2013, 1. 
106 Brown, Chris and Ainley, Kirsten (eds.) Understanding International Relations (3rd ed.) Palgrave Macmillan: 
New York, 2005,7; Waever, Ole. Still a discipline after all these debates? In Dunne, Tim Kurki, Milja and Smith, 
Steven. International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (4th ed.) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013, 300-321. For other views cf.  Schieder, Siegfried and Spindler, Manuela (eds.) Theories of International 
Relations. New York: Routledge, 2015; Reus-Smith, Christian and Snidal, Duncan. The Oxford Handbook of 
International Relations. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2010; Carlsnaes, Walter, Risse, Thomas and Sim-
mons, Beth A. (eds.) Handbook of International Relations. London: SAGE Publications, 2005; Burchill, Scott, 
Linklater Andrew, Devetak, Richard, Donnelly, Jack, Paterson, Matthew, Reus-Smith, Christian and True, 
Jacqui. Theories of International Relations (3rd), New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 
107 Schmidt, Brian C. On the History and Historiography of International Relations. In Carlsnaes, Risse, & 
Simmons 2005, 3-22; Schieder & Spindler 2015; Reus-Smith & 2010; Carlsnaes, Risse & Simmons 2005; 
Burchill, Linklater, Devetak, Donnelly, Paterson, Reus-Smith, C. & True 2005; Brown & Ainley 2005. 
F 
 
26 
‘debates’.108 The first two were between idealists and realists (1930–1940) and be-
tween traditionalists and behaviourists (1950–1960). The nature of their issues are 
relatively widely accepted. The third ‘debate’ (1970–1980/1990) is much more con-
troversial and has been variously described as neorealism versus neoliberalism or re-
alists versus pluralists versus Marxists109 or positivism110 versus post-positivism111 or 
rationalism112 versus reflectivism113. Clearly, there have been many simultaneous de-
bates.114 
 
What is important about the third ‘debate’ in the context of this thesis is that IR 
started to incorporate more ideas from the social sciences.115 This gave birth to, 
among other things, the field of Security Studies116 and back in the 1970s this affected 
                                              
108 Dunne, Kurki & Smith 2013; Schieder & Spindler 2015; Reus-Smith & Snidal 2010; Carlsnaes, Risse & 
Simmons 2005; Burchill et al. 2005; Brown, & Ainley 2005. It is only natural that the whole idea of ‘debates’ 
has been challenged by critical disciplinary historiography in the spirit of post-positivist self-reflection (Schmidt, 
Brian. Lessons from the Past: Reassessing the Interwar Disciplinary History of International Relations. Inter-
national Studies Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 3 (September 1998), 433-459; Katzenstein, Peter J., Keohane, Robert 
O. and Krasner, Stephen D. International Organization and the Study of World Politics. Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 
645-685). 
109 Neorealism refers to Kenneth Waltz’s structural realism and its later versions by other authors. Neoliberalism 
concentrates on the effects of international institutions on rational actors and builds on the seminal work of 
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. Realism is a name for a heterogenous collection of approaches emphasizing 
the role of states, power and the balance of power in international relations. Pluralism refers to an even wider 
collection of approaches with or without a normative agenda which emphasize the role of sub-state actors. 
Marxism in IR can be described as critical approach to the current (capitalist) world-order. (Cf. Dunne, Kurki 
& Smith, 2015). 
110 “(a) ‘a commitment to unified view of science, and the adoption of methodologies of the natural sciences to 
explain the social world’; (b) ‘the view that there is a distinction between facts and values, and, moreover, that 
”facts” are theory neutral’; (c) ‘a powerful belief in the existence of regularities in the social as well as the natural 
world. This, of course, licenses both “deductive-nomological” and the “inductive statistical” forms of covering 
law explanation’; and (d) ‘a tremendous reliance on the belief that it is empirical validation or falsification that 
is the hallmark or ”real” enquiry’”. (Adler, Emmanuel. Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World 
Politics. European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1997), 319-363, 348-349) Also cf. Smith, 
Steve. Positivism and Beyond. In Smith, Steve, Booth, Ken, and Zalewski, Marysia: International theory: Posi-
tivism and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 11-44). According to Wight, Positivism is 
based on the following premises 1) Phenomenalism (appearances, not realities, are the only objects of 
knowledge) 2) Nominalism (there is no objective meaning to the words we use) 3) Cognitivism (value judge-
ments and normative statements have no cognitive value) 4) Naturalism (unity of scientific method i.e. social 
sciences do not differ from natural sciences). (Wight 2005, 41-42). 
111 An approach that “rejects the possibility of a science of international relations which uses standards of proof 
associated with the physical sciences to develop equivalent levels of explanatory precision and predictive cer-
tainty.” (Burchill et al. 2005, 2). 
112 “…conscious goal-seeking agents pursuing their interests within an external environment characterized by 
anarchy and the power of other states.” (Adler 1997, 348.) 
113 “[Reflectivists] … stress the role of impersonal social forces as well as the impact of cultural practices, norms, 
and values that are not derived from a calculation of interest.” (Wight 2005, 23-51, 39). 
114 Ole Weaver has provided perhaps the most detailed and empiricist accounts of the debates. (Waever, Ole. 
The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European Developments in International 
Relations, International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, Autumn, 1998, 687-727; Waever 2013. Katzenstein and 
Sil have proposed a divide between positivism (inductive and deductive reasoning) and subjectivism (interpre-
tation) and pragmatism (context bound consensus-based knowledge) (Katzenstein, Peter and Sil, Rudra. Eclec-
tic Theorizing in the Study and Practice of International Relations. In Reus-Smith & Snidal 2010, 109-130.) On 
debates Cf. Katzenstein, Keohane & Krasner 1998. 
115 For the role of sociology in the development of IR cf. Lawson, George and Shilliam, Robbie. Sociology and 
international relations: legacies and prospects. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 1, 2010, 
69-86. 
116 Buzan, Barry. People, States and Fear: An agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era. 
Colchester: ECPR Press, 2007; Buzan, Barry, Wæver, Ole and de Wilde, Jaap: Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis. London: Lynne Rienne Publishers inc., 1998; Buzan, Barry. ‘Change and insecurity’ reconsidered. 
Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 20, No.3, 1999, 1-17; Smith 1999; Williams 2013. 
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the then heavily rationalistic and materialistic Strategic Studies by introducing the con-
cept of strategic culture.117 It also gave birth to the school of constructivism which 
has challenged (neo)realism’s authority on the questions of power and the use of force 
in international relations. This has forced realists to refine their theories and has led 
to the development of the neoclassical realist school. Additionally, the third ‘debate’ 
made understanding or interpretivism a legitimate epistemological approach in IR—
although what was exactly meant by it has been debated ever since.118 All in all, the 
third ‘debate’ produced many of the theoretical ideas applied in this thesis. 
 
The debates have not ended. Some accounts link a part of the third ‘debate’ to the 
fourth one beginning in the 1990s, and some consider the fourth ‘debate’ to be based 
on the convergence of IR and social theory characterized by ‘the cultural turn’119, ‘the 
practice turn’120, and ‘the pragmatic turn’.121 The debate has been framed by a philo-
sophical disciplinary reflections and has led to the fragmentation of the field.122 In 
this context, Patrick Jackson and Daniel Nexus argue that because IR theories are not 
incommensurable they should be viewed as alternative ‘cuts’ or ‘ideal types’ of the 
object that is studied.123 
 
Discussions about the philosophy of science were already strongly present in IR dur-
ing the 1990s and have continued up until this day.124 This is understandable because 
IR is interested in the social reality, which is arguably a complex entity because of the 
varied and changing nature of social objects and their relations. It is also full of un-
observable aspects—including its main objects of study: states, norms, power and the 
international system itself. The main points of the debate can be summarized by ask-
ing: Is there a reality? What kind of reality is it? What can be known about this reality? 
How can we gain that knowledge? and what kind of methods should be used for 
                                              
117 Snyder, Jack L. The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations. R-2154-AF. 
Santa Monica, RAND corporation, 1977 [Online]. Available: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/ 
pubs/reports/2005/R2154.pdf. Accessed: 28 May 2018; Strachan 2013, 136-137. 
118 The distinction between explaining and understanding was first introduced to IR by Martin Smith and Steve 
Hollis (Smith & Hollis 1991). Their views have been criticized, for example, by Colin Wight who argues that 
the separation of explaining and understanding has no basis in the philosophy of science (Wight 2005, 23-51). 
119 Michael Desch has argued that there have been at least three cultural turns or ‘waves’ in IR studies. In 1998 
he predicted that the current third wave will fail to supplant Realism. Desch, Michael C. Culture Clash. As-
sessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies. International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), 141-
170. 
120 “In seeing ‘practices’ as the stuff that drives the world and makes it ‘hang together’, the everyday practices 
of diplomats, terrorists, environmentalists, or financial analysts become the object of investigation.” Bueger, 
Christian and Gadinger, Frank. The Play of International Practice. International Studies Quarterly Vol. 59, No. 
3 (2015), 449-460, 449. 
121 Schieder & Spindler 2015, 4-9. 
122 Reus-Smith & Snidal 2010, 32; Katzenstein & Sil 2010; Kurki, Milja and Wight, Colin. International Relations 
and Social Science. In Dunne, T., Kurki, M. and Smith, S. International Relations Theories: Discipline and 
Diversity (4th ed.) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, 14-35. 
123 Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus and Nexon, Daniel H. Paradigmatic Faults in International-Relations Theory. 
International Studies Quarterly Vol. 53, No. 4, (December 2009), 907-930. This view is also reflected in the 
approach taken in Strategic Studies at the Finnish National Defence University (Sivonen, Pekka. Suomalaisia 
näkökulmia strategian tutkimukseen [Finnish approaches to Strategic Studies]. Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, Jul-
kaisusarja 1: Strategian tutkimuksia No. 33. Tampere: Juvenes Print, 2013). 
124 For a discussion about this in the context of political science cf. Gunnell, John G. Realizing Theory: The 
Philosophy of Science Revisited. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 57, No. 4 (November 1995), 923-940; Jonathan, 
Joseph and Wight, Colin (eds.) Scientific Realism and International Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010; 
Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. The conduct of inquiry in International Relations: philosophy of science and its 
implications for the study of world politics. London and New York: Routledge, 2011. 
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gaining knowledge? In the context of these debates, my thesis positions itself in the 
middle-ground between realism, pragmatism and practise theory. 
 
Realism as a philosophy of science is understood in IR either as Alexander Wendt’s 
Scientific Realism or Critical Realism advocated, for example, by Heikki Patomäki, 
Milja Kurki, Jonathan Joseph and Colin Wight.125 Highly simplified basic premises of 
realism are that there is a material and social reality independent of the mind, and that 
we can have theories about this reality, study it through observation, but positivistic 
causality126 is refuted.127 Some versions of realism propose elaborate theories about 
the structure and mechanisms of reality—the nature of which can be observed though 
events etc. The critical version highlights these structures as a form of power and has 
an openly emancipatory nature.128 However, to avoid determinism, Emmanuel Adler 
has argued that realism accepts ‘emergent’ properties of structures and mecha-
nisms.129 This basically means that social reality changes over time and we have to 
adapt our theories to it and thus cannot have universal explanative theories about 
social reality.130 
 
Pragmatism131 is a counter reaction to Marxist and overtly theoretical critical realism. 
It has been offered as a via media between rationalism/positivism and relativism.132 
Pragmatism has converged with ‘the practice turn’ which seeks to overcome, among 
other things, the agency – structure dichotomy133 by introducing practices as an object 
of analysis. These developments cross-cut almost all schools of IR and there have 
been hopes that a synthesis of pragmatism and practice theory could provide IR with 
                                              
125 Wendt, Alexander. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; 
Chernoff, Fred. Scientific Realism as a Meta-Theory of International Politics. International Studies Quarterly, 
Vol. 46, No. 2, (June 2002), 189-207; Patomaki, Heikki and Wight, Colin. After Post-positivism? The Promises 
of Critical Realism. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Jun. 2000), 213-237; Jackson 2011, xiv. 
126 According to Wight this is based on the D-N law, i.e. an explanation is only valid if it invokes a law which 
covers all the cases of the phenomena to be explained (Wight 2005, 41-42). Cf. also Wendt 1999, 79. 
127 Wight 2005; Jonathan & Wight 2010; Jackson 2011. 
128 Archer, Margaret, Roy Bhaskar, Andrew Collier, Tony, Lawson and Alan Norrie (eds.) Critical Realism: 
Essential Readings. London and New York: Routledge, 1998; Nash, Roy. Explanation and quantification in 
educational research: the arguments of critical and scientific realism. British Educational Research Journal, Vol. 
31, No. 2, (April 2005), 185-204; Patomäki & Wight 2000, 223. 
129 Cooper, Luke. Can contingency be ‘internalized’ into the bounds of theory? Critical realism, the philosophy 
of internal relations and the solution of ‘uneven and combined development’, Cambridge Review of Interna-
tional Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 3 (2013), 573-597. 
130 Kurki & Wight 2013, 28-29. 
131 Pragmatism has been claimed as ‘the American philosophy’. Although, it has gained renewed popularity at 
the beginning of 2000s, it was already applied in IR in the first half of the 1990s. Kaag, John and Kreps, Sarah. 
Pragmatism’s contributions to international relations, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 25, 
No.2, 2012, 191-208; Hamati-Ataya, Inanna. Beyond (Post)Positivism: The Missed Promises of Systemic Prag-
matism. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 2 (June 2012), 291-305. 
132 Hellman, Gunther (ed.) Pragmatism and International Relations. International Studies Review, Vol. 11, No. 
3 (September 2009), 638–662; Pratt, Simon. Pragmatism as Ontology, Not (Just) Epistemology: Exploring the 
Full Horizon of Pragmatism as an Approach to IR Theory. International Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Sep-
tember 2016) 508–527. 
133 This dichotomy refers to the relationship between structure and agent, i.e. which causes or constitutes which? 
“The agent-structure problem then, is concerned with the relationship between active and self-reflecting agents 
and the structural context in which their activity takes place.” (Wight 2005, 24). Also cf. Wight, Colin. Agents, 
Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006; 
Banerjee, Sanjoy. Rules, Agency, and International Structuration. International Studies Review, Vol. 17, No. 2 
(June 2015), 274–297; Knafo, Samuel. Critical approaches and the legacy of the agent/structure debate in in-
ternational relations. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 3, (September 2010), 493-516). 
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a new, unified path in the future.134 The basic, yet again highly simplified, premises of 
pragmatism are: There is truth but it is context-bound, i.e. knowledge is situated; the-
ory must be adapted to the reality it is describing; knowledge is achieved through 
academic consensus otherwise called the consensus theory; and the relationship of 
agents and structures is not a priori postulated.135 Friedrichs and Kratochwil have 
proposed the ideas of a theory synthesis136, analytic eclecticism137, and abduction138 
as pragmatic methods of research. They also make a point about the importance of 
‘triple hermeneutics’ in pragmatic research, involving: understanding human practice, 
the reflexivity of intersubjective rationalizations of the practitioners, and taking a crit-
ical approach to the concepts researchers themselves use.139 Pragmatism has enjoyed 
increasing popularity in IR theorizing, but IR has also been criticized for a free-handed 
application of pragmatism’s philosophical foundations.140 Although pragmatism 
seems to share many similarities with realism(s) there are some differences which 
seem to be about the status of ‘unobservable’ entities and causal mechanisms.141  
However, because both theories acknowledge the ideal and material nature of ‘social 
reality’ it could be argued that what the differences boil down to is what kind of claims 
we can make before doing research and how comprehensively we can make them, 
whether we should study actions and experiences or structures and power,  and what 
kind of universalist claims we can make about our findings. As Patrick Jackson has 
argued, the differences between IR approaches are methodological.142 Thus, from a 
pragmatist point of view it is quite possible to adopt a scientific or critical realist on-
tology if the case under study so requires. The philosophical premises of the theory 
of this thesis are thus realist but analytically eclectic. 
 
In the context of the ‘third/fourth debate’ discussions about pragmatism and scien-
tific realism have mainly stayed on the metatheoretical level. On a more concrete level 
‘Practice theory’ has been proposed as one way to move forward. It tries to step 
                                              
134 Adler, Emanuel and Vincent Pouliot. International practices. International Theory, Vol. 3 No. 1 (February 
2011), 1-36. 
135 Jackson & Nexon 2009; Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. Situated Creativity, or, the Cash Value of a Pragmatist 
Wager for IR. In Hellman 2009, 656-659; Friedrichs, J. and Kratochwil, F. On Acting and Knowing: How 
Pragmatism Can Advance International Relations Research and Methodology. International Organization, Vol. 
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Kratochwil 2009, 723-724). According to Katzenstein and Sil, analytic eclecticism means the problem-based 
application of different theories and methods, combining them creatively—not using the same theories and 
methods as the criteria for the accumulation of knowledge (Katzenstein & Sil 2010; Sil, Rudra. Simplifying 
Pragmatism: From Social Theory to Problem-driven Eclecticism. In Hellman 2009, 648-652). 
138 “We therefore start collecting pertinent observations and, at the same time, applying concepts from existing 
fields of our knowledge. Instead of trying to impose an abstract theoretical template (deduction) or “simply” 
inferring propositions from facts (induction), we start reasoning at an intermediate level (abduction).” (Frie-
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139 Friedrichs & Kratochwil 2009. 
140 On recent theoretical efforts cf. Bauer, Harry and Brighi, Elisabetta (eds.) Pragmatism in International Re-
lations. Oxon: Routledge, 2009; Ralston, Shane J. (ed.) Philosophical Pragmatism and International Relations. 
Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2013; Pratt 2016. 
141 Cf. Patomäki & Wight 2000; Kurki & Wight 2013; Wight 2005; Kratochwil, Friedrich. Of False Promises 
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142 Jackson 2011. 
 
30 
around the agent vs. structure debate and proposes practices as an object of study.143 
According to Emmanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot practices are characterized by 
“the patterned nature of deeds in socially organized contexts.”144 They depend on 
reflexive, normative, and instrumental judgments. Practices are political processes that 
occur between communities, and they can be studied as intervening variables in the 
constitution of strategic interaction. Although agents and structures are persistent, 
practices are introduced to explain why states act as they do—practice precedes so-
cialization.145 Christian Bueger and Frank Gadinger divide Practice theory into critical 
continental and American pragmatist versions. The critical version concentrates on 
power and domination, that is, stability, regularity and reproduction of power, and the 
pragmatist version on continuous stream of acts without end i.e. situations, contin-
gency, creativity, and change.146 The importance of Practice theory for this thesis is in 
that it highlights the process of strategy making which I will return to below. 
 
Before summarizing my philosophical scientific position, it is important to note the 
discussion on the normative characteristics of IR theory. Firstly, there is the uneasy 
possibility that researchers choose their theories based on ideology—that the way we 
scientifically approach international relations is based on political beliefs.147 Secondly, 
it has been argued that many academics have flown ‘too close to the sun’, i.e. that the 
practical policy needs they have tried to serve have affected their research, or that 
their theorizing has been somehow amoral.148 And thirdly, it is now widely accepted 
that IR is characterized by American/Western intellectual hegemony and insularity.149 
However, the claim that a more pluralistic, inclusive and regionalist IR would be 
somehow superior is suspect.150 If ‘Western exceptionalism’ is replaced by ‘Russian 
exceptionalism’ based on a politically motivated ontology and relativistic epistemol-
ogy then locally produced knowledge does not advance IR as a global discipline.151 
This is the main reason I do not apply Russian theories in my thesis. Although I 
subscribe to interpretivist epistemology, I believe that by using the so-called Western 
theories and by writing in English I expose my research to a wider audience, and 
through that to a more comprehensive criticism of the scientific community. 
 
Because this thesis approaches social phenomena, such as power, states and their en-
vironment and cyberspace as a priori real, I subscribe to the realist philosophy of 
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science.  Nevertheless, I do not claim that these phenomena are unchanging or that 
they can be a priori objectively known to be true. They must be understood in the 
context of time and place through the interpretation of meanings given to them by 
social actors. Although knowledge about the social is fleeting, it does not mean we 
should not make claims about it. We must accept that these conceptual and theoretical 
claims are contextual and related to specific cases and based on the knowledge that is 
currently available. Therefore, my approach is based on a synthesis of pragmatism, 
scientific and critical realism and practice theory. Realism provides the basis for mak-
ing a priori, ontological, theoretical assumptions about social reality but does not pro-
vide any practical views on methodology. Pragmatism provides a beneficial approach 
to theory-building and methodology which is based on abduction, problem-based 
theory synthesis and analytic eclecticism but is silent about ontology. It also empha-
sises the study of specific cases and unique outcomes the generalization of which is a 
result of the judgement scientific community. Both accept similar kinds of scientific 
explanations—claims about social reality in a specific context.152 Practice theory pro-
vides an approach for studying the role of ideas in a social process that affects both 
the structure and the actors. It helps me to bring different schools of IR and Strategic 
Studies together. What these philosophical choices mean in the framework of this 
thesis is that I can claim that both Western and Russian concepts are representations 
related to the same reality and can be compared and used to examine that reality in a 
specific context.153 In conclusion, I resort to throwing one more ‘philosophical hand 
grenade’154 and claim to be a realist analytic pragmatist.155 To add some more ‘shrap-
nel’ to this grenade I also incorporate elements of Practice theory in my own theory 
through the concept of ‘making of strategy’ as will be shown in this and subsequent 
chapters. I will now continue to examine the IR schools of realism and constructivism 
to legitimize the theoretical part of my research question: why power matters and why 
ideas are important. 
  
2.2 Realism and constructivism 
 
The roots of the realist school can be traced either to a line of premodern political 
thinkers or to the first debate in IR in the 1930-1940s between idealists and realists—
the first party were named idealists by the self-declared realists. Realism has gone 
through multiple phases and has branched into various distinct theories and schools 
which share some common basic assumptions which can be distinguished from each 
other, for example, by their chosen level-of-analysis and ontological assumptions 
about the agent-structure relationship.156 For example, classical realists are interested 
in state action and usually find causes from the subunit level, whereas neorealists or 
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structuralists examine the international system and explain state actions based on the 
structure of the international system.157 Realism has been defined, mainly by its critics, 
to consists of the following theoretical assumptions: instrumentally rational158 unitary 
states are the most important actors in international relations; the main interest of 
states is power because international relations are characterised by anarchy, self-help 
and thus a struggle for power and survival; and power is material and thus a relative 
resource.159 One important concept of realism is balancing, which refers to the way 
great powers try to match their power with other great powers either by acquiring more 
power or through alliances.160 Balancing is difficult because states are faced with ‘the 
security dilemma’.161  
 
Realism is, in principle, based on materialism162 and positivism, which has been a 
source of substantial criticism since the 1980s. It has also, unsurprisingly, been unable 
to produce a theory that manages to generally and universally explain international 
relations even if some of its versions have adopted elements of other theories—a 
source of further criticism.163 Constructivists, for example, have criticized realism for 
not taking the effects of ideas seriously or for smuggling ideas into their theories to 
explain inconvenient outcomes.164 Some of this criticism is a bit unfair, because there 
is no ‘monolithic’ realist school.165 It is easy to construct some simplified version of 
                                              
157 Narizny, Kevin. On Systemic Paradigms and Domestic Politics: A Critique of the Newest Realism. Interna-
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realism and argue against it. In fact, realists do not agree amongst themselves on the 
sources of conflict in international systems, on how states assess one another’s inten-
tions and promote security for themselves, or even on the likelihood and causes of 
major wars.166 The constant criticism has led to some self-reflection and historicism 
by realists.167 Additionally, by drawing on classical realism, realists have tried to fix the 
perceived problems of Structuralist theories and to build some kind of synthesis.168 
NCR can be considered such a synthesis, although it is primarily a theory of foreign 
policy.169 
 
The main challenger of realism has been constructivism which has also affected the 
development of neoclassical realism.170 Constructivism developed in IR as a criticism 
of positivist, structuralist, rationalist and materialist theories in the 1980s and drew its 
inspiration from sources such as sociology and the English school.171 Constructivism 
used its novel approach to study such phenomena as intersubjective172 meaning in 
world politics, social norms, rules, and discourse173, and the co-constitution of agents 
and structures174.175 This process divided Constructivist into diverse groups some-
times called ‘conventionalist’, ‘critical’, and ‘postmodern.’ Many of the groups are def-
initely anti-realist, anti-foundational and critical.176 
 
Because of this multiplicity, constructivism has been called “a theoretically informed 
approach” instead of a theory or school and its core features have been defined by 
John Ruggie as follows: “…the building blocks of international reality are ideational 
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172 “…occupying a public space external to the individual minds of the participants but not therefore independ-
ent of all minds in general.” (Jackson 2011, 129. 
173 This can mean either the analysis of communication through speech or writing as a system of signs etc.  or 
the analysis of discursive practices as process producing social reality. (Chandler, 2007). 
174 This view is based on Anthony Giddens’s concept of structuration. Social structures are temporally and 
spatially persistent social practices (re)created by those same practices. Transformation of structures is possible 
at the macrolevel when time and space start to move and emergent phenomena transpire. (Giddens, Anthony. 
The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984).  
175 McCourt, David M. Practice Theory and Relationalism as the New Constructivism. International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 3 (September 2016), 475-485. 
176 Katzenstein, Keohane, & Krasner 1998; Weber, Cynthia. International Relations Theory: A Critical Intro-
duction. London: Routledge, 2013; Kratochwil, Friedrich. Sociological Approaches. In Reus-Smith & Snidal 
2010, 444-461; Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. Competing Paradigms or Birds of a Feather? Constructivism and Ne-
oliberal Institutionalism Compared. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 1 (March 2000), 97-119. 
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as well as material; the ideational factors have normative as well as instrumental di-
mensions; that they express not only individual but also collective intentionality; and 
that the meaning and significance of ideational factors are not independent of time and 
place.”177 Another proponent of constructivism, Emmanuel Adler, has defined it as 
“…the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by 
human action and interaction depends on dynamic and epistemic interpretations of 
the material world.”178 Accordingly, both the social reality and knowledge about it are 
constructed. This view does not dispute the reality of the material world. It only claims 
that the material world holds meaning for human action through collective and inter-
subjective understandings—this understanding enables objects to become agents and 
act in a meaningful way.179 Constructivism thus focuses on the social construction of 
international politics.180 
 
Constructivism has its own theoretical and especially methodological problems. 
These include the inability to devise empirical solutions to the study of the mutual 
constitution of agents and structure; the underdevelopment of constitutive explana-
tions—and therefore the tendency to turn to causal explanations; and the ambivalent 
nature of agency which is related to choices in the level and unit of analysis, and how 
to explain rationalism.181 Despite these problems constructivism has been extended 
to the examination of national security issues and has contributed to the opening up 
of the ‘black-box’ of state. It has provided concepts and theories for studying state 
actions based on internal attributes and the processes of states such as culture182, 
norms183, identities184, and interests.185 
 
Norms have been one of the main interests of Constructivist research. The basic ques-
tions have been how states’ identities and interests are constituted by international 
norms, how international norms come into being in the first place186, and why some 
                                              
177 Ruggie 1998, 879. For another summary cf. Hurd 2010; Fierke, K. M. Constructivism. In Dunne, Kurki & 
Smith 2013, 161-178; Reus-Smith 2005. 
178 Adler 1997, 322. 
179 Adler 1997 & 2005. 
180 Barkin, Samuel J. Realist Constructivism. International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 2003), 
325–342, 326. The most famous example is Alexander Wendt’s social theory of international relations (Wendt 
1999).  
181 Adler 2005; McCourt 2016. 
182 For Katzenstein et al. culture is an environment which consists of constitutive and regulatory norms which 
prescribe and proscribe behaviour and describe how to behave (Katzenstein 1996, 54). 
183 Björkdahl has provided a good summary on Constructivist research on norms: “From a constructivist per-
spective, norms are generally considered as a set of intersubjective understandings and collective expectations 
regarding the proper behaviour of states and other actors in a given context or identity. Norms entail a collective 
evaluation and future expectations of behaviour in terms of what ought to be done.” (Björkdahl, Annika. 
Norms in International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological Reflections. Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 1, (June 2002), 9-23, 15). 
184 Wendt defines state identity as: “…a property of intentional actors that generates motivational and behav-
ioral dispositions.” (Wendt 1999, 224). 
185 Katzenstein 1996. According to Adler: “…national interests are intersubjective understandings about what 
it takes to advance power, influence and wealth, that survive the political process, given the distribution of 
power and knowledge in a society. In other words, national interests are facts whose ‘objectivity’ relies on 
human agreement and the collective assignment of meaning and function to physical objects.” Adler 1997, 337. 
186 Anna Björkdahl has presented the following “mechanism” for the birth of norms: Social practices (interna-
tional interaction based on cultural knowledge), demand and supply (perceived needs, exogenous shocks, policy 
failures – supply from interest groups), domestic norms (socialisation and internalisation). (Björkdahl 2002). 
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ideas become norms and others do not.187 The effect of norms is important because 
they are constitutive parts of the social structure of the international system. i.e. struc-
ture and are thus part of the explanation of how agents and structures are mutually 
constitutive188—one explanation being that states become socialized to norms.189 
Through norms, Constructivism has challenged realism’s assumption about the ra-
tionality of states because the ex-ante objective nature of rationality and interests has 
been challenged. The point is that state rationality is context bound and only through 
an interpretive approach can state preferences190 be discovered and examined in rela-
tion to behaviour.191 As Barkin and other Constructivists have claimed, interests are 
socially constructed so their content is a context-bound empirical question.192 There 
might be other interests also such as economic well-being and self-esteem. 
 
Epistemologically and methodologically constructivism concentrates on language as 
it is the bridge between the reality and the mind. This calls for interpretation or, what 
John Ruggie has described as understanding the meanings subjects give to phenom-
ena. This occurs firstly by understanding actions from the vantage point of the actor, 
secondly, explaining the act in the context of social practice recognized by a relevant 
social collective, and thirdly, by producing explanations.193 These explanations are 
usually constitutive, that is “X is a Y in context C” where C represents ideas, norms, 
identities etc. C also provides reasons as causes.194 As Adler has argued, “doing some-
thing for reasons means applying an understanding of “what is called for” in a given 
set of circumstances’ […] norms and rules socially constitute the cause.’”195 This 
means that all behaviour must be understood from the actor’s point of view and put 
into a historical and intersubjective context to generate any explanation for it.196 On 
a methodological level this has led to calls for abduction (or some variant of it) instead 
                                              
187 Cf. Checkel, Jeffrey. The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory. World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 
2 (January 1998), 324-348; March, James G.  and Olsen, Johan P. The Institutional Dynamics of International 
Political Orders. International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), 943–969. 
188 Checkel, Jeffrey. Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe. International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 1 (March 1999), 83-114; Checkel, Jeffrey. Social Learning and European Identity 
Change. International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 3 (Summer 2001), 553-588; Zürn, Michael and Checkel, Jef-
frey T. Getting Socialized to Build Bridges: Constructivism and Rationalism, Europe and the Nation State. 
International Organization, Vol. 59, No. 4 (October 2005), 1045-1079. 
189 Zürn & Checkel 2005. 
190 Preferences are ranked dispositions to outcomes. Usually referred from behaviour which is tautologically 
problematic. They reflect the self-interest of the actor— the best and probable ways to achieve ‘satisfaction’. 
(Yee, Albert S. Thick Rationality and the Missing “Brute Fact”. The Limits of Rationalist Incorporations of 
Norms and Ideas. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 59, No. 4 (November 1997), 1001-1039). 
191 “…an analysis of interpretation and intersubjectivity can mitigate some of the anomalies and problems of 
thin rationality by illuminating the sources of actors’ preferences. Instead of problematically assuming that 
preferences are given, analysts can ascertain the actual preferences of actors, prior to undertaking rational choice 
modelling, by examining their cultural ideas and beliefs.” (Yee 1997, 1029-1030). 
192 Barkin, Samuel J. Realist constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, 70-71. 
193 Ruggie 1998. Hollis and Smith introduced the concepts of explaining and understanding to IR. Understand-
ing referred to Weberian hermeneutics, i.e. understanding from the inside. (Hollis, Martin and Smith, Steve. 
Explaining and Understanding International Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990; Patomäki & Wight, 
2000). 
194 Banerjee 2015, 278-279. 
195 Adler 2005, 329. On reasons as causes cf. Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. Civilizing the Enemy: German Recon-
struction and the Invention of the West. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2006; Hall, Ian. What Causes 
What: The Ontologies of Critical Realism (Review). International Studies Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 
2009), 629–630; Kurki, Milja. Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
196 Kratochwil 2010. Cf. Fierke on criticism on this (Fierke 2013). 
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of induction or deduction.197 Abduction has been given many definitions in IR the-
ory.198 In this thesis it is understood to mean interpreting social and material reality 
though the interaction between existing theories and concepts and data to produce a 
new understanding of a phenomenon. There is no testing or positivistic explanation 
involved, although hypotheses are possible as a form of preliminary understanding. 
Abductive reasoning combined with realist ontology is not without its pitfalls as con-
cepts used in abduction lead to reification of social reality and chronocentrism. This 
can only be overcome through categories induced from historical analysis.199 
 
Despite their differences, some forms of realism and constructivism can be combined. 
Both accept that ideas matter on the level of state foreign policy—the difference is by 
how much.200 Samuel Barkin has in fact proposed that constructivism and classical 
realism can be combined into a realist constructivism.201 One of the main assumptions 
of Barkin’s theory is that foreign policy is the use of power by agents to effectively and 
intentionally reconstitute social structure. The agency’s relationship to the structure is 
always positional and situational, which means that rationality is contextual. For Barkin 
national interest is an issue-specific social purpose, held by the foreign policy elite, and 
it is a reason for action. There can be multiple national interests and they consist of 
collective ideas.202 The elite is intentional and reflexive, so it is capable of strategic 
action. This view is supported by James Gow who draws on Barkin’s ideas and argues 
that the necessity for security is based on both material and social needs.203 I find Bar-
kin’s approach to power as an intentional reconstitution of social structure to be help-
ful.204 It provides tools for bringing neoclassical realism closer to constructivism and 
legitimizes the emphasise of ideas as reasons for strategy, or in other words, for utiliz-
ing power. After I have reviewed the theory of neoclassical realism, I shall return to 
this synthesis. 
 
2.3 Neoclassical realism 
 
In contrast to Neorealism and much of Constructivist theory, NCR is a theory of 
foreign policy. It tries to explain foreign policy behaviour of states and system-level 
                                              
197 Here induction and deduction refer to modes of reasoning. (Blagden, David. Induction and Deduction in 
International Relations. Squaring the Circle Between Theory and Evidence. International Studies Review, Vol. 
18, No. 1 (June 2016), 195-213) 
198 Ruggie 1998. 
199 Lapointe, Thierry and Dufour, Frédérick Guillaume. Assessing the historical turn in IR: an anatomy of 
second wave historical sociology. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 25, No.1 (March 2012), 97-
121. 
200 Cf. Twomey, Christopher P. Lacunae in the Study of Culture in International Security. Contemporary Secu-
rity Policy, Vol. 29, No. 2, (August 2008), 338-357, 52; Gray, Colin S. Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for 
Strategic Culture. Comparative Strategy, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2007), 1-20. 
201 Barkin 2010. 
202 Ibid., 66-71. 
203 Gow, James. The Essence of Strategy: Constructivist realism and necessity. In Wilkinson & Gow 2017, 259-
278. 
204 Samuel Barkin’s ideas have been criticized, for example, by Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus and Nexon, Daniel 
H. Constructivist Realism or Realist Constructivism. International Studies Review Vol. 6, No. 2, 2004, 337-352; 
Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. Realist-Constructivism and Morality. International Studies Review Vol. 6, No. 2 
(2004), 337-352; Mattern, Janice Bially. Power in Realist Constructivist Research. International Studies Review 
Vol. 6, No. 2 (2004), 337-352. 
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outcomes based on both structure and unit-level variables. Thus, NCR relies on for-
eign policy analysis (FPA)205 for some of its premises. Walter Carlsnaes has described 
FPA’s unit of analysis as those goal-directed actions pursued by governmental repre-
sentatives acting on the behalf of their sovereign communities which are directed to-
ward external actors or objectives.206 Concurrently, state action is the action taken by 
state foreign policy decision-makers, so, from the analytic point of view, they are the 
state.207 However, FPA is quite ambivalent about the level of analysis at which these 
decisions are analysed. It could be in the minds of decision-makers, or it may concern 
domestic politics or state relations.208 NCR tries to square this circle by incorporating 
them all and then distancing itself from FPA to become a full-blown theory of IR. 
 
The term ‘neoclassical realism’ was coined by Gideon Rose in a review article.209 Ac-
cording to him NCR: “…explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables, 
updating and systematizing certain insights drawn from classical realist thought. Its 
adherents argue that the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven 
first and fore most by its place in the international system and specifically by its rela-
tive material power capabilities. This is why they are realist. They argue further, how-
ever, that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and com-
plex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at 
the unit level. This is why they are neoclassical.”210 According to Rose, NCR theory 
accepts an international system based on anarchy and the distribution of power but 
assumes that states do not have full knowledge of this system. States themselves are 
differentiated internally based on their political system, culture, power resources etc. 
The theory’s causal logic follows from independent systemic variables which are in-
fluenced by the state’s internal intervening variables to explain foreign policy as the 
dependent variable. Because the theory is realist, power is a central concept. This is 
understood in terms of material capacity or resources and it is used “to control and 
shape their the external environment.”211 How the structural incentives based on 
power distribution are interpreted and how the state’s power resources are mobilized 
is based on the perceptions of the policy makers and the intervening domestic varia-
bles. To study these causal relationships Rose calls for “…theoretically informed nar-
ratives, ideally supplemented by explicit counterfactual analysis, that trace the ways 
different factors combine to yield particular foreign policies.”212 
 
                                              
205 FPA is not a coherent theory, research program or paradigm, but parts of it have been interested in the 
influence of ideas. Cf. Hill, Christopher and Light, Margot. Foreign Policy Analysis. In Light, Margot and 
Groom, A. J. R. International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 
1985, 156-173; Carlsnaes, Walter. Foreign Policy. In Carlsnaes, Risse & Simmons 2005, 331-349. 
206 Carlsnaes 2005, 335.  
207 Stuart, Douglas T. Foreign-Policy Decision-Making. In Reus-Smith, Christian and Snidal, Duncan. The Ox-
ford Handbook of International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, 576-593. 
208 Kaarbo, Juliet. A Foreign Policy Analysis Perspective on the Domestic Politics Turn in IR Theory. Interna-
tional Studies Review, Vol. 17 (2015), 189-216; Hudson, Valerie M. and Vore, Christopher S. Foreign Policy 
Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow. Meshon International Studies Review, Vol. 39 (1995), 209-238. 
209 Rose, Gideon. Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy. World Politics, vol. 51, no. 1 (1998), 
144-172. 
210 Ibid., 146. 
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After Rose’s article, Steven Lobell, Norrin Ripsman and Jeffery Taliaferro summa-
rized a neoclassical theory as a basis of a research program.213 Their neoclassical realist 
theory states that the international system is a form of anarchy and states can rely only 
on self-help to achieve security. However, states are not like-units and state interests 
derive from the system through the interpretation of foreign policy elites (FPEs) and 
are pursued based on domestic incentives and constraints.214 According to neoclassi-
cal realism, the basic interest is survival. The ways and means of using power are 
dependent on the state’s ability to extract and mobilize the nation’s material resources. 
These variables come together in a ‘transmission belt’, which is a concept describing 
how national power resources are converted to state power at the international 
level.215 Lobell et al. describe the underlying causal logic as follows: Relative power 
distributions are independent variables, domestic constraints and elite perceptions216 
are intervening variables, and foreign policy is the dependent variable.217 Lobell et al. 
come very close to Rose’s definition, but they argue that NCR should be based on 
deductive theorizing and hypotheses testing. Moreover, NCR should be based on the 
understanding of explicitly material and relative of power resources and instrumentally 
rational FPEs, and on the premise that ideas are only tools for power or ‘wrong’ be-
liefs.218  
 
Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell developed their theory further in their book Neoclas-
sical Realist Theory of International Politics.219 In it they presented a more coherent theory 
of NCR, according to which systemic stimuli or independent variables are based on 
the structure of the international system, which can be understood as a polarity based 
on material capabilities, but modified by ‘systemic modifiers’, i.e. geography, rates of 
technological diffusion, and the offense-defence balance in military technologies. 
Ripsman et al. add ‘clarity’ to systemic stimuli as a systemic variable to explain how 
system “uncertainty” conditions the responses of states—through the nature of 
threats, time frames and optimal policy responses—and provides room for interven-
ing variables to affect policy choices. They also add the ‘strategic environment’ to 
explain how the imminence and magnitude of threats and opportunities affect the 
freedom of action of states. Consequently, there are then, in fact, three independent 
                                              
213 Lobell, Ripsman & Taliaferro 2009. Other prominent scholars labelled Neoclassical realist cf. Zakaria, Fareed 
From Wealth to Power. The Unusual Origins of Americas World Role. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1998; Schweller, Randall L. Deadly Imbalances. Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1998. 
214 States are defined as: “…variety of autonomous polities with different geographic scopes, internal attributes, 
and relative material capacities [interacting] in an anarchic environment” and “In the foreign policy realm, the 
state consists of the foreign policy executive, principally the head of government and key ministers and officials 
charged with the conduct of foreign policy.” Lobell, Ripsman & Taliaferro 2009, 26 & 280-281. 
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216 These perceptions mainly relate to the level of threat based on “…the function of the relative distribution 
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217 Lobell, Ripsman & Taliaferro 2009, 20. On the application of NCR in a case study cf. Saltzman, I. Z. Grow-
ing Pains: Neoclassical Realism and Japan’s Security Policy Emancipation. Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 
36, No. 3 (2015), 498 – 527. 
218 Lobell, Ripsman & Taliaferro 2009. 
219 Ripsman, Taliaferro, & Lobell, 2016. 
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variables.220 Ripsman et al. replace the “transmission belt”221 with perceptions, deci-
sion-making and policy implementation. These processes are affected by the inter-
vening variables of leader images (beliefs), strategic culture222, state-society relations, 
and domestic institutions. Ripsman et al. go on to propose NCR as a theory of inter-
national politics by naming state foreign policies, grand strategies and systemic out-
come dependent variables. They claim that state balancing activities can eventually 
lead to structural change and, thus, they propose they can explain systemic change, 
which is deemed a weakness of structural realism.223 
 
In their book Ripsman et al. explain ‘soft positivism’224 as an epistemological ap-
proach but seem to be more ambivalent about the rationality of FPEs who are “[of-
ficials] charged with the conduct of foreign and defence policy”225 but separated from 
society due to their position, authority, perspective, access to information and atti-
tudes.226 They argue for a positivist approach with a standard methodology, i.e. pro-
cess tracing, which should be based on the a priori deductive or inductive inference 
of independent, intervening, and dependent variables.227 However, this approach has 
been rightfully criticized for being able to find a needed variable for any explana-
tion.228 Therefore, Ripsman et al.’s Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Poli-
tics is, firstly, an attempt to answer the criticism levelled against NCR and, secondly, 
an attempt to distinguish it as a research programme or ‘school’ from other IR theo-
ries. As such, it ‘reifies’ a version of NCR which I consider unbeneficial but shall, 
nevertheless, adopt in a modified form. 
 
The problem with the approach by Ripsman et al. in the context of this thesis is that 
they treat ideas and beliefs as exogenous variables and leave them under-defined. 
Ripsman et al. claim that: “When states confront more permissive strategic environ-
ment, our theory expects ideas and ideology to exert a greater influence on states’ 
foreign policies.”229 The challenge is to empirically claim when a system is restrictive 
                                              
220 That is, the distribution of power, systemic modifiers, and imminence and magnitude of threats, i.e. percep-
tion and interpretation (Ibid., 182). 
221 These are now closer to Schweller’s definition: “[D]omestic processes act as transmission belts that channel, 
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or permissive. Moreover, contrary to Ripsman et al.’s claims, studies of strategic cul-
ture have shown that ideas matter when unexpected shocks, i.e. unpredicted signifi-
cant negative events, occur.230 Thus Ripsman et al. seem to be ready only to give ideas 
power when nothing else matters. 
 
The second problem is that Ripsman et al. define an international system as a system 
of states based on the distribution power. This does not include ideas, or, most im-
portantly, cyberspace. States can shape their environment only by changing its polarity 
through ‘grand strategies’.231 In relation to these deficiencies Michael Foulon points 
out the subjectivity of the geopolitical environment. NCR cannot ignore the meanings 
the FPEs give to the environment and how they perceive it.232 Moreover, the elites 
play two-level games, as state decision-makers must satisfy both domestic and inter-
national constituencies—their rationality is thus connected to two different levels.233 
Admittedly, NCR is an amalgamation of different theories and thus suffers from poor 
parsimony as an IR theory.234 The problems of NCR lie in the way it tries to be a 
theory of everything. To make its framework suitable for this thesis it must be stream-
lined, and its positivism and materialism must be replaced by Barkin’s synthesis of 
ideas and power described above. Moreover, the concept of ideas must be distin-
guished from norms and structures like culture so that I can examine the role of indi-
vidual ideas in elite decision-making as reasons for action. 
 
2.4 Ideas and power 
 
Ideas have been understood in the IR theory variously as individual, shared, collective 
or intersubjective beliefs.235 Individual beliefs reside in the minds of individual human 
beings, while shared beliefs are based on consensus in a social group, and collective 
or intersubjective beliefs reside in some respects outside individual minds and have 
independent staying power.236 In addition to levels of possessions, ideas have been 
                                              
230 Cf. Chapter 2.5 
231 “[T]he organizing principle or conceptual blueprint that animates all of the state’s relations with the outside 
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divided into types such as policy prescriptions, norms, principled beliefs, cause-effect 
beliefs, ideologies, shared belief systems, and broad worldviews according to their 
generalizability.237 According to Nina Tannenwald, worldviews are all-encompassing 
orientations to reality with changing and contradictory elements. She sees ideologies 
and shared belief systems as “a systematic set of doctrines or beliefs that reflect the 
social needs and aspirations of a group” which usually include an orientation to the 
future. In her view cause-effect or causal beliefs are about means and ends and they 
provide an understanding of the world and guidelines for achieving goals in this con-
text. She notes that norms and principled beliefs consist of values and attitudes de-
scribing right and wrong and proscribing appropriate behaviour and policy prescrip-
tions are derived from causal and principled beliefs which provide specific and exact 
solutions to problems.238 This thesis will use the concept of causal beliefs to argue for 
the existence of specific strategic cultural ideas explained below. They are something 
that can be observed from texts and provide direct connection to policies. Admittedly, 
the borders of different types of ideas on the empirical level are blurred, so causal 
beliefs usually include elements of principled beliefs. 
 
Ideas should be differentiated from norms which are “…standards of appropriate 
behavior for actors with a given identity”239 or more exactly in an IR context “a set 
of intersubjective understandings and collective expectations regarding the proper be-
haviour of states and other actors in a given context or identity.”240 According to 
Annika Björkdahl norms have been seen to have regulative, constitutive and enabling 
powers through a variety of mechanisms, whereas ideas and beliefs might not have 
direct behavioural effects.241 Ideas reside in the realm of the mind, culture, language, 
frames, representations and discourse—more as a potential than as a manifested so-
cial fact.242 Ideas should also be distinguished from institutions which are “a relatively 
stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific 
groups of actors in specific situations.”243 Institutions have their own causal and con-
stitutive powers and independent existence outside people’s minds, although, they 
might also be the carriers of ideas through their organizational processes, structure, 
and culture.244 Nevertheless, the distinction between norms and ideas is not clear-cut 
and depending on theoretical approach they have been used interchangeably.245 
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The traditional IR theory has usually approached ideas as commodities that are car-
ried, owned and intentionally manipulated by actors, whereas postmodernists and 
post-structuralists have argued that ideas are independent of actors and have their 
own constitutive power.246 Sometimes ideas are used to define preferences of instru-
mental rationalistic decision-making.247 From a Constructivist point of view, ideas 
give meaning and causal effects to matter, and formulate decision-making through 
causal beliefs.248 This means that rationality itself is contextual and affected by cultural 
beliefs and ideas.249 When this kind of understanding of ideas is connected to explain-
ing things, problems of proving causality follow. Thus, the use of ideas to depict 
causes usually results in producing descriptive research.250 
 
The relation of ideas to material aspects has remained problematic in IR theory.251 If 
reality is seen as a material aspect, then ideas do not matter or matter only a little —
which is a slippery slope. On the other hand, if reality is a social phenomenon, then IR 
research is in danger of turning into a pure analysis of language, speech, and discourse 
without any claims on knowledge of reality which would be policy relevant, prediction 
included.252 Related to this is the problem of change: How do ideas (norms) change 
and why some ideas become accepted as collective beliefs and others do not? Arguably, 
material and ideational aspects of reality interact and the interaction of actors and 
structures has emergent properties.253 One solution to these problems would be to 
engage in mid-level theorising, which would mean concentrating on case studies and 
process tracing to evaluate both ideational and material effects on contextual decision-
making and strive for causal explanations with limited generalizability or an interpre-
tive understanding.254 This is the approach taken in this thesis and it is in line with the 
philosophical assumptions presented above. 
 
Ideas have a life of their own through a cycle of adoption or reformulation or pro-
duction and then transmission, reception, and implementation.255 They emerge out of 
external events or shocks necessitating new thinking, from outside pressure or do-
mestic politics.256 The adoption of external ideas or the promotion of domestic ideas 
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to an external audience is contested.257 The life of ideas is connected to ‘epistemic 
communities.’258 This concept was invented by John Ruggie and developed by Ernst 
Haas and was later elaborated by Peter Haas and Emmanuel Adler.259 Adler and Haas 
have described an epistemic community as: “…a network of individuals or groups 
with an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within their domain of ex-
pertise. The community members share knowledge about the causation of social and 
physical phenomena in areas they have a reputation for competence in. They also 
have a common set of normative beliefs about what will benefit human welfare in 
such a domain. While members are often from a number of different professions and 
disciplines, they adhere to the following: (1) shared consummatory values and princi-
pled beliefs; (2) shared causal beliefs or professional judgment; (3) common notions 
of validity based on intersubjective, internally defined criteria for validating 
knowledge; and (4) a common policy project.”260 Epistemic communities are not 
purely domestic actors. They have contacts with other communities across borders 
and this facilitates the exchange of ideas internationally beyond state interaction.261 
 
Epistemic communities are not lobbyists. Their influence is based on the need for 
technological or other expert knowledge (residing mostly in academic circles) by de-
cision-making elites to understand their changed, novel environment.262 Ideas are not 
necessarily new but might be combinations of old ideas.263 Ideas proposed by epis-
temic communities are not necessarily revolutionary or liberal in a normative sense. 
To have purchase, they must be constructed to ‘fit’ into or ‘resonate’ with existing 
ideas of decision-making elites.264 In this way, through communicative actions and 
their bureaucratic position, epistemic communities provide decision-makers with 
principled and causal beliefs and perhaps also policy prescriptions which guide but do 
not determine their decisions.265 This process is contested and the elites do not get to 
just pick-and-choose, and neither do communities get their ideas through intact.266 
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Epistemic communities thus provide reasons for the actions of state decision-makers 
through causal and principled beliefs.267 Michael Barnett has called this ‘framing’. It 
is the intentional deployment of contextual meaning-providing structure268 to make 
sense of the underlying reality, to fix meanings, organize experience, and to suggest 
courses of action.269 This does not exclude strategic or instrumental rationality under-
stood as means to ends calculations. It only means that rationality must be set in a 
context and an interpretive analysis must be used to understand how decision-makers 
understand their environment and its restrictions and their means and goals. Causal 
and principled beliefs and epistemic communities explain how ideas end up affecting 
decision-makers or elites in the NCR and transform them from intervening variables 
into reasons to use power in accordance with Barkin’s ideas. 270 
 
A few words on power are required at this point. Ideas are related to power. This is 
because the concept of power that I subscribe to views power as relational and con-
textual.271 Power is power over something and it gains its effect and meaning from 
this relationship and context. This is why cyber power must be discussed in the con-
text of cyberspace and I shall return to this concept in Chapter 3. On a more theoret-
ical level, power is basically understood as a material capacity or a set of resources and 
is used “to control and shape […] the external environment.”272 Related to this, con-
structivism offers a ‘deeper’ understanding of changing the environment of the 
agents. Agent behaviour changes the environment because it is guided by meanings 
given to power, behaviour and the environment.273 In other words, Russia’s project 
to control and shape cyberspace can be considered as a part of a process that will 
change cyberspace for everyone. Power then is imbued with meaning and, therefore, 
ideas are important.  
 
It is also important to point out that power as a potential is only a set of resources 
and means.274 It must be extracted, mobilized and used for some purpose to become 
what NCR calls ‘state power’. This is compatible with Lawrence Freedman’s defini-
tion of strategy as an art of creating power through process or practice which is in-
formed by cultural ‘scripts’.275 I shall examine the relationship between strategy and 
power more in Chapter 3, but here it is essential to insert strategy, “the use that is 
made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy”276, into Ripsman et al.’s 
model.277 Perception, decision making, and policy implementation are incorporated 
into the concept of strategy when we are discussing military matters. The making of 
strategy is a continuous process of these elements to create, mobilize and utilize power 
for strategic effect, the ultimate manifestation of which is the use of force. 
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A few words on the state are also required at this point. Although NCR opens the 
‘black box’ of the state, it still considers states as the primary actors in international 
politics through FPEs. This might seem an anachronistic approach because the con-
cept of modern state and its current role in international relations has been chal-
lenged.278 Research has shown that state sovereignty is a socially constructed concept 
which has changed over time.279 Nevertheless, the state can be characterized as a set 
of institutions and relationships of governance which are partially independent of so-
ciety. Max Weber’s definition of an institution that possesses a monopoly over the 
legitimate means of coercion is still widely accepted.280 States have a foreign policy281, 
and a security282 and defence policy283 based on their internal, autonomous, and ex-
clusive authority over their territory, and externally recognized position by other 
states, i.e. sovereignty.284 These policies are managed by designated foreign, defence 
and security policy elites—elites meaning here a group of people with official author-
ity to represent the state. These have the legitimacy to use state power. This does not 
mean that they are independent of international or domestic pressures.285 In the con-
text of this thesis, and in line with NCR, defence and security elites are the people 
who make decisions on the state use of power for military and security ends and in 
responses to national threats. Thus, states use power based on the decisions made by 
the elites who are provided with reasons from ideas offered by, among others, epis-
temic communities. Power can be used in different ways and in different domains. As 
I will argue in Chapter 3, cyberspace is such a domain, in fact an environment, and 
power can be used to control and shape it. The connection of military power or use 
of force to state power can be found in ideas belonging to the sphere of strategic 
culture. 
 
2.5 Strategic culture 
 
Culture is either a type of idea, shared belief system, worldview, discourse, or a social 
structure, depending on the theoretical approach. It could be an environment which 
consists of constitutive and regulatory norms, which prescribe and proscribe behav-
iour and how to behave, or it could be “bundles of ideas and matter linguistically, 
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materially and intersubjectively mediated.”286 For Alexander Wendt, international sys-
tem is a social structure consisting of “distribution of ideas” where shared ideas form 
a “culture” which gives meaning to power and defines the substance of interests.287 
 
Strategic culture is a concept which was first used in the context of Strategic Studies 
by Jack Snyder in a study of Soviet nuclear strategy for the RAND corporation in the 
1977.288 Snyder was openly critical of the rational game-theoretical approaches of his 
time and of ‘mirror-imaging’ US nuclear strategic thinking to the Soviets.289 He de-
scribed strategic culture as: “the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, 
and patterns of habitual [cognitive] behaviour that members of national strategic com-
munity have acquired through instruction and imitation and share with each other 
with regard to nuclear strategy […] the body of attitudes and beliefs that guides and 
circumscribes thought on strategic questions, influences the way strategic issues are 
formulated, and sets the vocabulary and conceptual parameters of strategic debate.”290 
This culture had a certain amount of staying power because individuals were social-
ized into it and because institutional interests were involved. It could change through 
evolution of technology, but it also affected how new technologies were implemented. 
Snyder also recognized that there were strategic subcultures which were traditions 
related to specific institutional associations.291 Snyder proposed some ideas on how 
to connect culture to state behaviour but was cautious of giving either one too much 
credence or making overly precise predictions from them.292 
 
After Snyder, there have been at least three maybe four ‘generations’ of thoughts on 
strategic culture.293 Alistair Johnston was the first to describe different strains of stra-
tegic culture research as generations and his later debate with Colin Gray ingrained 
this division.294 In short, Johnston claimed that the first generation was based on 
Snyder’s concept of strategic culture. It had its heyday from the 1970s to mid-1980s 
and was theoretically over- and under-determined. This meant that strategic culture 
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alone strongly determined behaviour and culture was considered as an amalgam of 
potentially competing variables and inputs.295 The second generation from the mid-
1980s to early 1990s approached strategic culture as a tool or instrument but was 
unable to differentiate between occasions when decision-makers used culture and 
when they were influenced by it.296 The third generation from the mid-1990s, that 
Johnston himself represented and improved upon, saw culture as an independent var-
iable. It separated behaviour from culture and thereby avoided tautology and enabled 
culture to vary through subcultures and temporal change, and, most importantly, al-
lowed competitive testing of positivist theory.297 Later in 1999, Colin Gray defended 
the first generation, of which he had been a proponent, and introduced the idea of 
culture as a ‘context’ and thereby connecting strategic culture to Constructivist tradi-
tions.298 Johnston and Gray are, of course, not the only ones who have tried to define 
strategic culture, but they and Snyder are the ‘founding fathers’ to which almost every 
scholar has referred and built upon.299 
 
Johnson defined strategic culture as “as an integrated system of symbols (i.e. argu-
mentative structures [causal axioms]300, languages, analogies, metaphors, etc.) that acts 
to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts 
of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing 
these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem 
uniquely realistic and efficacious.”301 This system of symbols consists of basic as-
sumptions about the strategic environment, i.e. a ‘central paradigm’ and a limited 
ranked set of preferences derived from basic assumptions, which, based on hypothe-
ses, could be tested against behaviour. For Johnston, culture should be persistent and 
change slowly for it to have a causal effect on decision-making. Most importantly, he 
separated culture from behaviour, because otherwise he would have been guilty of 
the same tautology of which he accused the first generation.302  
 
Gray’s definition of strategic culture is more complex than Johnston’s and he has 
developed his concept over time. In his book Modern Strategy, Gray gave the following 
definition: “Strategic culture consists of the socially constructed and transmitted as-
sumptions, habits of mind, traditions, and preferred methods of operation—that is, 
behavior—that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security 
community. A security community may not be monolithic and can have several stra-
tegic (and military) cultures […] and it or they will be challenged constantly to adapt 
to new conditions. Strategic culture is likely to manifest itself in strategic behavior, 
though certainly not in a mechanistic or deterministic way.”303 For Gray, culture is 
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both the shaping context of strategic behaviour304, which gives it meaning, and ‘the 
total warp and woof of matters strategic’ (i.e. constituent of that behaviour).305 Not 
surprisingly, this definition has caused some confusion.306 Especially confusing is 
Gray’s claim that that polities cannot always follow their culturally preferred policy 
choices and that all dimensions of strategy affect behaviour.307 The influence of con-
structivism on Gray is clear when he claims that strategic culture and strategic behav-
iour are mutually constitutive, and the state’s culture evolves based on how it itself 
and others interpret its behaviour.308 Gray insists that behaviour is part of culture and 
by doing so disputes Johnston’s project for a positivist study of strategic culture.309 
This has led Gray to champion interpretivist epistemology, although, however, always 
keeping in mind the practical needs of strategy. Moreover, according to Gray, strategic 
culture’s influence is issue-dependent and changes gradually, but it also adopts outside 
influences through shocks, and it is negotiated and so always constrained by domestic 
factors and the international environment.310  
 
Although the debate between Johnston and Gray did not solve the differences be-
tween their approaches, it highlighted some of the basic problems of a strategic cul-
tural approach.311 Strategic culture is difficult to operationalize for empirical study, 
the reasons for its stability or change are difficulty to prove, its added value to material 
explanations is suspect, and its ability to produce forecasts is low, and thus its policy 
relevance has been challenged.312 Additionally, it has been claimed that by concentrat-
ing on sui generis cases, strategic cultural studies do not produce comparable knowledge 
or generalizations for scientific advancement.313 Moreover, IR and Strategic Studies 
rely heavily upon the works of historians which are already interpretations in them-
selves and include implicit and explicit underlying assumptions.314 They usually refer 
to historical studies or English-language media sources for their material. For exam-
ple, many strategic cultural studies of Russia or China use mostly English-language 
secondary sources.315 If a researcher aims to understand foreign social meanings and 
culture, he/she must immerse himself/herself in the subject, i.e. get to know the his-
tory, language, and the culture of foreign nations.  
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During the 2000s-2010s, the study of strategic culture has moved away from a mon-
olithic understanding of culture towards subcultures, and the object of study has 
changed from national culture to decision-making elites who are given a larger role in 
shaping the culture. Instead of exploring the effects of persistent ideas, the research 
has explored why some ideas persist and others change.316 One aspect of strategic 
culture which has remained unresolved is its source, the other is what exactly belongs 
to strategic culture. Current trends in strategic cultural studies have been categorized 
in diverse ways. For example, Jeffrey Lantis and Darryl Howlett describe approaches 
to strategic culture as value adding, explanatory and immersive, the distinction being 
what kind of explanatory power is given to culture. Value-adding perspectives are 
used to explain variation in realist models, explanatory views use culture as an inde-
pendent variable to explain behaviour and the immersive approach is based on un-
derstanding and does not produce falsifiable theories.317 On the other hand, John 
Glenn identifies four ‘conceptions’ of strategic culture: the epiphenomenal concept 
which considers culture as intervening variable, the conventional constructivist view 
which considers culture as the source of reasons, the post-structuralist conception 
which considers culture as an instrument to recreate reality through language, and the 
interpretivist view which considers  culture as a framework of understanding.318  
 
Below some ideas of current scholars of strategic culture are presented which specif-
ically inform this thesis’s theoretical framework. The synthesis is offered in Chapter 
2.6. The starting point is that I will subscribe to the immersive or constructive cate-
gory of strategic cultural research, and will thus bracket the issues of causality and the 
separation of ideas and behaviour, and I will abandon the concept of culture for a 
more fine-grained concept of strategic cultural ideas. Moreover, I will use Russian 
language primary sources in tracing the development of those ideas. 
 
Jeffrey Lantis has been one of the most prolific writers on strategic culture in the 
2000s and he points out that strategic culture has cognitive, evaluative and expressive 
dimensions.319  The cognitive dimension includes empirical and causal beliefs, while 
the evaluative dimension consists of values, norms and moral judgement, and the 
expressive or affective dimension encompasses emotional attachments, patterns of 
identity and loyalty, and feelings of affinity, aversion, or indifference.320 This defini-
tion pays attention to the nature of beliefs or ideas that restrict or constitute behav-
iour. It also explains how beliefs can at the same time guide strategic decision-makers 
and offer them tools for justification and legitimization policies—beliefs are frames 
                                              
316 Farrell 2002; Uz Zaman 2009; Sondhaus 2006; Gray 2007; Bloomfield 2012; Lantis 2014; Lantis & Howlett 
2013. 
317 Lantis & Howlett 2013. 
318 Glenn, John. Realism versus Strategic Culture: Competition and Collaboration? International Studies Re-
view, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2009), 523-551. For other categories cf. Christian Bueger and Frank Gadinger (2015) The 
Play of International Practice. International Studies Quarterly (2015) 59, 449–460, 451; Adler, Emanuel and 
Pouliot, Vincent (2011). International practices. International Theory, Vol. 3 No. 1, pp 1-36, 14; Desch 1998; 
Twomey 2008, 340. 
319 This is similar to what Alan Bloomfield has called ‘schemas’ or cognitive shortcuts (Bloomfield 2012, 451-
452). 
320 Lantis, Jeffery S. Strategic Culture and National Security Policy. International Studies Review, Vol. 4, No. 3 
(Autumn 2002), 87-113., 90. Lantis takes this division from John Duffield (Duffield, John S. World Power 
Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification. Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1998, 23). 
 
50 
for understanding but also tools for mobilization. Lantis has also argued that institu-
tions socialize members and provide ‘frames’ which offer them a cognitive framework 
to interpret what counts as a problem, how problems are presented, what strategies 
should be used to solve problems, and what kinds of constraints and requirements 
are placed on the solutions.321 As Lantis has perhaps been more interested in conti-
nuity, Kelly Longhurst has instead argued that a change of culture is based on contin-
uous self-evaluation vis-á-via external reality (fine-tuning) or occurs through shocks. 
Stability is based on institutional practices which sustain knowledge and limit the range 
of conceivable actions and responses. However, generational change may lead to re-
evaluation.322 The ideas of Lantis and Longhurst need to be kept in mind when ana-
lysing the continuity of Soviet ideas from one regime to another. 
 
De Souza has offered a definition of culture based on critical realism.323 According to 
her, community and culture are not united. The cultural system consists of all know-
able proposed ideas and socio-cultural interaction, i.e. the relationship between social 
order and ideas. Change comes from internal and external sources. Internal changes 
come from how ideas interplay with each other and how the social system affects the 
relationship between the political and social order and ideas. External changes arise 
from events and outside influences. Cultural and social systems are open, emergent 
systems consisting of structures, powers and mechanisms. They produce intentional 
agents which adopt, adapt and manipulate ideas. Souza claims that knowledge of ob-
jects is based on prior social products (knowledge). This means that all new ideas must 
be fitted to old ones and are, in fact, products of the old ones.324 Another view on 
this changing and reproductive nature of culture is to approach it as a practice or a 
continuous performance.325 Thus, Soviet and Russian ideas interact, merge, and pro-
duce new meanings and the political, social and cultural elements cannot be discon-
nected. 
 
Tamil Libel has studied Israel’s changing security policy. He combines the ideas of 
‘epistemic communities’ and subcultures with strategic culture to examine how policy 
crisis challenges hegemonic culture, how communities organize themselves around 
innovative statements, how they compete in public and how their ideas are diffused, 
how policy-makers select one of the subcultures and incorporate it to their policies 
and how a subculture then gains persistence and hegemony. Epistemic communities 
are not only academic circles whose influence is based on expertise, they also have 
power and resources needed to compete in public.326 Libel’s model is made to corre-
spond to democratic systems so the ‘competition’ phase could be opaquer in auto-
cratic political systems. Moreover, the existence and strength of distinct subcultures 
is also suspect or at least empirically difficult to prove in opaque political systems with 
one-party-rule. 
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Renny Babiarz’s study is also interesting in which he explains the Chinese approach 
to nuclear deterrence during the Mao Zedong era with strategic culture based on the 
concept of the ‘People’s War’.327 Babiarz argues that instead of process-tracing cer-
tain foreign policy decisions, competing and hegemonic ideas about a particular is-
sue can be studied. Then the development of concrete projects related to that issue 
are analysed, and finally the correspondence of ideas and the project can be ana-
lysed. This type of analysis is based on finding reasons for action, not on the causal-
ity of ideas. However, Babiarz’s study concentrates only on one idea, whereas it is 
quite possible that there are any number of ideas influencing certain policy issues at 
any point of time. Finally, Dima Adamsky has proved the important point that the 
Soviet Union’s or Russia’s and the United States’ strategic cultures have at least been 
in indirect contact and ideas have flown between them.328 Ideas thus flow even be-
tween ideologically competing superpowers, which proves the point that epistemic 
communities are not necessarily insular. 
 
Before I summarize my approach on strategic culture, a few parallel concepts of stra-
tegic culture need to be defined. These are: political culture, national character, secu-
rity culture, organizational culture, military culture, the national way of war, and the 
character of war. Political culture refers to a subset of beliefs and values of a society 
that relate to a political system.329 The national character is associated with the pri-
mordial characteristics of some ethnically related group of people and it is connected 
to a collective identity which might have effects on state foreign policy.330 Security 
culture is more of a synonym of strategic culture than a parallel concept, but its scope 
of ‘owners’ and ‘objects’ of security is more extensive.331 Organizational culture is a 
culture of a particular organization providing a collective understanding and shapes 
the perceptions of its members and thus frames and constrains the decision-mak-
ing.332 Military culture concerns only the military and includes perceptions of strategy, 
operations, and tactics.333 The national way of war has been used to describe, and in 
some cases to predict, how nations use military power. It is sometimes derived from 
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a larger strategic culture and includes both culture and observed behaviour.334 The 
concept of the character of war is based on the beliefs about the current and future 
meaning of war, its legitimate means and goals, and the utility of force.335 Both the 
concepts of way of war and the character of war can be understood as component 
parts of strategic culture, although the character of war transcends national and state 
borders because war can be understood as an international social fact or a subjective 
understanding.336 
 
What separates strategic culture from the above discussed parallel concepts is its con-
nection to the threat or use of force to achieve political ends by the state military and 
security elites. Force in the context of strategic must been understood as all means of 
national power, i.e. military, political, diplomatic, economic etc. National ways of war 
and the character of war are incorporated in strategic culture as ideas and beliefs about 
the threat and use of force. Nevertheless, this culture is not a monolithic structure but 
it is fragmented, contested, and changing.337  
  
To summarize, my approach to strategic culture is sympathetic to Snyder who on a 
conceptual level included almost everything that has been rediscovered by the later 
strategic culture scholars. Where I diverge from Snyder, and from many others, is that 
I concentrate on specific ideas and beliefs instead of a culture as a system or structure. 
I consider ‘culture’ as a pool of ideas whose influence and persistence are very much 
based on epistemic communities and the institutions carrying them. This is more in 
line with De Souza, Adler, and generally critical realism which excludes the possibility 
that culture is a closed system. From this it is clear, that I consider ideas as ‘objects’, 
the interaction of which produces emergent results. Ideas have power because they 
affect how agents understand their environment and their possible ways of action. I 
use the concept of ‘strategic cultural ideas’ to denote causal beliefs and sometimes 
principled beliefs as being about the threat and use of force—about how means and 
ends fit together on issues concerning state security interests—held by people belong-
ing to epistemic communities and, consequently, to defence and security elites. These 
ideas are communicated by and connected to certain concepts (symbolic representa-
tions, i.e. words with meaning) which carry meanings about the reality. I must be clear 
here: I am not interested in how these ideas construct identities and interests, i.e. 
discourse analysis. Nor am I interested explicitly in the lifecycle of ideas or epistemic 
communities. I am interested in how agents understand certain objects or processes 
of reality through these persistent but adaptable ideas and what kinds of reasons for 
action these ideas might offer. I do not strive to explain Russian strategic behaviour 
in cyberspace through cultural preferences. I only want to examine how certain stra-
tegic cultural ideas resonate with Russian actions, how they provide reasons to shape 
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cyberspace in specific ways.  
 
By combining NCR, Barkin’s constructivist realism and an interpretive version of 
strategic culture with practices it can be argued that the ideas carried by strategic cul-
ture are made real through practices—through the making of strategy. Security elites 
apply culturally persistent ideas to understand and shape reality either consciously or 
unconsciously. They choose these ideas based on their interpretation of international 
system and rationally bounded means-ends calculations. In this way, through the prac-
tices of states, cultural ideas shape ideational and material reality, produce power by 
shaping reality, and by changing social reality, change the actors themselves. However, 
because reality constrains actions and has emergent properties, and because there are 
other international intentional actors with cultural ideas of their own, and because the 
defence and security elite’s control of ideas is restricted and because elites must con-
sider both international and domestic ‘games’, strategic cultural ideas do not deter-
mine outcomes. This is even more true when we are talking about cyberspace, which 
is a manmade and malleable environment. The point in combining constructivism, 
NCR, and strategic cultural ideas is to demonstrate how ideas affect the state’s policies 
by influencing elite reasoning and how this shapes reality by directing power in a cer-
tain way. There is an objective, material reality but how this is understood and how 
the use of force is comprehended and then utilized differs between states. This is es-
pecially true concerning new environments, resources, and means like cyberspace, 
cyber power, and cyber warfare.338  
 
2.6 Synthesis 
 
The theoretical framework I am proposing here is by its nature constitutive. It de-
scribes the process through which ideas influence the way power is understood and 
used in a certain environment but does not make any claims of causality. It is also a 
lens to the world. Its task is to legitimize the approach I take in understanding how 
certain strategic cultural ideas influence the way in which the Russian state shapes cy-
berspace. It is a middle-level foreign policy theory more than a theory of IR. Accord-
ingly, the basic premises of my theory are: power matters, while the material and social 
environments constrain and enable actors, and can be changed, ideas are important, 
and dissimilar states guided by elites are the primary actors in international relations. 
 
Because power matters in state to state relations, the international system, or environ-
ment of states, is based on a division of power. Power by its nature is both material 
and social. Its division does not directly cause states to behave in any fixed way because 
power is affected by geography, institutions, norms, technology, and the offence and 
defence balance. Most importantly, this environment is strategic, and it gains its mean-
ing through the perception of defence and security elites. Power is relational and con-
textual—one such context being cyberspace understood as a subdomain of the inter-
national system. Strategic cultural ideas as causal or principled beliefs are about the 
threat and use of force for political ends and they affect the way in which state defence 
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and security elites understand their environment, of which clear and complete infor-
mation is not available per se. Incentives of the environment are real but subjective.339 
Ideas influence the continuous strategic decision-making process, consisting of assess-
ment, formulation, and implementation of strategy, i.e. its practice. Ideas affect ‘the 
making of strategy’340 but they do not determine it. This is because reality constrains 
actions and has emergent properties, and there are other international, intentional ac-
tors with cultural ideas of their own who the defence and security elites do not control 
(i.e. epistemic communities have power), and because elites must consider both inter-
national and domestic ‘games.’ 
 
The ways in which a state uses power to pursue its interests, including creating more 
power, are influenced by ideas and thus ideas shape reality through power.341 In other 
words, ideas shape the understanding of the environment, give meaning to material 
power, indicate acceptable and unacceptable strategic choices, and affect the interpre-
tation of the use of power. In this way they are reasons for contextual social action.342 
Ideas have constructive effects, that is, they change the social and material reality 
through intentional and positional agents and emergent processes. Together ideas 
might amount to constitutive effects, but their individual effects and interaction is 
better captured by the concept of construction.343 
 
Ideas influencing the state elites might be quite persistent. However, in situations when 
the environment is understood to be confusing or threatening, old and new ideas are 
employed in creative and innovative ways to make sense of it and to guide action. 
Cyberspace is arguably a new environment with unknown or poorly understood po-
tential threats.344 This does not mean that the material reality is ontologically prioritized 
over social reality—what matters is how defence and security elites understand the 
environment. Elites get their ideas primarily from epistemic communities who are the 
carriers of ‘all knowable and proposed ideas’ in society. This system of ideas is open 
and changing. Ideas are born through interaction of old ones and through influences 
from the outside. New ideas must be ‘fitted’ to old ones—they must make sense in 
order to have legitimacy. When old policies fail, or new ones are needed because of 
changes in the environment, epistemic communities articulate ideas in statements 
which might compete with each other. Defence and security elites choose and adapt 
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those ideas that ‘fit’,  i.e. those which are understandable and provide guidelines for 
appropriate means to ends. These are formed into policies and then implemented. The 
above described process is theoretical. Every real society and state have their own con-
stellation of epistemic communities and elites and rules for their interaction. 
 
Based on the above, an empirical analysis to understand how ideas affect the strategic 
decision-making in any particular case of state use of power must consider the strate-
gic environment, the internal characteristics, and the internal processes of a state. 
Thus, the particulars of a political system and the composition of elites with power 
related to the issue under study must be examined. However, to be clear, I am inter-
ested in understanding how ideas influence the ways and means of implementing 
strategy and the outcomes of the implementation, not the specific decision-making 
process or the success or failure of policies, or the effects of the objective environ-
ment on state behaviour. Therefore, I reject NCR’s search for causality, explanation, 
and prediction. Nevertheless, I accept NCR’s modified ontological framework as pro-
posed by Ripsman et al. as a middle-range theory of social reality.345  
 
My ontology relies more on constructivism than the admittedly overly complex one 
proposed by critical realism.346 Observations and theories are therefore dependent on 
the scholar. There is a social ‘reality’ but it cannot be fully captured, and knowledge 
claims can only be justified through ‘rational adjucation.’347 I claim no direct causality 
between ideas and action, only that ideas shape the understanding of agents of their 
environment and of their own actions.348 My epistemological approach is ‘interpreta-
tive’ in the sense that I believe ideas carried by elites can be known and understood 
in a similar way in which the elites themselves understand the ideas and the reasons 
they provide—I make no claims beyond conscious understanding. Methodologically 
I am interested in the constructive effects of ideas and beliefs held by agents to prac-
tices and structures—or in the context of this thesis: how ideas held by Russian de-
fence and security elites shape cyberspace through Russian strategy and policies. Thus 
I am interested in the representations of particular ideas in the texts produced by 
epistemic communities and in the policies (texts and behaviour) formulated by the 
decision-making elites. My choices can be criticized, but I argue that I have con-
structed a theory and approach tailored for this study and its subject and that this is 
in accordance with realist analytic pragmatist philosophy. in the next Chapter, I will 
introduce the main concepts, which will enable me to apply my theoretical framework 
to the study of Russian Federation’s strategy to control and shape a part of cyberspace 
into ‘a national segment of the Internet.’ 
  
                                              
345 On middle-level theory cf. Merton, Robert K. Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: Free Press, 
1968. 
346 Adler 2005, 100. 
347 Adjucation refers to “a relative, working truth, that is, claims to validity that I expect to be true only in 
relation to other interpretive claims, not to some objective reality. The claims to validity are ‘working’ because 
they operate.” Hopf, Ted. Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Mos-
cow, 1955 and 1999. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002, 24. Cf. also Wight 2005; Kurki & Wight 2013.). 
348 Patomäki & Wight 2000; Adler & Pouliot 2013; Lebow 2010. 
 
56 
 
  
 
57 
3  
CYBER CONCEPTS AND CLOSED NATIONAL             
NETWORK 
 
n this chapter I examine and develop the main concepts of this thesis: Cyber-
space, cyber power, cyber warfare, cyber strategy and a closed national network. 
These are based on previous research and are offered as theoretical concepts to 
understand how states shape cyberspace in the neoclassical realist theoretical frame-
work that was adopted in the previous chapter. The concepts guide the empirical 
analysis conducted in the following chapters in three ways: 1) They inform me of the 
kind of ideas or causal beliefs I should be looking for when interpreting Russian think-
ing on cyberspace and power—they provide a preliminary description of the objects 
of reality to which ideas give meaning; 2) they provide tools for analysing how Russian 
policies shape cyberspace; and 3) they enable the analysis of the Russian segment of 
Internet as a closed national network. 
 
3.1 A short history of cyber issues 
 
Strategic thinking about cyberspace and cyber power started in the 1990s but really 
got off the ground at the beginning of the 2000s.349 Accordingly, concepts and theories 
have not yet matured or stabilized enough to form a coherent theory of cyber issues, 
‘cyber warfare’ least among them, and many of the concepts with the cyber -prefix 
are academically and politically contested.350 Additionally, cyberspace and military is-
sues related to it are not defined by international law and there is no international 
consensus about them—although a UN workgroup of experts has proposed that in-
ternational law should be applicable to cyberspace and there have been non-govern-
mental efforts to create a basis for cyber law.351 IR theory has just started to incorpo-
rate cyber issues in International Relations.352 Thus, cyberspace and the scholarly un-
derstanding of it have both been in a constant flux for the past thirty years.353 In this 
context, it is clear that no common definition of cyberspace or power, to say nothing 
about warfare can be found. Here I shall bracket the social and economic aspects of 
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cyberspace and concentrate mostly on texts produced from a military-strategic per-
spective.  
 
The term cyberspace was coined by a science-fiction writer William Gibson in 1982.354 
Gibson defined the term as “‘consensual hallucination’ that takes place when humans 
interact with networked computers”.355 The prefix to space used by Gibson has its 
roots in the concept of ‘cybernetics’ which was developed by the mathematician 
Norbert Wiener in the 1940s. He was writing about human-machine analogies, the 
nature of information, control and feedback mechanisms, and borrowed the term 
cyber from the Greek word for steersman.356 Cybernetics had its theoretical high tide 
in the West in the 1950-1960s when a group of American and British academics elab-
orated it into theories of automatization, robotization, and cyborgization.357 Some of 
the academics were later involved in the development of ARPANET (Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency Network)—the network upon which the Internet was later 
built.358 Cybernetics later branched into multiple different theories under diverse dis-
ciplines and the term itself was largely abandoned. It was replaced in the 1980s by the 
term ‘information’ in management, business, and social sciences and policy circles, 
either referring to systems and artefacts of a new transformative technology or to a 
new kind of social order brought about by technological revolution—information so-
ciety.359 
 
In the 1980-1990s Western militaries got interested in virtual reality, precision guided 
weapon systems, sensor fusion, information warfare (IW), and Network Centric War-
fare (NCW), in short, during the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) which brought 
information technology to the forefront of military affairs.360 At same time infor-
mation society361 started to develop along with the Internet362. The cyber-term made 
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a ‘comeback’ when the popular culture (ála Gibson and others) and the need for novel 
concepts to understand the changing reality merged in the 1990s. In the English-
speaking world the term ‘cyber’ transformed gradually to mean almost anything re-
lated to networks and computers.363 Currently, ‘information’ and ‘cyber’ live side-by-
side in English-language military discourses but have a somewhat contested and 
strained relationship.364 
 
Cybernetics had a significant impact on the development of robotics, computers and 
networks during the Cold War on both sides of the confrontation.365 It was adopted 
from Western thought by Soviet scientists as kibernetika which expanded later to in-
fluence large parts of the Soviet scientific field and guided the faith in the promise of 
computer based technocratic governance.366 As Benjamin Peters has argued, Soviet 
science ”...rejected, rehabilitated, adopted and adapted cybernetics for historically ex-
pedient and changing purposes.”367 The force of ‘kibernetik’ ideas was such that Slava 
Gerovitch claims that cybernetics affected almost all of the Soviet sciences.368 Despite 
of the enthusiasm for cybernetics the Soviet Union never managed to produce its own 
version of the Internet.369 The Soviet military was aware of the changing nature of war 
caused by the development of information technology perhaps earlier than its West-
ern counterparts, and in fact provided the West with the concept of the Military-
Technological Revolution. Nevertheless, it had only limited success in putting its own 
ideas into practise before the fall of the Soviet Union.370 
 
Cybernetics left a whole sublanguage of input-output-feedback systems based on 
computer technology in the Russian language.371 However, modern Russian official 
texts do not use the term cyber but instead use the term information.372 Unofficially 
the term cyber is quite commonly used.373 Previous studies have argued that the Rus-
sians see ‘cyber’ only as a technological (information-technical) subcomponent of a 
much larger ‘information space’ which includes cognitive, informational and infra-
structural components and that there might be political motivations behind the usage 
of the term information.374  
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Based on this short history of terminology it can be argued that the meanings of cy-
berspace and power are cultural constructs, i.e. that they are based on strategic cultural 
ideas. Moreover, there has been a transfer of ideas between, arguably hostile, cultures. 
Thus, I argue, based on the theoretical framework adopted in Chapter 2, that behind 
differing meanings there are real and objective phenomena that different cultures have 
tried to comprehend in their own way. To denote these objects this thesis uses the 
term ‘cyber’ as a prefix that gets its meaning in combinations with other terms. Bran-
don Valeriano and Ryan C. Maness have described cyber as meaning “computer and 
digital interactions.”375 It seems to resonate adequately with both Western and Russian 
understandings.376  
 
3.2 Cyberspace 
 
This chapter examines what previous studies have claimed about cyberspace. It will 
then proceed to take a more throughout look at cyberspace and the Internet to see 
how well previous, perhaps somewhat abstract definitions correspond with the tech-
nical and functional reality of local and global networks. Lastly, I will adopt a defini-
tion of cyberspace that will correspond with the empirical reality and my theoretical 
framework.  
 
3.2.1  Previous concepts of cyberspace 
 
In the Western cyber literature, there are many different definitions for cyberspace 
and the formulation of the definitions depends on the context they are used in. The 
Tallinn Manual 2.0, for example, defines cyberspace as: “The environment formed by 
physical and non-physical components to store, modify, and exchange data using 
computer networks.”377 Many definitions claim that cyberspace is a manmade space, 
medium or environment, distinct from the land, sea, air, and outer space.378 Some 
definitions emphasize the electromagnetic transfer of information, interconnection of 
systems and networks.379 Others concentrate more on the functionality of cyberspace, 
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i.e. creating, transmitting, receiving, storing, processing and deleting data.380 Further-
more, some combine these two approaches.381 Yet some take a more holistic view and 
combine cyberspace with the information sphere or environment.382 They designate 
cyberspace as a platform or facilitator for the flow and use of information. Others 
have tried to separate the physical infrastructure, software, rules and processes, and 
information and its users from each other.383 For example, the current United States’ 
Joint Doctrine defines the ‘information environment’ as an aggregate of individual, 
organisation and system levels and physical, informational and cognitive dimensions; 
and cyberspace as a part of the information environment consisting of layers of phys-
ical network, logical network, and cyberpersona.384 On the civilian side, Martin C. Li-
bicki’s division into physical (boxes and wires), syntactic (instructions and rules) and 
semantic (information useful for humans or instructions for services) levels is one of 
the most influential definitions.385 John B. Sheldon has further divided the physical 
dimension into infrastructure (cables etc.) and the electromagnetic spectrum.386 In 
these definitions the control of one level does not necessarily mean control of other 
levels.387 
 
The architecture of cyberspace has been described as a flat, worldwide, interconnected 
network, without a centre.388 Some argue that cyberspace is in fact not a separate space 
or domain, but a ‘substrate’ underlying all other domains.389 Although cyberspace as a 
concept conveys a feeling of borderless and limitless space, it might also be considered 
inherently fragmented. This is because while cyberspace consists of networks that are 
largely technologically compatible, a conscious decision is required to connect and 
disconnect them.390 The more philosophical understandings of cyberspace have 
changed over time. They have gone through visions of self-organizing anarchy to ‘the 
Wild West’ to global commons and now more towards regime or territorial and sov-
ereign state-centric visions.391 
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Cyberspace has its own characteristics. Nazli Choucri lists instantaneity, geographical 
transcendence, permeation, fluidity, participation, non-attribution and non-accounta-
bility.392 John Sheldon  describes cyberspace as having a low cost of entry, multiple 
actors, an existence based on reliance on the electromagnetic spectrum and man-made 
objects, constant replication, and instantaneity.393 According to Gregory Rattray, the 
strategic features of cyberspace are: the laws of physics, software logic, mutability, 
interconnectivity, limited limitlessness (actors have power but it is limited), human 
resources, and know-how.394  Joseph Nye points out that the virtual level provides a 
low cost entry to the physical level and that technology has a dominant role in chang-
ing the nature of cyberspace.395 This means that the architecture leads to diffusion of 
power and empowers multitude of actors.396 Thus, cyberspace has been described as 
a domain of human activity with its own characteristics which affect the use of power 
in and through it.397 When discussing cyber deterrence Martin Libicki emphasizes the 
role of man-made rules.398 He also highlights the problem of attribution, that is, how 
to link actors in cyberspace to actors in the physical world.399 A preliminary summary 
of these definitions is that the cyberspace is a manmade and malleable technological 
environment. 
 
The connection between information space and cyberspace is apparent in the defini-
tions presented above. This relationship can be understood through Russell Ackoff’s 
data-information-knowledge-wisdom (DIKW) hierarchy.400 According to Jennifer 
Rowley, data consists of discrete, objective facts which are unorganized and without 
meaning. When data is structured and given context and meaning it becomes infor-
mation. Knowledge is information as part of the human mind, embedded in experi-
ence and values and enables action. Wisdom might be an ability for abstraction or 
critical reflection.401 If we compare the American military definitions of the infor-
mation space or environment to the DIKW hierarchy it seems logical that electronic 
data and electronic information reside in cyberspace, which is a subcomponent of the 
                                              
392 Choucri 2012, 4. 
393 Sheldon 2013, 288. 
394 Rattray, Gregory J. An Environmental Approach to Understanding Cyberpower. In Kramer, Franklin D., 
Starr, Stuart H. and Wentz, Larry K. Cyberpower and National Security. Washington, D.C.: National Defence 
University Press, 2009, 253-274, 256-257. 
395 Nye 2010, 4. 
396 Ibid., 9. 
397 Choucri 2012. 
398 Libicki 2009, 18. 
399 Ibid., 41-52. 
400 Rowley, Jennifer. The wisdom hierarchy: representations of the DIKW hierarchy. Journal of Information 
Science, Vol. 33, No. 2 (2007), 163-180; Zins, Chaim. Conceptual Approaches for Defining Data, Information, 
and Knowledge. Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, Vol. 58, No. 4 
(2007), 479-493. 
401 Rowley 2007, 170-174. 
 
63 
information space.402 The idea that the information environment is composed of in-
formation, systems, infrastructure and users of information seems to be widespread 
among the militaries of the great powers.403 
 
Based on the above, cyberspace forms the basis for the information space and is thus 
part of the material and social structure of the international system. This relationship 
between cyberspace and the information space is contested because of the political 
implications inherent in the use of information. Moreover, it can be argued that when 
states try to shape cyberspace, they are influencing something that is shared in objec-
tive reality. However, our understanding of this space is constantly changing.404 
Therefore, I shall take more comprehensive and technical look at what cyberspace is 
composed of. 
 
3.2.2  Wires, protocols and governance 
 
To understand how the Internet and the wider cyberspace really works it is necessary 
to briefly examine the physical and logical infrastructure of the Internet and its gov-
ernance. This review is also necessary for understanding Russia’s policies towards cy-
berspace in the later chapters of this thesis because cyberspace is shaped by control-
ling its physical and logical levels through governance. Therefore, I will highlight the 
potential vulnerabilities and threats related to the Internet. The overview will also help 
in devising the concept of a closed national network. 
 
The Internet refers to an interconnected group of global networks whereas cyber-
space is a collection of all computer networks, open and closed, public and private.405 
Therefore, the political and social borders of cyberspace refer more precisely to the 
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borders of the Internet—not the entirety of cyberspace. The Internet is not a com-
mons.406 The physical infrastructure of the Internet is always operated by someone 
and networks cannot be separated from the geographical territory in or through which 
they operate.407 In fact, fibre cables, servers, routers etc. are owned and operated pri-
marily by private, commercial, profit-seeking actors.408 Additionally, the Internet is not 
a finite resource—bandwidth can always be increased409—and openness is in reality 
limited because states have shown the ability to pressure Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs) to shut down connections.410 
 
On a physical level or layer411, cyberspace consists of computers, servers, wires and 
optic fibre cables, satellite-communications or radio relay links and routers, switches 
and other equipment, i.e. mechanical, electrical, functional and procedural means of 
transferring bits (0s and 1s) as electrical signals or light.412 On a logical level, cyber-
space consists of intranets, extranets, internets and the Internet and protocols and 
applications running them and in them. Intranets are private networks, while extranets 
are networks which can be connected to the Internet in a limited manner and internets 
are multiple networks connected using the same protocols.413 In all of these ‘nets’ the 
de facto414 standard protocol for internetworking is the Transmission Control Proto-
col/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). It is used to transfer packets of data (‘packet-switch-
ing’) between different networks to their destination in the right order and without 
errors.415 Every host, i.e. computer, requires an IP address to take part in this network 
and networks are connected by routers, which are responsible for transmitting packets 
between networks.416 These connect to other routers and advertise the addresses of 
the networks (hosts) they are connected to and keep registers of known addresses 
received from other routers.417 It is important to note that the ARPANET and later 
TCP/IP (and many other protocols) were not designed for security but with accessi-
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bility, reliability and connectivity in mind. Therefore, malicious actors can easily ob-
fuscate their identity, manipulate and block data packets, access systems without au-
thorization, launch Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks etc.418 
 
The Internet as a one type of network has its own architecture. The physical level 
consists of hundreds of fibre optic cables running under seas and oceans which 
transport the main portion of global data traffic.419 These are owned by private cable 
companies or groups of companies.420 These magisterial lines connect to smaller re-
gional networks managed by service providers which use mainly land-built fibre cables 
and radio link relays to create their own backbone networks.421 These Internet service 
providers (ISPs) are private and state owned companies who own and control almost 
all of the physical infrastructure of the Internet. ISPs run their own networks which 
provide connectivity to end users, companies, state institutions and private citizens. 
These networks may consist of edge routers, core routers, connections between them, 
data centres and different types of operations centres and client networks. They route 
their traffic based on protocols such as Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS).422 
Smaller ISPs rent capacity from larger ones and run their services virtually over the 
underlying infrastructure.423 Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) are physical points 
where networks run by the largest ISPs physically connect. These are run by non-
profit organizations, for-profit companies and government agencies.424 Routing be-
tween large networks on the Internet is based on the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) 
which is based on Autonomous System (AS) addresses. The ISPs use BGP to create 
connections between and through their networks. This is a system based on agree-
ments, usually commercial. The BGP protocol advertises IP subnets found under it 
or through it so that the rest of the Internet can know where to send traffic reliably 
and efficiently.425 It is possible to hijack these advertisements and manipulate the traf-
fic flow of the Internet for example to spy or temporarily deny services.426 
 
In addition to IP addresses and AS numbers, the Internet relies on the Domain Name 
System (DNS). The DNS protocol was developed to convert domain names to IP 
addresses in a process known as name resolution because human users could not be 
expected to memorize IP addresses. Domain names are organized as a tree. Top-level 
domains (.com) include generic TLDs (gTLDs), country-code TLDs (ccTLDs) (.su, 
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.ru) and internationalized country-code TLDs (IDN ccTLDs) (.рф) and these are fur-
ther divided into two levels of subdomains (example.com and www.example.com). 
Registry operators maintain domain name databases (registry) and provide zone files, 
which map IP addresses to domain names for domain name servers. ccTLD servers 
are delegated to national registry operators. DNS registrars are service providers who 
have a mandate to sell domain names to customers. On the technical side, name serv-
ers can provide a domain name to IP address resolutions. Thirteen root servers and 
their multiple backups maintain the root zone files which include TLD name server 
addresses and thus enable the Internet’s global connectivity.  The TLD servers main-
tain their own zone files as do subdomain servers. These servers usually have multiple 
logically and physically dispersed backups. In principle, name servers answer to the 
host name it requests. However, in practise, names are usually resolved through 
caches maintained by recursive servers.427 The DNS is important for the functioning 
of the modern information society and state. If the names and addresses of a state’s 
country code domain name servers were removed from the global root and other 
zone files, or access to the TLD servers were blocked, that country’s Internet traffic 
would be greatly affected, perhaps even halted.428 It is also possible to hijack and 
eavesdrop on DNS traffic.429 
 
The Internet would not work without IP addresses, DNS root files and servers and 
AS numbers.430 They are distributed and managed by a non-profit multi-stakeholder 
organization called Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN) which functions as the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). 
ICANN uses Regional Internet registries (RIRs) to distribute IP and AS addresses to 
customers.431 This is a critical function because assigning duplicate addresses to net-
works and hosts would break the Internet routing. RIRs also maintain the Internet 
Routing Registry (IRR) which provides information on BGP routing policies of ISPs 
for common use and routing planning.432 ICANN/IANA approves changes to the 
root zone file and has a contract with VeriSign which is responsible for distributing 
the file to the operators of root name servers.433 Despite their functions and mandates 
ICANN and its associates do not control the Internet. Contrary claims have been 
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based on the fact that for historical reasons the United States’ National Telecommu-
nications and Information Administration (NTIA) has supervised ICANNs IANA 
functions up until 2016.434 
 
ICANN is not the only non-governmental multi-stakeholder organization with an in-
fluence on Internet governance.435 The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), In-
ternet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) and Internet Architecture Board (IAB) are 
responsible for setting technical standards for the Internet through meetings, working 
groups and Request for Comments (RFCs). The Internet Society (ISOC) functions as 
an umbrella organization connecting academics, governmental representatives and 
the private sector to govern and develop the Internet.436 In effect, the technical stand-
ards regulating the development of the Internet are not controlled by nation-states, 
although there have been efforts to increase states’ control through the United Na-
tion’s International Telecommunications Union (ITU).437 The tug-of-war between the 
principles of state sovereignty and the multi-stakeholder model in the context of in-
formation (cyber) security has been visible in the work of the United Nations Group 
of Governmental Experts on Information Security (UN GGE) from 2004–2019. The 
UN GGE has tried to find some common global understanding on the questions of 
information security, wars and weapons but has so far failed to produce binding agree-
ments.438 Basically, the United States and some European countries and Russia and 
China and their allies have promoted conflicting views, and this has paralyzed inter-
national cyber security norm building on the UN level.439 This does not mean that 
cyberspace is unregulated on the international level. There are already a great number 
of bi- and multilateral accords which regulate cyberspace440 and create some level of 
transparency, confidence, and trust—as do the multitudes of commercial agree-
ments.441 The point is that cyberspace is not an anarchic or uncontrollably malleable 
                                              
434 ICANN. Stewardship of IANA Functions Transitions to Global Internet Community as Contract with U.S. 
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space and that there are political, economic and judicial constraints to the actions of 
states and non-state actors—and these constraints are sources and objects of power.442 
 
There are still other elements and functions that are important for the operation of 
the Internet and cyberspace. Encryption and authentication have become critical re-
sources for the Internet and indeed for the whole of cyberspace.443 Ben Buchanan has 
even claimed that encryption has affected state sovereignty as the use of public key 
encryption restricts states’ access to information on their own territory.444 As was 
mentioned above, the Internet protocol suite was and is not inherently secure. From 
a nation state’s point of view this means that strong encryption is a national security 
interest, as is the capability to break potential or real opponent’s encryption.445 New 
and more powerful supercomputers and quantum computing are challenging current 
encryption solutions, although this ‘arms race’ is nothing new in computer-based 
cryptography.446 Additionally, the importance of authentication, which is the corner-
stone of public-key encryption, means that Certificate Authorities447 are a point of 
vulnerability. If someone could fake certificates distributed by these authorities, the 
confidentiality of information on the Internet would be in danger.448  
 
Despite of what some of the above-mentioned definitions claim, cyberspace is not a 
collection of independent, equal and similar nodes changing information. Content 
delivery networks have appeared inside the Internet to balance the ever increasing 
traffic load.449 Cloud computing has led to the establishment of big data centres that 
offer computing and storage capacity for the public and private sector.450 Public ser-
vices and even government institutions have located critical data in commercial data-
centres outside states’ territorial borders and jurisdictions.451 Disconnection from for-
eign data centres could lead to major disruptions, even the loss of life. Additionally, 
data located in some countries is, in principle, subject to that country’s laws and is 
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vulnerable to espionage at its destination and during traffic.452 The geography, location 
of physical infrastructure, state borders and jurisdictions all affect the ‘borderless’ cy-
berspace. 
 
Satellites have become part of cyberspace and at the same time are vulnerable to its 
threats. Although global data communications are not dependent on satellites some 
remote areas are. Moreover,  satellites provide TV transmissions, navigation and time-
signal services, and most importantly communications needed by the command and 
control of modern armies, including nuclear early-warning systems.453 Satellites are 
vulnerable to attacks using software and malicious code through their terrestrial con-
trol links, and to electromagnetic interference and kinetic attacks. The number of sat-
ellites is increasing as micro-satellites are being deployed in Low-Earth Orbit (LEO). 
There are plans to create global Internet services based on hundreds or thousands of 
small satellites which would provide Internet services unhindered by terrestrial or 
governmental borders.454 These satellites would in principle create a world-wide net-
work connecting millions of IoT devices.455 This service will aggravate the difficulties 
some states are facing in controlling the Internet-access of their citizens. Moreover, 
after the development of mobile broadband, plain old telephone networks (POTS) 
have been transformed into data networks. Digitalized telecommunications services 
have become indistinguishable from cyberspace—and also its threat landscape.456 Wi-
Fi and other short-range connections such as Bluetooth and Low Power Wide Area 
Networks (LPWAN), as well as 5G mobile, fixed broadband connections and differ-
ent types of satellites will create a truly global multi-layered and multi-access data net-
work in the near future. These kinds of connections make cyberspace truly ubiquitous 
and challenge the territorial borders of nation states. 
 
Cyberspace, and in fact, the Internet now reaches inside factories and power plants, 
to electric networks, transportation and sewage systems. There is no cyberspace with-
out electricity and as automatization proceeds soon there might not be electricity 
without cyberspace. Malfunctions or intentional attacks against a program running 
some logistical system might lead to the disruption of air or sea traffic and shortages 
of critical imports. These interdependencies and collateral effects make cyberspace an 
inherent part of information society, its security and defence.457 
 
                                              
452 Wolff, Josephine. Borders in the Cloud. Countries are increasingly putting limits on how data travels. Slate, 
20 November 2017 [Online]. Available: http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2017/11/ 
countries_are_increasingly_imposing_borders_on_the_cloud.html?via=gdpr-consent [Accessed: 8th August 
2018]. 
453 Bardin, Jeffrey. Satellite Cyber Attack Search and Destroy. In Vacca 2014, 309-323. 
454 Scoles, Sarah. Maybe Nobody Wants Your Space Internet. Wired, 15 March 2018 [Online] Available: 
https://www.wired.com/story/maybe-nobody-wants-your-space-internet/ [Accessed: 8th August 2018]. 
455 Qu, Zhicheng, Zhang, Genxin, Cao, Haotong and Xie, Jidong. LEO Satellite Constellation for Internet of 
Things. IEEE Access, Vol. 5 (2017), 18391-18401. 
456 Dodd 2014; ENISA. Signalling Security in Telecom SS7/Diameter/5G EU level assessment of the current 
situation, March 2018 [Online] Available: https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/signalling-security-in-tel-
ecom-ss7-diameter-5g [Accessed: 10th August 2018]. 
457 Edwards, Matthew (ed.) Critical Infrastructure Protection. NATO Science for Peace and Security Series. 
Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2014; Zhang, Nan, Krishna, Kant and Sajal K. Handbook on Securing Cyber-Physical 
Critical Infrastructure. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2012. 
 
70 
Lastly, as big data analytics, neural network modelling, and machine learning advance, 
cyberspace might be populated by some kinds of self-modifying Artificial Intelli-
gences (AIs).458 Currently, the usefulness and effectiveness of AIs is an open question 
but their development is nevertheless taken seriously by state and private research 
institutions.459 On a more mundane level the technical governance of cyberspace is 
being automatized and virtualized through semi-intelligent and self-learning programs 
which enable the control and configuration of networks from remote locations inde-
pendently of hardware or software solutions. Security is increasingly being handled by 
centralized systems that can inspect traffic and react to anomalies semi-autono-
mously.460 Arguably, as states are increasingly interested in controlling cyberspace, that 
space is being increasingly controlled by machines. 
 
What makes all the above-mentioned systems and protocols critical resources for cy-
berspace is that if someone would disturb their governance, or logically or physically 
damage them or hinder their action, the Internet could temporarily stop working in a 
certain, perhaps targeted area. Confidential and critical information could be lost. De-
cision-making of governments could be impaired. Military, including nuclear weapons 
command systems, could be affected. Great economic losses could be suffered. Soci-
etal disorder could ensue, and people could die.461 Local and regional services might 
be available, but international banking services such as SWIFT462 and any foreign 
cloud-based services might be affected. Information could be secretly compromised 
or corrupted. Conversely, the inability of states and their security institutions to con-
trol connections to the global Internet, encrypted traffic inside their borders, and ser-
vices located outside their borders can create political, social and economic prob-
lems—and weaken military defence.463 It is thus understandable that states might seek 
guarantees against these vulnerabilities especially if their political system is authoritar-
ian or if they fear outside interference based on information flowing on the Internet. 
 
Another common theme that emerges from the issues discussed above is the ‘new-
ness’ and constant change of cyberspace. The technology underneath cyberspace is 
rapidly evolving, new protocols are emerging, new hardware and software solutions 
are being produced.464 Sometimes novel threats appear that seem to challenge the 
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whole infrastructure of Internet.465 According to the World Economic Forum, cyber-
attacks are one of the main risks facing the world today.466 This means that state de-
fence and security elites are continuously forced to find new solutions to the chal-
lenges emerging from cyberspace.467 Related to the constant change is the problem of 
attribution, i.e. the possibility to identify the source of an attack.468 The constant evo-
lution of cyberspace makes it hard to devise attribution techniques. This has direct 
consequences on strategic issues such as deterrence, early warning and the possibility 
for retaliation.469  
 
Behind the idea of freedom and openness of the Internet has been the governance 
model of multi-stakeholderism, i.e. ‘an ecosystem’ that includes state and non-state 
actors.470 This model is being increasingly challenged by states which claim that terri-
torial state sovereignty, with its jurisdiction and borders, should be reflected into cy-
berspace.471 This process has been called ‘fragmentation’, ‘balkanization’ and ‘Cyber-
Westphalia’.472 A World Economic Forum report divides this phenomena into tech-
nical, governmental and commercial fragmentation.473 Technical fragmentation chal-
lenges the universal connectivity of the Internet by affecting its technical standards 
and processes. Governmental fragmentation arises from the intentional policy to 
build ‘national Internets’ by blocking and filtering traffic. Commercial fragmentation 
is based on the manipulation of digital markets by companies and is manifested in 
policies such as network neutrality and the geo-blocking of content.474 Proponents of 
this ‘fragmentation’ see it as the ‘normalization’ of the state role and interstate rela-
tionships in cyberspace or as economically logical policy to protect nascent digital 
economies, for example.475 
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There are obstacles in this process of nationalization of the Internet. The private sec-
tor owns the infrastructure and services of the Internet and also the critical infrastruc-
ture connected to it. Protocols running the data traffic in networks do not inherently 
support concepts such as ‘national borders’ or ‘citizenship’. Encryption and proxy-
services are available to those wanting to circumvent state control. There could be 
major economic expenses in creating ‘national Internets’ and in engaging in ‘digital 
protectionism’, and, according to the current understanding concerning cyber-attacks, 
computer networks will always be vulnerable to attacks either from outside or in-
side.476 Therefore, based on all the technological, governance and political issues ex-
amined above, I argue that cyberspace is an environment which can  be shaped by 
state actions influenced by strategic cultural ideas, but that it is not absolutely mallea-
ble and efforts to build closed national ‘Internets’ will be severely challenged. 
 
3.2.3   Definition of cyberspace 
 
Based on the above analysis and because this thesis is focused on the shaping of cy-
berspace by state actors who carry particular cultural ideas about strategic issues, a 
modified version of the definition by Daniel T. Khuel  is used to describe cyberspace: 
“…cyberspace is a [man made and governed] global domain within the information environment 
whose distinct and unique character is framed by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum 
to create, store, modify, exchange, and exploit information via interdependent and interconnected net-
works using information-communication technologies.”477 ‘Man made and governed’ is an ad-
dition to Khuel’s definition. This definition highlights cyberspace’s nature as a collec-
tion of networks, its physical and logical levels and its malleable character. It includes 
a distinction between physical, syntactic and semantic layers that have different rules, 
and which are interdependent but not necessarily controlled by each other. Cyber-
space can be shaped by intentional actors by controlling its infrastructure, technical 
design and standards, and by laws, regulations and institutions. Through electronics 
and the electromagnetic spectrum, the definition connects cyberspace to the physical 
world, territoriality and kinetic effects. Information gives substance, resources, and 
effects to cyberspace and makes it possible to describe it as a domain, and a sphere 
of human activity478. The processing of information gives cyberspace meaning beyond 
its borders. The manipulation of information affects human activity. Khuel’s defini-
tion combines structure (medium), substance (information) and processes (creation 
etc.) and emphasizes technical aspects. The additions emphasise the aspect of human 
control.  
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Based on Khuel’s definition and previous discussion a short summary of the basic 
characteristics of cyberspace can be deduced. These are: its artificial nature, physical 
base, inherent rules, interconnectivity, mutability, replication, ease of access, multi-
plicity of actors, difficulty of attribution, diffusion of power, non-significance of dis-
tance, and machine speed.479 This means that cyberspace is clearly different from other 
physical domains, i.e. land, sea, air and the outer space. Its nature and properties can 
be intentionally shaped by states which may be affected by strategic cultural ideas, and 
by private companies and institutions if they have sufficient resources. However, the 
shaping may be contested by others and even by the functional logic of the space 
itself. This means that components of cyberspace can be damaged, but it is difficult 
to permanently destroy any part of it—backups can be restored—and even kinetic 
effects can be negated by rerouting traffic and by replicating services to other loca-
tions. This does not mean that cyberspace is invulnerable—it is based on physical 
infrastructure, electricity and human-made software which may contain errors and 
bugs. Cyberspace also differs from other domains because it is not continuous—it is 
a collection of internetworked or independent, air gapped, networks—the Internet 
being the most important. There are physical and logical control or pressure points in 
the Internet and other networks that can be used to control traffic and connections. 
Borders in cyberspace are perhaps even more real than in the physical realm where 
no human action can change the laws of nature. 
 
Based on the above discussion I argue that cyberspace is indeed a new environment 
and is in fact a constantly changing environment which gives rise to unknown and 
poorly understood threats. This environment requires elites to fit new ideas to old 
ones to understand their position and to produce strategies to create power. It also 
enables the creation of closed national networks, although this might be difficult to 
achieve. 
 
3.3 Cyber power 
 
Power is a contested concept.480 In IR theory there are three or four (depending on 
the view) different concepts of power, the so called ‘Faces of power’.481 The first one 
is based on Robert Dahl’s formulation of “A getting B to do something B would 
otherwise not do.”482 This is basically the direct power over resources or effects ap-
proach and sees power and its results as measurable. The second one is based on 
Bacrach’s and Barantz’s critique of Dahl and states that “…power works more indi-
rectly through both actors being positioned in an institutional setting and the ability 
of A to influence this setting ‘against’ B.”483 This approach is interested in agenda-
setting, and the ability of A to exclude some agendas from the political process alto-
gether. A structuralist version of this ‘face’ is an approach where the positions of A 
and B order their power relationship without direct intentionality from the part of 
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A.484 The third face is based on Steven Lukes who was interested in how A can ma-
nipulate B’s inherent interests, basically changing B’s preferences.485 Finally, the fourth 
‘face’ is based on poststructuralism and especially on the writings of Michel Foucault. 
Here power is seen as productive power, shaping the identities and interests of A and 
B.486 It should be noted that all the different ‘Faces of power’ are based on different 
theoretical premises and are not necessarily commensurable.487 
 
There are unresolved theoretical problems behind these seemingly simple presenta-
tions of the ‘faces’ of power. First, the causality of power is still being debated —do 
we identify power with change or continuity? Second, how do we make claims about 
unintentional and indirect effects of power? Third, what is the relationship between 
causal and constitutive power?488 There is also the question of power as an objective 
material capacity and measurable quantity—either segmented and issue-specific or an 
aggregated ‘lumped’ indicator—versus the understanding of power as a relational and 
contextual phenomenon.489 How are we supposed to measure power and how do we 
measure potential power? Measurement is linked to the question of the fungibility of 
power, i.e. the convertibility of power resources, which has been advocated, among 
others, by Robert Art and criticized by Stephen Baldwin and Stefano Guzzini. In 
short, the theoretical dispute is about whether one kind of power can be changed to 
another kind through some spill-over effects or linkage.490 Art sees state power as a 
composite of wealth, political skill and military power which can be given net worth. 
However, for Baldwin power is multidimensional.491 The dimensions are its scope 
(aspect of behaviour), domain (size of the target of power), weight (probability of 
influence), costs (cost of influence) and means (military, economic etc.)492 To these 
dimensions could be added societal norms because power must have meaning, at least 
to its target, and norms influence the way power is used.493 Any meaningful analysis 
of power must empirically define these dimensions that is, put power in a relationship 
and a context. 
 
Consequently, Joseph Nye has argued that “…there is no standard value that can 
summarize all relationships and contexts to produce an agreed overall power total.”494 
Nye himself has formulated the concept of ‘soft power’ which is “the ability to affect 
others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting 
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positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes.”495 Behind Nye’s concept is 
the separation of power resources and power behaviour, which obtain their meaning 
and produce different outcomes depending on the context. According to Nye, differ-
ent forms of power have different modalities, for example, military power can be used 
to physically destroy, back up threats in coercive diplomacy, promise protection and 
provide many forms of assistance.496 This is an interesting notion because it gives 
different forms of power characteristics which are dependent on the environment it 
is used in. Like Baldwin’s dimensions it is worthwhile to also consider cyber power 
instead of just power. 
 
Theorists of cyber power have had to combine the characteristics of cyberspace with 
different theories of power.497 One of the most holistic descriptions is Betz’s and Ste-
vens’: “…the variety of powers that circulate in cyberspace and which shape the ex-
periences of those who act in and through cyberspace.”498 This is a product of their 
attempt to combine all ‘Faces of power’ into one concept and what it gains in brevity 
it loses in parsimony. In practice, Betz and Stevens use Barnett and Duvall’s categories 
of power to show that concepts of power formulated in the field of political science 
are compatible with cyber studies.499 Joseph Nye describes cyber power as “…the 
ability to obtain preferred outcomes through use of the electronically interconnected 
information resources of the cyber domain. […] …[it] can be used to produce pre-
ferred outcomes within cyberspace or […] in other domains.”500 This is a subject-
centric, intentional use of power, compatible with the first and second faces of power, 
and highlights the fungibility of cyber power, i.e. its convertibility and scope.501 Some-
what similar is Khuel’s version: “…the ability to use cyberspace to create advantages 
and influence events in all operational environments and across the instruments of 
power.”502 The value of Khuel’s definition is that it highlights the possible synergistic 
effect of cyber power. These formulations seem to suggest that cyber power is com-
patible with universal definitions (‘faces’) of power but has its own resources and 
context which give it a distinct character. In his survey of cyber power concepts 
Schreier summarizes it as “the capability to control IT systems and networks in and 
through cyberspace”, which is in a sense tautology but nevertheless points to the ob-
ject of power through which outcomes and effects are produced.503 Gregory Rattray 
has also emphasised that power comes from the control of specific parts of the cyber 
environment which some have called ‘key terrain’.504 
 
Besides the above presented more conceptual formulations, there have been attempts 
to define cyber power by its resources. Nye, for example, offers infrastructure, edu-
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cation, legal control, markets, budgets, institutions and reputation as the power re-
sources of states.505 Brandon Valeriano and Ryan C. Maness propose a resource-based 
concept of power by differentiating between capabilities of offence, that is weapons 
and training, and dependence, i.e. reliance on the Internet, and of defence, meaning 
resilience, adaptation and protection.506 They later change their model to consist of 
just infrastructure, broadly understood as connectivity and knowledge capital.507 
Somewhat similar is the more policy oriented view presented by Chris Demchak who 
argues that institutions, national mentality, and offensive and defensive forces are re-
sources of cyber power.508  
 
Alexander Klimburg has offered coordinated government policy, international alli-
ances and agreements, and cooperation with non-state actors as the three dimensions 
for national cyber power.509 He advocates a ‘whole of nation’ policy-based view of 
cyber power. Somewhat similarly, Robert Bebber has argued that potential cyber 
power is “the available human and material resources within a strategic environment 
that can be utilized to generate effects in and through cyberspace.” These resources 
are information culture, technology industry, information networks, political institu-
tions, civil-government relations, global norms, foreign partnerships, mass and scale, 
and foreign relationships. The resources should produce skilled forces for effective 
cyber power if the state organizes, trains, and resources them properly.510 Considering 
purely military cyber power Rebecca Slayton has proposed technology, skilled people 
and well-developed organizations as resources of power.511 
 
It is not surprising that education and thus human knowledge, technology, regulation 
and organizations are defined as resources because of the dual physical – non-physical 
nature of cyberspace. The problem is, that these resources are more difficult to meas-
ure than purely physical capabilities, which have already in themselves been proven 
to be notoriously difficult to measure, at least in the military context.512 Moreover, 
there is no shared understanding between the great powers on how to measure cyber 
power.513 Because there has been no conflict categorized as cyber war, there is not 
even a shared understanding of the enabling or strategic role of cyber power, i.e. 
whether it has independent strategic effect or not.514 This means that the effect of, or 
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at least, military effectiveness of cyber power is disputed.515 David Betz has, for ex-
ample, criticised visions of cyber power that liken it to strategic air power, such as 
long-range bombers, because Douhetian visions of cyber power have no empirical 
basis.516 Others have criticised discursive and technological comparisons between nu-
clear weapons and cyber weapons.517 Yet some have even seen cyber weapons as a 
threat to nuclear weapons, so in a sense, even more strategic in their effects than the 
thermonuclear bombs themselves.518 All this considered, the usefulness and effects of 
strategic offensive military use of cyber power is still suspect.519 Moreover, it is debat-
able if cyber power should be considered as a military means or a more comprehen-
sive instrument of national or global politics. Consequently, Baylis, Wirtz and Gray 
argue that cyber power is used in the whole continuum of state relationships from 
peace to war.520 This point is important because it takes note of the long term effects 
of cyber power and argues that the use of cyber power is not restricted to wartime 
even if it can be considered to have a military aspect.  
 
The definitions presented above indicate that cyber power is not confined to cyber-
space, it is not separate from other types of power and it can have persistent effects 
even though its domain is changeable. In addition to these observations, scholars have 
listed characteristics of cyber power. Stuart H. Starr would not apply the principles of 
war from other domains to cyberspace because cyber power is more diffuse, its speed 
and scope are different and it is very dependent on technology.521 John B. Sheldon 
describes cyber power as pervasive, complementary, and stealthy.522 Elinor C. Sloan 
takes a more military oriented view and lists unconquerable space, continuous change 
and adaptability, borderlessness, rapid and potentially wide scale effects and indirect-
ness as characteristics of cyber power and space.523 Joseph Nye offers the extinct mo-
nopoly of violence by states, difficulty of attribution, cheap and plentiful resources, 
low relevance of distance, strength of offense compared to defence, the unfeasibility 
of conquering space or destroying opposing forces and the high fog of war.524 Erik 
Gartzke and Jon Lindsay note that the effects of cyber power are only temporary and 
that it is difficult to hoard it, because it is insubstantial and relative, and loses its utility 
when used.525 Martin Libicki has declared that there is no forced entry into cyberspace, 
which means that power is tied to the rules of cyberspace, e.g. if you try to blow your 
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way in, you do not have cyberspace anymore.526 Maness and Valeriano point out that 
cyber power can have a spill-over effect into other domains or issue areas and there 
can be unintentional second or third order effects. 527 Other definitions tell us that 
cyber power has its own physical, logical, organizational and cognitive aspects de-
pending on which level power is used. It may be kinetic or non-kinetic depending on 
its object. As a defensive power it is resilient as it is based on networks. Furthermore, 
it might or might not be cheap—depending on creativity and vulnerabilities.528 Con-
cepts of cyber power have often concentrated on the active and offensive military use 
of power. Peaceful or civilian definitions of cyber power are scarce. However, the 
interest in offensive aspects has recently begun to change as resilience, deterrence, 
and offensive operations have been integrated into cyber strategy proposals.529  
 
Because I am interested in the military strategic aspects of cyber power and approach 
power through a neoclassical realist framework, it is natural that the definition of 
cyber power adopted for this thesis should be centred on the first and second faces 
of power. This does not imply a concentration on just the direct influence or agenda-
setting but also includes the shaping of the space or environment where direct power 
is used. Therefore, cyber power can have persistent effects and its means and ways 
are not necessarily military. This is the reason why the term cyber power is used in 
this thesis and not that of military cyber power. Accordingly, cyberspace can be 
shaped and controlled, and it retains its attributes for a length of time, even outside 
conflicts, and without the use of exclusively military means and resources. Cyber 
power’s resources can be anything if the effect is in cyberspace or transmitted through 
it. However, the main resources can be argued to be technological, scientific, eco-
nomic, normative, doctrinal, organizational and professional. Cyber power can be uti-
lized in peace or wartime. It can be used to achieve strategic or enabling effects as 
part of a state’s grand or military strategy.530 Through strategic cultural ideas cyber 
power has meaning to its users. Thus, the use of cyber power is planned, intentional, 
and strategic and it is dependent on the actors’ understanding and perceptions of 
cyberspace and cyber power. In short, cyber power is an ability that empowers an actor to 
influence others in or through cyberspace and to control and shape cyberspace to its advantage according 
to its preferences.531 This is not a universal definition of cyber power. It emphasises the 
creative aspect of power and lays the ground for understanding how closed national 
networks or ‘national segments of the Internet’ are shaped into being and controlled.  
It does not exclude the direct use of force but, on the contrary, highlights an actor’s 
ability to create conditions for a more efficient use of both offensive and defensive 
direct force. This kind of power cannot be measured outside the relationship and 
context it is used, although resources or its potential can be. Cyber power is based on 
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constantly evolving technological, human, regulatory and organizational potential and 
it becomes military only through its use, effects or outcomes. 
  
3.4   War and warfare 
 
To understand how strategic cultural ideas, i.e. ideas about the use of force, relate to 
cyber power and how this power becomes military power, the concept of cyber war-
fare needs to be examined. Cyber power is exercised in a military strategic context 
through the threat or use of force. This definition includes both offensive and defen-
sive uses. Force is here understood as power that has been given (even if only implic-
itly) direction and/or an objective in a military context, that is a purpose. Power can 
be used or utilized based on a belief of effectiveness when applied for specific ef-
fect.532 In line with these definitions, cyber power might be utilized as a force with 
potential violent consequences in and from cyberspace. Although there is legitimate 
criticism against defining cyberspace and cyber power in military terms, it does not 
relinquish us from the fact that cyberspace has become a military domain and as such 
requires study from a military perspective.533  
 
War is a central term for understanding the use of force. According to the perhaps 
most famous Western military scholar Carl von Clausewitz war is “…a continuation 
of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.”534 Clausewitz and his fol-
lowers have enshrined the idea of war as a political instrument understood as a strug-
gle between two opposing sides affected by friction, and defined by an unchangeable 
nature composed of passion, chance and reason. However, war is also a ‘chameleon’ 
by character. The last premise means that war is a changing and historical phenome-
non.535 Clausewitz’s views have been criticized over time but much of the criticism 
has been disputed, or has been adjusted to fit Clausewitz’s ideas (or other way 
around).536 Others have added to Clausewitz’s ideas, for example, by pointing out that 
war is a social phenomenon, it is defined by people in historical context, or that the 
use of military force is not restricted to states or the state of openly declared interstate 
war.537  
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Warfare is about fighting, the making of war.538 Like war, warfare is an ambivalent 
concept because its use has emigrated from physical violence to cultural, economic 
and purely political realms.539 It has acquired qualifiers such as ‘information’, ‘eco-
nomic’ or ‘political’ warfare. In a way, this problem is inherent in the Clausewitzian 
idea of the changing character of war and, of course, also in the politicized use of the 
term.540 In addition to war and warfare, conflict is defined as the use of force below 
the level of open war. Conflict is limited in its means and ends and perhaps out-
comes.541 Moreover, terrorism, insurgency, civil war, and intrastate war are associated 
with organized violence for political purposes inside states, possibly with the covert 
or semi-open interference from other states. Between states competition and con-
frontation might take such forms as political, economic, and military pressure, includ-
ing sanctions, blockades and the show of military power. Different kinds of power 
can be used overtly or covertly, directly or indirectly in state to state relations before 
the threshold of war is crossed.542 This means that state relations related to the use of 
force and warfare are a continuum from peaceful relations to open war and this affects 
the ways power is utilized for force and other purposes. More importantly, the under-
standing of this continuum changes as the understanding of war changes when, for 
example, new technologies are introduced, societies change, or the views on morally 
acceptable means of influence evolve.  
 
3.4.1   Cyberwarfare 
 
Cyberwarfare and war are part of the changing character of war. John Arquilla and 
David Ronfeldt coined the term ‘cyberwar’ in 1993 which: “…refers to conducting, 
and preparing to conduct, military operations according to information-related prin-
ciples. It means disrupting if not destroying the information and communications 
systems, broadly defined to include even the military culture upon which an adversary 
relies in order to “know” itself.”543 Their concept was rooted in the growing role of 
knowledge in warfare (“…who knows what, when, where, and why, and about how 
secure a society or a military is regarding its knowledge of itself and its adversaries”).544 
During the 1990s the original concepts of cyber war and warfare where partly sub-
sumed by the concepts of RMA, NCW, and Information Warfare or Operations 
(IW/IO).545 The RMA and NCW emphasised the fusion of sensors, intelligence, com-
munications and precision weapons enabled by new technology which promised to 
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change the future way of war.546 NCW could be characterized as a semi-doctrine under 
RMA which emphasised the use of networks, the self-synchronization of units, and 
superior situation awareness in dominating the battlespace through increased speed 
and effectiveness command, control and communications.547 The central concept for 
NCW is information superiority which is “[the] ability to collect, process, and dissem-
inate an uninterrupted flow of information, while exploiting and/or denying an ad-
versary the ability to do the same.”548 
 
The concept of an ‘information war’ was first used by Thomas P. Rona in 1976.549 
According to Daniel Khuel, Rona described information warfare later in 1994 as “the 
sequence of actions undertaken by all sides in a conflict to destroy, degrade, and ex-
ploit the information systems of their adversaries. Conversely, information warfare 
also comprises all the actions aimed at protecting information systems against hostile 
attempts at destruction, degradation and exploitation. IW actions take place in all 
phases of conflict evolution: peace, crisis, escalation, war, de-escalation and post con-
flict periods.”550 At the beginning in the 1990s, IW in the United States was under-
stood as counter command and control warfare. It was about the development and 
adoption of digital technology.551 As the 1990s advanced, information warfare was 
increasingly seen as a new generation of warfare in which material resources were 
replaced by information. Edward Waltz, whose book Information Warfare: Principles 
and Operations contained many of the ideas NCW theorists would adapt, claimed 
that: “Information warfare operations concepts are new because of the increasing 
potential (or threat) to affect capacity and perception in the information and percep-
tion domains as well as the physical domain. These information operations are also 
new because these domains are vulnerable to attacks that do not require physical force 
alone […] The second new aspect to information warfare is the expansion of the 
battlespace beyond the traditional military realm. Information targets and weapons 
can include the entire civil and commercial infrastructure of a nation.”552 
 
Consequently, IW was later upgraded in the Western military doctrines to apply to 
the whole information environment, explicitly targeting an adversary’s information 
through information operations (IO) or protecting own information.553 In the US 
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doctrine, IO consists, among other things, of kinetic attacks, psychological opera-
tions, military deception, operational security, electronic warfare and computer net-
work operations.554 NATO defines the targets of IO as the will, understanding of 
situation, and command and control capabilities of an adversary.555 The substance of 
information warfare and operations has been debated in the 2000s-2010s because the 
means (kinetic and non-kinetic), targets (systems), information, people, behaviour, 
methods (direct and non-direct), and the environment (physical, electronic and cog-
nitive) are more or less mixed in definitions.556 The addition of ‘strategic information 
warfare’ and ‘strategic communications’ further muddled the distinction between the 
tactical, operational, strategic and political use of information.557 It speculated that 
information means could be used for strategic effect by affecting the military and 
infrastructure of the opponent.558 
 
After 2001 officials and politicians in the United States’ administration started to talk 
about cyber catastrophes or ‘Cyber Pearl harbours’.559 Attempts were made to under-
stand this new threat based on the ideas about the strategic role of the air force from 
1920s and ideas about nuclear forces from  the1950—1960s.560 The cyber threat was 
combined with terrorism, which gave birth to the concept of ‘cyber terrorism’ where 
non-state actors would be able to use cheap and formidable cyberattacks to cripple 
modern societies. 561 Cyber threats became a high priority for states globally, which 
led to  the creation of cyber military units, as well as the development of cyber weap-
ons, and the writing of state strategies to militarily defend national networks (instead 
of delegating this to the realm of broader security) and, if need be, to attack hostile 
nation’s networks.562 In this context Adam Liff defined cyber warfare as “the deliber-
ate hostile and cost-inducing use of Computer Network Attacks (CNAs) against an 
adversary’s critical civilian or military infrastructure with a coercive intent to extract 
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political concessions, as a brute force measure against military or civilian networks in 
order to reduce the adversary’s ability to defend itself or retaliate in kind or with con-
ventional force, or against civilian and/or military targets in order to frame another 
actor for strategic purposes.”563 Interestingly, Liff’s definition is very similar to the 
strategies of air power defined by Robert Pape with the addition of obfuscation and 
exclusion of decapitation.564 
 
Cyber war ‘hype’ led to a pushback from sceptics, who discredited the idea of 
cyberwar, cyber power’s ability to achieve strategic effects by itself, and the ability of 
cyber weapons to create sustained and kinetic effects, i.e. casualties and destruction 
on the magnitude compared to conventional weapons.565 Erik Gartzke claims that 
cyberwar is a myth because as an isolated instrument cyber-attacks have only a tem-
poral effect and lack coercive power, and deterrence is difficult to maintain without 
revealing critical capabilities.566 Valeriano and Maness prefer the term cyber conflict 
because of the perception that cyberwar has not happened and that cyber weapons 
might only have limited military effect anyways.567 There is no agreed, universal defi-
nition on what is to be considered an armed attack in cyberspace, and so no interna-
tionally accepted concept of the violation of sovereignty in cyberspace, or a basis for 
individual or collective self-defence.568 However, there is an emerging consensus since 
the 2010s among academics that ‘cyber war’ will not take place.569 Some even propose 
that cyber operations have become part of all conflicts and that the cyberspace is in a 
constant state of ‘skirmish’.570 Recently, in the context of the so-called hybrid and 
political warfare Martin Libicki has questioned the, admittedly Western, separation of 
cyber and information warfare.571 This proves the earlier point that defining cyber 
power as a strictly military power and concentrating purely on its destructiveness in 
the context of the warfare aspect is too narrow an approach. Moreover, the Western 
debate demonstrates how the offensive military use of force has been overemphasised 
and defence has been delegated to the realm of cyber security. Furthermore, it demon-
strates that the understanding of cyber warfare has changed and there is no agreed 
Western definition of what cyber warfare or war means. 
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3.4.2   Dialectics of cyber offensive and defence 
 
War and warfare require weapons. Thomas Rid and Peter McBurney have defined 
cyber weapon as a code that can do harm.572 The concept of cyber weapons is prob-
lematic because code (software) can be used in different ways and attacks are usually 
based on vulnerabilities of the target systems, not on tailor-made weapons as such.573 
Additionally, the term weapon refers to a certain purpose and an effect which arguably 
limits the ways in which the use of malicious code can be understood.574 Instead of 
weapons, the term cyber-attack or threat has been used to categorize different forms 
of tools or methods.575 Targeted cyber-attacks are, in fact, operations consisting of 
variously described chains of actions.576 The code used in the attacks is constantly 
modified and malware polymorphs into new versions with new signatures which de-
grade the ability to detect them.577 This means that attacks are constantly evolving, 
using newly found and unknown vulnerabilities, and, therefore, attribution based on 
code is difficult and defence based on previous incidents always lags behind. The 
problem of designating malware as a weapon is that computer code does not directly 
kill people and attacks usually consist of dual-use code. This is something that has 
caused a lot of consternation for those who have tried to define cyber weapons in 
legalistic terms and the whole concept has been politized.578 Conversely, Forrest Hare 
has argued that developing precision cyber weapon systems to be used during a lawful 
conflict ought to be legitimized as it would reduce the need for conventional weapons 
and thus could be more ethical, operationally effective, and cheaper.579 The problem 
is that cyber-attacks can be used by states, state proxy-actors and non-state actors 
(criminals and terrorists) and distinguishing them from each other based on the meth-
ods used is practically impossible.580 
 
IR and cyber scholars have differentiated cyberattacks or weapons to more abstract 
categories to manage a world of constantly changing malware names and technical 
slang. The most common categorization of cyberattacks is by effect: deny, disrupt, 
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degrade, or destroy.581 Martin Libicki argues that a cyberattack is about making a code 
or system do something it should not by manipulating it or giving it incorrect infor-
mation. He also emphasises that a cyberattack is different from espionage or crime—
mostly based on the agenda, not the means used.582 Others have abandoned the con-
cept of a weapon and have categorized actions or emphasised the nature, mechanism 
or technical aspects of the attack instead of the effects of attacks.583 Western militaries 
have integrated weapons and attacks into cyber operations which include Computer 
Network Attack (CNA), Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) and Computer Net-
work Defence (CND) or more recently Offensive cyber operations (OCO), Defen-
sive cyber operations (DCO) and DODIN operations (securing and sustaining De-
partment of Defence’s information networks).584 
 
Networks are inherently vulnerable to attacks and thus networks and the services run-
ning inside them have been protected with various systems and policies. Martin Li-
bicki has categorised these as those minimizing exposure to attacks, increasing resili-
ence, accelerating recovery, and defeating cyberattacks.585 A more technical approach 
distinguishes perimeter protection, filtering, monitoring, response, information shar-
ing, authentication, encryption, deception, and patching systems which range from 
manually human controlled to fully autonomous. 586 These systems can be combined 
in a complex of hardware and software or a system of systems587 that provides all 
services with centralized interfaces and control.588 Information has a definite role in 
security: threat intelligence must be shared inside and outside an organization if con-
stantly evolving cyber-attacks are to be countered.589 Cyber security should be sepa-
rated from cyber defence. The former refers to measures to protect computer sys-
tems, networks and information from intentional or unintentional harm. The latter 
refers either to protective systems or functions explicitly designed against malicious 
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attacks or to defensive military actions in cyberspace.590 Moreover, the meaning and 
scope of cyber security has changed over time.591 
 
The management of networks and their security is usually given to designated organ-
izations on corporate, governmental and national levels.592 These are  organizations 
run by humans, but because security systems are becoming increasingly complex and 
they monitor massive amounts of data, AI solutions being sought.593 Additionally, the 
networks themselves have become so complex and expensive to maintain that tech-
nology is increasingly being used to manage heterogeneous network devices from a 
centralized location. This increases the efficiency of network security management, 
but centralization may also cause new vulnerabilities.594 The threat of supply chain 
attacks has made the domestic production of hardware and software part of the na-
tional cyber defence. Moreover, education, training and internal security are inherent 
parts of cyber security as the insider threat, unintentional or intentional, is always 
present.595 
 
Cyberspace is full of potential malicious activity produced by various actors with var-
ious objectives.596 This makes it difficult to distinguish warfare from the ‘noise’ of 
other activity. Cyber-attacks and security systems are both constantly evolving and 
new vulnerabilities are discovered daily, and old exploits lose their effectiveness.597 
Therefore, there cannot be persistent dominance in cyberspace. Every kind of power 
relationship requires constant and proactive upkeep, or it will change and shift. Of-
fensive and defensive cyber forces are in a constant dialectical relationship, even dur-
ing peacetime, and cyber power provides a means to manage that relationship. Thus, 
if there is such a thing as cyber warfare, it can be tentatively defined as the use of force 
based on cyber power in or through cyberspace with a coercive intent to make political gains in the 
context of the continuum of interstate relations. 
 
3.4.3   Cyber use of force 
 
The use of cyber power on a strategic level has borrowed its language from nuclear 
strategy scholars such as Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn, Albert Wohlstetter, and 
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Thomas C. Schelling.598 This has led, with a slight variance in terminology, to the 
adoption of the concepts of persuasion, compellence, deterrence, coercion and brute 
force as the ways to use cyber force in the Western cyber literature.599 It must be 
noted that although the concepts are widely used there is variance in how they are 
understood and used in non-Western countries.600 Also, these political-strategic-level 
concepts lose their meaning on the tactical and technical levels.601 
 
Persuasion is something like Joseph Nye’s ‘soft power’: agenda framing, persuading, 
and positive attraction.602 The object of the use of force does not even notice the use 
of force or accepts it as legitimate that he/she is being influenced. Deterrence is based 
on the ability to hurt an opponent. It is based on the threat to use force to make an 
opponent not to take an action. The threat is based on punishment or on denying the 
opponents’ objectives by inflicting unbearable costs. This means that deterrence can 
be divided into deterrence by punishment (imposing costs) and deterrence by denial 
(preventing gains). The latter is in practise achieved by an outwardly effective defence. 
The opponent must know about the threat, it must to be credible and it must affect 
the opponent’s cost-benefit calculations.603 Deterrence is about the manipulation of 
the risk-calculations of an opponent.604 Deterrence is a theory on its own and has gone 
through at least three, perhaps four, generations with substantial criticisms at every 
turn. It is embedded in historical context and in the technological evolution of nuclear 
weapons.605 The difference between deterrence and compellence is that the latter is 
aimed at making or stopping an opponent acting in a certain way. It is based on active 
measures and the power to hurt the opponent more. Additionally, the opponent must 
have a choice to comply or not to comply. Deterrence and compellence are the de-
fensive and offensive or passive and active sides of coercion which is equated as the 
power to hurt.606 Brute force does not include any kind of bargaining or cost benefit 
calculations on the side of the opponent. Brute force is meant to destroy and kill, to 
take something or to hold something – to win without bargaining.607 
 
Both Joseph Nye and Martin C. Libicki have written about persuasion and cyber 
power. Nye gives it a role in his ‘soft power’ concept and Libicki writes about the 
‘friendly conquest of cyberspace.’ Based on their views it can be argued that cyber 
                                              
598 Cf. Libicki 2009; Geers 2011; Lango 2016; Nye 2016/2017; Valeriano, Jensen & Maness 2018. On the de-
velopment of the U.S. nuclear strategy theory cf. Freedman, Lawrence. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (3rd 
ed.) New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2003; Kaplan, Fred. The Wizards of Armageddon. Stanford, Calif.: Stan-
ford University Press, 1983; Klinger 2019.  
599 This taxonomy is based on the activity of the user of force, the perception of the opponent, and on the 
effects of force. 
600 For the Chinese and Russians cf. Babiarz 2015; Thomas 2015a; Adamsky 2018. 
601 Schelling, T. C. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008, 5. 
602 Nye 2011, 21. 
603 Schelling 2008, 5; Snyder, Glenn. Deterrence and Defence. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961; 
Angström & Widen 2015, 47-49; Freedman 2013, 159. 
604 Freedman 2003, 303. 
605 Jervis, Robert. Review: Deterrence Theory Revisited. World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 2 (January 1979), 289-324; 
Knopf, Jeffrey W. The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research. Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 31, No. 1 
(2010), 1–33. 
606 Schelling 2008, x. This terminology has not been fixed and some have used coercion to mean compellence 
(Cf.  Pape1996, 12). 
607 Schelling 2008, 2. 
 
88 
power plays an enabling role in persuasion as a part of the wider information war-
fare.608 Cyber deterrence has been a hotly contested issue.609 The basic problems are: 
against whom to direct deterring actions; how to evaluate the costs and effects; how 
to compensate the loss of deterrent means after their usage; how to estimate collateral 
damage; and how possible and desirable escalation610 into other domains would be.611 
All things considered, deterrence exclusively by punishment in cyberspace seems quite 
problematic. It would require proof, proximate temporal range, proportionality, and 
a specific weapon at the ready.612 Deterrence by denial, i.e. an effective defence which 
makes the expected costs too high for the potential attackers, might be a better solu-
tion. In fact, as time has gone by, and technology and the understanding of cyber 
power have improved, the argument about ‘cyber weapons always getting through’ 
has changed to a careful optimism about the denial aspect of deterrence.613 This aspect 
has been subsumed under the concept of resilience. Cyber resilience has been defined 
as “the ability to anticipate, withstand, recover from, and adapt to adverse conditions, 
stresses, attacks, or compromises on systems that include cyber resources.”614 The 
point is that whatever destruction an attack causes, systems can be restored in a quick 
and ordered manner which deprives the attacker of the sought benefits. The downside 
of resilience are the investments that must be made based on risk calculations.615  
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Deterrence has branched out to include a so-called active defence, which basically 
means penetrating potential aggressor’s networks and conducting intelligence gather-
ing operations with the option of pre-emptive or preventive attack.616Admittedly, ac-
tive defence might be considered the opposite to a deterrence because it is ‘active.’617 
Some scholars claim that the development of technology enables more accurate and 
faster attribution as well as better defence, which would allow cross-domain punish-
ment to be used in cyber incidents.618 Cross-domain here means retaliation for cyber-
attacks with diplomatic, economic, conventional military and even nuclear weapons.619 
There have also been attempts to fit cyber deterrence to the Cold War concept of the 
escalation ladder.620 Be that as it may, cyber deterrence still suffers from the ‘security 
dilemma’, that is, an arms race and unintentional escalation induced by the search for 
security.621 This is compounded by the fear that cyber-attacks could be used to degrade 
the C3 systems of strategic nuclear weapons.622  
 
The coercive or compelling use of cyber power is also a problematic concept because 
of the above mentioned strategic enabling effect.623 Consequently, Thomas Mahnken 
has stated that for cyber weapons to have an effect they need to be combined with 
other uses of force which makes states the primary cyber actors.624 Additionally, 
Thomas Rid has argued that the coercive or compelling use of cyber power would 
require that there is a clear understanding of who is using force against whom and for 
what purpose. The inherent secrecy of cyberspace makes this difficult.625 Conversely, 
cyber-attacks can target vulnerable and critical assets of a state and, consequently, are 
tools of strategic warfare.626 Instead of decapitation, a compelling use of cyber power 
could be used to enhance negotiations by only temporarily paralysing the opposing 
leadership, which would allow the resumption of the bargaining process after a 
demonstrative attack.627 The problem with arguments in favour of strategic effects is 
the shortage of empirical data on them and their low perceived effectiveness so far.628 
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627 Smeets, Max and Lin, Herbert S. Offensive Cyber Capabilities: To What Ends? In Minárik, Jakschis & 
Lindström 2018, 55-72. 
628 On the shortage of data and the debate about the strategic effects of offensive cyber operations cf. Valeriano, 
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Brute cyber force is related to destructive attacks against the critical information in-
frastructure on a strategic scale.629 Be that as it may, destroying and killing with cyber 
power without any element of bargaining has some of the same limitations as coer-
cion. Additionally, as some have noted, there might be no supremacy in cyberspace.630 
No one actor can control cyberspace in any meaningful way and destruction removes 
the access to it from both the defender and attacker.631 Taking and holding cyberspace 
are problematic concepts in a mutable, man-made environment. There is also the fear 
that the use of brute force on a strategic level could trigger conventional and nuclear 
counter retaliation.632 So, on a strategic level, brute force might be conceivable as an 
enabling and supporting force, but as a means to achieve political objectives, it could 
be unreliable and possibly suicidal. On an operational or tactical level holding ‘key 
terrain’ or even temporarily destroying or disrupting an adversary’s systems might 
make sense as part of conventional military operations.633  
 
A couple of issues concern all the ways of using cyber force. Firstly, the security di-
lemma applies also to cyberspace as the feeling of constant vulnerability and the cre-
ation of cyber forces will make states feel vulnerable, which will result in an arms race 
and possible conflict, which would reduce the security for all.634 Secondly, the security 
dilemma in cyberspace has changed as the offensive has lost its claimed ‘asymmetrical’ 
advantage and trust in defence through resilience has increased.  This asymmetry was 
based on the logic that an offensive needed to get through only once, and that abso-
lute defence was prohibitively expensive, and offensive weapons could not be pre-
ventively targeted.635 Thinking has changed as it was understood that true cyber weap-
ons require nation-state-level resources, must be tailored for a specific use and do not 
store well.636 Moreover, their effects are hard to predict, the risks are thus higher, and 
their acclaimed surprise effect is limited to the first strike.637 Thirdly, as the experience 
and understanding on the cyber use of force has accumulated, its connection to war 
                                              
629 Cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure might cause death and destruction and beat an opponent to surrender 
without any bargaining by destroying the foundations of society and government, cf. Rattray 2001; Geers, Ken-
neth. The Cyber Threat to National Critical Infrastructures: Beyond Theory. Information Security Journal: A 
Global Perspective, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2009), 1 - 7; Clark & Knake 2010; Wirtz, J. J. Life in the “Gray Zone”: 
observations for contemporary strategists. Defense & Security Analysis, Vol. 33, No. 2 (2017), 106 - 114. 
630 Libicki 2009, 141-142. 
631 This view contradicts current Western, Chinese and Russian military doctrines which emphasize the im-
portance of gaining ‘information superiority.’ (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017. Joint Operations (Joint Publication 
3-0). [Online]  
Available at: http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_13.pdf 
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трины информационной безопасности Российской Федерации” [Online]. Available: http://www. con-
sultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_208191/ [Accessed: 30th March 2019]; Johnson, James. China’s vision 
of future network-centric battlefield: Cyber, space and electromagnetic asymmetric challenges to the United 
States. Comparative Strategy, Vol. 37, No. 5 (2018), 373-390 
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dental/Inadvertent Nuclear War and Information Warfare. Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 25, No.4 (1999), 653 
- 675).) 
633 Cf. Bryant 2016. The concept of ‘key terrain’ is present in the United States cyber doctrine as a physical, 
logical or personal element that should be targeted for an effect or be protected (Kern & Gaines 2015). 
634 Van Evera, Stephen. Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War. International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 
1998), 5-43; Jervis 2011. 
635 Cf. Alberts, David S. Defensive Information Warfare. Washington: NDU Press, 1996; Rattray 2001; Libicki 
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and thus to visions of massive destruction have been replaced by ‘normalcy.’ Cyber-
attacks are now seen as part of an already ongoing ‘grey zone’ conflict under a nuclear 
strategic deterrence.638 And fourthly, as there are no commonly shared, tested or 
agreed rules or theories regarding the use of cyber force, different solutions based on 
the strategic cultural ideas will be tried and this will affect the whole of cyberspace 
because of its man-made and malleable nature. Most importantly, the above-examined 
strategic-level concepts do not include the shaping of battlespace. However, cyber 
power can be utilized to control and shape cyberspace as part of the strategy of a state 
actor. 
 
3.4.4   Cyber strategy 
 
The use of cyber power and force require intentionality. This issue is captured by the 
term strategy. Strategy as a term has lost its connection to military issues and has 
become a synonym for ‘a plan’.639 Nowadays the term ‘military’ needs to be added in 
the front of ‘strategy’ to make clear that what is meant by it is: “…the use that is made 
of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy.”640 This is, of course, only one 
way to define a military strategy.641 There are at least two opposing wills using force 
to resolve their dispute.642 It is never done in a vacuum or out of context or relation-
ship. ‘Linear logic’ in strategy produces failure. This is because, among other things, 
a strategy is never enacted on a passive opponent, every measure produces a counter-
measure and different levels of action interact in unforeseen ways.643 Strategy is also 
“the art of creating power”644 and “a plan of action designed in order to achieve some 
end.”645 It is also a process to identify the character of future war, prepare for it and 
manage it.646 According to one influential definition, strategy is “concerned with ways 
to employ means to achieve ends.”647 Hedley Bull states that military strategy “is the 
art or science of exploiting military force so as to attain given objects of policy.”648 
Military strategy can even be considered as a culture-bound vision of the use of force. 
Thus, different nations and militaries have different notions of strategy.649 In the 
                                              
638 Whyte, Christopher and Mazanec, Brian. Understanding Cyber Warfare. Politics, Policy and Strategy. Lon-
don & New York: Routledge, 2019, 163-164. 
639 Strachan 2013, 249-252. 
640 Gray 1999a, 17. 
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18) Strategy according to André Beaufre. Cf. Kolodziej, E. A. French Strategy Emergent: General Andre Beau-
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Strachan 2013, 118. 
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1989), 2-8. 
648 Bull, Hedley. Strategic Studies and Its Critics. World Politics, Vol. 20, No. 4 (1968), 593 – 605, 593. 
649 Gray 1999a, 141-150. According to Timothy Thomas China and Russia have, for example, their own con-
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Western literature strategy is nowadays related hierarchically to the concepts of oper-
ational art and grand strategy and it interacts with doctrine.650  
 
From an analytical perspective, military strategy has at least five aspects. Firstly, it can 
be a theory about the conduct of war. Secondly, it can be a concept concerning na-
tional security objectives and the nature of current war, i.e. a national security concept. 
Thirdly, it can be a concrete plan for how to fight a war and what forces to develop 
for it at the strategic level of planning. Fourthly, it can be a process of analysing the 
environment and formulating plans. Fifthly, it can be the conduct of war on the high-
est level—sometimes referred to as theatre-level warfare. These aspects are based on 
the notion that military strategy is subordinate to policy. Strategy gets its objectives 
from politics and transforms them into military ends which are achievable by military 
and non-military means.651 This somewhat overly rationalistic and mechanistic top-
down view of strategy is challenged by the idea of ‘emergent strategy.’ This empha-
sises the ad hoc nature of strategy or doing strategy. Strategy emerges from individual 
acts through learning and practise in a continuous process.652 
 
In the context of cyberspace, cyber strategies have been used mainly in the sense of a 
plan or concept.653 About 40% of the states of the world in 2017 had a national cyber 
security strategy that defined threats, opportunities, responses, responsibilities, re-
sources and a vision in some combination.654 These strategies are not military strate-
gies, but whole-of-government policies.655 As I want to emphasise the actions and 
their effects conducted through strategy I will not define cyber strategy as a plan or 
document. Therefore, I combine Lawrence Freedman’s definition of strategy as “the 
art of creating power” with Colin Gray’s “the use that is made of force and the threat 
of force for the ends of policy” as the basis of my definition.656 Behind these short 
definitions is the view that there are political ends which are achieved in various ways 
using means to achieve them. According to Lawrence, strategy is more than just a 
rational, materialistic plan. The unpredictability of human affairs challenges desired 
                                              
650 Operational art is usually defined as the use of military forces, string of battles or a campaign to achieve the 
objectives of war and grand strategy as the coordination of all of a nation’s assets to pursue a policy objective 
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Doctrine: A Reference Handbook. California: ABC-CLIO LLC, 2009, 2). According to Barry Posen doctrines 
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Proceedings of the 14th European Conference on Cyber Warfare & Security. Hattfield: University of Hertford-
shire, 2015, 71-78. 
655 Luiijf, Eric, Besseling, Kim and de Graaf, Patrick. Nineteen national cyber security strategies. International 
Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Vol. 9, No. 1-2 (2013), 3-31; Shafqat, Narmeen and Masood, Ash-
raf. Comparative Analysis of Various National Cyber Security Strategies. International Journal of Computer 
Science and Information Security, Vol. 14, No. 1 (January 2016), 129-136; Sabillon, Regner, Cavaller, Victor 
and Cano, Jeimy. National Cyber Security Strategies: Global Trends in Cyberspace. International Journal of 
Computer Science and Software Engineering, Vol. 5, No. 5 (May 2016), 67-81. 
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ends and may change calculations altogether. Furthermore, strategy is a form of active 
interaction involving bargaining, negotiation, threats, pressure and physical effects.657 
Gray on the other hand specifies seventeen dimensions of strategy grouped under the 
categories of people and politics, preparation for war and war proper. Strategy is done 
under each of them. Gray argues that the use of force in specific ‘geography’ (meaning 
land, sea, air, space and cyberspace) has its own grammar and it is always culturally 
based. Material circumstances and ‘laws of warfare’ will punish those that try to over-
come these objective rules.658 Somewhat similarly Freedman argues that, interests 
which define ends are socially construed needs—they are connected to strategic cul-
tural ideas, or scripts.659 Thus, based on Freedman and Gray, it can be argued that 
cyber strategy is very much a cultural phenomenon and connected to the defence and 
security elites’ understanding of their environment. 
 
Cyber strategy is also a practice based on ‘art’ or experience and a knowledge-based 
ability which allows for multiple resources, ways and means to create an effect. This 
idea follows Joseph Nye’s understanding of power resources which are converted to 
power in some context and relationship, using different ways or modalities.660 This 
formulation goes beyond the pure military use of force, and permits concentration on 
non-kinetic and non-military ways of using cyber power for military ends during the 
whole continuum of interstate relations. A cyber strategy can thus be understood as 
ways of using means (based on power) to produce effects in or through cyberspace 
for some end. These ends, ways, means and power derive their characteristics from 
cyberspace, but might have effects outside it. To sum it up, cyber strategy is one component 
of the ability to control and shape cyberspace when considering the use of military and non-military 
force in the context of cyberspace and the continuum of interstate relations. It refers to the ‘ways’ 
of using power resources— which are inherently connected to the actor itself and its 
understanding of the environment and thus to strategic cultural ideas. The concept of 
strategy explains why power rarely produces lasting effects because conflicting objec-
tives of a multitude of actors require constant evolution of ways and means.661 Cyber 
power must be exercised constantly, and cyberspace must be shaped if any advantages 
are to be had. 
 
3.5 Closed national networks 
 
Cyber power can be used to control and shape cyberspace in various ways. Arguably 
states with significant resources and the sovereign authority over their territory are 
the most capable actors to shape cyberspace. As was shown above, cyberspace is 
highly dependent on physical connections and hardware which are tied to the geo-
graphical locations and international and domestic governance, over which the state 
has either relative or theoretically absolute power. Thus, the Internet, as a part of 
cyberspace, is not outside the scope of the states’ cyber power. It was also argued that 
states can use cyber power for military purposes even if this does not amount to a use 
                                              
657 Freedman 2013, xi-xii. 
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659 Gow 2017, 275-276. 
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of force. This could be considered as shaping the battlefield on a strategic level.662 
Therefore, it is argued below that the shaping of cyberspace can have military strategic 
objectives in all phases of intrastate relations. 
 
According to the scholars of Internet governance, by shaping and controlling the In-
ternet, states are mainly trying to protect and promote their traditional interests: man-
aging the new threats emanating from and through the Internet, maintaining political 
control of their population by controlling information, and supporting the digitaliza-
tion and development of their economy.663 The most visible manifestations of the use 
of this power have been Internet ‘shutdowns’: the disconnections of Internet and 
mobile connections on a national level in times of domestic disorder.664 Chris Dem-
chak and Peter Dombrovski have argued that states respond to the existential vulner-
ability brought on by the borderless Internet by building virtual borders, establishing 
national cyber commands and ensuring the control of national cyberspace, i.e. terri-
torial sovereignty in cyberspace.665 This is part of the fragmentation of the Internet 
mentioned above.666 Moreover, this fragmentation could have direct military effects 
if it results in ‘cyber blockades’ or Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) zones which 
deny the use of cyberspace from designated actors.667 The states’ threat and use of 
force therefore have a role in the way states shape cyberspace. 
 
As was argued in the introduction of this thesis, the Russian regime’s project to con-
trol that portion of the Internet which resides on its territory and under its jurisdiction, 
i.e. its national segment of the Internet has been approached mainly as an issue of 
censorship, political control, and information warfare. However, Kukkola, Risto-
lainen and Nikkarila have argued that behind this project is an effort to gain military 
strategic advantage by creating a closed national network.668 In this context a closed 
national network is a state controlled segment of Internet that can be technically dis-
connected from the global Internet.669 The idea has its roots in a paper written by 
Nikkarila and Ristolainen in which they applied traditional elements of combat power, 
i.e. manoeuvre, fire, and protection to analyse the military implications of Russia’s 
                                              
662 A cyber battlefield is an area of confrontation within the cyber domain where adversaries battle for control 
in order to achieve tactical and operational objectives. (Kukkola, Ristolainen & Nikkarila 2017b). 
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666 Giampiero 2014; Mueller 2017; Kremer & Müller 2016. 
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son. Strategic Anti-Access/Area Denial in Cyberspace. In Maybaum, Osula & Lindström 2015, 153-168. “An 
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Open network society’s choices and consequences. Presented at Military Communications (MILCOM) confer-
ence, Baltimore, USA, October 23.-25, 2017; Kukkola, Juha, Nikkarila, Juha-Pekka and Ristolainen, Mari. 
Asymmetric frontlines of cyber battlefields. Presented at International Command and Control Research and 
Technology Symposium (ICCRTS), Los Angeles, USA, November 6.-8., 2017. 
669 Kukkola, Ristolainen & Nikkarila 2017b; Kukkola, Nikkarila & Ristolainen 2017. 
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project to secure and, if needed, close its national Internet from outside traffic. They 
argued that although increased protection is the main benefit of closing the national 
Internet, Russia could gain a relative advantage in fire and manoeuvre in cyber warfare 
against opponents who keep their networks open.670 Theoretically then, the closed 
national network provides better protection and a military advantage against those 
states that are not able to disconnect their national networks. 
 
Kukkola, Ristolainen and Nikkarila continued to analyse the possible results of closing 
national networks and developed concepts of ‘cyber asymmetry’, ‘asymmetric cyber 
frontlines’ and ‘structural cyber asymmetry’ to describe the military advantage that the 
closing of national network could provide.671 Basically, ‘cyber asymmetry’ refers to an 
offensive and defensive advantage of a nation closing its networks over a nation that 
keeps its networks open in cyberspace. ‘Asymmetric frontlines’ refers to a layered and 
echeloned defences inside a closed national network—a concept which has, in prin-
ciple, been proposed by two Russian scholars. These ‘frontlines’ are asymmetric be-
cause open networks lack them. ‘Structural cyber asymmetry’ describes the result of 
shaping and controlling closed national networks from cyberspace. It is an attribute 
of cyberspace created by manipulating the infrastructure and rules of cyberspace by 
means of technology, governance, norms and politics.672 The infrastructure and rules 
can be understood as ‘digital territory’ which refers to material, functional, normative 
and political elements of cyberspace.673 This is an analytical concept which enables 
the visualization and mapping of hardware, software, infrastructure, interconnection, 
information, human resources, protocols, services, policies and norms. Because cy-
berspace was defined above as a man-made and governed, the digital territory needs 
to be mapped on a case-by-case basis. It this thesis, the case is the Russian national 
segments of the Internet which will be ‘mapped’ as system of systems in the way 
described below.674 
 
The basic argument of Kukkola, Nikkarila and Ristolainen is that in a situation where 
one nation manages to disconnect its national segment of the Internet from the global 
Internet it would gain an asymmetrical advantage in computer network attack (CNA) 
and computer network exploitation (CNE) operations.675 Figure 1 shows how the 
asymmetry achieved by closing national networks is achieved. In the figure, the attack 
vectors (arrows) between a nation closing its networks (solid circle) and a nation with 
open networks (smaller dotted cloud) towards the global Internet (larger dotted 
cloud) are illustrated. It is important to note that the closing does not necessarily mean 
disconnecting all traffic. It can be done in steps based on increased control of traffic 
to, from and inside the national segment of the Internet.676 The model is based on 
                                              
670 Nikkarila & Ristolainen 2017. The paper was inspired by Ristolainen 2017a. 
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controlled and what their political, economic or strategic function is. (Cf. Ó Tuathail, Gearoid and Simon Dalby 
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96 
Russian policies which will be more extensively discussed in Chapter 6. The nation 
closing its networks would control the Internet routing architecture inside its national 
segment and so maintain operational capabilities, i.e. services outside the global In-
ternet. Additionally, it could operate in the global Internet through various interfaces. 
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic outline of the asymmetry between a closed and open national network. 
Source: Kukkola, Nikkarila & Ristolainen 2017. 
 
In a confrontation between open and closed network nations, CNA/CNE opera-
tions from the closed network to the open network (solid arrows) can be conducted 
through interfaces officially designated for traffic, as well as through non-designated 
interfaces, through third-party networks and from inside the national network. Al-
ternatively, CNA/CNE operations into the closed national network (dotted arrow) 
can be conducted through designated interfaces, non-designated interfaces that re-
quire additional measures to penetrate the defences of the closed national network, 
and from inside the closed network. Third-party networks operate towards closed 
networks like attacks through non-designated interfaces. 
 
Designated interfaces are monitored and regulated points of traffic exchange points 
(IXPs) between national ISPs and their functions are based on agreements, AS adver-
tisement, and physical lines of traffic. Traffic through these interfaces can be tracked, 
attributed (at least to the previous hop), and analysed efficiently in real-time, and the 
interfaces can be disconnected at will. The level of control of the designated interfaces 
by the state is an empirical question, but in the following analysis it is assumed that 
on the side that is closing its networks designated interfaces are highly controlled and 
regulated by the state. Non-designated interfaces are unregulated and possibly illegal 
interfaces, which nevertheless allow traffic from and into national networks.677 Third-
party networks are maintained by instances not connected to either nation. Insider 
interfaces require physical connections to the target network in the target country 
using USB, side-channel techniques or other media. 
 
                                              
& Nikkarila 2017a, 52-53). 
677 These could be mobile data networks, satellite Internet services or unregulated optical fibre cable connec-
tions etc. which provide access into the wider national segment. They also include corporate networks which 
reside on the territory of a nation but are physically or logically disconnected from the national segment. 
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Kukkola, Nikkarila and Ristolainen analysed the interaction between open and closed 
networks by examining how the closing of a national segment of the Internet could 
affect the defence and offence of a nation closing its network contra a nation leaving 
its networks open.678 In this context, Kukkola et al. used the freedom of movement, 
situation awareness and decision-making679 capabilities to analyse a theoretical con-
frontation between an open and closed network nation on a conceptual level using 
the interfaces as points of analysis. 
  
The advantages point to a disproportioned and exploitable advantage for the nation 
closing its networks. Furthermore, Kukkola et al. analysed the ‘asymmetrical front-
lines’ inside closed national networks and claimed that this provided a further ad-
vantage for the closed network defender. This argument was based on a possible Rus-
sian project to use BGP routing, SDN technology and the nationalization of parts of 
the critical information infrastructure to create a centrally controlled national segment 
of the Internet. A hypothetical version of this project is shown in Figure 2. 
 
         
 
 
Figure 2. A simplified schematic outline of the asymmetrical frontlines inside a closed national 
network. Source Kukkola, Nikkarila & Ristolainen 2017. 
 
In Figure 2 a network of routers form frontlines through which all traffic must pass. 
The first frontline is a border and customs zone through which all traffic must cross, 
and inside which its source and legitimacy are verified. It is a kind of nation-level 
demilitarized zone (DMZ)680. At the later frontlines the traffic is analysed and moni-
tored, and the legitimacy of packets is checked based on routing tables. In effect, all 
                                              
678 Kukkola, Juha. The Russian Segment of Internet as a Resilient Battlefield. Presented at the International 
Society of Military Sciences Conference (ISMS) Warsaw, Poland, October, 18.-19., 2018. 
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standing the idea behind the analysis: Freedom of movement—the ability to conduct defensive and offensive 
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traffic is registered, and unauthorized traffic is dropped. The last frontline consists of 
point defences, i.e. firewalls etc.681 
 
To summarize, the claimed advantages in the defence and offence of the nation clos-
ing its networks are based on the argument that through technological solutions and 
by nationalizing the control of that portion of the Internet which resides on its terri-
tory and under its jurisdiction a nation can gain an asymmetrical advantage in freedom 
of movement, situation awareness, and decision-making capabilities because the 
properties of cyberspace would be decidedly different for each belligerent. Kukkola 
et al.’s main point is that if one nation or a group of nations decide to build national 
systems to control and disconnect their national segments of the Internet, those na-
tions leaving their networks open would be in a position of a serious strategic disad-
vantage in a time of conflict. The project to prepare for the disconnection of national 
networks can be compared to the preparation of the battlefield on a strategic level. 
Or put in a different way in the words by Philippe Maigret: “the best kind of fortresses 
are those that forbid access to one’s country while at the same time giving an oppor-
tunity to attack the enemy in his own territory.”682 
 
The Russian or any national segment of the Internet is a possible manifestation of the 
above described closed national network. Every national segment is however different 
because they are the result of the use of cyber power through strategy which is guided 
by strategic cultural ideas. Therefore, it is important to study how they have been 
shaped into being, how they are controlled and how they function. In this thesis I 
shall approach the Russian national segment of the Internet as a system of systems. 
This has been defined by Annette Krygiel as “a set of different systems so connected 
or related as to produce results unachievable by the individual systems alone. [...] They 
are capable of independent action. These constituents fulfil purposes of their own 
and can operate when disassembled from the whole. They are managed for their own 
purposes.”683 A system consist of objects in an interactive relationship which form a 
whole and thus have borders and relationships to other ‘wholes’. They also have a 
function and a goal.684The argument is that the system of systems is designed for the 
state control of the national segment to provide different functions in different phases 
of interstate relations according to the reasons provided by the prevailing strategic 
cultural ideas. Thus, I am not assuming that the Russian national segment is meant 
for closing the national network, achieving cyber asymmetry, or any other predeter-
mined function except as an exercise of cyber power. The reason why I choose to 
approach the Russian national segment as a system of systems is that, as Chapters 4 
                                              
681 Ibid. The asymmetry has been proven also mathematically cf. Nikkarila, J-P., Åkesson, B., Kuikka, V., and 
Hämäläinen, J. Modelling Closed National Networks – Effects in Cyber Operation Capabilities. Presented at 
the 17th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security (ECCWS), 28-29 June 2018, Oslo, Norway. 
682 Guerlac, H. Vauban: The Impact of Science of War. In Paret, Peter (ed.) Makers of Modern Strategy from 
Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, 64-90, 87. 
683 Krygiel, Annette J. Behind the Wizard’s Curtain: An Integration Environment for a System of Systems. 
CCRP Publication Series, 1999, 33-34. 
684 Ackoff, Russell L. Ackoff’s Best. His Classic Writings on Management. New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 
1999; Checkland, Peter. Soft Systems Methodology: A Thirty Year Retrospective. Systems Research and Be-
havioral Science Syst. Res. Vol. 17 (2000), 11-58; de Rosnay, Joël. The Macroscope A new world scientific 
system. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1975 [Online]. Available: http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/ macro-
scope/ [Accessed: 23rd September 2019]. 
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and 5 will demonstrate, cybernetic and systems theoretic thinking685 influences Rus-
sian information security theorizing. Moreover, several types of national systems of 
information security and political control have been proposed by many Russian schol-
ars. I do not argue that Russians are building such a system, just that it makes sense 
in the context of the prevailing strategic cultural ideas and provides one way to map 
a digital territory as a functional, normative, and political construct. This in my mind 
corresponds to the realist analytic form of pragmatism that was chosen as the thesis 
philosophical premise. 
 
Now, that I have defined the main concepts of this thesis and provided a framework 
for analysing the Russian national segment of the Internet, and as such, answered the 
theoretical problems of this thesis, I shall continue to the analytical part. I have argued 
that the concepts developed here are preliminary descriptions of the objects of reality 
to which strategic cultural, in this case Russian ones, give meaning. The concepts are 
thus also tools to discuss, analyse and understand the objective and real phenomena 
of shaping and controlling cyberspace into a closed national network. 
  
                                              
685 Systems thinking is a scientific approach which came into being in the 1930s and 1940s. It spans diverse 
disciplines and includes multiple theories and methodologies which approach reality as holistic systems. One 
of the first developers of systems theory was the Russian Aleksandr Bogdanov (1873-1928). Austrian Karl 
Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1901-1972) is widely recognized as the actual creator of general systems theory. It aims 
to examine the whole of reality as systems which are entities composed of parts and the relationships between 
those parts. Systems theory is present in IR, for example, in the Neorealism of Kenneth Waltz (1924-2013). 
The modern version of systems theory argues that it is the responsibility of the researchers to search, describe 
and define systems. (Checkland 2000; Hammond, Debora. The Science of Synthesis. Exploring the Social Im-
plications of General Systems Theory. Boulder: The University Press of Colorado, 2003; Lillienfeld, Robert. 
The Rise of Systems Theory: an Ideological Analysis. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1978). 
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4  
HISTORICAL IDEAS 
 
his chapter begins to find answers to the thesis’ research problem’s analytical 
part by identifying the main strategic cultural ideas related to cyberspace and 
cyber power present in the discourses of Russian defence and security policy 
oriented epistemic communities and elites. I will begin this chapter by identifying a 
group of strategic cultural ideas that are connected to cyberspace, cyber power and 
cyber warfare and at same time I will present a critical literature review of previous 
studies on Russian information warfare. The ideas identified are: interstate struggle, 
digital sovereignty, strategic deterrence, asymmetric response, information superior-
ity, information-technological warfare, automated command and control systems, and 
unified information space. I continue by examining the historical roots of the identi-
fied ideas through previous research and secondary literature and through some of 
the most important primary sources mainly to show the linguistic continuity of the 
terms and how the concepts were framed and perhaps understood in the time of 
writing. In the next chapter I follow the development of these strategic cultural ideas 
between 2000-2018.  
 
4.1 Russian information warfare and strategic cultural ideas 
 
Kier Giles, a senior consulting fellow at Chatham House, has been one of the most 
prominent proponents of the view that the Russians see cyber warfare as a Western 
concept and when they use it, they refer to Western concepts and actions. He argues 
“that any research on Russian capabilities and intentions which includes the word 
“cyber” risks providing fundamentally misleading results.”686 Instead of cyber, Rus-
sians use the term ‘information’. Giles’ argument can be empirically proven by exam-
ining the official information security documents of the Russian Federation.687 To my 
knowledge no one has produced a proper explanation for why the Russians, who do 
borrow words from other languages quite readily, have not adopted the term cyber in 
the context of information and data networks of computers and software.688 I claim 
that this phenomenon has at least three reasons. The first is the negative connotation 
with the term ‘kibernetik’ which refers to the Soviet (pseudo)meta-science of cyber-
netics that was discarded in the 1980s by Soviet scientists themselves. Conversely, the 
                                              
686 Giles 2016. Cf. also Giles, Kier. The Next Phase of Russian Information Warfare. Research paper. Riga: 
NATO STRATCOM COE, 2016; Giles, Keir. Russia’s Public Stance on Cyberspace Issues. In Czosseck, Ottis, 
& Ziolkowski 2012, 63-76; Giles, Keir. Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West – Continuity and Inno-
vation in Moscow’s Exercise of Power. Chatham House, Russia and Eurasia Programme, March 2016; Giles, 
Keir and Monaghan, Andrew. Legality in Cyberspace: An Adversary View. The Letort Papers, Strategic Studies 
Institute March 2014. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2014; Giles & Hagestad 2013. 
687 Cf. Указ Президента РФ от 9 сентября 2000 г. N Пр-1895. ”Об утверждении Доктрины информаци-
онной безопасности Российской Федерации” [Online]. Available: http://base.garant.ru/ 
182535/#ixzz4x5P8ZYEp [Accessed: 21st March 2019]; Указ Президента РФ 2016. 
688 Mustajoki, Arto. Kevyt kosketus venäjän kieleen [A Slight Touch on the Russian Language]. Helsinki: Gau-
deamus, 2012, 147-151. 
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term ‘kibernetik’ already has a legitimate and established meaning in the Russian lan-
guage.689 The second is based on politics and relates to the official Russian policy of 
claiming that the content of information is a legitimate interest of  sovereign states 
and that information is a form of weapon that should be regulated.690  The third reason 
is connected to the taken-for-granted claim that the Russian approach to information 
is more holistic and consequently the cyber concept refers only to a means to an 
effect. According to Giles, for Russians “information itself […] is important and is 
the object of operations, independent of the channel through which the information 
is transmitted. The aim is to control information in whatever form it takes. In this 
context, cyber in particular is just a technical representation of information, standing 
alongside other carriers such as print media, individual or mass consciousness, and 
much more besides.”691 
 
Giles’ arguments are not novel. In her article from 1999 Mary Fitzgerald from the 
Hudson Institute, who was the leading scholar on the Soviet Military Technical Rev-
olution (MTR)692, claimed that by 1999 Russian military theorists were convinced of 
the strategic effects of information warfare and considered it to be a continuum of 
operations starting already in peacetime to intimidate the opponent and escalating to 
massive information-electronical warfare during conflict.693 Moreover, modern 
means, forms, and methods made it possible to attain strategic objectives of war with-
out the conquest of territory.694 Fitzgerald claimed that the lessons drawn from the 
operation Desert Strom convinced the Russians that, a successful use of information 
warfare might resolve a conflict already at the initial period of war.695  According to 
Fitzgerald, already in the late 1990s Russia was pursuing operational niche capabilities 
or asymmetries to exploit the United States’ vulnerabilities and to counter its superi-
ority until Russia managed to realize its own RMA. The defensive aspect of this strat-
egy was the development of automated and autonomous (“intellectual”) command-
and-control systems and a state-level (intergovernmental), territorial unified telecom-
munications networks combined with early-warning radars, EW and air-defence as-
sets. This “unified information-management system” would integrate separate armed 
forces networks and centralize the command. Fitzgerald presented the Deputy De-
fence Minister Andrei Kokoshin as one of the masterminds behind the idea of “sci-
entific-technical reserve” which would allow Russia to leap-frog over a generation of 
technology to surpass the Western militaries.696 In her article Fitzgerald touched upon 
                                              
689 Gerovitch 2002; Susiluoto 2006; Peters 2016. 
690 Tikk & Kerttunen 2017; Thomas, Timothy L. Russian Information Warfare Theory: The Consequences of 
August 2008. In Blank & Weitz 2010, 265-299; Patryk Pawlak. Reducing Uncertainties in Cyberspace through 
Confidence and Capacity-Building Measures. In Giacomello 2014, 39-58; Nocetti 2015.  
691 Giles 2016b, 6. 
692 According to Soviet sources, the Soviet Union went through at least two Military Technological Revolutions. 
The first was the mechanization of 1920s and the second was the development of the capability for interconti-
nental strategic nuclear weapons. The third would have been the 1970s and 1980s transition to technologically 
advanced conventional armed forces. (Adamsky 2010, 26-28.) 
693 Fitzgerald, 1999. 
694 Ibid. For the original cf. Самсонов, Виктор. Точка зрения. Нужна новая система коллективной без-
опасности, или Что сегодня может угрожать национальным интересам государств СНГ. Красная звезда 
1995, № 279. 
695   This view was based on an analysis of the United States’ use of EW capabilities. From a defender’s view-
point, effective defensive EW means were seen to reduce the surprise and the effectiveness of deep strikes, and 
to blind the enemy. The “electronic-fire” concept was considered as a new concept of war. (Fitzgerald, 1999). 
696Ibid. For another view on the Russian ‘RMA’ cf. Kipp, Jacob W. The Russian Military and the Revolution in 
Military Affairs: A Case of the Oracle of Delphi or Cassandra? Fort Leavenworth, KS: FMSO, 1995. 
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many of the strategic cultural ideas I claim have had historical continuity, namely the 
interstate struggle, asymmetric response, information superiority, automated com-
mand and control systems, and a unified information space. 
 
Timothy L. Thomas from the Foreign Military Studies Office at the U.S. Army War 
College has been steadfastly writing about the Russian approach to information war-
fare from the 1990s and because of this, his writings have had a defining effect on the 
Western understanding of Russian IW.697 The writings of Thomas are important be-
cause he is one of the few Western scholars who has consistently and extensively used 
Russian language primary sources to study the Russian approach to IW. Below, I will 
briefly summarize his main points from different articles published first between 
1996-2017. 
 
Already in his 1996 article Thomas presented almost all the elements of Russian IW 
thinking that he elaborates in his later articles.698 He introduced the concept of ‘infor-
matsionnoe protivoborstvo’ which he translated as information war. He argued that 
the terms ‘informatsionnaia voina,’ ‘informatsionnaia bor’ba,’ and ‘informatsionnoe 
protivoborstbo’ all relate to the Western concept of IW. Thomas also claimed that 
the Russian approach to IW can be divided to information-psychological and infor-
mation-technological/technical aspects699. The first refers to perception management, 
the moral-psychological preparation of own forces, and the concept of ‘reflexive con-
trol’—which targets the brain.700 The second refers to counter command and control 
warfare which includes attacks against the enemy’s information systems—which tar-
gets machine processors.701 According to Thomas, the Russians argued after the Gulf 
War that superior information processing had become at least as important in warfare 
as numerical superiority.702 Additionally, Thomas argued that the Russians considered 
IW both in a broad national and societal context, where it might even have a strategic 
impact and at the same time in tactical-operational level, where it was more an ena-
bling factor.703 In a 2005 book ‘Cyber Silhouettes’ Thomas demonstrated that the in-
formation-psychological/technological divide, which he had proposed more as an an-
alytical concept in 1996, was in reality concretely present in the Russian IW thinking 
and writings by 2003. Moreover, Thomas acknowledged that the Russian terms for 
                                              
697 In the Finnish context many of the studies written about the Russian IW are based on Timothy Thomas or 
scholars referring to his analysis. (Berger, Heidi. Venäjän informaatio-psykologinen sodankäyntitapa terrorismin 
torjunnassa ja viiden päivän sodassa [Russia's information-psychological warfare in the fight against terrorism 
and in the Five-day war], Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, Johtamisen ja sotilaspedagogiikan laitos, Julkaisusarja 1, 
5/2010; Saarelainen, Jorma. Informaatiosodankäynti – venäläinen näkökulma [Information warfare - a Russian 
perspective]. In Saarelainen et al. 1999, 247-271; Pynnöniemi 2019a; Pynnöniemi, Katri. Information-Psycho-
logical Warfare in Russian Security Strategy. In Kanet 2019, 214-226). 
698 Thomas 1996. 
699 Thomas uses the terms technological and technical interchangeably (Cf. Thomas 1996; Thomas, Timothy. 
Cyber Silhouettes. Shadows Over Information Operations. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies 
Office, 2005.) 
700 “Reflexive control involves creating a pattern or providing partial information that causes an enemy to react 
in a predetermined fashion without the enemy realizing that he is being manipulated.”  (Thomas 1996, 31-32; 
Cf. Thomas, Timothy. Russia's Reflexive Control Theory and the Military, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 
Vol. 17, No. 2 (2004), 237-256.) 
701 Thomas 2005, 166-167. 
702 Ibid., 31. 
703 Ibid., 27. 
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IW had important distinctions and he began to translate ‘informatsionnoe protivo-
bortsvo’ first to mean confrontation and then later struggle.704 
 
Through his articles Thomas has consistently referred to a group of Russian theorists 
who he sees to have influenced the Russian thinking on IW. These are primarily Ad-
miral Vladimir Pirumov, the Scientific Advisor to the President of the Russian Fed-
eration until 1997 and the first head of the Scientific Council of the Security Council; 
a civilian analyst of the MoD V. I. Tsymbal; and a professor and member of the Rus-
sian Academy of Sciences (RAN) Colonel S. A. Komov. They have been later joined 
by professor S. V. Rastorguyev, a member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sci-
ences (RAEN) and Academy of Military Sciences (AVN); professor Vitalii Tsygichko, 
a member of the RAS; and Major S. V. Markov.705 These scholars have offered di-
verging views on IW and I will return to them more closely when analysing strategic 
cultural ideas. Nevertheless, Thomas’ examination of their ideas shows that ideas 
about an information struggle, information superiority, and information-technologi-
cal warfare were quite well-established by the early 2000s.706 Although Thomas does 
not mention it, these scholars and probably many others with a security service back-
ground, especially from the FAPSI707, probably took part in the interagency 
workgroup or committee on information security of the Security Council established 
in 1993-1996, and participated as experts in the subcommittee of information security 
of the Committee of Security of the State.708  
                                              
704 Ibid.  
705 Thomas 2015a & 2017. 
706 Thomas, Timothy L. The Russian Understandings of Information Operations and Information Warfare. In 
Alberts & Papp 2001, 777-814, 785-786; Thomas 2001; Thomas 2005. 
707 FAPSI was established in 1991 (its status was defined in law in 1993) to manage special communications, 
cryptographic and engineering-technical security of encrypted communications, intelligence gathering activities 
in the sphere of special communications, and the provision of special information to higher bodies of authority. 
(Thomas 1996, 28) Organization and tasks were based on the KGB’s 8th Main directorate (communications 
intelligence and cryptography), 16th Directorate (radio-electronic surveillance and technical intrusion) and 12th 
Department (eavesdropping). FAPSI was a fully-fledged security service, in practice answering only to the pres-
ident, and grew in personnel and power during the Yeltsin era. FAPSI was disbanded and its resources and 
responsibilities divided between the FSB and FSO in 2003. (Bennett, Gordon. The Federal Agency of Govern-
ment Communications & Information. Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, The Conflict Studies Research Cen-
tre 2000 [Online]. Available: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/96806/00_Aug.pdf [Accessed: 3rd December 
2018]; Soldatov & Borogan 2010; Agentura.ru. В спецслужбе создали новую структуру для противодей-
ствия компьютерным Преступлениям. 12.09.2018 [Online]. Available: http://www. agen-
tura.ru/news/28975/ [Accessed: 18th April 2019].) 
708 According to Thomas, the 1995 draft law on information security clearly saw IW as a military threat mainly 
directed against command and control of military and critical information resources of military-industrial com-
plex (Thomas 1998a, 159-160). What Thomas does not mention in his articles is that according to Professor 
Igor’ Sheremet, Vice-President of the Academy of Military Sciences, in 1995 the Security Council of the Russian 
Federation formed an interagency workgroup consisting of the representatives from the SVR, FSB, FAPSI, 
MVD, MoD, Roskomnadzor, Academy of Sciences, military-industrial complex and Security Council. Its task 
was to investigate the issues concerning the developing global information infrastructure. (Шеремет, Игорь. 
Киберугрозы России растут — часть I. Ситуация в этой области изменяется в лучшую сторону гораздо 
медленнее, чем того требует развитие геополитической обстановки. ВПК, № 5 (523) за 12 февраля 2014 
года.) It is possible that many of the articles published in military journals in the latter half of the 1990s, which 
Thomas analysed, were influenced by this working group and that the 2000 Information security doctrine was 
based on the work done by the group. Anatolii Strel’tsov argues that an interagency commission of information 
security under the Security Council was established already in 1993 (Стрельцов, А.А. Обеспечение 
информационной безопасности России. Теоретичнские и методологические основы. М.: МЦНМО, 
2002, 10.). It is unclear if this is the same commission that Sheremet referred to. Strel’tsov also claims that in 
1996 under the Committee of Security of the State Duma a subcommittee of information security was estab-
lished (Ibid., 11.) In 1998 President Yeltsin gave a degree that designated V. P. Sherstiuk, the director of FAPSI, 
as the chairman of the Interagency Committee of Information Security (Указ Президента Российской 
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Based on the writings of Russian theorists and some practitioners, Thomas argues 
that the Russians purposefully did not copy American definitions because their needs 
and structural incentives were different.709 Already in 1998, Thomas summarized ten 
key elements of Russian IW thinking, which (in a very condensed form) are described 
as follows: The incorporation of ‘object laws and principles’ of the military science 
into IW; The main objective and methods of implementation of IW change from 
peace to war time (peacetime includes reducing the information potential of the en-
emy and the protection own potential); The Russian focus is on society and conse-
quently on information-psychological aspects; People are seen as information-psy-
chological entities who can be influenced, for example, through energy; Superiority in 
information technologies challenges the geo-strategic balance by compromising nu-
clear command systems; The information potential of a country is a measurable quan-
tity; Modern information operations affect military art by changing the nature of the 
initial period of war, tempo and importance of C4ISR; Computer research has pro-
duced and will produce unexpected results; IW is the interaction between opposing 
systems not unidirectional combat operations; Lastly, ‘the infosphere’ is understood 
to consist of computer programs and system are seen to become the most likely ob-
jects of military confrontation.710 Later, Thomas distinguishes at least four different, 
non-exclusive, views of IW which are the geopolitical struggle of confrontation, in-
formation technology based military actions, systems-based warfare and an opera-
tional categorization of means including support, counter-measures, and defence.711  
 
Timothy Thomas’ writing reflects the wider lack of Western interest in Russian IW 
thinking from the mid-2000s to 2014 as he specialized in Chinese IW during those 
years.712 During 2015-2017 Thomas wrote quite extensively about the Russian military 
and strategic thinking to an audience which was trying to understand the resurgent 
Russian military actions in Ukraine.713 Thomas, for example, claimed that the Russian 
                                              
Федерации от 24 декабря 1998 года N 1637 ”Об утверждении составов межведомственных комиссий 
Совета Безопасности Российской Федерации” Российская газета" No. 248 30 декабря 1998). It was es-
tablished as a part of the structural reconfiguration of the Security Council ordered by President Yeltsin in 1996 
(Коротченко, Игорь. Реорганизация совета безопасности РФ завершена. Созданная структура, по мне-
нию Ивана Рыбкина, позволяет решать задачи любой сложности. Незавизимая газета, № 9 21 января 
1997.). According to Leonid Maiorov, vice-secretary of the Security Council in 1997, information security issues 
were handled by ‘a directorate’ before the establishment of the interagency committee (Майоров, Леонид 
Сергеевич. Информация и безопасность. Развитие современных технологий как реальная угроза буду-
щему России. Незавизимая газета, № 180 25 сентября 1997.) 
709 Thomas 1998b, 44; Thomas 2005, 186-187; Thomas, Timothy L. The Bear Went Through the Mountain: 
Russia Appraises its Five-Day War in South Ossetia, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol.22, No.1 (2009), 31-
67. Heickerö argues that the Russian views have been affected by observing American doctrinal development 
and military successes from the viewpoint of a possible target, and also by the experiences of Afghanistan and 
Chechnya (Heickerö 2010; Heickero, Roland. Russia’s Information Warfare Capabilities. In Lemieux, Frederick 
(ed.) Current and Emerging Trends in Cyber Operations. Policy, Strategy and Practice. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillian, 2015, 65-83). 
710 Thomas 1998b, 50-57. 
711 Thomas 2005, 186-187; Thomas 2009. 
712 Cf. Timothy, Thomas L. Decoding The Virtual Dragon - Critical Evolutions In The Science And Philosophy 
Of China's Information Operations And Military Strategy - The Art Of War And IW. Fort Leavenworth, KS: 
ISMS, 2007; Timothy, Thomas L. Three Faces Of The Cyber Dragon. Fort Leavenworth, KS: ISMS, 2012. 
713 Thomas, Timothy. Russia’s 21st century information warfare: Working to undermine and destabilize popu-
lations, Defence Strategic Communications, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Winter 2015), 11-26; Thomas, Timothy. Russia’s 
Military Strategy and Ukraine: Indirect, Asymmetric—and Putin-Led. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 
Vol. 28, No. 3 (2015), 445-461; Thomas 2015a; Thomas, Timothy. The Evolution of Russian Military Thought: 
Integrating Hybrid, New-Generation, and New-Type Thinking. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 29, 
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leadership believes that the country is in a state of information war and that the regime 
survival is in question. He argued that Russia’s means are deception, reflexive control, 
cognitive weapons, deflection and denial, fear mongering and building an alternative 
reality, and that it aims to deceive and destabilize opponents and unite citizens 
through fear of internal and external enemies.714 Thomas tried to push back on some 
of the more erroneous interpretations of Russian military thinking such as the ideas 
of the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and ‘hybrid war/warfare’.715 According to Thomas, the 
Russians considered hybrid warfare to be a Western concept, waged against Russia, 
and the Russians used it to deduce counter-forms and methods for their own use. 
Consequently, Thomas argued that the Russians used the concepts of ‘New-genera-
tion warfare’ (NGW) and later ‘New-type war’ (NTW) to characterise future war. The 
concepts were developed by civilians and adopted by the military.716 One of the key 
arguments Thomas makes in his 2015-2017 texts is the Russian emphasis on infor-
mation superiority.717 In the NGW concept this superiority was based on principles 
similar to Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) with added EW and other capabilities to 
deny the aggressor information capabilities. In the NTW concept information supe-
riority changed to emphasise the psychological aspect of IW.718 Thomas argued that 
current Russian military approach seems to emphasise the attainment of information 
superiority before the initial period of war (IPW).719 
 
The analysis of current Russian military thinking leads Thomas to the conclusion that 
the Russians show a definite interest in an asymmetric strategy, operations, tactics, 
actions and means at the theoretical and conceptual level. According to Thomas, 
asymmetry seems to be about off-setting an opponent’s superiority, taking advantage 
of an opponent’s unequal combat potential, avoiding direct confrontation, and de-
ploying new and innovative forms and methods of conflict. Thomas argues that this 
emphasis on non-military and non-direct means and asymmetry led to the formula-
tion of the concept of ‘strategic deterrence’ as an asymmetric measure publicised by 
M. A. Gareev in 2008.720 He even argues that the Russian concept of asymmetry is 
more active than the American or British one, as it includes the creation of asym-
metry.721 
 
                                              
No. 4 (2016), 554-575; Thomas, Timothy. Thinking Like a Russian Officer: Basic Factors and Contemporary 
Thinking on the Nature of War. Fort Leavenworth, KS: FMSO, 2016; Thomas 2017. 
714 Thomas 2015b. 
715 For these concepts cf. Galeotti, Mark:  Hybrid War or Gibridnaya Voina? Getting Russia’s non-linear military 
challenge right, Mayak Intelligence, 2016; Thornton 2016; Bartles, Charles K. Getting Gerasimov Right. Military 
Review, January-February 2016, 30-38; Renz, Bettina. Russia and ‘hybrid warfare’. Contemporary Politics, Vol. 
22, No. 3 (2016), 283-399; Galeotti, Mark. I’m Sorry for Creating the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’. Foreign Policy, 5 
March 2018 [Online]. Available: https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/05/im-sorry-for-creating-the-gerasimov-
doctrine/ [Accessed: 7th November 2018]; McDermott, Roger. Does Russia Have a Gerasimov Doctrine? Pa-
rameters, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Spring 2016), 97-105. 
716 Thomas 2016a. 
717 Ibid. 
718 Thomas 2016a & 2017.  
719 Thomas 2016b; Thomas 2015c. 
720 Thomas 2015, 97. Jonsson and Seely argue that the concepts of asymmetric and non-linear do not describe 
modern Russian doctrine because all strategy strives for asymmetry and non-linearity. They propose a concept 
of ‘full-spectrum conflict’ which includes all military, information, economic and political means. (Jonsson, 
Oscar and Seely, Robert. Russian Full-Spectrum Conflict: An Appraisal After Ukraine, Journal of Slavic Military 
Studies, Vol.28, No. 1 (2015), 1-22, 21). 
721 Thomas 2005, 294. 
 
107 
The view that successive Russian regimes, and most importantly Putin’s current re-
gime, have seen international relations as a geopolitical zero-sum competition be-
tween great powers, political and economic systems, or civilizations is a well-estab-
lished view among Western Russia scholars.722 As recently as 2018, Dmitr Adamsky 
claimed that the ‘information struggle’ (bor’ba/protivoborstvo)723 plays a central role 
in modern Russian doctrine and that its nature is holistic (merges technological and 
psychological means), unified (synchronises kinetic and non-kinetic activities) and un-
interrupted (conducted during peacetime and wartime in all domains). This struggle 
has both digital-technological and cognitive-psychological components. The infor-
mation struggle includes electronic warfare, computer network operations, PSYOPS 
and deception.724 This ‘holistic’ vision should not be pushed too far. No single state 
can integrate such complex issues as national interests into an indivisible, homoge-
nous and fully coordinated policy. As Thomas’ analysis of the 1990s has shown, there 
were multiple voices and interests at work in Russia, and as Chapter 6 will show there 
still are multiple voices. To perceive all Russian actions as a single approach only 
serves to placated current Western distress in the face of alleged Russian information 
or political warfare.725 
 
Automated command and control systems and a unified information space have been 
mentioned only passingly by Giles, Fitzgerald, Thomas and Adamsky. Nevertheless, 
automated command and control systems (ASU) have been the subject of intense 
interest for Russians for as long as they have debated the post-Soviet period military 
reform.726 Although the concept seems to include numerous different meanings it has 
particular cultural connotations which can help to understand how the Russians per-
ceive the relations between networks, computers, computer programs, and infor-
mation. In addition to previous studies, the concept of ASU has a central place in the 
Russian law on Critical Information Infrastructure.727 Similarly, the concept of unified 
                                              
722 Trenin, Dmitri. The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization. Wash-
ington, DC: The Carnegie Moscow Center, 2001; Sondhaus 2006; Blank, Stephen. Threats to and from Russia: 
An Assessment. Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3 (2008), 491-526; Mankoff, Jeffrey. Russian 
Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics (2nd ed.) Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 
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Systems, Enduring Interests. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2014; Kipp 2014; Lo 2015; Porfiriev, Boris and Simons, 
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724 Ibid. 
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mation warfare—they never went through a process of divergence in the first place.” (Giles 2016a, 69. Also, 
Blank, 2017). Michael Kofman manages to combine all Russian foreign and security policy into a ‘grand strategy’ 
(Kofman, Michael. Drivers Of Russian Grand Strategy. Frivärld, 23 April 2019 [Online]. Available: 
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cember 2019]). Somewhat surprisingly a RAND report from 2018 is more objective in its approach (Robinson 
et al. 2018). 
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information space seems to refer to an optimal way of arranging communications and 
it has been mentioned in both civilian and military context already in 1950s-1960s.728 
Most recently it has been mentioned in the current Military Doctrine of 2014.729 It has 
been replaced in the official documents by the concept of the national segment of the 
Internet since the publication of the 2016 Information Security Doctrine.730 Previous 
Western research on Russian automated command and control systems and unified 
information space has mainly concentrated on analysing the Russian military reform 
and tactical and operational issues but they might also have national and strategic level 
applications.731 
 
The most apparently novel aspect of the strategic cultural ideas chosen for the subject 
of this study is ‘digital sovereignty’. This appeared in Russian official statements and 
documents around 2015 when the Minister of Telecommunications Nikolai Nikifo-
rov made a proposal on ‘sovereignty of the Russian Internet’.732 Nevertheless, as Mar-
garita Jaitner and Jari Rantapelkonen argue the idea had already been around in 
2012.733 The tendency of the Russians to project the idea of territorial sovereignty 
through virtual borders into cyberspace has been observed also by Julian Nocetti.734 
Others have noted the drive of the Russian government to ‘tame’ Internet through 
regulation and censorship.735 The idea of sovereignty in cyber or information space is 
thus something that clearly defines Russia’s approach to the shaping and controlling 
of cyberspace. 
 
Based on above, the concepts of the interstate struggle, digital sovereignty, strategic 
deterrence, asymmetric response, information superiority, information-technological 
warfare, automated command and control systems, and unified information space 
seem to represent the most important ideas shaping Russia’s strategy towards cyber-
space. I shall now examine more closely each of the strategic cultural ideas with the 
intent to show that they have roots in the Soviet and Russian historical strategic think-
ing in the period between the 1950s and 2000. 
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4.2    The strategic cultural ideas in the period of 1950–2000 
 
This chapter examines how the chosen strategic cultural ideas manifested during the 
time of the Soviet Union and the first decade of the independence of Russia. The 
primary objective is to show that the strategic cultural ideas discussed above were 
active and present when Russia began to emerge from the ‘Time of Troubles’ of the 
1990s and Vladimir Putin’s regime started to search for ideas to fit the changing en-
vironment and Russia’s interests. 
 
4.2.1   Interstate struggle  
 
The idea of a continuous interstate struggle is somewhat difficult to locate from sec-
ondary sources because the English translation of ‘protivoborstvo’ is variously either 
warfare, confrontation, countermeasure, or struggle.736 The fact that Soviet civilian or 
military dictionaries do not directly recognize the term makes tracing the idea even 
more difficult.737 Based on articles published in Voennaia Mysl’ in the 1980s the term 
was used in connection to potential war between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, so the translation of warfare or confrontation might be suitable.738 The term 
was also used in the Soviet times in connection to the continuous psychological war-
fare (psikhologicheskaia voina) between two competing systems even during peace-
time.739 On the political level the idea of a constant struggle against internal and ex-
ternal enemies was promoted by the Bolsheviks from the 1920s onward.740 The idea 
of an international class struggle (klassovaia bor’ba)741, which would eventually lead to 
the triumph of communism, informed Soviet military strategy and foreign policy—
although it did leave room for ‘realism’, ‘realpolitik’ and détente.742 Inherent in these 
ideas is a worldview of continuous competition, conflict, and possibly war with a peer 
or a counterpart, a system or a great power—a certain dialectic of power and escha-
tological view of war. In this context, politics is the continuation of war in another 
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guise.743 This struggle went on by other means if military confrontation was not pos-
sible and did not exclude expedient alliances with third parties.744 The degree of influ-
ence that this ideology had on Soviet military and foreign policy thinking is still un-
clear, but in theory the military strategy745 should have reflected military policy that 
was based on the party’s interpretation of Marxism-Leninism.746 On the military tech-
nological side, Mary Fitzgerald has argued that Marxism-Leninism imposed the idea 
of “the dialectical law of unity and struggle of opposites” on Soviet thinking, which 
meant, “every means of attack generates a new means of defence, and every means 
of defence in turn generates a new means of attack.”747 
 
Petteri Lalu points out that military confrontation with capitalism was officially re-
placed with ‘peaceful coexistence’ in the 1957 XXI Party Congress of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), which allowed victory through other forms of 
competition.748 Others have suggested that the international class struggle was aban-
doned by the disillusioned elites during Leonid Brezhnev’s era (1964–1982) and was 
replaced by Russian nationalism and chauvinism but the official ideology still re-
strained great power realpolitik.749 Raymond Garthoff has argued that from 1954–
1956 the Soviets concentrated on the prevention of war.750 Moreover, Oscar Jonsson 
has argued that by the 1980s the idea that war might be something other than strict 
violence had gained support amongst military scholars.751 Be that as it may, David 
Glantz has argued that the basis of the Soviet military strategy during the Cold War 
developed from defending the achievements of the Second World War from the 
Western containment with massive conventional forces (1940–1950s), to a reliance 
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on strategic nuclear weapons and belief in the improbability of conventional war 
(1960s) and ultimately this led to the view that a major conventional war might still 
be possible without the use of nuclear weapons (1970s–1980s).752 
 
By the 27th Party Congress in 1986 the rhetoric about class struggle had been toned 
down and, in fact, the struggle (bor’ba) was now conducted against poverty, corrup-
tion, alcoholism etc.753 Interestingly, the General Secretary of the Central Committee 
of the CPSU Mikhail Gorbachev stated that  “Thus, the objective […] conditions 
have taken shape in which confrontation [protivoborstvo] between capitalism and 
socialism can proceed only and exclusively in forms of peaceful competition and 
peaceful contest”. 754 However, “The psychological warfare unleashed by imperialism 
cannot be understood as anything else than as a specific form of aggression, of infor-
mation imperialism which infringes on the sovereignty, history, and culture of peo-
ples. Moreover, it is a direct political and psychological preparation for war…”755 At 
least on the political level, it seems that the struggle had become more of a metaphor-
ical war against any ill or evil, and confrontation was upgraded to manage great power 
relations characterized by, among other things, psychological warfare or ‘information 
imperialism’ which was a threat to Soviet sovereignty. 
 
This political shift was reflected in the Soviet military strategy and doctrine which 
changed from emphasising all-out war, an offensive military-technical doctrine, and 
the initial period of war756 to one that was more or less defensive.757 The reality was 
not quite so linear as the Soviet Union in the 1980s waged war in Afghanistan, was 
engaged in proxy wars in the ‘Third World’, pursued nuclear parity with the United 
States, deployed SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe, developed new SSBNs and carri-
ers, and continued, arguably offensive, chemical and biological weapons programs.758 
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Additionally, the military doctrine759 did not fully follow the fast political develop-
ments of the 1980s.760 The Soviet military saw the correlation of forces (sootnoshenie 
sil i sredstv) based on military means in exclusion of non-military means.761 Arguably, 
these means were based on material and spiritual strengths but the Soviet military 
leadership was quite clear that what mattered were strategic weapons.762 Still, up until 
adopting a Warsaw Pact doctrine based on strategic defence in 1986/1988 the military 
strategy relied on pre-empting a NATO deployment through non-military means (de-
ception and propaganda) and failing that on strategic and operational surprise.763 It 
should be noted that whatever notions the Soviet military might have had about its 
mandate to contemplate the use of non-military means and despite the militarized 
nature of Soviet society, the Soviet armed forces were tightly subordinated to the 
Party during peacetime.764 On its part, the Soviet military planned to fight a massive 
conventional war at least in the initial period of a war against NATO, but it never 
dropped the assessment that tactical and strategic nuclear weapons would eventually 
be used—presumably first by NATO as the Soviet Union officially denounced the 
first use of nuclear weapons in 1977.765 These views are confirmed by post-Cold War 
era testimonies.766 It is also important to note that unlike the United States, the Soviet 
Union’s civil defence was an earnest attempt to maintain hope that the Soviet state 
could survive a nuclear attack in some form. It was not, however, a tool of coercion 
or deterrence.767 
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The change to the defensive military posturing in addition to economic weakness 
necessitated prioritizing the prevention of war rather than preparing for it.768 This led 
to a heated discussion about the feasibility of the defensive doctrine and posture 
which continued into the 1990s.769 Additionally, the perceived impossibility of a nu-
clear war in the late 1980s increased the interest in strategic balance and other forms 
of struggle and confrontation.770 This aversion to the use of nuclear weapons did not 
evidently stop the Soviet Union pursuing factual nuclear superiority over the United 
States up until the late 1980s.771 However, thanks to the policy of glasnost and the 
importance of strategic arms control negotiations in restraining the United States, 
from the mid-1980s “civilian strategists” could take part in the discussions of military 
matters. Although they had limited influence, they introduced Western military stra-
tegic terms into the Soviet discourse.772 Conversely, military strategists became inter-
ested in, among other things, information technologies and electromagnetic war-
fare.773 These ideas were already discussed by the military at least since the late 1970s 
in the context of ‘Military Technical Revolution’ (nauchno-tekhnicheskaia revoli-
utsiia) and ‘informatization’ (informatizatsiia).774 
 
During the 1980s the Soviets translated the U.S. ‘countervailing strategy’ (Presidential 
Directive 59 July 1980), as ‘a strategy of direct confrontation’ (strategiia priamogo 
protivoborstvo).775 Despite the use of the term confrontation or struggle to denote a 
strategic relationship, the Soviet military theorists seem to have used the word antag-
onistic/counterpart (protivoborstvuiuchshii) mainly in tactical and operational con-
texts to describe active or potential violent warfare or the use of force.776 Thus, in an 
article discussing the military aspects of the 27th Party Congress of the CPSU General 
Lieutenant D. A. Volkogonov implies that the political and strategic level ‘protivo-
borstvo’ between systems is something which occurred mainly outside the open state 
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of only conventional means to win a war. (‘Прямого противоборства, стратегия’ ВЭС 2001, 2: 412-413)  
776 Cf. Кузнецов 1984; Воробьев, И. Н. Новое оружие— новая тактика. Военная мысль 1984 № 2, 34-45. 
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of war and did not necessitate (nuclear) war.777  Eventually, in 1988 General Lieuten-
ant V. V. Serebriannikov argued that to prevent military aggression against socialism 
both military and non-military means were required. Military means preserved the 
parity while political means stopped the threats from materializing. For Serebrianni-
kov, non-military means would replace military means in the future.778  
 
The idea of an information confrontation began to gain traction in the early 1990s. 
After Operation Desert Storm Colonel A. I. Pozdniakov could claim that: “The con-
tent of military operations has increased the importance of information-technological 
confrontation [protivoborstvo]. Superiority [prevoskhodstvo] in information aware-
ness is an indispensable condition of victory in air, sea and even land warfare.”779 In 
1995 Colonel A. N. Lukashkin and Captain A. I. Efimov claimed that ‘infosphera’ 
(i.e. the aggregate of general and special software means for creating, processing and 
storing computerized data and the data itself) would become one the most probable 
objects of military confrontation (protivoborstvo).780 Finally, in a conference paper in 
1995 Professor V. I. Tsymbal presented the wider and narrower types of IW.781 He 
argued that, “In the broad sense, information warfare is one of the varieties of the 
‘cold war’ - countermeasures [sbosobov protivoborstva] between two states imple-
mented mainly in peacetime with respect not only and not so much to the armed 
forces as much as to the civilian population and the people’s public/social awareness, 
to state administrative systems, production control systems, scientific control, cultural 
control, etc.”782 Tsymbal’s definition is clearly connected to the Cold War era system-
versus-system confrontation/struggle idea. He also offers a narrower definition which 
refers to military actions aimed at achieving an overwhelming information advantage 
(podavliaiuchshee preimuchshestvo). The nature of IW changes from the wider to 
narrower type when peace changes to war.783 According to Tsymbal and some others, 
IW means and their effects could be compared to nuclear weapons, i.e. they had stra-
tegic effects and they could require a response in kind.784  
 
Around the mid-1990s both Russian officers and civilian scholars were claiming that 
the United States had used information war (informatsionnaia voina) to disintegrate 
the Soviet Union and continued to use activities in the information sphere to weaken 
Russia. The U.S. used its technological advantages and the control of the Internet 
against Russia’s interests in a geopolitical struggle. New information weapons would 
be developed and if Russia did not catch up it would be destroyed.785 The ideas of the 
                                              
777 Волкогонов, Д. А. Военные вопросы в Программе КПСС. Военная мысль 1986 № 5, 3-15, 4. 
778 Серебрянников, В. В. Диалектика политических и военных средств в защите социализма. Военная 
мысль 1988, № 10, 3-11. 
779 Поздняков, А. И. Информационная безопасность личности, общества, государства. Военная мысль 
1993 No. 10, 13-18. 
780 Лукашкин, А.Н., Ефимов, А.И. Проблема безопасности компьютерной инфосферы стратегических 
оборонных систем. Военная мысль 1995 № 5, 48-52. 
781 Thomas 2001, 785-786.  
782 Quoted in Thomas 1998, 45. Original: Цымбал, В.И. О концепции информационной войны. Инфор-
мационный сборник Безопасность, № 9 (1995), 35. 
783 Thomas 1998, 53-54. 
784 Thomas 1996, 26; Цымбал 1995; Смолян, Г., Цыгичко, В., Черешкин, Д. Оружие, которое может быть 
опаснее ядерного. Независимая газета от 18.11.95 г. no. 3 (18 November 1995), 1–2. 
785 Коротченко, Е.Г. Информационно-психологическое противоборство в современных условиях. Во-
енная мысль № 1/1996, 22-28; Смолян, Георгий Львович, Цыгичко, Виталий Николаевич and Череш-
кин. Дмитрий Семенович. Куда ведет информационная супермагистраль. Независимая газета 1996, No. 
33; Смолян et al. 1995; Цыгичко & Черешкин 1995; Черешкин, Д.С., Смолян, Г.Л., Цыгичко, В.Н. Реалии 
 
115 
scholars were echoed in 1996 by the First Deputy Minister of Defence A. A. Ko-
koshin, who argued that  Russia needed “to develop theoretical and practical founda-
tions of information confrontation [protivoborstvo], since it is becoming an integral 
part of the armed warfare [bor’ba].” He called for the creation of forces and means 
of information warfare which included EW, intelligence, communications, command 
and control, and means to protect C2 assets from the enemy. Kokoshin clearly had 
in mind information-technological warfare as part of armed warfare, not just the ge-
opolitical struggle.786 The views of officers and academicians were shared also by the 
vice-secretary of the Security Council Leonid Maiorov when he argued in 1997 that 
Russia’s interests in the information sphere were the spiritual development of the 
nation and the rights and freedoms of its citizens, the development of Russian infor-
mation industry and the functioning of information-telecommunications systems.787 
 
The character of future war became a hot topic among Russian military scientists in 
the latter half of the 1990s.788 General Major I. N. Vorob’ev for example argued that 
it was characterized by the use of military-technological means based on information 
sciences (informatika), informatization (informatizatsiia) and an information-psycho-
logical confrontation or struggle (informatsionno-psikhlogicheskoe protivo-
borstvo).789 For General Vorob’ev this latter psychological aspect was understood as 
deception, demoralizing the army and population of the enemy, controlling its actions, 
and achieving surprise in the initial period of war. It was covert strategic level warfare 
conducted during peacetime and enhanced by modern technology. Rear Admiral V. 
S. Pirumov and Colonel M. A. Rodionov offered a more nuanced analysis of infor-
mation warfare [informatsionnaia bor’ba] and divided it into two aspects: geopolitical 
rivalry (protivoborstvo v informatsionnoi sfere) which was a legitimate, objective pro-
cess aimed at achieving state policy objectives in interstate relations, and information 
warfare which was aimed at gaining information superiority to win an armed conflict. 
They further divided information warfare into actions conducted during peacetime, 
the period of threat, and open hostilities.790 In a later article Rodionov argues that 
information warfare (informatsionnaia bor’ba) should be understood as subordinate 
to strategic actions (strategicheskoe deistvie), as operations, actions and strikes of the 
Armed Forces, not as an independent strategic action.791 Rodionov’s article is an ex-
ample of ‘fitting’ the novel phenomena of IW to the old ideas of military theory—it 
might also be an attempt to create a role for the military in the IW framework. The 
third example of this ‘future through old glasses’ approach is Colonel A. A. Komov 
who in 1998 proposed a Marxist-Leninist cybernetic philosophical basis for Russia’s 
                                              
информационной войны. Конфидент, 1996. № 4; Цыгичко В.И., Вотрин Д.С., Крутских А.В., Смолян 
Г.Л., Черешкин Д.С. Информационное оружие - новый вызов международной безопасности. Москва: 
Институт Системного Анализа Ран, 2000. It should be noted that the ideas and articles of Tsymbal, 
Korotchenko and Tsygischko et al. might have been connected to the creation of the workgroup on the devel-
opment of the principles of Russia’ s entry into the global Internet under the Security Council in 1995. (Шере-
мет 2014). 
786 Кокошин, А.А. Военно-политические и экономические аспекты реформы Вооруженных Сил Рос-
сии. Военная мысль № 6 (11-12) (1996), 2-11. 
787 Майоров 1997. 
788 Гулин, В.П. О новой концепции войны. Военная мысль № 2 (3-4) 1997, 13-17. 
789 Воробьев, И.Н. Какие войны грозят нам в будущем веке. Военная мысль № 2 (3-4) 1997, 18-24. 
790 Пирумов В. С., Родионов М. А. Некоторые аспекты информационной борьбы в военных конфлик-
тах. Военная мысль, № 5 1997, 44-47. 
791 Родионов, М.А. К вопросу о формах ведения информационной борьбы. Военная мысль № 2 1998, 
67-70. 
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upcoming information security doctrine.792 
 
The most important of these ‘modern cybernetists’ was professor S. P. Rastorguev 
who in 1998 published a book (reprinted in 1999) named Information War (Infor-
matsionnaia voina). In it he defined an information warfare as the open and hidden, 
purposeful and information-based influence of two systems (or more) on each other 
in order to obtain a certain advantage in the material sphere.793 He categorized systems 
as A type systems, which were mechanical, and B type systems which consisted of 
two cybernetic and one social hierarchical subsystem—respectively, information 
communication systems, systems of automated management, and people and social 
structures. Rastorguev admitted that the means used against B type systems’ cyber-
netic aspects (technical systems and data) should be called cyber weapons but took a 
wider approach in his book and adopted the term information warfare and weapons 
when discussing system B. The point of an information war was to manipulate the 
opposing system’s algorithms by using information weapons.794 Rastorguev’s thinking 
summarized the idea of a confrontation or struggle between systems, cybernetic the-
ory, and modern ideas about IW and cyber warfare.795 Rastorguev continued his the-
oretical work in the 2000s—to which I shall return in Chapter 5. 
 
General M. A. Gareev, the president of the Academy of Military Sciences from 1993, 
also took part in the discussion. In 1998 he disavowed arguments that claimed that 
war could be fought with non-military means because otherwise human history would 
have been a continuous war. War’s essence was unrestricted military violence. Gareev 
distinguished war from political confrontation (protivoborstvo) which exploited po-
litical, diplomatic, and information actions. Information confrontation was part of all 
kinds of struggle (bor’ba) up to and including armed warfare and at the same time had 
a relatively independent character and aimed to demoralize and paralyze the will of 
the other side to dominate peoples and impose development models. To counter this 
new threat, Gareev argued, the efforts of all security ministries and agencies were 
needed under the coordination of the Security Council, combined with a strong econ-
omy, firm political system, and united society.796  
 
The discussion on the interstate struggle and the character of future war was partially 
connected to the discussion about the character and content of the future Information 
Security Doctrine and Military Doctrine, the drafting of which started in 1995/1997.797 
Timothy Thomas has analysed this discussion and according to him there were at least 
four different views present: The Security Council was interested in the social stability 
                                              
792 Комов, С.А. О доктрине информационной безопасности Российской Федерации. Военная мысль, 
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A theoretical review and application of the Russian ‘information weapon’. Presented in 18th European Con-
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of the Russian state and concentrated on information-psychological aspects; the 
FAPSI was interested in technological threats and security and defined IW as war 
(voina) using information technology;798 the FSB was interested in regulating the In-
ternet for internal security reasons; and the military was interestingly more interested 
in psychological (moral spiritual) issues than technological. However, the military saw 
the technological aspects of IW as belonging to wartime counter-C2 warfare and 
EW.799   
 
The idea of struggle was present in the national security documents of the new Rus-
sian Federation. In the Foreign Policy Concept of 1993 Russia first dissociated itself 
from “obsolete ideas about the confrontation [protivoborstvo] of the “two systems” 
as a guideline of our foreign policy“800 but recognized the continuing contradic-
tions/conflicts (protivorechie) between governments and opposing (pro-
tivopolozhnoe) interests, and reserved for itself the ability to resist and counter (pro-
tivodeistvovat’) other governments.801 The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine 
of the Russian Federation from 1993 did not mention confrontation or struggle nor 
information except implicitly when discussing the military-technological needs of mil-
itary.802 A more assertive approach was affirmed in the National Security Concept 
(NSC) of 1997, which also claimed that ‘other governments’ tried to counter (pro-
tivodeitsvovat’) Russia’s strengthening through various non-military means. It also 
recognized Russian interests in the ‘information sphere’ (informatsionnaia sfera). Re-
spectively, information threats were compared to military threats but were considered 
to mainly have a spiritual or psychological effect. Additionally, the NSC warned about 
a threatening technological backwardness which might lead to economic and military 
weakness.803 
 
The national security documents published in 2000 echoed earlier views. The NSC of 
2000 further elaborated the means used against Russia by introducing the concept of 
                                              
798 According to the First Deputy of the General Director of FAPSI Vladimir Markomenko, information war 
had become a priority issue for national security because 1) the destruction and disorganization of the infor-
mation infrastructure of the country on the scale of weapons of mass destruction was possible, 2) the interstate 
struggle had shifted to the information sphere, and 3) information weapons had become available to criminals 
and terrorists in addition to nation states. Маркоменко, Владимир. Невидимая затяжная война. Независи-
мое военное обозрение, № 30 1997. 
799 Thomas 1998a & 1998b. 
800 The national security documents of the Russian Federation from 1991 to 2000 have been published in a 
monograph by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This monograph is used as a primary source in this Chapter as 
the national security documents of the 1990s are poorly available from other sources and the monograph is 
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вет безопасности Российской Федерации одобрил доработанный документ. Указом Президента Рос-
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a struggle or confrontation in the information sphere (protivoborstvo v informatsion-
noi sfere).804 The idea of an information struggle or confrontation was reiterated also 
in the Military Doctrine and in the Information Security Doctrine of 2000.805 It should 
be noted that the idea was not defined in any of the documents and the Russian term 
‘protivoborstvo’ was only used in the context of information. The term counter action 
or measure (protivodeistvie) was used to describe concrete actions related to the in-
formation space and other threats and environments. The Military Doctrine claimed 
that the military-political situation was characterized by aggravation of information 
confrontation and that hostile information-technological and information-psycholog-
ical (informatsionno-tekhnicheskii, informatsionno-psikhologicheskii) actions were a 
threat to Russia.806 Interestingly it defined information warfare (informatsionnaia 
bor’ba) as a wartime activity which was aimed at gaining information superiority in 
the initial period of war.807 The foreign policy concept of 2000 was very different in 
its tone emphasizing shared global information space and promoting Russian views, 
although, it did connect information security to strategic stability.808 
 
The most interesting case is of course the Information Security Doctrine of 2000. It 
follows the NSC and declares that a confrontation or struggle in the information 
sphere (protivoborstvo v informatsionnoi sfere) in currently ongoing.809 It defines the 
information sphere as “an aggregate of information, information infrastructure, enti-
ties engaged in the collection, formation, dissemination and use of information, as 
well as a system for regulating the resulting social relations.”810 Information security 
is seen as elemental to the national security. It consists of the protection of the bal-
anced interests of individuals, society, and the state. The state interests include terri-
torial integrity, sovereignty, political, social, and economic stability, and cooperation 
based on equality.811 Threats against information and telecommunications systems in-
clude the destruction, damage, or electronic suppression of information processing 
equipment and systems, telecommunications and communications, compromised en-
cryption systems, etc.812 Threats to Russian interests arise mainly from the actions of 
other states whose policies harm the development of the Russian ICT industry and 
who have developed the ‘dangerous concept’ of an information war (informatsionnaia 
voina). Threats originate also from the poor state of industry, criminality, insufficient 
domestic regulation and government institutions.813 The Doctrine recognizes that the 
use of foreign information technology has led to a growing threat of ‘information 
weapons’ being used against ‘information infrastructure’ of Russia.814 In fact, the Doc-
trine has both a civilian and military character as the security and protection of infor-
mation systems is defined to include both civilian and military systems from peace-
time to wartime.815 Among the methods of securing information security, the Doc-
trine proposes the creation of a system of information security including monitoring, 
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protection, prevention, and certification functions.816 The Doctrine names the prohi-
bition of the development, dissemination and use of ‘information weapons’ as its 
main international agenda.817 Arguably, the Information Security Doctrine of 2000 
painted a picture of a Russian that was losing the control of its information sphere.818 
Previous studies on Russian strategic and political culture have observed that there is 
a persistent tendency to perceive international relations as a continuous great power 
struggle. The reasons given for this struggle differ and include, among others, messi-
anism, imperialism, status competition, nationalism, geopolitics, balance-of-power re-
alism, nature of domestic system (i.e. the sistema), bureaucratic interests, the mentality 
of ‘the siloviki’819 and the personality of leaders.820 Consequently, it is argued, there is 
an inherent feeling of insecurity built into the Russian strategic thinking which has 
ebbed and flowed throughout its history. Therefore, the strategic cultural idea of an 
interstate struggle with its latest incarnation of ‘information struggle’ fits quite well 
into the wider Russian strategic cultural thinking.821 It has functioned as a causal or 
perhaps even a principled belief by proving a framework for understanding interna-
tional relations during and after the Soviet era. It connects and collects under it a 
group of more causal beliefs which provide ends, ways and means to manage those 
relations—these are basically the rest of the strategic cultural ideas analysed in this 
thesis. The language used in the national security documents of the 1990s differed 
from the more radical ideas presented by the military and civilian academics but there 
was clearly some resonance. The policy documents were, of course, the end-result of 
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bureaucratic processes and compromises during a time when Russian domestic poli-
tics were highly volatile.822 
 
Moreover, it can be argued that the translation of ‘informatsionnoe protivoborstvo’ 
as information warfare has distorted the Western understanding of Russian thinking 
on the use of information for political and military goals. The information confron-
tation or struggle is a political-strategic level concept with its roots in Marxist-Leninist 
thought.823 It is not war or warfare but a constant struggle to influence the opponent 
with technological and psychological means. The technological and more destructive 
means gain primacy when interstate relations move into the initial period of war and 
war proper. This latter phase is clearly reminiscent of the Western views of counter 
C2, IW and cyber warfare concepts. During the 1990s Russian theorists, civilian and 
military, began to ‘fit’ modern ideas of IW to previous Soviet ideas about information, 
technology, politics, and warfare. Nevertheless, during the 1990s there was no single 
accepted definition of IW or information confrontation in the Russian discourse. Ad-
ditionally, by the end of the 1990s civilian (or semi-civilian as many had a KGB-back-
ground) theorists had started to take part in the discussion and to formulate Russian 
theories of IW. The struggle for the meaning of IW was arguably a struggle for insti-
tutional interests and resources.824 The ideas were eventually taken up by the security 
and defence elites and were reflected in the national security documents of 2000.  
 
4.2.2   Strategic deterrence 
 
Mary Fitzgerald wrote in 1986 that “[to] enter the world of Western Sovietology is to 
enter a debate as endless as Lenin’s Collected Works.”825 She was stating this in a 
context of trying to understand the Soviet nuclear strategy but the same might be said 
about the current discussion on the Russian nuclear strategy.826 Fitzgerald and later 
William E. Odom have claimed that during the Cold War the Western analysts were 
divided into those who thought that the Soviets shared the Western understanding of 
deterrence theory and mutually assured destruction (MAD) and to those who believed 
that the Soviets were preparing to fight a nuclear war.827 Be that as it may, the problem 
for the Soviet political leadership was that nuclear weapons threatened to freeze the 
‘struggle’ against capitalism which was the underpinning of their ideology.828 
 
The political calculus changed after the 27th Party Congress of CPSU in 1986 after 
which the officials under Gorbatchev adopted the concept of ‘defensive’ or ‘reason-
able sufficiency’.829 It was an implicit denouncement of the Western version of mutual 
                                              
822 On the politics of the Yeltsin era cf. Sakwa 2008. 
823 This claim is supported, among others, by Lalu (Lalu, 2014). 
824 On the Russian political system cf. Brannon, 2009, 165-166; Sakwa 1998; Soldatov & Borogan 2010; Ericson 
et al. 1998; Breslauer et al. 2000. 
825 Fitzgerald, Mary. Changing Soviet Doctrine on Nuclear War. Research memorandum AD-A187 722. Alex-
andria, Virginia: Center for Naval Analyses, 1986. 
826 Adamsky, Dmitry (Dima). Russian Nuclear Incoherence. Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 37, No. 1. (2014), 
91–134; Oliker, Olga. Russian Nuclear Doctrine. Washington, DC: CSIS, 2016; Adamsky 2018; Tertrais, Bruno. 
Russia’s Nuclear Policy: Worrying for the Wrong Reasons, Survival, Vol.60, No.2 (2018), 33-44. 
827 Fitzgerald 1986; Odom 1998, 66, 86. The dispute was also related to the argument between those who 
supported the idea that there was a Soviet strategic culture which influenced decision-making and those who 
approached the Soviets through rational actor-based game-theories (Gray 1992). 
828 Odom 1998, 67. 
829 Odom 1998, 106-107. 
 
121 
deterrence (i.e. MAD).830 Testimonial evidence gathered after the end of the Cold War 
indicates that “Unlike their U.S. counterparts, the Soviets did not develop an elaborate 
doctrine of deterrence enhanced by various strategies of nuclear use, selective target-
ing, planned and deliberate escalation, etc.”831 The Soviets relied on massive retalia-
tion, accepted the possibility of nuclear war and prepared for it, and aimed for supe-
riority in nuclear arms up until the latter half of the 1980s. Nuclear deterrence was 
never seen as stable. Parity and balance were only theoretical concepts as power rela-
tions were constantly changing because of technological advances.832  
 
The challenge of understanding the Soviet military thinking on deterrence was that 
the Soviets did not use the concept in the same way as Western theorists.833 The term 
most similar was ‘sderzhivanie putem ustrashenie’ which refers to deterrence (re-
straining or holding back) through intimidation by nuclear weapons.834 ‘Sderzhivanie’ 
was defined as a deterrence by containment, when referring to Americans, or dissuad-
ing an enemy from a decision to attack as a result of one’s acquisition of a capability 
to retaliate with devastating effect, when referring to the Soviets.835 ‘Ustrashenie’ is 
defined as deterrence through intimidation. It is used to frighten someone via fear. 
Moreover, ‘prinuzhdenie’ refers to forcing or coercing but does not have the same 
meaning as Western coercion.836 Deterrence was to be achieved through “parity” 
which enabled nuclear retaliation.837 However, the Soviet military was open to the 
pre-emptive, launch on warning, and retaliatory use of nuclear weapons as the situa-
tion demanded.838 On the conventional side, the Soviet Union relied on quantitative 
superiority in military material and personnel and an offensive doctrine which would 
deter any aggression and enable counterattack in the event that the Soviet Union 
would be surprised by the West or the Chinese.839 The organization and doctrine of 
conventional forces were modified to respond to the changes in technology and doc-
trine of the probable adversary.840 
 
In the 1980s Soviet military theorists concentrated on analysing the initial period of 
war which gained new importance as the defensive doctrine was being adopted. The 
problem was, how to deter a surprise attack with forces in a defensive posture and 
then to mobilize for counterattack and assure mutual destruction if needed.841 Surprise 
was connected to deception and disinformation, i.e. maskirovka.842 Based on what 
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military officers wrote in the Voennaia mysl’ journal in the 1970s and 1980s the fear 
of being surprised was indeed discussed among the high rank officers. Additionally, a 
future war was considered total and nuclear weapons were thought to be used even-
tually. This emphasised the need for either a strategic or operational surprise.843 The 
role of strategic nuclear weapons was to ‘prevent’ inherently ‘aggressive’ capitalist 
countries from attacking. The economy had to be geared towards the future war and 
for the needs of the armed forces because otherwise ‘a gap’ in capabilities would open 
and enemies would use it to attack.844 In this context, the Western deterrence (ustrash-
enie) was a form of ‘nuclear blackmail’ directed against socialist countries and was 
seen as a cover-up for building offensive forces.845 
 
On the political level, the Soviet leadership tried from the 1970s onwards to avoid a 
nuclear war and to constrain their enemy and from 1980s onward to limit the eco-
nomically disastrous arms race through international arms control treaties, conven-
tional and nuclear force reductions and other military-political activities.846 In addition 
to the military and political elements, there was a definite informational element in 
deterrence that, on the one hand, promoted a view of the Soviet Union as a non-
aggressive super power  and, on the other hand, produced enough ambivalence to 
keep the Western decision-makers guessing about the Soviet strategy.847 This infor-
mational element had also an internal component based on protecting Soviet citizens 
from Western propaganda through censorship, counterpropaganda, restrictions on 
movement and communication, and the pursuit of dissidents by the KGB.848  It in-
cluded the jamming of Western radio and TV transmissions, and the physical control 
of a handful of fixed international phone lines and switches.849 Moreover, the Soviet 
Union managed and maintained a global network of ideologically aligned allies, for 
political and military reasons, and a commitment to protect those allies—or more 
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precisely their socialist/communist regimes.850  
 
Some Western scholars have argued that the current Russian security and defence 
policy is based on the so-called Soviet era ‘besieged fortress’ syndrome.851 According 
to Andrei Kokoshin, the concept was developed by Mikhail Frunze, a Bolshevik mil-
itary leader and theorist, who wrote that “our country continues to be like a besieged 
fortress, and it will remain in this position as long as capital prevails in the world.”852 
Conversely, Bobo Lo claims that the term ‘besieged fortress’ was first used by Lenin 
in a Pravda article from August 22, 1918.853 In any case, the concept became to mean 
that the Soviet security and defence policy was highly sensitive to both external and 
internal threats, both real and imagined, and that it had a decidedly geopolitical view 
of security.854 A part of this worldview emanated from the belief that in its history 
Russia/the Soviet Union had been a victim of repeated aggression, the other part was 
based on Marxism-Leninism and the inevitability of war.855 As Eliot Borenstein ar-
gues, this kind of thinking fits quite naturally with the long tradition of Russian con-
spiracy theories which the regime has, at least tacitly, encouraged.856 Such a conspira-
torial worldview would have produced its own type of deterrence thinking—presum-
ably something that would have tried to keep threats as far away from the Soviet 
borders as possible and tried very actively to prevent any internal or external threats 
from materializing. It is also quite easy to understand how through this kind of per-
spective the fall of the Soviet Union can be interpreted as a tragedy which external 
and internal enemies could be blamed for.857  
 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russians began to copy Western ideas about 
deterrence but did not produce any coherent domestic theory during the 1990s. 
Dmitry Adamsky claims that the Russian professional discourse began to use the 
terms coercion, deterrence and compellence interchangeably, and that there was no 
established term for coercion which would serve as an umbrella term for both deter-
rence and compellence.858 By the end of the 1990s, deterrence referred to preserving 
the status quo mainly reactively, whereas compellence, or ‘prinuzhdenie’, referred to 
the efforts to change the status quo. Thomas and Kristen Ven Bruusgard argue that 
‘ustrashenie’ is defined as deterrence through intimidation. It is used to frighten some-
one via fear and resonates with the Cold War era understanding.859 According to Ven 
Bruusgard and Dmitry Adamsky the Russian deterrence ‘theory’ has gone through 
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three stages.860 The first from 1991 to 2000 was a response to the Western technolog-
ical superiority and Russia’s own conventional weakness which led to the emphasis 
of nuclear weapons as guarantees of security and great power status. By 1999, military 
scholars were figuring out how nuclear weapons could be used to deter a convention-
ally superior adversary. The second stage from 2000 to 2010 consisted of combining 
nuclear and conventional capabilities to deter nuclear and conventional threats in-
cluding actual exercises. The third stage from ca. 2010 onward introduced ‘strategic 
deterrence’ which included non-nuclear and non-military components.861  
 
The Russian unofficial military debate on deterrence at the beginning of the 1990s 
associated the term ‘strategic’ primarily with nuclear weapons but also used the term 
in the context of strategic stability (strategicheskaia stabil’nost’) the meaning of which 
was debated. It had meant nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War, but the security environment and Russia’s posture and 
composition of forces did not anymore reflect or support that interpretation.862 Espe-
cially the United States’ performance in the Gulf War and the use of high technology 
weapons forced the Russian military to think again about the role of the non-nuclear 
high-tech forces in deterrence.863 In 1998 Major General Lyzianin defined the previ-
ous understanding of the strategic stability as: “a state of military power of the parties 
in which none of them can achieve their military-political goals by aggression without 
unacceptable consequences for themselves as a result of the response of the other.”864 
According to Lyzianin, this concept should have been modified to support Gorba-
chev’s idea of ‘sufficient defence’. It meant a minimum defence strength that would 
not provoke adversaries but ensured the deterrence of aggression, and in the case 
deterrence failed, the repulsion of aggression.865 
 
In 1996 Andrei Kokoshin, then the vice defence minister, wrote that the ‘nuclear 
shield’ was more important than other means to prevent aggression. The main func-
tion of the armed forces was the deterrence (sderzhivanie) of aggression against Rus-
sia. This deterrence was based on the demonstration of Russia’s material capacity and 
the readiness of the government to use it.866 The problem was of course that nuclear 
weapons might not be usable in the current and future regional or local wars as 
Makhmut Gareev argued.867 As the importance of information warfare grew towards 
the end of the 1990s, Rear-Admiral Pirumov and Colonel M. A. Rodionov implicitly 
supported the view that deterrence was connected to lethal weapons, although infor-
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mation in its wider, confrontation/struggle aspect was seen as a way to influence op-
ponents.868 In 1998 General Major Iu. A. Nikolaev, Colonel V. P. Pchelianoi and Pro-
fessor V. I. Tsymbal claimed that the weapon systems of the armed forces should 
consist of the means of nuclear deterrence to deter nuclear and non-nuclear oppo-
nents and means of non-nuclear deterrence to deter aggressors of local and small 
intensity conflicts—including information warfare.869 Moreover, they argued that 
means of information warfare could perhaps be used to deter the enemy or demoral-
ize it ‘without a single shot’.870 This utility of information in preventing (predotvrash-
enie) wars, among other non-direct means, was shared by M. A. Gareev.871 The wid-
ening of the substance of deterrence was also reflected in the ‘escalate to de-escalate 
discussion’,  i.e. the use of (mainly) tactical nuclear weapons to control regional or 
wider conflicts.872 
 
In 1999 two academics of the Russian Academy of Sciences Evgenii Fedosov and 
Igor’ Spaskii claimed that the meaning of ‘strategic deterrence’ (strategicheskoe 
sderzhivanie) now included deterring a nuclear attack and serious non-nuclear attack. 
For Fedosov and Spaskii, deterrence included the effectiveness of the threat of retal-
iation, the credibility of the threat, and the adversary’s awareness of the consequences 
of a retaliatory strike. This definition shows how much Western concepts of deter-
rence had affected the Russians by the end of the 1990s.873 The emphasis on nuclear 
deterrence in the Military Doctrine of 2000 also generated discussion on the surviva-
bility of nuclear weapons which led to the argument that deterrence was based on, 
among other things, resilient command and control systems.874 By the end of the 
1990s, military professionals and academicians doubted the sufficiency of pure nu-
clear deterrence as the guarantor of Russian military security and saw deterrence as 
consisting of something more than pure nuclear means. 
 
The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation from 1993 
uses the term ‘deterrence’ (sderzhivanie) in relation to preventing both nuclear and 
conventional aggression against Russia. This is achieved through civilian and military 
intelligence, the ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons, and the ability to repulse an 
aggressor with conventional forces.875 The NSC of 1997 connects ‘deterrence’ more 
clearly to nuclear weapons which are the basis of Russia’s security—their existence 
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prevents war. The concept also states that Russia does not strive for parity with lead-
ing states and accepts the principle of ‘realistic deterrence’.876 The NSC of 2000 states 
that the most important mission of the armed forces is to implement deterrence to 
prevent aggression of any scale against Russia or its allies.877 The Military Doctrine of 
2000 further states that the Russian nuclear deterrence is a positive force for security 
and that Russia “will maintain its status as nuclear great power to deter (prevent [pre-
dotvrazhenie]) aggression against itself or its allies.” The main priority of developing 
the military organization are “the forces providing strategic deterrence [strate-
gicheskoe sderzhivanie] (including nuclear).” Russia maintains conventional and nu-
clear forces in constant readiness to deter and repulse (otrazhenie) aggression.878 No 
official definition of strategic deterrence was offered, although, in 2000 Putin related 
it to the wider concept of preventing war. According to Putin, almost all state agencies 
took part in preventing war.879 The term compellence (prinuzhdenie) appears in the 
Foreign Policy Concepts of 1992 and 2000 and the Military Doctrine of 2000 in a 
connection to internationally sanctioned peace enforcement (prinuzhdenie k miru) 
and seems to be a direct translation from the English term.880 It is not so much about 
changing status quo than making the opponent to change his behaviour by incurring 
costs.881 The primary security documents of the Russian Federation from 1993-2000 
do not use the term intimidation (ustrashenie). 
 
The concept of deterrence was adopted into the Russian unofficial and official dis-
course during the 1990s and experienced a definite expansion of substance at the 
informal level. The concept of ‘strategic deterrence’ was introduced but its official 
elaboration would be left to the 2000s. Deterrence has a clear connection to the con-
cept of interstate struggle and its sub-concept of information struggle: from the 1980s 
onward to 2000 nuclear parity and later ‘defensive sufficiency’ were increasingly ac-
companied first by conventional and then by other means of deterrence, prevention, 
and repulsion of armed aggression (or other threats to state interests). Although Rus-
sian military thinkers strived to separate war and political competition and confron-
tation from each other they were more and more inclined to argue that Russia had to 
‘deter’ a wide range of hostile measures with more active countermeasures even dur-
ing peacetime. This ‘deterrence’ was influenced by the debate over the advantages 
between an offensive and defensive doctrine as the borders between offence and de-
fence became increasingly hazy in the context of the future war. 
 
4.2.3   Asymmetric response 
 
The term asymmetry was first used in the context of conventional arms reductions in 
Europe in the 1980s before it became to define the Soviet ‘asymmetric response’ to 
Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) in 1986 and long before it became 
a kind of ‘deux-ex machina’ concept of solving the Russian military backwardness in 
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relation to the United States during the 1990s and 2000s.882 However, the somewhat 
anachronistic interpretations of the claimed Soviet ‘asymmetric response’ to the 
United States’ SDI must be put into a historical context and understood as a concept 
that has been purposefully revived in the 2000s in the context of a dispute between 
the Russian Federation and the United States about the latter’s ballistic missile defence 
programme.883 
 
In the Russian language ‘asymmetry’ means the ‘absence, disruption of symmetry’ 
(otsutstvie, narushenie simmetrii)884 which, as Timothy Thomas remarked, implies a 
more active aspect in the change of symmetry’s parameters than the American or 
British definitions, even the creation of asymmetry.885 Thomas claims that the Russian 
dialectic thought process of thesis and antithesis encourages an analysis of a situation 
from a different, more confrontational perspective.886 According to Thomas, asym-
metry seems to be about off-setting an opponent’s superiority, taking advantage of 
the opponent’s unequal combat potential, avoiding direct confrontation, and deploy-
ing new and innovative forms and methods of conflict.887 Dmitry Adamsky has stud-
ied Soviet/Russian strategic culture and argues that asymmetry has long historical 
roots in Russian strategic thought in the guise of ‘military cunningness’ (khitrost’) or 
stratagems. It is an ability or attribute which multiplies or substitutes the direct use of 
force with deceit, surprise and indirect approach.888 Adamsky also claims that the Rus-
sian theory of victory is asymmetrical because it is based on a strategy which plays 
one’s strengths against the opponent’s weaknesses. Nevertheless, the Russian strategy 
is also symmetrical because the nature of a threat shapes the response.889 Currently, 
asymmetry is seen by Western scholars as an inherent part of Russian strategic 
thought and the making of strategy.890 For example, Pynnöniemi and Forsström both 
argue that asymmetric measures are part of Russian deterrence and strategy to prevent 
war.891 
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The Soviet military was aware of the technological ever-widening gap between itself 
and NATO’s conventional forces in the early 1980s. Marshal Ogarkov and others had 
seen the coming of MTR and understood that doctrinal and organizational changes 
were not enough to counterbalance the Western advantage.892 However, Ogarkov’s 
call for comprehensive reform was rejected because of political, economic, strategic 
cultural, and bureaucratic reasons.893 When the United States’ president Ronald 
Reagan declared his Strategic Defence Initiative (a space-based ballistic missile de-
fence system) the Soviet Union had to accept the technological challenge or lose the 
strategic parity it had strived to achieve the last two decades.894 
 
In this context the Soviet civilian scientists declared that the SDI was practically im-
possible. In fact, Soviet scientists had studied a similar defensive system already in the 
1960s and 1970s but their proposals were discarded.895 Moreover, military theorists 
and politicians saw SDI as threatening the offence-defence balance, which would lead 
to further arms race and insecurity.896 The Soviet leadership could not be sure if the 
SDI was in fact a cover for the offensive militarization of space.897 Scientific ‘proof’ 
for these views was provided by the so-called ‘institutchiki’ or people from science 
institutions foremost among them Evgenii Velikhov, Aleksei Arbatov, and Andrei 
Kokoshin.898 As president Ronald Reagan refused to let go of his project, General 
Secretary Gorbachev stated that the Soviet Union would give an ‘asymmetric re-
sponse’.899 
 
This response was based partly on ballistic missile defences and hardened silos for 
ICBMs, space deployed defences, and exotic weapons such as lasers directed against 
American satellites, and partly on updating the strategic nuclear missiles (mainly SS-
18) to be able to penetrate any defences the United States might be able to deploy, 
and partly on diplomatic measures.900 The idea was to make SDI obsolete and preserve 
the retaliatory capabilities of Soviet strategic nuclear weapons.901 Therefore, the ‘asym-
metric response’ was at least partly based on the Marxist-Leninist oriented strategic 
dialectical thinking on historical arms development through cycles of measures and 
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countermeasures.902 It was also compatible with the calculations about the correlation 
of forces by introducing extra ‘asymmetric’ variables. The military part of the ‘re-
sponse’ was driven by the military and military-industrial complex. The diplomatic 
and political part was driven by Gorbachev and his circle of reformers. It consisted 
of the elimination of the threat through arms control measures, defensive doctrine, 
diplomacy, and propaganda—measures which would change the thinking of the op-
ponent. It resulted into the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) and the Treaty on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe (CFE). The two versions did not fully support each other, and both 
contributed to the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.903 Conse-
quently, the ‘asymmetric response’ was dropped from the political vocabulary and 
practical policy when the military standoff between the Soviet Union and NATO 
ended in 1988-1989 and the new U.S. president George W. Bush pushed SDI to the 
side lines of his political agenda. Nevertheless, the Soviet military and military-indus-
trial complex sought asymmetric responses up until the end of Soviet Union.904 
 
Against the above presented background, it can be argued that the roots of ‘asym-
metry’ are historically contextual. Andrei Kokoshin has claimed that the ‘ideology of 
asymmetry’ was born in the 1980s when he and some others rehabilitated Soviet mil-
itary theorist A. A. Svechin’s ideas of strategic defence and combined them with the 
ideas of ancient Chinese strategist Tzun Tsu.905 The asymmetric response was an idea 
created by Soviet civilian scientists in a reinterpretation of Soviet military history 
which incorporated technological evidence—perhaps to package it to a more attrac-
tive form for the military.906 This technique was also used when Kokoshin and Colonel 
General V. Larionov published an article based on historical analogies to argue for a 
defensive strategy in the 1988.907 
 
Asymmetry was discussed implicitly by the Soviet military in the 1980s mainly due to 
the perceived destabilization of the military balance. For example, General Colonel 
Cherpov used the term when referring to force reductions in Europe.908 In an article 
by a nameless writer in 1985 Voennaia Mysl’ journal the U.S. SDI project was attacked 
as an effort to gain military-strategic superiority over the Soviet Union by militarizing 
space. If the United States continued with its plans the Soviet Union must “respond 
to restore the strategic balance” which might require either defensive or offensive 
measures which “will not be those that the United States tries to make the Soviet 
Union to take”.909 In 1986 General Major M. M. Kozlov, declared that the military-
strategic parity between the Soviet Union and the United States guaranteed world 
peace. He defined this parity as the approximate equality of the military potentials of 
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the opposing sides based on socio-economic, political and scientific-technical factors 
and expressed in the quantity and quality of weapons and military material and the 
strategic posture and organization of forces. Kozlov claimed that the Soviet Union 
with other ‘fraternal peace-loving countries of socialism’ would always respond to 
actions taken by the United States and NATO aimed at acquiring military superior-
ity.910 Apparently, this was something that some Soviet writers recognized the West 
claimed the Soviet Union was aiming for; which was ‘of course’ not based on any 
facts.911 Military scientific and technological development were offered as tools to re-
spond to the West’s destabilizing efforts—Mikhail Gorbachev’s words about asym-
metric response were repeated, including the response’s cost-effectiveness.912 In 1987 
Andrei Kokoshin wrote that the purpose of the SDI was to make nuclear war winna-
ble and so to provide military superiority through space and to economically wear out 
the Soviet Union in an arms race.913 
 
In the late 1980s these ideas and calculations about parity were disturbed by the adop-
tion of a defensive Warsaw Pact doctrine followed by force reductions.914 The military 
leadership had to convert the political idea of a ‘sufficient defence’ to fit with the idea 
of parity and to produce a doctrine and force structure that would still prevent sur-
prise attack by the capitalists.915 In this process asymmetry was related to the dissimi-
larity of the structure of military potential of the different sides. Possible force reduc-
tions could be replaced by enhancing the ‘human factor’, i.e. through skills instead of 
spending money on new weapons—thus the idea of low-cost solutions persisted.916  
The declared principle was that the Soviet Union would not strive for more security 
but would not settle for less.917 In the end of the 1980s the term ‘asymmetry’ was 
almost exclusively connected to the calculations concerning strategic force-rations be-
tween peer competitors and to finding low-cost ways to undo the great power adver-
sary’s moves.918 
 
During the 1990s the Russian military theorists used the term ‘asymmetry’ or ‘asym-
metric response’ infrequently. Asymmetry appeared, for example, in the calculations 
of the correlation of forces between NATO and Russia and mathematical models of 
symmetric and asymmetric strategies.919 General Gareev wrote implicitly about asym-
metry when he claimed in 1995 that indirect actions expressed as political efforts to 
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prevent war, surprise and misdirection in the event of war, and massing fire and 
manoeuvring to bypass the enemy, and using psychological and special operations 
during battles would be very much part of the future wars.920 General Major Vladimir 
Dvorkin used asymmetry in 1997 when referring to the new intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBMs) that the Soviet Union began to develop in response to the SDI but 
noted that this project was very expensive and progressed slowly.921 In 1999 two aca-
demics from the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAN) Evgenii Fedosov and Igor’ 
Spasskii argued that the development of long-range precision strike weapons had cre-
ated an asymmetry in conventional forces which could lead to the lowering of the 
threshold of nuclear weapons use.922 This ignited a debate about whether strategic 
nuclear weapons could provide an asymmetric response to mitigate the degraded state 
of the Russian military and the U.S. BMD programme.923  
 
The First Deputy Defence Minister Nikolai Mikhailov argued in 1998/1999 that alt-
hough Russia was economically weaker than the United States it had time and 
knowhow and should pursue ‘the principle of asymmetry’ in developing its military 
technology, i.e. not to strive to develop all capabilities towards parity but to asymmet-
rically concentrate on those in which the opponent was weak. This strategy would 
eventually lead the opponent to produce expensive countermeasures and further 
weaken him.924 Ironically, this was exactly what Mikhail Gorbachev claimed Reagan 
had tried to achieve through his SDI project.925 Mikhailov’s ideas were echoed by the 
Minister of Defence Marshal I. D. Sergeev in 1998 when he argued “that in the com-
ing years Russia will not be able to maintain military-strategic and military-technical 
parity with the leading military powers of the West on a ‘symmetric basis’ and that 
this required effective ‘asymmetric development paths’ (asimmetrichnoe napravlenie) 
of new military technology. This should be achieved through the optimal use of lim-
ited resources to produce new information technology-based weapons and ASUs. Ul-
timately, Russia should avoid “direct military-technological rivalry with the most de-
veloped countries by creating ‘asymmetric’ means of warfare. These would allow it to 
strike the most vulnerable functional elements of the main systems and key infrastruc-
ture of the enemy and thereby significantly devalue their military-technical ad-
vantages.”926 
 
Based on database searches (EastView) and the analysis presented above it would 
seem that the term ‘asymmetry’ was not widely used in military journals until the end 
of the 1990s.927 Although the term ‘asymmetry’ could be used in connection to corre-
lation of conventional forces, the ‘asymmetric response’ was usually connected to the 
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strategic level and often explicitly to the 1980s policy against the SDI. There was no 
single accepted use of the term in the professional discourse. Nevertheless, during 
1998-1999 ‘asymmetric responses’ were repeatedly connected to technology-based 
cost-effective solution to Western military superiority in the context of strained Rus-
sia-West relations.928 The term was not used in any of the national security documents 
of the 1990s. It is safe to argue that for Soviet and Russian military scholars of the 
1990s asymmetry was associated with the strategic balance of power, capabilities that 
could be measured, and cost-effective measure-countermeasure dialectics. It was not, 
however, an exclusively military response as by the end of the 1990s it also had ac-
quired elements related to the economy and technological-scientific development of 
the county. The Russians did not widely adopt the Western version of the term which 
referred to non-state actors and terrorism.  
 
4.2.4   Kibernetika 
 
The discussion about the ideas of information superiority, information-technological 
warfare, automatic command and control systems, and the unified information space 
must start with cybernetics or kibernetika. The above-listed strategic cultural ideas are 
inherently connected to the late Soviet cybernetic thinking and cannot be understood 
without it.  
 
According to Slava Gerovitch, kibernetika was a social movement in search of a uni-
versal method to solve all problems through modelling and new objective language.929 
The roots of Soviet cybernetic thinking and theory go back the 1930s to men like 
Nikolai Bukharin and Aleksandr Bogdanov who applied international trends in sys-
tems theory to social and political thinking. Their legacy was purged by Stalin in the 
1930s, and systems theory and later Western cybernetic theory remained condemned 
as “idealist, anti-proletarian and imperialist” during Stalin’s reign.930 Nevertheless, for-
mal sciences were freed from the ideological supervision which enabled the Soviets 
to develop computers or EVMs (electronic calculating machines or elektronnaia 
vychislite’naia mashina) for nuclear weapon, ballistic missile, and radar development 
programmes.931 This independent and secretive development and the ideological re-
quirement to eschew Western terms led to a particularly Soviet language in the com-
puter sciences.932 Cybernetics was rehabilitated from a “a reactionary pseudo-science” 
in the late 1950s and 1960s to a “science in the service of communism.”933 By the 
1970s cybernetics had gone through a fashionable phase and subsequently lost its 
intellectual content and appeal and was displaced by informatics.934 Later, in the 1990s 
cybernetics was blamed for many of the shortcomings of the Soviet sciences.935 The 
popularity of cybernetics was  partly based on its use in the de-Stalinization of Soviet 
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science and in the way it resonated with the ideal of scientifically controlled Soviet 
society and system.936 Nevertheless, it was later embraced by political power and 
turned into a vehicle of the status quo.937 Despite its failure, the United States saw the 
Soviet adoption of cybernetics as a possible threat worthy of surveillance.938 This is 
understandable as the Americans were themselves trying to win the Vietnam war 
based on systems analysis and operational research.939 
 
The Soviet cybernetics were already being deployed by the military in the 1950s and 
its ideas were eventually transferred to the civilian side through experimental eco-
nomic policy proposals.940 Cybernetics was attractive because on the economic side it 
promised to reform the Soviet economic system and on the military side it provided 
automated command and control systems for military purposes.941 Pioneers of cyber-
netics argued in 1955-1963 for its ability to manage the Soviet economy through net-
worked computers which would greatly increase the economy’s efficiency and reduce 
red tape.942 This project ultimately failed because of the unofficial features of the So-
viet economic system and because of the political and armed forces’ opposition. The 
idea surfaced again in the 1970s and 1980s, however, without any marked success 
except perhaps pushing the Soviets towards developing and producing personal com-
puters.943 Personal computers were copied from the Western models with poor suc-
cess, and they were not allowed to connect through networks.944 During the 1970s-
1980s there was a real interest in the development of networks, as the Soviets were 
aware of the development of the ARPANET and the technological lead that the West 
had begun to gain in the 1970s, but no real progress was made.945 Ilmari Susiluoto has 
summarized this evolving Soviet ‘information society’ as closed, centralized, vertical, 
and controlled by the security services.946 According to Gerovitch, Soviet scientists 
and politicians never accepted the idea of a network gradually growing from below, 
because it would have been inefficient and politically dangerous. They tried to build 
networks from the top down but ended up duplicating exciting hierarchies of power 
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which nullified the expected benefits of networks.947 
 
The cybernetics dreams culminated in the variously named state-wide Economic Au-
tomatic Management System (EASU), All-state Automated System (OGAS) or All-
State Automated System of Management (OGAS(U)).  They were based on the idea 
of a system that would have connected Soviet decision-makers and factories etc. for 
sharing information and to rationalize planning and production on a national scale. 
This would have been the nervous-system and the brain of Soviet command econ-
omy. Officially the system of networks and computers connected to it would have 
been hierarchical, pyramidical and centrally controlled, but the Soviet scientists had 
visions that corresponded to the Western ideas of freely networking systems and even 
surpassed them.948 The main concepts related to OGAS(U) were automated manage-
ment systems or ASUs (avtomatizirovannaia sistema upravleniia) which referred to 
“...a kind of local area network that allowed mainframe computers to control and 
communicate with factory machinery through a series of automated feedback loops 
and programmable control processes”949 and “the unified information network” (edi-
naia sistema svyazi) or “unified territorial network” which would enable centralized 
command of computation centres.950 The ASU was not only a computer but also a 
system that enabled planning and management of processes based on the collection 
and processing of information.951 The unified information network would connect 
computer centres through phone lines and would provide computation power to in-
dustry and agencies that did not have their own computers.952 
 
Although ideas about automated command and control systems (ASU)953 and net-
works migrated from the military to the civilian side, the infrastructure of the military 
remained separated and closed. It resisted civilian ideas of dual use of its networks 
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and produced its own computers which were advanced but tailor-made for military 
systems and did not support civilian industry.954 The Soviet military built networks for 
an air defence system, a missile defence system, and a space surveillance system—
each with its own centralized computer network during the 1950-1960s.955 The mili-
tary knew about the United States’ SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment) 
air defence network and later ARPANET.956 It approached networks through the lens 
of an arms race and possible nuclear war. The dual-use of military technology and 
networks would have been a risk, which the military did not want to take.957 
 
Based on the articles in the Voennaia Mysl’ journal the Soviet military was aware of 
cybernetic ideas from the late 1950s onward.958 In 1961, A. Berg, A. Kitov and A. 
Liapunov published an article named “Cybernetics in military affairs” in which they 
defined the science of kibernetika and its role in military affairs as: “The use of cyber-
netics in the military is aimed at increasing the effectiveness [speed and accuracy] of 
the command and control [upravlenie] of weapons and troops through the use of 
scientific methods and modern technical means for collecting and processing infor-
mation and developing control commands.”959 The tasks of kibernetika would be the 
development of the autonomous guidance systems, automated command and control 
systems, in addition to automated planning and management processes for headquar-
ters. These systems and processes were supposed to handle processes that were be-
coming too complex and fast, and involved too much information for humans to 
handle. They would also offer optimal solutions for human decision-makers, even on 
military operational issues.960 
 
The ideas of Berg, Kitov and Liapunov were repeated in later articles although not 
without criticism and discussion.961 During the 1980s kibernetika as a term was re-
placed on the pages of Voennaia Mysl’ by informatics962, mathematics etc. but its in-
fluence was arguably felt through the 1990s.963 Based on the USSR General Staff Lec-
tures from 1969 which were translated by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in 
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1976, automated command and control systems and cybernetics featured strongly in 
the Soviet command and communications theory and practice.964 Cybernetics then 
was not only written about in journals, it was taught in the highest military academies 
of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the so-called “third” Soviet military-technological 
revolution was related to cybernetics.965  
 
In the 1970s Soviet military scholars started to perceive a forthcoming military-tech-
nological revolution (MTR) in the military applications of future technologies—partly 
based on the American conduct of the Vietnam war.966 The Soviets developed the 
concepts of the reconnaissance strike (RUK) and fire (ROK) complexes, i.e. ‘system 
of systems’ that combined reconnaissance, fire, and command and control. According 
to Adamsky, the Soviet and Western discussion about RUK/ROK shows how the 
Soviets deliberately used ‘Western concepts’ to discuss their own ideas through West-
ern concepts and thus masked their own theoretical development. Ironically, the 
Westerners referred to RUK/ROK as genuinely Soviet concepts.967 Ultimately, at the 
end of the 1980s Andrew W. Marshall and others in the Office of Net Assessment 
(ONA) argued that the Soviets had identified a kind of revolution in military affairs 
brought about by technological development.968 In practice the Soviet MTR was in-
terrupted by the fall of the Soviet Union which seriously affected the Armed Forces 
budget, while the U.S. Armed Forces began their RMA.969 During the 1990s there 
were no economic resources or enough political will to push through modernization 
of the military forces in the way envisioned by the MTR/RMA advocates.970 This 
history explains why the Russians feel a certain affinity with the American NCW and 
its principles. 
 
Cybernetics thus had its civilian and military aspects, and it manifested as theoretical 
dreams and practical solutions. Moreover, it is quite likely that it also affected the way 
in which the Soviets planned and prepared to mobilise for war. Furthermore, it is 
likely that cybernetics affected the way in which the Russians began to see information 
security as a system.971 
 
4.2.5   Information superiority  
 
During the 1960s and early 1970s the benefits gained from automated information 
management systems were discusses by the Soviet military in connection with the 
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efficiency of command and control and helping the commander to handle large 
amounts of information.972 The idea of information superiority appeared implicitly in 
the Soviet military thinking during the 1970s as the importance of automated infor-
mation systems increased. They were seen to provide faster planning and decision-
making relative to the enemy.973 This development was related to the establishment 
of military command and control as an independent subject in the Soviet military 
sciences in 1979 and to the development of the first ASUs by the Soviet military.974 
Interestingly the idea of ‘spiritual’ and ‘ideological’ superiority, in addition to techno-
logical, was also already present in the 1970s.975 The idea of faster command and con-
trol cycles (tsikla upravleniia) was expressed in 1978 by professor General-Major I. I. 
Anureev who stated that: “If the time of command and control cycle is long enough 
and the conditions of efficiency [operativnost’] are not met, then the losses will be 
significant and the effectiveness of the troops may be low, despite their potentially 
high combat capabilities.”976 As the tempo of current and future war was increasing, 
a faster process of command and control was required to avoid destruction.977 During 
the first half of 1980s, the importance of ensuring the functioning of command and 
control led logically to the importance of denying the opponent his capabilities—or 
to counter C2 warfare (narushenie upravleniia voiskami).978 This increased the role of 
EW in warfare and gave birth to the term radio electronic superiority (radioelektron-
noe prevoskhodstvo).979 General Major I. I. Vorob’ev summarized these develop-
ments in 1984 by stating that: “The confrontation [protivoborstvo] in the sphere of 
command and control, along with the struggle [bor’ba] for fire superiority, for air 
supremacy, and with the anti-tank combat [bor’ba] becomes the most important com-
ponent of the content of modern battle [boi] (operation).”980 
 
In 1990 this set of ideas was mature enough that Colonel A. Ia. Vainer could call it “a 
struggle in the sphere of control and command” (protivoborstvo v sfere upravleniia). 
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Vainer distinguished three elements of this struggle. The first according to Vainer was 
the struggle for information superiority. Information is circulated in and between 
command and control systems and the side that can secure faster and better infor-
mation while denying the opponent the same ability gains the superiority. The second 
was a creative- and knowledge-based intellectual struggle which is conducted through 
reason and ideas related to the optimization of one’s own decisions and deceiving the 
enemy through stratagems. The third element was a technological struggle which was 
based on computer software, its algorithms and optimization, including artificial in-
telligence, and software/information security.981 Vainer’s article was followed by oth-
ers emphasising the different aspects of ‘command and control warfare’ etc. They 
were probably inspired by the Gulf War.982 
 
By 1993 the terms ‘information weapon’ (informatsionnoe oruzhie) and ‘information 
support’ or ‘security’ (informatsionnoe obespechenie or bezopasnost’) were intro-
duced into the Russian military thinking in the context of information superiority. 
Both concepts had technological and psychological aspects from the start.983 Conse-
quently, in 1996 Colonel S. A. Komov could argue that information warfare had been 
conducted in all wars, but during the previous ten years, IW had begun to predeter-
mine the course and outcome of all hostilities.984 Komov also considered information 
superiority as an important element of IW and offered an operational definition of 
IW divining it into information support, information counter-measures and infor-
mation defence measures.985 According to General Major I. N. Vorob’ev, the infor-
mation-psychological struggle could already be conducted during peacetime and, 
therefore, could be understood as ‘a strategy of indirect action’ (strategiia nepriamykh 
deistvii) which promised the achievement of objectives without the use of direct, open 
military force.986 For Vorob’ev this meant that the actual future wars would be short 
and fought with information-technological means and long-range precision weapons, 
which meant that information superiority (including its technological and psycholog-
ical aspects) was the key to victory.987 Similarly, Pirumov and Rodionov claimed in 
1997 that information superiority was required to win wars and it necessitated more 
comprehensive, accurate, authentic, and timely situation information than that pos-
sessed by the enemy’s command and control agencies.988  
 
The idea of information superiority was quite-well established in the Russian military 
thinking by the end of 1990s, although some commentators argued that its theoretical 
                                              
981 Вайнер, А. Я. О противоборстве в сфере управления. Военная мысль № 9 1990, 12-16. 
982 Португальский, Р. М. О борьбе в сфере управления войсками. Военная мысль № 3 1991; Палий, А. 
И. Борьба с системами боевого управления в операциях вооруженных сил НАТО. Военная мысль № 4 
1991; Захаров, А. Н. Тенденции развития вооруженной борьбы. Военная мысль № 11 1991, 9-15; Вла-
димиров А.В. Информационное оружие: миф или реальность? Красная звезда № 5 (октября) 1991. 
983 Фефелов, Б.В. Информационное обеспечение системы управления войсками. Военная мысль № 1 
1993, 36-39; Поздняков 1993; Комов, С.А О концепции информационной безопасности страны. Воен-
ная мысль № 4 1994, 12-17; Лукашкин & Ефимов 1995; Коротченко 1996. 
984 Комов, С. А. Информационная борьба в современной войне: вопросы теории. Военная мысль № 3 
1996, 76-80; Комов, С. А. О способах и формах ведения информационной борьбы. Военная мысль № 
4 1997, 18-22.  
985 Thomas 2001, 787. 
986 Воробьев 1997. Here Vorob’ev echoes the ideas presented earlier by Gareev (Gareev 1998). 
987 Ibid. Also Гулин 1997.  
988 Pirumov & Rodionov 1997. 
 
139 
aspects needed further development.989 It is interesting to note, that although the So-
viets saw the pursuit of conventional and nuclear military superiority as hopeless, they, 
and later the Russians, did not have the same view on information warfare.990 It could 
be argued that information was seen as something novel, and as such, providing a 
decisive advantage. It is also more than possible that the Russians copied the concept 
of information superiority from Western sources, although who influenced who is 
more difficult to ascertain. Both shared the same core principle: information superi-
ority was based on ‘better’ information than the opponent, protection of that infor-
mation, and denying information from the opponent.991 An important point must be 
made here that when some Soviet and Russian military writers argued that infor-
mation superiority was becoming ever more important for future warfare many of 
them meant advanced digitalized command and control systems and counter-C2 war-
fare in the context of military operations. The psychological aspect was present in the 
texts, but information-technological warfare was clearly a distinct phenomenon. 
 
4.2.6   Information-technological warfare  
 
As was argued above, according to the Western research, the Russian view on infor-
mation warfare has two aspects: information-technical/technological and infor-
mation-psychological. Moreover, these aspects are connected by a view which em-
phasises the target or objective of  an ‘information struggle’ instead of means of in-
formation warfare.  In the context of modern Russian military thought (ca. 2015) 
Adamsky has argued that the Russian approach to information-technological warfare 
is based on historical continuity. The first source is the Soviet MTR/RMA thinking 
which emphasised disrupting the enemy’s decision-making process by targeting its 
C4ISR capabilities. The second source is the tradition of maskirovka and active 
measures which aim to deny, deceit, disinform, and conceal, i.e. to manipulate enemy’s 
consciousness and produce favourable behaviour. The third source is the Soviet sci-
ence of cybernetics.992 
 
What has been meant by information-technological war or warfare has changed over 
time.993 However, during the 1970s and 1980s the technological aspect of warfare was 
emphasised by Marshal Ogarkov and others who were writing about the MTR.994 In-
tegration of reconnaissance and weapons through command and control channels 
gave birth to the ideas of ROK/RUK. Moreover, autonomous operational manoeu-
vring groups (OMGs) fighting deep inside NATO lines required advanced automated 
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command and control systems (ASUV) (avtomatizirovannaia sistema upravleniia 
voiskami).995 By the 1980s, Soviet military writers understood that the availability of 
automated command and control systems and communications had become a deci-
sive factor on the modern battlefield—the ability to manoeuvre and fire upon the 
enemy was dependent on them.996 This view elevated radio electronic warfare to a new 
status, and placed higher requirements of efficiency, high quality, stability, reliability, 
secrecy (operativnost’, vysokoe kachestvo, ustoichvost’, nadezhnost’, skrytnost’) on 
command and control.997 The approach resonated with the Western ideas of Com-
mand, Control and Communications Countermeasures (C3CM), which later evolved 
into Command and Control Warfare (C2W) at the same time in the West.998 Soviet 
military writers followed the developments in the West, and predicted the introduc-
tion of autonomous weapon systems, and digitalized C3I capabilities.999 
 
By the late 1980s the term ‘software’ (programmnoe obespechenie) entered the Soviet 
lexicon from the West which indicated that the Soviet writers were aware of the qual-
itative changes in computer technology and the ways it could change warfare.1000 Ad-
ditionally, many Soviet theorists thought that the new conventional weapons based 
on novel physical principles would be as global in reach and as effective as weapons 
of mass destruction.1001 Consequently, the Soviet military was highly aware of the vul-
nerability of its strategic communication and early warning systems and feared a sur-
prise attack against them followed by a decapitation strike with nuclear weapons.1002  
 
Counter command and control warfare and radio electronic warfare began to coalesce 
at the beginning of the 1990s into information warfare or struggle. The distinct tech-
nological aspect was the continuation of the MTR thinking, although the psycholog-
ical aspect was also present from the early on, as was clear from A. Ia. Vainer’s cate-
gorization of the information, intellectual, and technological struggle.1003 Vainer high-
lighted the dual short-term and long-term nature of the technological struggle. The 
short term indicated that EW and software manipulation were connected to the bat-
                                              
995 Ibid., 33-35. 
996 Стишковский 1977; Лосик 1979; Воробьев 1984a. 
997 Kokoshin 1998, 138; Шурупов 1979; Воробьев, И. Н. Новое оружие и развитие принципов общевой-
скового боя. Военная мысль No. 11 1983, 35-45. 
998 Kaplan 2016, 14-16; Layman, Gene A. C3CM – A Warfare Strategy. Naval War College Review, Vol. 38, 
No. 2 (March-April 1985), 31-42; Larson, Doyle E. Exploiting Electronic Warfare. Air Force Magazine, July 
1981. The C2W concept was official defined as late as 1996 as “the integrated use of psychological operations 
(PSYOPS), military deception, operations security (OPSEC), electronic warfare (EW), and physical destruction, 
mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary C2 capa-
bilities while protecting friendly C2 capabilities against such actions.” United States Department of Defence, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W) Joint Pub 3-13.1, 7th February 
1996, v. [Online]. Available: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a357635.pdf [Accessed: 27th November 
2018]. 
999 Пощипов, И. Н. Американская концепция «управление, связь и разведка». Военная мысль № 7 1986, 
63-72. 
1000 Ниесов, В. А. Состояние программного обеспечения автоматизированных систем управления во-
оруженными силами США. Военная мысль № 6 1988, 64-72. 
1001 Fitzgerald 1987b, 35. 
1002 Hoffman 2009, 147-150; Hines et al. 1995a, 16-19; Podvig, Pavel. The Operational Status of the Russian 
Space-Based Early Warning System. Science & Global Security, Vol.4 (1994), 363-384; Blair, Bruce. The Logic 
of Accidental Nuclear War. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993; Yarynich, Valery E. C3: Nuclear 
Command, Control Cooperation. Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information, 2003. 
1003 Вайhep 1990. 
 
141 
tlefield and the long term indicated the level and potential gap of technological devel-
opment between adversaries.1004 The information-technological component was so 
important that Rear-Admiral V. S. Pirumov argued that ‘information support’ (infor-
matsionnoe obespechenie), i.e. electronic systems and computers, were an integral 
part of the combat potential and needed to be added to the correlation of forces 
calculations.1005 At the same time Tsymbal and others were arguing that information 
weapons might be as destructive as the weapons of mass destruction.1006 In 1996 S. V. 
Markov offered one of the first definitions of information weapons as pieces of in-
formation affecting the information processes of information systems.1007 Later Vitalii 
Tsygichko and others classified information weapons into the means to locate and 
destroy equipment emitting signals in the electromagnetic spectrum, means to affect 
the components of electronic equipment and software and data traffic, as well as the 
means to spread propaganda and disinformation, and also psychotronic weapons.1008 
 
These ideas were echoed by A. N. Lukashkin and A.I. Efimov who argued in 1995 
that the computerization of critical systems would make the infosphere the future 
object of military confrontation.1009 Although Lukashkin and Efimov did not refer to 
Western sources, it is quite clear that they were aware of the debate on the protection 
of critical infrastructure going on in the United States at the time.1010 The way in which 
the duo attacked the so-called ‘pessimists’ (sceptics) informs us that by 1995 the pos-
sibilities of ‘dangerous algorithms and software’ was not taken seriously by all in Rus-
sia. Others, like General Major E. G. Korotchenko, saw information as a tool of in-
formation-psychological struggle and an ongoing geopolitical confrontation to con-
trol the Russian people, weaken the moral of its armed forces, and to gain scientific-
technological superiority over Russia. For Korotchenko computer viruses, various 
means of EW, microwave generators and means of software-mathematical influence 
could be used to destabilize whole nations by striking at military and civilian targets 
during peacetime or war.1011 This transitory and dual nature of IW was present in the 
1995 edition of  the Russian Military Encyclopaedia which equated information weap-
ons with psychological warfare but ‘military informatics’ with theory about automated 
information processing.1012 In the mid-1990s many Russian scholars followed the 
Western discourse on IW theory and not only the conduct of American military op-
erations. However, they still employed Marxist-Leninist ideas and cybernetic models 
to conceptualize information-technical warfare.1013 
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For example, Rastorguev, who was commissioned to write a book called Information 
War for the Russian Security Council, defined IW as “a battle between states involving 
the use of exclusively information weapons in the sphere of information models.” He 
was especially interested in modelling how information weapons could affect infor-
mation systems and defined information weapons “as means directed at activating (or 
blocking) information system processes in which the subject using the weapons has 
an interest. An information weapon can be any technical, biological, or social means 
or system that is used for the purposeful production, processing, transmitting, pre-
senting or blocking of data and or processes that work with the data.”1014 According 
to Rastorguev, information does not in itself destroy anything but it affects the en-
emy’s system which might destroy itself.1015 
 
In one way or another, many Russian scholars approached information-technologi-
cal/technical warfare/struggle/confrontation in the context of a more expansive or 
comprehensive information-psychological confrontation/struggle. They also distin-
guished the information warfare means of wartime from those of peacetime. They 
highlighted the importance of technological means, although they perhaps saw the 
objective to reside at the strategic or political level.1016 Information-technological war-
fare/confrontation was an integral part of the visions of the future character of war.1017 
Additionally, at the turn of the millennium, with nuclear deterrence as the backbone 
of Russia’s defence, the vulnerabilities of the command and control systems of stra-
tegic nuclear forces were an important topic.1018 Therefore, it can be argued that in-
formation-technological means were seen by the Russian military thinkers in the 
1990s as an intrinsic part of the modern warfare and strategic stability, but there is no 
clear evidence that they had solved the question of how these concepts were supposed 
to be realized in organizations, or as concepts, and used by forces or implemented as 
means—let alone come up with a ‘holistic’ strategy. At the beginning of 2000s these 
ideas were still underdeveloped, but the basic elements had been formulated. When 
the Chief of the General Staff Valeri Gerasimov produced his presentation about 
future warfare in 2013 his views were based on ideas articulated already in the 
1990s.1019 
 
4.2.7  Automated command and control systems  
 
Automated command and control systems were already explicitly and implicitly men-
tioned in the article by Berg, Kitov and Liapunov in 1961.1020 Subsequently, they be-
came the central concept around which the Soviet kibernetik ideas revolved. The ter-
minology of ASUs is diverse and for clarity’s sake I will use the term ‘automated com-
mand and control systems’ (abbreviated as ASU) to refer to a group of different terms 
                                              
1014 Quoted in Thomas 2005, 78. Original Расторгуев, Сергей Павлович.  Введение в формальную теорию 
информационной войны. Москва: Вузовская книга, 2002. 
1015 Thomas 2005. 
1016 Комов 1996; Комов 1997; Pirumov 1992; Pirumov & Rodionov 1997; Расторгуев 1999; Смолян, Цы-
гичко & Черешкин 1995; Цыгичко, Вотрин, Крутских, Смолян & Черешкин 2000; Черешкин, Смолян 
& Цыгичко 1996. 
1017 Круглов 1998; Слипченко, Владимир. Война будущего (прогностический анализ). 1999 [Online]. 
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1018 Рукшин 2000. 
1019 Герасимов, Валерий. Ценность науки в предвидении. ВПК № 8 (476) 2013, 1-3. 
1020 Берг, Китов & Ляпунов 1961, 19. 
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that were used during the Soviet and Russian times.1021 I will concentrate here on the 
ideas about military ASUs as civilian ideas have been examined by Gerovich, Peters 
and Susiluoto and presented above in the context of ‘kibernetik’. 
 
The Soviet military was interested in ASUs from the 1960s.1022 Colonel P. Tkachenko 
described them in 1961 as the “automation of information processing using electronic 
machines.” He however argued that the creative processes inherent in command and 
control could not be automated.1023 This statement expressed an argument which the 
Soviets had difficulties solving on the level of military theory: Could and should ma-
chines be more than support tools for commanders’ subjective creativity and what 
were the ‘scientific principles’ of command and control?1024 There was also the prob-
lem of how to fit ASUs into the Marxist-Leninist theory and ‘partiinost’’ or party-
mindedness. A further problem was how the political principle of centralized control 
was to be combined with shared computation capabilities or decentralized command 
in general.1025 Nevertheless, as one commentator stated: “typical representatives of 
cybernetic systems are automated command and control systems.”1026 And if cyber-
netics was politically acceptable after the 1950s, so were the ASUs. 
 
According to the USSR General Staff Academy lecture materials from 1969, auto-
mated systems would increase the efficiency of control by reducing the time expended 
on the control cycle, i.e. obtaining information, processing it, making decisions and 
transmitting orders, and thus leaving more time for carrying out the orders by the 
forces.1027 The main processes to be automated were the collection of primary infor-
mation; processing, formulation, reproduction, and the visual display of information; 
performance of certain calculations; and transmission of information.1028 ASUs would 
be used to connect the headquarters and forces of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact 
to an integrated automated system of control.1029 Consequently, a Ministry of Defence 
directive from the 2nd of December 1967 commanded “the combining of computer 
centres of districts into a unified system connected to the ground forces computer 
                                              
1021 Military sources use the term ‘avtomatizirovannaia sistema upravleniia voiskami’ (ASUV) which translates 
to command and control systems of troops whereas civilian sources use ‘avtomatizirovannaia sistema uprav-
leniia’ which translates to more general automated management systems. Berg, Kitov and Liapunov basically 
made this distinction in their article from 1961 (Берг, Китов & Ляпунов 1961). 
1022 Computers were, for example, used to calculate optimal use of tactical nuclear weapons and air defence 
systems. Chernov, L., Moiseyev, V. and Kiselev, A. Some Problems in the Use of Electronic Computers. Mili-
tary thought – Secret version 1962, No. 6 (67). Translated and published by the Central Intelligence Agency, 
Intelligence Information Special Report, 2nd June 1978 [Online]. Available: https://www.cia.gov/library/ read-
ingroom/docs/1978-06-02b.pdf [Accessed: 29th November 2018]. 
1023 Ткаченко 1962. 
1024 Варе 1962; Дружинин & Конторов 1970 & 1973; Дружинин, В. В., Конторов, Д. С. Принципы созда-
ния и применения автоматизированных систем управления войсками. Военная мысль № 8 1976, 43-54; 
Андреев 1978; Горлов, А. И., Смирнов, С. С. О влиянии автоматизации на работу органов управления. 
Военная мысль № 12 1984, 49-55. 
1025 Алтухов, П. К. Предмет и содержание теории управления войсками. Военная мысль № 7 1975, 15-
25; Евстигнеев & Вичугов 1977; Соловьев, С. Л., Терехов, И. П. К вопросу о совершенствовании управ-
ления войсками. Военная мысль № 11 1980, 48-51. 
1026 Жованик 1976, 28. 
1027 CIA 1976. 
1028 Ibid., 12. The distinctions between automated and automatic systems was already clear. Automatic systems 
were only monitored by humans whereas automated systems required human thinking, will and decisions to 
operate. (Ibid., 19) 
1029 Ibid., 13-14. 
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centre […]”1030 
 
The 1970s and early 1980s were an intensive period of ASU development in the Soviet 
military. The command and control system of the strategic nuclear forces was up-
graded multiple times  from 1967 to 1985 and its automated functions increased in 
every iteration.1031 The fear of a surprise nuclear attack and the establishment of the 
launch-on-warning doctrine made it necessary to build an early-warning (EW) system 
based on networks, radars and satellites.1032 In the 1970s the military began to develop 
operational, tactical and technical level ASUs to enable the control of military actions 
from strategic operations on TVDs (theatre of military operations ‘teatr voennykh 
deistvyi’) down to individual weapon systems. It also built a naval reconnaissance sys-
tem which included space, air, and naval assets to track U.S. carried battlegroups and 
an integrated territorial air defence network. These systems suffered from the defi-
ciencies of Soviet computer technology and were introduced to troops only haltingly 
and partially.1033  
 
The interest in automated systems was visible in the pages of the Soviet military en-
cyclopaedia which in its 1976 edition gave a description only of automatic control 
systems but the 1986 edition of the military encyclopaedic dictionary dedicated almost 
a page to automated command and control systems (ASU/ASUV).1034 They were de-
fined as: “an interrelated set of information processing, data transmission and com-
munication tools that automate the collection, analysis and assessment of the situation 
data, decision making, planning, giving orders, and delivering tasks to the troops 
(forces) and the controlling their implementation.” The main task of the automated 
command and control systems was to increase the efficiency, stability, flexibility, se-
crecy and quality of the processes of command and control of troops [operativnost’, 
ustoichivost’, gibkost’, skrytnost’, kachestva protsessov]. ASUVs were ‘unified sys-
tems’ that provided effective information-technological interaction between com-
mand posts.1035 Based on this definition, ASUs were not just computers but cybernetic 
                                              
1030 Ibid., 27. 
1031 Hoffman 2009, 147-148. 
1032 Podvig, Pavel. History and the Current Status of the Russian Early-Warning System. Science and Global 
Security, Vol. 10 (2002), 21–60; Podvig 2008. 
1033 Nauta, Frank. Logistics Implications of Maneuver Warfare. Volume 3: Soviet Offensive Concepts and Ca-
pabilities. Bethesda, Maryland: Logistics Management Institute, 1988; Vego, Milan. Recce-Strike Complexes in 
Soviet Theory and Practice. Fort Leavenworth, KS: SASO, 1990; Тимошенко, Михаил. «Маневр» и маневры. 
Арсенал. Военно-промышленное обозрение» №6, 2010 г.; Мосиенко, Юрий Иванович. «Маневр» – 
Первая советская АСУВ поля боя. «Арсенал» № 3 2011 г.; Андреев 2011; Безель, Я. В. Этапы развития 
автоматизированных систем управления авиацией и ПВО. Вестник Концерна ПВО «Алмаз – Антей», 
№2, 2015 [Online]. Available: http://www.almaz-antey.ru/upload/iblock/e95/e95a21ddf357267fc0137-
dbd3cace605.pdf [Accessed: 11th December 2018]; Алехин, Ю., Прохоров, А., Проценко, А. «Пирамида» 
начиналась с «воздуха». Воздушно-космическая оборона №1, 2011 г; Huchthausen & Sheldon-Duplaix, 
2009, 233-234. 
1034 ‘Автоматическая система’. Советская военная энциклопедия в восьми томах (СВЭ), Том I. M.: Воен-
ное издательство Министерства обороны, 1976, 82. 
1035 ‘Автоматизированная система управления войсками (силами)’ Военный Энциклопедический Сло-
варь, Том. I. M.: Военное издательство, 1986, 17. The term appeared with shorter definition already in 1983 
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reliability, security and speed. (Stishkovskiy, V. The Principal Ways of improving the quality of Military Com-
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systems which were used to control and manage the process of command. Addition-
ally, already in 1983, one of their benefits was seen to be decentralization and the 
mobility of command.1036 Interestingly, the technical requirements for ASUs were be-
ing discussed under the term ‘ustoichivost’’ which consisted of reliability, survivabil-
ity, and noise immunity and which would later in the 2000s be understood as ‘resili-
ence’. This ‘ustoichivost’’ could be affected by internal and external factors, the latter 
of which included kinetic force, EW, and software attacks.1037  
 
In 1987 General Colonel V. N. Konchits argued that the contemporary aspects of 
command and control were related to the increased tempo and volume of infor-
mation, the possibly to provide optimal solutions and forecasting, and the vulnerabil-
ity of complex systems. These were the same kind of issues that the Western armed 
forces were starting to consider at the time.1038 Nevertheless, at least Konchits did not 
argue for decentralization and networking or for adopting other future RMA concepts 
but, instead, for enhancing the role of staff and the commander who had to know 
everything with the help of information support, i.e. ASUs.1039 The importance of 
ASUs was reflected in strategic assessments. According to testimonial evidence, the 
Soviet military in the 1970s and 1980s considered command and communications the 
second most important target of possible the Western attack after nuclear weapons.1040 
In more futuristic visions, command and control warfare was imagined as a kind of 
struggle between ASUs supported by EW conducted on an operational level under 
strict control of divisional staff etc.1041 This view was different from the Western, per-
haps more individualistic, ‘cyber warrior’ imaginary1042 and it might have led to differ-
ent operational and strategic conclusions. 
 
In the 1990s ASUs remained an important topic and in the 1997 edition of the Military 
Encyclopaedia ‘automatization of command and control’ with subtopics covered mul-
tiple pages.1043 The definition of ASU had practically remained the same but future 
perspectives now included further unification of systems, the use of personal com-
puters and local networks, the use of common software and programming languages 
etc. Obviously tailor-made, customized, independent systems were out of vogue. 
Whatever the dictionaries claimed, the problems of inefficient and insufficient tech-
nology and theory seemed to be the reality.1044 Kibernetika was replaced by informat-
ika, informatization and information theory, and the rapid ‘informatizatsiia’ produced 
calls for standards and unification of ASU solutions. Military districts were offered as 
the basis of the information structure of the armed forces as they were peacetime and 
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wartime formations and were responsible for operations in strategic directions.1045 Ar-
guments were made for dispensing with the term of ASU and replacing it with more 
modern ‘information systems’ and ’information networks’ as automation had lost its 
distinctive meaning.1046 By the end of the 1990s a few scholars offered artificial intel-
ligence either as a replacement for ASUs or as a new core component of ASUs1047 
 
On the eve of the new millennium General Lieutenant V. V. Barvinenko argued, after 
stating that previous efforts to create domestic ASUs had failed or were insufficient, 
that: “The unified (combined-arms) ASU for the Armed Forces should be centralized, 
hierarchical and territorial, have sophisticated horizontal links, and have vertical 
trunks.” The modular, flexible and networked structure of automated systems of com-
mand and control, and the availability of functioning algorithms would make such a 
system adaptive, able to adequately respond to changes in “the means and methods 
of conducting military operations.”1048 Barvinenko’s statement was born out of frus-
tration with the fragmented field of multiple types of ASUs used by the services and 
branches of the Armed Forces. He also wished to create a global military information 
network similar to the United States’ network which would facilitate the joint capa-
bilities of the Armed Forces.1049 Others saw informatization as a way to finally build 
an automated mobilization system.1050 By the end of 1990s, the Russian military schol-
ars were actively thinking about ways to adopt modern ASUs to the Russian approach 
to conducting war. However, at that time, a lack of resources hindered the ‘fitting of 
ideas’ to reality. 
 
Although ASUs are not explicitly mentioned in other strategic documents, the Infor-
mation Security Doctrine of 2000 recognizes the concept of ASU and connects it to 
almost all spheres of information security. In the context of the Doctrine ASUs might 
be understood as a shorthand for ‘hardware and software’, but they are more than 
that. They secure the functioning of the economy and society, public and secret tele-
communications, the command and control of the military, the functioning of the 
judicial system etc. ASUs are systems, not pieces of hardware or pieces of code.1051 
Thus, the strategic cultural idea of ASUs was quite alive when Russia entered the 21st 
century. On the civilian side it offered ways to understand the information revolution 
gripping Russia. On the military side it provided visions of how to arrange command 
and control in future wars. 
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№ 5 1994, 29-33; Кежаев, В.А. Совершенствование управления войсками: аспект информатизации. Во-
енная мысль № 4 1996, 42-45; Ловцов, Д. А. Информационная безопасность АСУ войсками и оружием: 
теоретические аспекты. Военная мысль № 6 1996, 32-38. 
1046 Калинин, Ю. П. Озеранскии, Л.И. Информационные сети — перспектива автоматизации процес-
сов управления войсками. Военная мысль № 2 1997, 54-58.  
1047 Ibid; Sayfetdinov, Kh., Kulyanitsa, A. L. Information Technology and Artificial Intelligence. Military 
Thought No. 5 1997. 
1048 Барвиненко, В. В. Об автоматизации управления группировками Вооруженных Сил. Военная мысль 
№ 2, 1999, 26-29. 
1049 Ibid. 
1050 Бобошко, А.А., Муравьев, Н. Л., Пономарев, С.Ю. Основные проблемы автоматизации организа-
ционно-мобилизационных органов ВС РФ. Военная мысль № 6, 1999, 50-53. 
1051 Доктрина информационной безопасности РФ. (Шаклеина 2002). 
 
147 
4.2.8   Unified information space  
 
The idea of a unified information space (EIP) was already expressed by the pioneers 
of the Soviet kibernetika as “the unified territorial state network of information-com-
puting centres with a centralized command.” For Berg, Kitov and Liapunov this ar-
rangement was necessary not only because of the their cybernetic ideas but because 
of the lack of computers and the size of the Soviet Union.1052 However, this idea did 
not materialize in the way the pioneers had hoped and the civilian Soviet ‘information 
space’ remained fragmented.1053 Nevertheless, the military needed redundant and re-
silient communications networks which would connect geographically distinct assets 
in conditions of conventional or thermonuclear war.1054 It also had to create commu-
nications to the Soviet Union’s allies in the Warsaw Pact, to its troops in Eastern and 
Central Europe and, from the 1960s onward and particularly in the 1970s, to its troops 
in Third World countries and to its blue water navy on the world’s oceans—including 
ballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBNs). The military had to prepare for a war in 
multiple theatres of military action or TVDs with the recognition that governmental 
central command might be wiped out by nuclear strikes.1055 
 
One of the principles of command and control in the Soviet and later Russian military 
art has been continuity or uninterruptedness (nepreryvnost’).1056 This was a hierar-
chical relationship between the commander and the subordinates requiring a direct 
channel of communication.1057 This, according to Colonel I. D. Pombrik, who was 
writing in 1976, meant that the commander and staff had to be able to influence the 
events of battle even under the effects of EW and nuclear weapons.1058 By the late 
1970s the Soviet signals officers agreed that communication systems had become the 
key to winning and, therefore, a target of enemy action. Because of this, continuity 
required that more depth, redundancy, and reserves were demanded of the systems.1059 
This required the unification and centralization of control of the communication sys-
tems.1060 Moreover, another principle of ‘edinonachalie’ or unity of command empha-
sised the undivided responsibility of the commander to command and control.1061 
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Nevertheless, the principles were not fully consistent or historically constant and at 
times they emphasised the relative, initiative and independence of subordinates.1062 
 
Since the late 1970s the Soviet military was aware of computer networks created in 
the United States on the basis of public telecommunications networks.1063 It was un-
derstood that these kinds of digitalized networks which were connected to satellite 
communications required technological standardization and common interfaces—
something that the Soviets lacked.1064 However, in the context of continuity, uninter-
ruptedness and unity of command, the control these new networks offered a solution 
to territorial defence. They provided centralized command during peacetime but 
were, nevertheless, able to function in a fragmented form after an initial period of war 
had destroyed their state-level unity.1065 Many in the 1970s considered the main bene-
fits of automation and networks to be the enhanced centralization of decision-making 
and commander-centric operations rather than the freedom and proactivity of subor-
dinates.1066 
 
During the 1980s the Soviet military continued to follow the Western efforts to unify 
tactical and operational networks and clearly admired what they were seeing.1067 This 
did not stop Colonel E. G. Korotchenko claiming in 1988 that under massive aero-
space attack using precision-guided weapons a strictly centralized command was re-
quired to prepare for and repulse aggression.1068 Although Korotchenkos presented 
his views as universal principles of the military art, they were based on an analysis of 
NATO doctrine. Moreover, his views must be put in the context of the 1980s offence-
defence debate in the Soviet military circles where the emphasis was put on surprise 
and the initial period of war. It is reasonable to argue that the Soviet military viewed 
the benefits of networks from the viewpoint of territorial defence and total war. 
 
The civilian version of the idea of an EIP found new life after the fall of Soviet Union 
in the Russian Internet, commonly known as RuNet. It was born from the networks 
of universities and research academies in Moscow and St. Petersburg from 1989 on-
wards.1069 RuNet started from ‘zero’ as there were no proper telecommunications in-
frastructure, cross-border connections or even demand for it—markets were splin-
tered and the development of networks was highly regionalized.1070 The scholars of 
Soviet era cybernetic institutions were instrumental in the development of the Inter-
net, although many scientists left Russia during the economic hardships of the 1990’s 
or had to change profession.1071 State funding decreased and projects on super-com-
puters etc. declined. Ilmari Susiluoto argues that the state IT sector basically ceased 
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to exist.1072 Consequently, the Russian information society was built from the bottom 
up by Soviet engineers who had been discarded by the system, destitute academics, 
and adventurous entrepreneurs. The groundwork for the Russian information society 
was laid in the 1990s, but the Russian information revolution did not begin until 2000-
2002.1073 Cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg were at the forefront of the develop-
ment, but major energy- and mining companies provided funds for developing net-
works in parts of the periphery. Despite the relative success of the civilian IT sector, 
the lag in technology and resources afflicted the military, which in 1999 was mainly 
equipped with C3 systems from the 1970-1980s, and only about 10-15% of the equip-
ment was modern. The armed forces lacked satellite and fibre optic communications, 
proper encryption and jamming resistance, digitalised networks, and end-user equip-
ment. Because of the cost of developing purely military systems, civilian technology 
and cooperation was considered as a serious option. The military required the support 
of the civilian information infrastructure to cope with the changes.1074  
 
In 2005 Russia was still 10 years behind the leading countries in information technol-
ogy, and its telecommunications infrastructure was in the hands of state companies.1075 
For much of the 1990s the Russian telecommunications network was outdated if not 
obsolete from the point of view of modern data traffic. Regional telecommunications 
networks were owned by local companies, which reduced competition and therefore 
investment and the building of intraregional and state-wide connections. Civilian net-
works capable of supporting data traffic were splintered, fragmented, and partly non-
existent. Satellite communications were used in many places instead of fixed connec-
tions.1076 It is thus not surprising that kibernetik ideas returned in a new guise as the 
‘unified information network’. 
 
In 1995 President Yeltsin approved the Concept of the Formation and Development 
of a Unified Information Space of Russia and Relevant State Information Re-
sources.1077 The concept stated that the Russian information systems were fragmented, 
disconnected, and used mainly by government institutions which restricted access to 
their systems and did not cooperate with each other. It defined an EIP as “a set of 
databases and data banks, technologies of their management and use, and infor-
mation-telecommunications systems and networks operating on the basis of common 
principles and according to general rules that ensure information interaction between 
organizations and citizens.” This space consisted of information resources, organiza-
tional structures, and means to use and exchange information, the latter two of which 
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formed an information infrastructure. The Concept promoted the discarding of mo-
nopolization of information, bureaucratic stove-piping, and the tradition of secrecy. 
It encouraged the connection of the Russian information space to the European and 
global information spaces. The Concept contained many of the kibernetik ideas of 
the 1960s and 1970s, but instead of centralized control, it emphasised the benefits 
gained from the freedom of information. Nevertheless, the development of the EIP 
would be guided by vertical and horizontal cooperation in which the state customer 
would drive the development, and ‘discipline’ would be maintained through a state 
register, standardization, and licensing. The development of the policy of EIP was 
given to the FAPSI, i.e. the division of the KGB which had been responsible for 
eavesdropping and cryptography.1078 
 
The planned unified information space would connect the state leadership and power 
ministries and could be used to coordinate ‘operational’ actions in peacetime and dur-
ing special time1079. It would include information and communications necessary for 
the peacetime management of the military, strategic reconnaissance and warning, mo-
bilization, command and control necessary for strategic deployment through a system 
named ‘Shirota’. The concept does not indicated which parts of the Shirota system 
would be connected to the larger ‘information space of public authorities’ if any.1080 
When the discussion about the draft Information Security Doctrine began in 1995-
1997, the ideas that the FAPSI and the military had were in fact based on an intranet, 
which would be protected against outside interference, and not on the Internet.1081 
The Concept of the Formation and Development of a Unified Information Space 
was eventually buried, although it gave rise to some plans to create unified communi-
cation networks between the Russian security institutions and  between the countries 
belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States.1082 Moreover, the Concept 
had included a mention of the ‘Automated information exchange system between 
member states of the CIS’ (ASIO CIS).1083  
 
Consequently, in 1996 the CIS adopted the Concept of the Formation of Information 
Space of the CIS.1084 This Concept aimed at synchronizing the regulation and poten-
tially integrating the national information spaces of the CIS countries. It defined the 
information space of the CIS as a collection of national information spaces that in-
teracted based on intergovernmental agreements. Although the ‘national information 
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space’ was not defined, the information infrastructure was, and it basically referred to 
communications technology or ‘information resources’. The information security as-
pect of the Concept was obvious as it emphasised the regulation of information, not 
so much infrastructure or economic aspects.1085 Thus, despite the ‘liberal’ intentions 
of both Concepts, they were, at least partly, intended to impose state control over the 
emerging information space. 
 
The military adopted the term ‘information’ in the 1990s and began to use it when 
writing about spaces, infrastructure, and systems of command and control, although  
without any clear agreement on what those concepts meant.1086 For B. I. Glazov and 
D. A. Lovtsov the ‘unified information environment’ (edinaia informatsionnaia sreda) 
meant the Internet and other data networks that enabled command and control sys-
tems to interact.1087  The principles of continuity, efficiency, resilience and stealth 
(nepreryvnost’, operativnost’, ustoichivost’, skrytnost’)1088,  and the unity of command 
were clearly present when Barvinenko in 1999 made his demand for the integration 
of all government bodies in a unified global information command and control net-
work.1089 This call was repeated by Contra-Admiral V. V. Biriukov who, moreover, 
defined the unified information space as the common and unified collection of infor-
mation systems, resources, technologies, communications, languages, and infrastruc-
ture.1090 
 
The concept of a unified information space eventually appeared in the 2000 Infor-
mation Security Doctrine, but was not clearly defined.1091 Consequently, the Military 
Doctrine of 2000 mentioned the creation of a unified command and control system 
of military organizations of the government, the centralization of command and con-
trol of all means and forces of air defence, and the creation of a unified defence space 
of the CIS countries.1092 Considering the 1995 and 1996 Concepts it is safe to argue 
that the idea of the EIP had reached the elites already in 1990s. This was to be ex-
pected because Berg, Kitov and others had promoted the idea from the 1950s, and 
because the Internet and ‘informatization’ by the early 1990s was recognized globally 
as something important and promising in this regard.1093 
 
The unified information space got its current name during the 1990s, but the idea was 
already present in the 1950s. Although it would exaggeration to claim that the 1990s 
concept of unified information space was like the kibernetik ideas of a computer con-
trolled socialist command-economy, it had the same idea of controlling information 
flows to enable a more efficient management of the state. The military seems to have 
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enthusiastically adopted the information era language in the 1990s. This was unsur-
prising as it had pursued the unification of its own, but never all, networks already 
from the 1960s. The concept of EIP was very probably related to the Western terms 
and concepts associated with the Internet in the 1990s, such as: infospace, hyperspace, 
cyberspace, the global information society, the World Wide Web etc. Thus, the trans-
lation of the term ‘edinnoe’ in the ‘edinnoe informatsionnoe prostranstvo’ to ‘single’ 
might be more accurate in some cases. Instead of a vertically and horizontally inte-
grated and regulated national network, the sources might have used the EIP to refer 
to open information sharing networks in the context of the developing (global) infor-
mation society. However, in the sources used here, this was not usually the case. 
 
4.2.9   Digital sovereignty 
 
‘Digital sovereignty’, or its parallel concept ‘information sovereignty’, as a term, has 
not been used by military scholars writing for Voennaia Mysl’ or, for that matter, by 
any Russian military or civilian theorists that I have been able to find until the 2000s. 
Nevertheless, ‘information sovereignty’ was used in the 1996 Concept of the For-
mation of the Information Space of the CIS, although its substance was not de-
fined.1094 It seems to have referred to the state’s right to control the formation of its 
information space and especially security in that space. According to a Russian asso-
ciated professor A. A. Efremov, sovereignty in the ‘information sphere’ was first dis-
cussed in Russia by V. B. Naymov in a conference article in 1999.1095 Before that the 
issue was mainly discussed in Western sources.1096 Be that as it may, territorial integrity 
and sovereignty have been guiding principles of Russian foreign and security policy 
from its rebirth after the collapse of the Soviet Union.1097 Additionally, according to 
previous studies, a geopolitical approach which emphasises territoriality and sover-
eignty has been present in the Soviet/Russian security thinking at least from the 
1930s.1098 
 
The strategic cultural ideas of digital sovereignty and the EIP are related. It is quite 
clear that the Soviet cybernetists of the 1960s and 1970s were not thinking about a 
global information network but about a network which would control a territorially 
distinct economic system.1099 Although, in the event that socialism had conquered the 
world, their system might have had acquired global dimensions. In the 1990s the con-
cept of a unified information space of Russia was also clearly state oriented—it de-
fined a distinct Russian information space which would be under state control.1100 This 
connection to sovereignty and the EIP would produce the concept of the national 
segment of the Internet as the basis of digital and information sovereignty in the 2000s 
and 2010s.1101 Furthermore, sovereignty in the information space was also strongly 
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related to the idea of interstate struggle which, during the 1990s, incorporated the new 
information-psychological and technological threats to state interests and concomi-
tant modes of confrontation. 
 
In the context of the drafting of the 2000 Information Security Doctrine, S. A. Ko-
mov, for example, stated that the Russian information security system is based on 
constitutional principles including the hierarchical division of power.1102 Furthermore, 
the discussion concerning the draft was about protecting Russia from outside influ-
ences and was an indication of how important the idea of sovereignty was for the 
security services and the military.1103 When the Information Security Doctrine of 2000 
was released it connected information security to the sovereignty and territorial integ-
rity of the Russian Federation.1104 It is safe to argue that whatever ideas the pioneers 
of the Russian Internet might have had, the state approached the information space, 
sphere and environment from the viewpoint of state sovereignty.1105 This was appar-
ent already before 1999 when Russia’s draft resolutions on information security was 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1998. It stated that “Expressing 
concern that these [information] technologies and means can potentially be used for 
purposes that are inconsistent with the objectives of maintaining international stability 
and security and may adversely affect the security of States.”1106 This expressed con-
cern was about state interests, not about human rights or other global challenges. 
 
Digital sovereignty was something that had been brewing for some time. Its proto 
version was already present in the thinking of the Soviet and Russian scholars and the 
security and defence elites in the 1990s in the form of information sovereignty. More-
over, many theorists saw the information struggle as a state- or system-based con-
frontation and thus related to sovereignty. It resonated quite well with other tradi-
tional ideas about the Russian state and its interests in the Russian strategic culture. 
Previous studies have shown that as the 1990s progressed, a nationalist, statist and 
civilizationist circle of academicians, politicians, and security and military officers 
gained influence in Russia.1107 These people were more ready to see the cyber and 
information space as an extension of state sovereignty. Consequently, during the 
2000s and 2010s information/digital sovereignty was to become a defining term and 
concept for how the Russian Federation strove to shape cyberspace.  
 
4.3 Summary of historical ideas 
 
From the analysis presented above a few conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, the Marx-
ist-Leninist idea of a struggle between competing social and economic systems was 
transformed into an information struggle between great powers in which information-
technological means are one of the primary tools—or conversely the idea of the strug-
gle was updated to include modern notions of information. Nevertheless, the Russian 
military viewed these technological tools in a different framework than their civilian 
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counterparts. It was interested in the character of a future war. 
 
The different views on a future war—oscillating between massive aerospace surprise 
attack, regional conflicts, and internal insurgency—seem to have produced a concept 
of deterrence that expanded from deterrence to prevention and consequently in-
cluded all forms and means of state power. This was not a new idea. Information-
technological means were effortlessly incorporated in the idea of constant struggle 
between great powers. It can be argued that a defensive strategy and an offensive 
doctrine were transformed through a dominantly defensive phase into an offensive 
grand strategy—in the Western parlance. In this context, the security of the state is 
guaranteed by constantly challenging the competing powers on multiple levels and 
fronts, to act otherwise is to risk being encircled and suffocated. Russia’s foreign pol-
icy in the late-1990s reflected this concept, but there were no resources to truly act on 
it.1108 Furthermore, during the 1990s Russian military thinkers searched for an alter-
native deterrence mechanism for the Soviet era’s massive conventional and nuclear 
forces in a new environment which included new threats. In the turn of the millen-
nium this process was still unfinished. 
 
During the Cold war and in the 1990s the Russians considered asymmetry to relate to 
the correlation of forces between peer competitors—mainly between the United 
States and the Soviet Union—not, for example, terrorism. Asymmetry was something 
that affected parity and thus the balance of power, in a way it cost-efficiently exploited 
the weaknesses of the systems of the side that had temporarily gained advantage and 
restored the balance (and possibly gained an advantage) by employing science, tech-
nology and ingenuity. An asymmetric response (and strategy) was a strategic-level so-
lution which negated the advantage of the opponent—it was part of the dialectics of 
war where measures and countermeasures were constantly developed. In this context, 
information superiority was a critical advantage. Informatization had made it so. The 
side that processed information faster and therefore made better and faster decisions 
would win a conflict. The Russians recognized the importance of information-tech-
nical means in a future war. These were weapons that could be used against the mili-
tary’s command and control systems and the critical information infrastructure of a 
nation and possibly had strategic effects. The Soviets and Russians recognized ‘cyber 
warfare’ even if they did not use similar terms and concepts. However, they ap-
proached information and computer technology from a wider perspective emphasiz-
ing the nation’s scientific and technological potential as a source of power. Moreover, 
the psychological element was almost always understood as the primary aspect and 
technological tools subordinated to it. 
 
The kibernetik ideas of ASUs, unified information space, and their ultimate end state 
of digital sovereignty went through a long and arduous incubation period. They 
brought with them into the next millennium the idea of a centralized, vertically com-
manded and controlled, horizontally integrated system of systems in the information 
sphere, where systems would fight systems. Ideally, the Russian information space 
would be free and controlled at the same time and it would provide unforeseen eco-
nomic benefits through information sharing. Nevertheless, the Internet and the Rus-
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sian information society were left to develop on their own during the 1990s—admit-
tedly there were more pressing issues that needed attention during that decade. When 
the Russian government called upon the power ministries, academia, and industry in 
1995 to formulate a strategy for Russia to handle the challenges of the information 
era, sovereignty was the principle around which the approach was built. The imple-
mentation of this ‘strategy’ produced a persistent Russian policy of promoting infor-
mation sovereignty in the UN, but domestically its effects would not materialize be-
fore the reign of Vladimir Putin. 
 
The analysis of strategic cultural ideas conducted in this chapter points yet to one 
additional finding. The epistemic communities have had a definite role in providing 
new ideas to the Soviet and Russian elites in the course of history. There have been 
definite ‘circles’ of people who have offered their ideas to the elites. The military and 
civilian cybernetists of the 1950s and 1960s were such groups, kagebists and gereush-
niks (the KGB and GRU operatives who acquired party membership and influ-
ence)1109 were another, the institutchiki of the 1980s were a third group, and the mili-
tary and ex-KGB/FSB officers of the mid to late 1990s seem to form a fourth group. 
It is noteworthy that the formidable KGB was divided into the FSB, the SVR, the 
FSO and the FAPSI and that the military intelligence was much reduced in the 
1990s.1110 Like the future president Vladimir Putin who went to serve in the city ad-
ministration of St. Petersburg, people retired from the security services because of 
economic problems and/or ideological disillusionment and formed new communities 
and (fragmented) interest groups with a certain worldview.1111 These people had aca-
demic credentials and held high positions in scientific institutions sometimes emigrat-
ing to the decision-making elite itself.1112 However, a shared worldview did not mean 
that these people held homogenous causal beliefs or that their institutional interests 
coalesced, quite the contrary.1113  
 
Domestic politics, bureaucratic infighting, and the change of strategic environment 
probably affected the way strategic cultural ideas were adopted. According to William 
D. Jackson, the views of the Russian civilian leadership and the military were increas-
ingly at odds in the 1990s.1114 Nevertheless, as conservative forces made a comeback 
in the political arena around 1993, the ideas carried by the armed forces and security 
services started to influence political elites, which in many cases were themselves ex-
military or ex-KGB/FSB.1115 The national security documents of 2000 were practically 
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drafted by the siloviki and the future President, the ex-Director of the FSB, Vladimir 
Putin took part in writing them.1116 The international environment of Russia had 
changed with the enlargement of NATO, the war in Yugoslavia with its consequences 
for Russia’s status as a great power, with the two wars in Chechnya, and the economic 
crisis of 1998. Therefore, the epistemic communities involved in security and defence 
policy were able to offer their ideas to reorient Russia and practically moved from 
outside experts to inside policy makers as Putin started to build his regime.1117 This 
was not a smooth and all-encompassing transition as the FSB, the Ministry of De-
fence, the General Staff and others fought with each other for power, money, and 
influence.1118 It should be noted that the empirical use of the concept of epistemic 
communities has its challenges in such political systems as the Soviet Union of the 
Russian Federation. Available sources are not complete enough and political pro-
cesses are quite opaque. However, it can be claimed that there was a community or 
communities of academics and specialists present and able to influence the elites as 
they faced a new and challenging millennium.  
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5  
PUTIN ERA IDEAS 
 
his chapter continues to find answers to the thesis’ research problem’s analyt-
ical part, that is, identifying and examining strategic cultural ideas related to 
cyberspace and cyber power present in the discourses of Russian defence and 
security policy oriented epistemic communities and elites. This chapter aims to exam-
ine what ideas were present when the Russian security policy towards cyberspace 
changed in 2011-2015 and the Russian state began to control and shape a part of 
cyberspace into a national segment of the Internet.  The objective is to demonstrate 
that the strategic cultural ideas analysed in Chapter 4 were present and available to the 
elites and to observe how the ideas were reflected in the highest national security 
documents. Chapter 6 will concentrate on the policy and implementation level. The 
analysis in this chapter concentrates on studying ideas not the persons writing about 
them. However, in order to show how the ideas could have transferred from the ep-
istemic communities to the security and defence policy elites I trace and present some 
academic and professional histories of the most important writers—I will do so 
mainly in the footnotes.  
 
This chapter starts with an examination of how strategy is made in Russia to under-
stand how strategic ideas might end-up in the highest national security documents 
and what these documents are. The structure of this chapter then follows the analysis 
of strategic cultural ideas in descending order from the more political and strategic to 
the more technical. In the sub-chapters, the ideas are analysed in chronological and 
thematical order.  The contextualization of these ideas is included in the analysis 
where necessary, but the broader international environment is analysed in Chapter 6. 
I end the chapter with a comparison of the relationship between the Russian ideas 
and the theoretical concepts presented in Chapter 3. I also discuss the nature and role 
of the Russian military and epistemic defence communities which have been the car-
riers of the ideas analysed in this chapter.  
 
5.1 Strategic planning and the national security documents 
 
The Russian foreign and defence policies belong to the mandate of the president of 
the Russian Federation and many Western scholars argue that foreign policy and ma-
jor national security policies are made, or at least ultimately decided by the presi-
dent.1119 Although the president’s authority is paramount in foreign policy and security 
issues,1120 the Russian political system has characteristics which influence national for-
eign and security policy decision-making. After Putin consolidated his power in the 
                                              
1119 Sakwa 2009; Mankoff 2012; Bobo 2015; Cadier & Light 2015; Tsygankov 2016 & 2018. 
1120 IIFFMCG. Independent international fact-finding mission on the conflict in Georgia, report, volume I-III, 
2009 [Online]. Available: http://www.mpil.de/en/pub/publications/archive/independent_interna-
tional_fact.cfm [Accessed: 25th March 2019]; Россия-24. Крым. Путь на Родину, ВГТРК, Россия-24, 
15.3.2015 [Online]. Available: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t42-71RpRgI [Accessed: 15th March 
2019]; Замахина, Татьяна. Совфед разрешил использование ВС в Сирии. Российкая Газета 30.09.2015 
[Online]. Available: https://rg.ru/2015/09/30/armia-site.html [Accessed: 25th March 2019].  
T 
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early 2000s, this system has been claimed to be either highly patrimonial,  monolithic 
and vertical1121, ruled by bureaucratic capitalists under Putin1122, autocratic1123, or, later 
on, to be based on clans, blocks and networks with tight connections between political 
and economic power and highly unofficial procedures in which the president is the 
final arbitrator.1124 Thus, nothing definite about the way certain ideas end up in official 
documents, i.e. how and by whom they are chosen, will be offered in this analysis. 
The national security documents will be approached as the official and public presen-
tation of the state elite’s worldview, interests and strategies drafted through a bureau-
cratic process of negotiation under strong presidential guidance.1125 
 
According to Julian Cooper and Andrew Monaghan, strategic planning (or strategy) 
and mobilization are particular features of Russian political culture and have be en-
coded in federal laws.1126 Nation-level planning derives its attraction from the Soviet 
era economic planning.1127 Cooper divides Russian strategic planning into socio-eco-
nomic and national security activity, and places its modern roots in 1995–1997, alt-
hough, the process was not institutionalized until 2006–2009.1128 In 2006 the Security 
Council organized an inter-agency commissions for strategic planning and president 
Putin called for a more comprehensive approach to socio-economic development.1129 
No official reason for this interest in planning was offered—Cooper believes it was 
related to worsening Russia–U.S. relations and Monaghan points to internal problems 
                                              
1121 Blank, Stephen J. Perspectives on Russian Foreign Policy. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute 
(SSI), 2012 [Online]. Available: http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub1115.pdf [Accessed: 29th October 
2018]; Shevtsova, Lilia. Post-communist Russia: a historic opportunity missed. International Affairs Vol. 83(5) 
(2007), 891–912. 
1122 Trenin, Dmitri. Russia Redefines Itself and Its Relations with the West. The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 
30 (2), 95–105. 
1123 Freedom House 2018. 
1124 Ledeneva 2013, 248-250; Gvosdev, Nikolas K. and Marsh, Christopher. Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, 
Vectors, and Sectors. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2014, 49-54.  
1125 Russian military doctrines and other national security documents have been studied before by Western 
scholars, few of the most recent ones are. Cadier & Light 2015; Pynnöniemi, Katri and Mashiri, James. Venäjän 
sotilasdoktriinit vertailussa: Nykyinen versio viritettiin kriisiajan taajuudelle. [Russian military doctrines in com-
parison: Current version tuned to emergency frequency] FIIA-Raportti 42. Helsinki: Ulkopoliittinen instituutti, 
2015; Forsström, Pentti. Venäjän sotilasdoktriinien kehittyminen Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen jälkeen. [The de-
velopment of Russia’s military doctrines after the fall of the Soviet Union] National Defence University, De-
partment of Warfare, Series 3: Working Paper No. 3 [Online] Available: https://www.doria.fi/ bitstream/han-
dle/10024/123521/Ven%C3%A4j%C3%A4n%20sotilasdoktriini%20ja%20sen%20kehitty-
minen%20Forsstr%C3%B6m%20%28netb5%29.pdf?sequence=2 [Accessed: 25th October 2018]; Tsygankov, 
Andrei (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Russian Foreign Policy. London: Taylor & Francis Ltd., 2018. 
1126 Monaghan 2014; Monaghan, Andrew. Russian State Mobilization: Moving the Country on to a War Footing, 
Chatham House Research Paper, May 2016; Monaghan 2017; Cooper, Julian. Reviewing Russian Strategic Plan-
ning: The Emergence of Strategy 2020. NDC Research Review [Online]. Available: http://www.ndc.nato 
.int/download/downloads.php?icode=338 [Accessed: 26th March 2019]; Cooper 2016; Cooper, Julian. Strate-
gic Planning, Situation Centres and the Management of Defence in Russia: An Update. Changing Character of 
War Centre, Pembroke College, Oxford [Online]. Available: http://www.ccw.ox.ac.uk/ 
blog/2018/11/14/strategic-planning-situation-centres-and-the-management-of-defence-in-russia-an-update-
by-julian-cooper [Accessed: 25th March 2019]. 
1127 Cooper 2012, 1. According to the general secretary of the Security Council and ex-FSB director Nikolai 
Patrushev, this planning is based on the experience acquired during the Soviet times. (Патрушев, Николай. 
На сильных не нападают Крайне желательно понимать, как, а главное – зачем эволюционирует парк 
отечественных средств вооруженной борьбы во всей обозримой перспективе. ВПК, № 12 (480) за 27 
марта 2013 года.) 
1128 Cooper, 2-3. 
1129 Ibid., 3. 
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and failed reforms.1130 In 2009 the president gave a classified order ‘On the founda-
tions of strategic planning’ which defined strategic planning as “determining the main 
directions, methods and means of achieving strategic goals of stable development of 
the Russian Federation and ensuring its national security”1131 and gave  guidelines for 
drafting the main documents.1132 Additionally, around 2008-2009 an order for drafting 
a law for strategic planning was given. The law was finally adopted in 2014.1133 
 
The law on strategic planning defines strategic planning as the activity of setting goals, 
forecasting, planning, and programming the socio-economic development of the 
state. Its objective is to ensure the national security of the Russian Federation and its 
sustainable socio-economic development.1134 Strategic planning includes the monitor-
ing and controlling of the implementation of the goals set in the strategic documents. 
It encompasses federal, subject and municipal authorities. The socio-economic part 
of the planning belongs to the government’s responsibility and the national security 
part to the Security Council. The main goal-setting documents on the federal level of 
strategic planning include the President’s Annual Address to the Federal Assembly, 
the Strategy of Social-Economic Development, the Strategy of National Security and 
the Strategy of Scientific-Technological Development of the Russian Federation. 
From these are derived the sectoral and regional documents of goal-setting, forecast-
ing, planning and programming.1135 Strategic planning also includes the secret Defence 
Plans (issued in 2013 and 2015).1136 These Plans are presented to the President by the 
Minister of Defence but drafted in cooperation with 49 ministries and agencies.1137 
The Defence Plan “identifies potential risks and threats to the security of the state, 
determines the direction of development of the Armed Forces, the implementation 
of weapons programmes, as well as questions of mobilization preparation and terri-
torial defence.”1138 Part of the strategic planning process include the state armament 
programmes (GPV-2021 and GPV-2027) which have been drafted for 10-year peri-
ods to produce future weapons, military and special equipment. Andrew Monaghan 
has argued that behind the idea of strategic planning is Putin’s need for manual con-
trol of the power vertical of the Russian state.1139 Monaghan also argues that the so-
called May Edicts of 2012 have become part of strategic planning.1140 A new set of 
Edicts was adopted in 2018.1141 
                                              
1130 Ibid., 4; Monaghan 2017, 22. 
1131 Указ Президента РФ от 12 мая 2009 года № 536. Об основах стратегического планирования в РФ 
[Online]. Available: http://lj.rossia.org/users/anticompromat/587675.html [Accessed: 26th March 2019]. 
1132 Ibid; Monaghan 2017, 22. 
1133 Cooper 2012 & 2014. 
1134 Федеральный закон 2014a. 
1135 Monaghan 2017. 
1136 Ibid., 24-25. 
1137 Kremlin.ru. Президенту представлен План обороны Российской Федерации 29 января 2013 года 
[Online]. Available: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17385 [Accessed: 12th February 2019]; 
Гаврилов, Юрий. Защитят по плану Оборону расписали на пять лет вперед. Российская газета - Феде-
ральный выпуск № 260(6831), 17.11.2015 [Online]. Available: https://rg.ru/2015/11/17/oborona-site.html 
[Accessed: 12th February 2019]. 
1138 РИА Новости. План обороны России на 2016–2020 годы введен в действие 1 января 2016 [Online]. 
Available: https://ria.ru/20160101/1352552856.html [Accessed: 12th February 2019]. 
1139 Monaghan 2014, 16-17. 
1140 Ibid., 23. 
1141 Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 7 мая 2018 г. N 204 “О национальных целях и стратеги-
ческих задачах развития Российской Федерации на период до 2024 года” [Online]. Available: 
https://rg.ru/2018/05/08/president-ukaz204-site-dok.html [Accessed: 26th March 2019]. 
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Strategic planning is related to the Russian concept of mobilization. Mobilization has 
two aspects, military and economic, and it refers to the measures to activate state 
human and material resources for military-political and national grand strategic goals. 
It is a peacetime activity, conducted in advance of conflict through preparation (pod-
gatovka) and readiness (gotovnost’).1142 The idea of mobilization has Soviet roots as it 
became one of the basic pillars around which Soviet economy and society were 
built.1143 The system of mobilization degraded from the 1980s but it was reinvigorated 
around 2008-2011 and in 2013 Putin approved a new mobilization plan for the econ-
omy.1144 According to the Law On Preparation of Mobilization and Mobilization of 
the RF, mobilization means a set of measures to transfer the Armed Forces and other 
military forces and the economy and administration of the state to war time condi-
tions and organization. Its main principles are centralized leadership; timeliness, plan-
ning and control; complexity and consistency. Mobilization includes the state man-
agement of national telecommunications.1145  
 
In this Chapter I will analyse the National Security Strategies of 2009 and 2015, Mili-
tary Doctrines of 2010 and 2014, Foreign Policy Concepts 2008, 2013 and 2016 and 
the 2016 Information Security Doctrine as the main products of strategic planning. 
Other documents will be analysed in Chapter 6. The Security Council of the Russian 
Federation, led by the president, has an important role in drafting these documents. 
The Strategy and Doctrine of 2009 and 2010 were a result of a power struggle between 
the MoD and the General Staff and reflected a resurgent Russia and a poorly con-
ducted war with Georgia in 2008, so the documents are more or less as a compromise 
of interests.1146 It is safe to argue that the Foreign Policy Concept of 2013 was prem-
aturely published. The Military Doctrine of 2014, and the rest were drafted in the 
context of the war in Ukraine, and in accordance with the new legislation concerning 
strategic planning.1147 The public infighting between defence and security elites had at 
this point disappeared behind the need to show national unity and tightened secu-
rity.1148  
 
5.2 Interstate struggle 
 
This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the strategic cultural idea of interstate 
struggle or confrontation—the translation depending on the context the concept is 
used in. As was noted in Chapter 4, the idea of an interstate struggle or confrontation 
                                              
1142 Monaghan 2017, 10. 
1143 Cooper 2016.  
1144 Cooper 2016, 19-20. 
1145 Федеральный закон от 26.02.1997 N 31-ФЗ (ред. от 18.12.2018) “О мобилизационной подготовке и 
мобилизации в Российской Федерации” [Online]. Available: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_ 
doc_LAW_13454/ [Accessed: 26th March 2019]. 
1146 Bouldin 2004;  Bartles, Charles K. Defense Reforms of Russian Defense Minister Anatolii Serdyukov, The 
Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol.24, No.1 (2011), 55-80; Herspring 2006; McDermott 2009, 485-501;  
McDermott 2015; Blank, Stephen J. “No Need to Threaten Us, We Are Frightened of Ourselves, ” Russia’s 
Blueprint for a Police State, The New Security Strategy. In Blank & Weitz, 2010, 19-149, 94. [Online] Available: 
https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB997.pdf [Accessed: 22nd October 2018]; Kipp 2011.  
1147 Monaghan 2017. 
1148 Forsström argues that that while the discussion about the 2010 Doctrine was open, in the case of the 2014 
Doctrine it was not. The Doctrines of 1993 and 2000 were declared as documents of a transitional period while 
2010 was not. (Forsström 2016). 
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frames all the other strategic cultural ideas. My focus will be on the information aspect 
of this struggle. 
 
In 2001 the PIR Center1149 published a book edited by A. V. Fedorova and V. I. 
Tsygichko called ‘Information challenges of national and international security’.1150 
Among the contributors for the book were people from the SVR, the FSB, the Min-
istry of Interior, the Foreign Ministry, the Security Council, the General Staff of the 
Armed Forces like A. V. Krutskikh, G. L. Smolian, A. A. Strel’tsov, D. S. Chereshkin 
and V. N. Tsygichko who all would feature prominently in the Russian infor-
mation/cyber policy circles in the years to come.1151 The book is also proof of the 
concentrated effort of the ‘siloviki’ to form a united view on the rising challenge that 
was the Internet and, consequently, information warfare. The book was written to 
support the Russian effort in the UN to push through an international agreement to 
ban ‘information weapons’ and to create transnational regulation of the Internet. 
 
The book defined information security as the countering of adversary influence to-
wards the most important information systems of the state, and also towards democ-
racy, development of society etc.1152 Information space (also infosphere) was defined 
as “a sphere of human activity related to the creation, transformation, and usage of 
information, including individual and societal consciousness, information-telecom-
munications infrastructure and intrinsic information.”1153 The writers also claimed that 
globalization has led to the creation of a worldwide unified information space 
(edinnoe informatsionnoe prostranstvo). They also used the term cyberspace ‘kiber-
prostranstvo.’1154 The authors claimed that the information industry would form the 
basis for future economic systems and mass media had gained new powers to influ-
ence government policies and societies. The dependence of society, material produc-
tion, and the armed forces on information technologies and infrastructures has em-
phasized the importance of resilience (ustoichivost’) of communications systems and 
networks. The authors echoed Marxist-Leninist historical materialism when they ar-
gued that the ‘information society’ is a concept based on the forces and means of 
production, not the freedom and prevalence of information in societies.1155  
 
The authors of the book claimed that the threats against the information infrastruc-
ture and resources, including critical infrastructure, are for a large part related to in-
tergovernmental confrontation (protivoborstvo), the proliferation of information 
                                              
1149 The PIR Center is an independent organization and was established in 1994. Its main research subject is 
international security and it has a workgroup on international information security and global management of 
the Internet. It is connected to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence and to such aca-
demics as V. N. Tsygichko. (Иванов, И. С. (ред.) Военно-политические исследования в России. М.: НП 
РСМД, Весь мир, 2014). Tsygicko himself is a professor and member of RAN. He is a retired Colonel and 
worked at the Research Institute of the General Staff Headquarters in 1962—1971, took part in Soviet strategic 
planning in 1979—1985, and worked at the Institute of System Analysis of RAN from 1985 and as an expert 
of information security for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1995 (Hoffenaar & Findlay 2007, 41-42). 
1150 Федорова, А.В., Цигичко, В.Н. (общ. ред.) Информационные вызовы национальной и международ-
ной безопасности.  М.: ПИР-Центр, 2001. 
1151 ТАСС. В России создана Национальная ассоциация международной информационной безопасно-
сти 10 апреля 2018 [Online]. Available: http://tass.ru/obschestvo/5111643 [Accessed: 28th March 2019]. 
1152 Федорова & Цигичко 2001, 11. 
1153 Ibid., 234. 
1154 Ibid., 91. This is defined as a synonym to information space or datasphere. Other words with a ‘kiber’ prefix 
have synonyms with the ‘information’ prefix (Ibid., 222). 
1155 Федорова & Цигичко 2001. 
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weapons (informatsionnoe oruzhie), and efforts to create a concept of an information 
war (informatsionnaia voina). Information weapons could be used through the global 
information network as tools of political pressure, deterrence, and warfare to produce 
strategic effects. Nevertheless, the kinetic information-technological aspect of these 
weapons was not their main function. The authors argued that the ‘developed demo-
cratic countries’ would resort to ‘information weapons’ in pursuit of their interests as 
the interdependence created by globalization and their technological advantages ena-
bled it, and their political systems discouraged the use of direct force. Accordingly, 
they claim that borders are becoming increasingly eroded which leads to the loss of 
state sovereignty. Although the writers emphasised state-related threats they also dis-
cussed crime and terrorism-related threats.1156 
 
For Fedorova and Tsygichko et al., in contrast to an information war, an information 
struggle or confrontation (protivoborstvo) is either a distinct phase of non-military 
relations which might lead to the achievement of political objectives without the use 
of force, or a type of warfare using special means to affect an opponent’s information 
systems. In the military sense, information warfare is divided into counter C2 warfare, 
information security, EW, psychological influence, hacker wars, economic wars, and 
cyberwarfare.1157 The authors claimed that information superiority (informatsionnoe 
prevoskhodstvo) will decide future wars and that it is based on the capability to ac-
quire more information, to process it faster and to make decisions more efficiently. 
They defined an information war (informatsionnaia voina) as military actions in in-
formation space and divided this into offensive and defensive versions, both of which 
used information. Weapons were divided into information-psychological and techno-
logical weapons. Information weapons could be used independently or parallel to tra-
ditional weapons. They were used mainly to gain information superiority, which was 
not, however, an objective in itself. The weapons should be based on precise, covert, 
and non-lethal means in distinction from weapons of mass destruction. Militarily, in-
formation weapons could be used to gain a strategic surprise. Additionally, the secret 
or unseen nature of these weapons could lower the threshold for the use of nuclear 
weapons.1158  
 
After analysing information weapons and warfare, Fedorova and Tsygichko et al. dis-
cussed the Unites States’ and its allies’ military operations from the 1980s and pointed 
out information warfare elements in them. This ‘method’ is repeated in most of the 
monographs and articles analysed in this thesis and it arguably shows who the Rus-
sians see as leading the military technological and doctrinal development, and who 
they consider as their probable or main enemy.1159 Interestingly, the writers bring up 
the concept of netwars1160 (setevaia voina) in the context of terrorism and  argue that 
states can use networked terrorist organizations as part of information operations.1161 
As will become clear in this chapter, this view evolved during the next two decades 
                                              
1156 Ibid. 
1157 Martin Libick’s categorization is used to discuss about ‘informatsionnoe protivoborstvo’. Libicki 1995. 
1158 Федорова & Цигичко 2001. 
1159 For the terms ‘main enemy’ and ‘probable enemy’ cf. Haslam 2015, 265. China is also mentioned as a 
possible competitor but only passingly (Федорова & Цигичко 2001, 139). 
1160 The concept was introduced by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt and it refers to low-intensity conflict on 
a societal level waged by networks using information, among other means. (Arquilla, John and Ronfeldt, David. 
The Advent Of Netwar. Santa Monica: RAND, 1996). 
1161 Федорова & Цигичко 2001, 137. 
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from terrorists and separatist, to colour revolutions, to controlled chaos, and to hybrid 
wars, and forms one of the main threat images of the Russian armed forces. Moreo-
ver, technological backwardness, and thus dependency on foreign technology, the 
possibility of Russia being disconnected from international information networks, 
and negative foreign cultural effects are mentioned as the main threats of an infor-
mation confrontation. Therefore, the writers argued, Russia needs to adopt an active 
role in information confrontation instead of passive isolation. It must use infor-
mation-psychological and information-technological offensive measures in the oppo-
nents’ information space and defensive measures in its own space.1162 In summary, the 
book by Fedorova and Tsygichko et al. includes many of the themes and concepts 
present in the later Russian IW debate and demonstrates that the Russians were keenly 
following Western debates. 
 
Igor Panarin is a professor and political scientist who worked for the KGB from 1976 
to 1991 and after that for the FAPSI. He is a member of the Academy of Military 
Sciences (AVN) and has academic positions in the Diplomatic Academy of the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs of Russia and the Moscow State Institute of International 
Relations (MGIMO).1163 He has specialized in psychological information warfare and 
has written over twenty books mainly on information warfare. Panarin bases his ar-
guments on geopolitics and on ideas about Russia (or ‘Rus’) as a culturally distinct 
and special entity. He views these issues in the light of an information revolution 
which has turned information into power and information security into a critical se-
curity issue. During the latter part of the 20th century the great powers waged infor-
mation war (informatsionnaia voina) against each other for spiritual, political and eco-
nomic power, and consequently, the Soviet Union was destroyed by the West.1164 Be-
cause Panarin approaches mental activity as an adaptive system, he can be grouped 
together with other Russian ‘system theorists’, although he does not favour formal 
logic or mathematical models.1165  
 
According to Panarin, a unified global information space (edinnoe mirovoe infor-
matsionnoe prostranstvo) has been created in which leading countries face each other 
in a geostrategic struggle (protivoborstvo) to attain information superiority in the 
global information space.1166 Panarin argues that the Russian elites must develop a 
doctrine which would lead to the unity of humanity and to the prosperity of Russia 
                                              
1162 Ibid., 141. 
1163 According to Jolanta Derczewska Panarin’s writings have influenced the formulation of the 2000 Infor-
mation Security Doctrine and generally Russian views on information warfare. (Darczewska, Jolanta. The Anat-
omy of Russian Information Warfare: The Crimean Operation, A Case Study. Warsaw: Centre for Eastern 
Studies, 2014, 13-14.) AVN is a non-governmental interregional scientific-research institution which employs 
over 1,400 active and retired military personnel as researchers, press-correspondents and lecturers. It is tightly 
connected to the Armed Forces of the RF. Its main research subjects are military-political and strategic issues, 
the character of war and forecasting future war (Иванов 2014, 19). MGIMO is an academic institution run by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. It is a teaching university with scientific centres like military-political 
studies and international information security and scientific-technological politics centres. (МГИМО. [Online]. 
Available: https://mgimo.ru/about/ [Accessed: 28th March 2019]). 
1164 Панарин, И.Н., Панарина, Л.Г. Информационная война и мир. Москва: ОЛМА-ПРЕСС, 2003; Па-
нарин, И.Н. Информационная война и геополитика. М.: Поколение, 2006; Панарин, И.Н. Информа-
ционная война и Третий Рим. М.: 2003; Панарин, И.Н. Первая мировая информационная война: развал 
СССР. СПБ: Питер, 2010; Панарин, И.Н. СМИ, пропаганда и информационные войны. М.: Поколение, 
2012. 
1165 Панарин & Панарина 2003, 18, 222-225. 
1166 Панарин & Панарина, 2003. 
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and the whole world.1167 Panarin argues that the U.S., Great Britain and some other 
countries are waging an information war against Russia to weaken it because of its 
newfound strength, and, therefore, the elite and the people must be protected from 
negative information flows.1168 Panarin distinguishes between information warfare (in-
formatsionnaia bor’ba) and a geopolitical information struggle (geopoliticheskoe in-
formatsionnoe protivoborstvo). The former is a form of warfare, possibly initiated 
already in peacetime, in which special (political, economic, diplomatic, military and 
other) methods, ways and means are used to influence the information environment, 
or systems of management and control of the opposing side and to protect one’s own 
side to achieve desired goals.1169 The struggle is defined as a modern form of interstate 
struggle, as well as a system of measures, to violate the information security (integrity 
and resilience of control systems, public opinion, state leadership and decision-mak-
ing) of another country and to defend against similar actions and to gain information 
superiority in the global information space.1170 Panarin, like other Russian writers di-
vides information warfare into information-technological and information-psycho-
logical types according to their target, i.e. technological systems or the individual psy-
che, societal consciousness or decision-making systems.1171  Panarin argues for the 
establishment of a centralized ’information-analytical bureau’ and later develops this 
to ‘a system of information struggle’ (sistema informatsinnogo protivoborstva).1172 
Panarin’s ideas are representative of the ‘holistic’ views that some Russians have had 
on information warfare. Moreover, the cybernetic idea of, usually centralized, intra-
governmental, or a hierarchical ‘government information management’ system has 
been repeated by many Russian civilian and military scholars.1173 
 
Andrei Viktorovich Manoilo is a professor and political scientist who served in the 
FSB from 1998 to, at least, 2002 after which he has worked at the Russian Academy 
of Public Administration (later incorporated to RANEPA)1174, and the MGIMO. He 
is currently a member of the Scientific Council at the Security Council of the Russian 
Federation. He has specialized in and written extensively about psychological infor-
mation warfare especially in the timeframe of 2003-2008. Manoilo has co-authored 
some of his most known works with Dimitrii Borisovich Frolov, a doctor of political 
science, and the Director of finCERT at the Bank of Russia, and Anatolii Ivanovich 
                                              
1167 Ibid., 301; Панарин 2006, 170-171; Панарин 2003. 
1168 Панарин & Панарина 2003, 248-249; Панарин, И.Н.  Инструмент внешней политики. ВПК, № 32 
(248) за 13 августа 2008 года; Панарин, И.Н. Система информационного противоборства. ВПК, № 41 
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онного управления и противоборства. Информационные войны, № 2(10) 2009, 2-8; Сергеев, Н.А. Ар-
хитектура перспективной сетецентрической информационно-управляющей системы обеспечения 
национальной безопасности России в новых геополитических условиях. Информационные войны, № 
2(14) 2010, 69-84. 
1174 The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA) is a federal 
state-funded institution of higher professional education created by combining multiple state education insti-
tutions in to one in 2010. It is mainly a teaching institution but conducts also research in areas related to public 
administration (РАНХиГС [Online]. Available: https://www.ranepa.ru/ [Accessed: 28th March 2019].) 
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Petrenko, who has a Ph.D. in psychology and is an ex-KGB official.1175 Below I shall 
summarize some of the ideas presented by Manoilo, Petrenko and Frolov.1176 
 
Manoilo et al. approach their subject from a geopolitical, zero-sum worldview in 
which the competition (sopernichestvo) between states has moved over to the ‘infor-
mation-psychological space’ (informatsionno-psikhologicheskoe prostranstvo). In 
this space the competition is conducted in the form of an information struggle (in-
formatsionnoe protivoborstvo) which for the weaker side might provide the oppor-
tunity for ‘an asymmetric response’ (asimmetrichnyi otvet).1177 In this context, global-
ization is seen as something that strengthens information-psychological aggression as 
it unifies the global information space, and this can lead to ‘information neo-coloni-
alism’ (informatsionnyi neokolonializm) where weaker states become sources of stra-
tegic resources—information and knowledge.1178 Accordingly, the control of infor-
mation networks and flows on and through the state territory is a source of power.1179 
 
Manoilo et al. define the information struggle as the rivalry of social systems in the 
information-psychological sphere over the control of limited strategic resources.1180 
Its principles are, among others, secrecy, surprise, asymmetry, and the massive use of 
force as means. The aim of an information war (informatsionnaia voina) is to acquire 
a certain gain in the material realm to secure information superiority (prevoskhodstvo) 
over the enemy and to inflict material, ideological, or other damage on it.1181 This 
superiority is defined as the ability to collect, process and distribute uninterrupted 
information flows while at the same time denying the same from the enemy. It could 
also mean faster tempo of information operations than the enemy is capable of, which 
leads to domination.1182 Mainoilo et al. argue that information is an inherently asym-
metric object because it is constantly changing and takes on new, novel forms and is 
unpredictable. Additionally, it changes the environment it is part of.1183 Therefore, 
information weapons are algorithms used to control other information systems for 
the someone’s benefit and they transform the environment they are part of.1184 Con-
sequently, for Manoilo et al. the information space (informatsionnoe prostranstvo) is 
a sphere of action.1185 It is a dynamic and constructed space and thus only temporary 
domination is possible. Its information processing functions are nation-dependent, 
and its nature defines the weapons and warfare used in relation to it.1186 Information 
                                              
1175 Петренко, Анатолий Иванович. Межрегиональное бюро судебных экспертиз Им. Сикорского 
[Online]. Available: https://www.expertsud.ru/content/view/166/39/ [Accessed: 28th March 2019]; Фролов, 
Дмитрий Борисович. Высшая школа государственного аудита [Online]. Available: http://itlaw.au-
dit.msu.ru/ [Accessed: 28th March 2019]. 
1176 Манойло А. В., Петренко А. И., Фролов Д. Б. Государственная информационная политика в усло-
виях информационно-психологической войны. 3-е изд., стереотип. М.: Горячая линия – Телеком, 2012; 
Вепринцев, В.Б., Манойло, А.В., Петренко, А.И., Фролов, Д.Б. Операции информационно-психологи-
ческой войны: краткий энциклопедический словарь-справочник. М.: Горячая линия – Телеком, 2011. 
1177 Манойло et al. 2012, 11-12. 
1178 Ibid., 15-16. 
1179 Ibid., 16. 
1180 Манойло et al. 2013, 318-319. 
1181 Ibid., 68-69, 74. 
1182 Ibid., 280. 
1183 Ibid., 21-23. 
1184 Ibid., 234-236. 
1185 Ibid., 310. Cf. also Information-psychological space (Манойло et al. 2012, 32-37). 
1186 Манойло et al. 2013, 313. 
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security (informatsionnaia bezopasnost’) is the security of the information environ-
ment (sreda), and the security of the national interests in the information sphere in-
cludes sovereignty.1187 The sovereignty of a state will be in danger if it does not control 
the information infrastructure.1188 
 
Based on their theory, Mainoilo et al. propose, for example, the creation of a Eurasian 
information space to counter American unipolar politics.1189 Although the threat of 
an information war is ever present, Manoilo et al. do not promote isolation but rec-
ommend developing national strength (psychological and technological) and an active 
policy towards the global information space.1190 A system of state information con-
frontation or struggle should be created.1191 All in all, Manoilo et al. create a synthesis 
of Western information warfare theories and geopolitical thought and develop the 
idea of a continuous interstate information struggle for (always temporary) infor-
mation superiority. 
 
Sergei Nikolaevich Griniaev is a doctor of technical sciences and has worked in vari-
ous institutions of the Ministry of Defence from the 1990s—for example as a leading 
researcher at the Centre for Military Strategic Studies of the General Staff1192. He is 
currently the General Director of the Centre of Strategic Estimations and Forecasts 
(CSEF)1193 and is a specialist on information warfare.1194 Griniaev has made Western 
IW theory known in Russian perhaps more than created his own. In his writings from 
2000–2004 Griniaev’s basic claim was that information is the most important product 
and resource of the information economy, and that the 21st century battles will be 
fought in cyberspace (kiberprostranstvo) where information resides.1195 Griniaev  has 
argued that information is an instrument of power and that power is connected to 
geopolitics. Here he referred to Panarin. It should be noted that Panarin and Manoilo 
respectively refer to Rastorguev and that the Russian IW theorists know each other’s 
work.1196 Griniaev translated the Western IW as an information struggle or confron-
tation (informatsionnoe protivoborstvo) and defined it as a multifaceted impact on 
                                              
1187 Ibid., 28-29. 
1188 Ibid., 261. They refer to Батурин, Ю. М. Телекоммуникации и право (Вопросы стратегии). Москва: 
Центр “Право и СМИ”, 2000. Baturin uses the term ‘information sovereignty’ multiple times in the context 
of law on information. 
1189 Манойло et al. 2012, 72-74. 
1190 Ibid., 85. 
1191 Ibid., 515-517. 
1192 The Centre for Military Strategic Studies of the General Staff (Tsentr voenno-strategicheskikh issledovanii 
General’nogo shtaba) was established 1985 to study the challenges posed by the U.S. SDI and other strategic 
weapons related issues. Currently, the Center prepares scientifically based proposals on the construction, de-
velopment, and use of the Armed Forces and takes part in the drafting of the strategic planning documents and 
coordinates the drafting of basic main field regulations. (Чекинов, С. Г. Центр военно-стратегических ис-
следований Генерального штаба Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации история и современность. 
Военная мысль № 1, 2010, 3-5). 
1193 The Center of Strategic Estimations and Forecasts (Tsentr strategicheskikh otsenok i prognozov) (CSEF) 
is an independent non-commercial organization established in 2012. Its mission is to propagate Russian geo-
political views of the international order and to network domestic and foreign experts. (Иванов 2014, 110).  
1194 Гриняев, Сергей Николаевич. Центр стратегических оценок и прогнозов [Online]. Available: 
http://csef.ru/ru/team/5 [Accessed: 18th March 2019]. 
1195 Гриняев, С.Н. Глобализация и информационная безопасность. Красная звезда № 4 2.11.10.2000.  
1196 Гриняев, С.Н. Поле битвы - киберпространство: Теория, приемы, средства, методы и системы веде-
ния информационной войны. М.: Харвест, 2004, 13. For example, Griniaev’s ideas almost completely re-
semble the ideas of the lesser known V. F. Prokof’ev (Прокофьев В.Ф. Тайное оружие информационной 
войны: атака на подсознание. М: СИНТЕГ, 2003.) 
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the system of state and military management of the opposing side, on its military-
political leadership. This impact should already in peacetime lead to the adoption of 
decisions favourable to the initiator of the information measures, and during conflict 
to completely paralyze the functioning of the target’s management processes and in-
frastructure.1197 Griniaev claimed that the Western IW is a struggle for knowledge, i.e. 
“who will know the answers to the questions: what, when, where, why faster and more 
precisely” and that it aims for information superiority even in peacetime.1198 Griniaev 
further argues that ‘noonpolitiks’ is the basis of the American 21st century infor-
mation strategy and that the Americans aim to use ‘soft power’ to achieve national 
objectives.1199 The means include ‘controlled chaos’ (upravliaemoi khaos) which is 
used to manipulate the networks of a target society.1200 In an interesting twist of mili-
tary academic sabre-rattling Griniaev was criticized by Iuri Gorbachev, an influential 
EW theorist, for misinterpreting Western terms.1201 
 
Griniaev defined a proper information war or warfare as a new form of armed war-
fare, meaning large-scale warfare using methods of information influence to achieve 
the goals of the influencing party.1202 Furthermore, he claimed that information 
war/warfare can be divided into information-psychological and information-techno-
logical. The main distinction of information warfare from physical warfare is that it is 
not aimed at destroying but manipulating the opponent.1203 The aim of information 
war/warfare is to gain information superiority, secure the objectives of national mili-
tary strategy, and foresee and eliminate threats before they emerge, or eliminate them 
in the initial stage of war—or even before that.1204 Like Manoilo and Panarin, Griniaev 
emphasised the economic and financial aspects of information warfare and the grave 
consequences if a country were to be excluded from the Internet. Thus, he argued 
that the special services of different countries were strengthening the control of na-
tional segments of the global network which might eventually lead to ‘virtual state 
borders in cyberspace’ (virtual’naia gosudarstvennaia granitsa).1205  
 
The more abstract theories of information confrontation have a definite kibernetik 
foundation. This is apparent in the works, for example, of Rastorguev, Tsyganov, 
                                              
1197 Later, Griniaev translates information warfare and information war both as ‘informatsionnaia voina’. 
(Гриняев 2004, 93-94). 
1198 Ibid. 
1199 Гриняев 2004, 15. ‘Noonpolitik’ is a term used by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Arquilla, John and 
Ronfeldt, David. The Emergence of Noonpolitik: Toward An American Information Strategy. Santa Monica: 
RAND, 1999). It should be noted that Griniaev is not the only Russian theorist who interprets Arquilla’s and 
Ronfeldt’s ideas and the concepts of netwars and network-centric warfare quite freely. For example, Vitalii 
Grigor’ev builds his theory of IW on the claim that NCW is an American geopolitical strategy to manipulate 
global networks through the Internet-based mass media (Григорьев В.Р. Информационные вирусы – Новое 
оружие массового поражения. Информационные войны, №3 (7) 2008, 2-29). 
1200 Гриняев 2004, 53, 70-71, 196-198. 
1201 Горбачев, Юрий. К вопросу о “войне в четвертой сфере”. В США у нее иная терминология, чем в 
России, а задачи – всеобъемлющие. Независимое Военное Обозрение, № 14 20.4.2001. 
1202 Гриняев 2004, 96. An exact translation of war/warfare is difficult because Griniaev has to use the Russian 
words available to explain foreign Western theory while at the same time claiming that these terms had universal 
value. This problem is, of course, in the heart of this thesis also. 
1203 Ibid., 96. 
1204 Ibid., 101. 
1205 Ibid., 165-167. 
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Bukharin and Kruglov.1206 In his book “Mathematical models of information confron-
tation” (2014) Sergei Pavlovich Rastorguev argues that human societies are self-learn-
ing and organizing systems which can be manipulated from the outside through in-
formation.1207 Information weapons are like viruses which reprogram self-learning sys-
tems (society or the human mind) and change their structures until the system self-
destructs. They are used to activate, destroy, block or create processes in the infor-
mation system. Rastorguev claims that there is no difference between the concepts of 
information confrontation/struggle (protivoborstvo), war (voina) and warfare 
(bor’ba) because an information war is not defined by particular weapons or a state 
of relationship.1208 In an earlier book from 1999 Rastorguev argued that systems could 
defend themselves by creating a barrier between themselves and the source of danger; 
avoiding danger by moving beyond its reach; through the destruction of the source 
of danger; and through self-modification beyond recognition. Rastorguev claimed 
that the last method would be self-destructive if it was done according to the wishes 
of the aggressor.1209 Later, Rastorguev introduced the concept of the resilience 
(ustoichivost’) of a system against information weapons, which was based on its ability 
to resist the change of its elements as societal structures are based on stable (non-
fluctuating) knowledge.1210 According to Rastorguev, the resilience and aggressiveness 
of systems can be mathematically modelled. This makes it possible to predict how 
different ‘world models’ affect each other, and so, in practice, to plan information 
warfare.1211 Rastorguev was by far one of the most original Russian thinkers on infor-
mation warfare. He was not unique in using cybernetic and systems theory but went 
further than anybody else in trying to give his theories a mathematical and logical 
basis. 
 
Vladimir Viktorovich Tsyganov and Sergei Nikolaevich Bukharin are also quite influ-
ential cybernetists who have written about information security especially in the late 
2000s.1212 They have both worked at the Institute of the Control Sciences in the RAS, 
which has a strong history of systems theory and cybernetics.1213 Their main interest 
has been the management (upravlenie) of information confrontation or warfare (pro-
tivoborstvo) as a complex system, and they have tried to formulate a single basic 
                                              
1206 Расторгуев 1999; Расторгуев С. П. Математические модели в информационном противоборстве. — 
М.: ЦСОиП, 2014; Бухарин С. Н., Цыганов В.В. Ситуационный анализ в информационных войнах. 
информационные войны, №2 (6) 2008, 47-58; Цыганов, В.В., Бочкарева, Ю.Г. Эволюция социальных 
систем при информационной конфронтации и партийные механизмы обеспечения общественной без-
опасности. Информационные войны № 3(31) 2014, 12-22; Круглов, В. В. Новый подход к анализу со-
временного противоборства. Военная Мысль, № 12 2006, 50-61. 
1207 The analysis presented here draws on and complements Ristolainen & Kukkola 2019a. Расторгуев 2014, 
14. 
1208 Ibid. 
1209 Расторгуев 1999, 116-117. 
1210 Расторгуев 2014, 73-77. 
1211 Ibid., 223-224. 
1212 Цыганов, В.В., Бухарин, С.Н. Информационные войны в бизнесе и политике. М.: Академический 
Проект, 2007; Бухарин, С.Н., Цыганов, В.В. Методы и технологии информационных войн. M.: 
Академический проект, 2007. 
1213 The institution was first established in 1939 as the Institute of Automation and Remote Control of the 
USSR Academy of Sciences. Throughout its history it has produced important theoretical and applied works 
on automation. Its current customers include almost all of the power ministries. (Васильева, С.Н. (общ. ред.) 
Институт проблем управления им. В.А. Трапезникова Российской академии наук. Москва: ИПУ РАН, 
2014 [Online]. Available: https://www.ipu.ru/sites/default/files/page_file/ 75%20лет%20ИПУ%20РАН. 
pdf [Accessed: 28th March 2019].) 
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model and templates for waging information war (informatsionnaia voina).1214 Tsy-
ganov and Bukharin have used system-theoretical logic to analyse information con-
frontations and like Rastorguev have claimed that ‘civilizations’, understood as adap-
tive complex systems, are the main sources of values which guide the motivations of 
possible targets of information warfare or operations.1215 This means that the modern 
world can be understood as a conflict between competing civilizations through infor-
mation because kinetic warfare has lost much of its usability. Tsyganov and Bukharin 
claimed that the objective of an information war is to achieve capital and power, a 
claim which gives their theory a definite Marxist twist.1216 Tsyganov and Bukharin have 
used the term ‘voina’ and ‘protivoborstvo’ interchangeably to define a phenomenon 
that exists in human relations from the corporate level up to the global level. In their 
view “information war [voina] is a dynamic process occurring in a complex self-or-
ganizing system.”1217 Depending on the context, ‘protivoborstvo’ then means either 
confrontation. i.e. state of affairs (condition), or warfare, i.e. active engagement 
through information means.1218 In an article published in 2013 Tsyganov claimed that 
the constantly on-going information confrontation is aimed at achieving information 
superiority over the enemy in military, political, economic and other fields. Russia was 
losing and, thus, needed ‘information troops’.1219 Moreover, Tsyganov and Bukharin 
have argued that an information war should be conduct by a centralized and hierar-
chical ‘intellectual mechanism of information war’ (IMIV).1220 
 
Major General, Professor, Viacheslav Kruglov, who is a member of the Military Acad-
emy of Sciences, has used mathematical models based on a theory of the symmetry 
of chaos and order to theorize about the modern confrontation—and to offer Russia 
a role as a ‘Eurasian harmonizer’.1221 He, like many others has argued that globalization 
is directed against Russia. Kruglov has claimed that living systems strive for harmony 
or equilibrium between their parts and resist forces opposing this process. The parts 
are ever moving because of a ‘triad of forces’ and this produces evolution.1222 This 
means that war is an eternal condition even if its form changes. Information manage-
ment and intellectual resources are power for Kruglov in this constant, ongoing battle. 
Kruglov concluded that Russia should use offensive and defensive actions during 
peacetime, and that it should use all available methods in wartime, including non-
direct or asymmetric means. Moreover, Russia’s state and military command and con-
trol systems should be unified with the military system having primacy over other 
control systems.1223 The system-theoretical-thinking Rastorguev, Bukharin, Tsyganov 
                                              
1214 Цыганов & Бухарин 2007, 50-53. The principles of information war are: a systemic approach, self-organ-
ization, adaptability, progressiveness, and intellectuality (Цыганов & Бухарин 2007, 179). 
1215 Cf. Rastorguev on civilizations (1999, 99) He defines civilizations as a thing “…conceivable as a reality by 
a set of living beings with their own material and spiritual culture.” Bukharin and Tsyganov define culture as 
corresponding to a certain level of the stage of social evolution, and material and spiritual culture. (Бухарин & 
Цыганов 2007, 27) 
1216 Cf. Цыганов & Бухарин 2007, 42-44, 188. 
1217 Цыганов & Бухарин 2007, 40. For an example of the ambiguous use of the terms Бухарин & Цыганов 
2007, 166-168, 299. 
1218 Cf. Ibid., 304 
1219 Цыганок А.Д. Информационные войны в начале XXI века. Информационные войны, №4 (28) 2013, 
17-29. 
1220 Цыганов & Бухарин 2007, 125-26; Бухарин & Цыганов 2007, 296; Цыганов et al. 2009. 
1221 Круглов 2006; Круглов, В. В.  Фундаментальные законы мироздания - Основа новой теории войны. 
Обозреватель, №8 (187) 2005. 
1222 Круглов 2006, 56. 
1223 Ibid., 58-59. 
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and Kruglov carry with them the explicit policy recommendation to protect the Rus-
sian national information space (or system) from outside influences. This resonated 
with the widely shared claim that the Soviet Union had been destroyed by Western 
information operations and Russia was again under similar attack.1224 
 
Professor Anatoly Strel’tsov is an ex-military, possibly ex-KGB or GRU, information 
warfare and policy specialist who has worked in the Security Council of the Russian 
Federation as an advisor from 1995 and in the Information Security Institute at the 
Moscow Lomonosov State University from 2012.1225 Strel’tsov has written extensively 
about the information security (informatsionnaia bezopasnost’) of the Russian Fed-
eration beginning from the late-1990s when the basic provisions of state information 
policy were being formulated.1226 According to Strel’tsov, information security as a 
concept entered Russian law in 1992 and politically it was given form in the 2000 
Information Security Doctrine, the drafting of which Strel’tsov took part in.1227 He 
argued in 2002 that information security (obespechenie informatsionnoi bezopas-
nosti) is based on the protection of an object from a threat or harm through the action 
of securing it.1228 Accordingly, there is such an object as state information security, 
meaning the functions of controlling society, the protection of which is paramount. 
Strel’tsov pointed out that information itself and information systems can also be an 
object of security, which means they must be protected from unauthorised use and 
manipulation, but also that access to them must be secured. The information sphere 
is recognized as a distinct sphere of human action and, accordingly, there are national 
interests in the information sphere which are connected to the legal rights and re-
sponsibilities of citizens, the development of society, and the control functions of the 
state involving information and the information infrastructure—the crosscutting in-
terest being the preservation of national identity. Therefore the information security 
of the Russian federation is the responsibility of the state, and information security is 
characterised by a technological-spiritual dualism: social norms, morals and laws are 
                                              
1224 Федорова & Цигичко 2001, 144; Панарин 2003, 34; Расторгуев 1999, 174 & 2014, 240-241; Цыганов & 
2007, 15; Ковалев В.И., Малков С.Ю. Что делать, чтобы не распасться как ссср? Информационные 
войны, № 3(35) 2015, 52-57; Калиновский, О.Н. Дискуссионная трибуна. "Информационная война" - 
это война? Военная мысль, № 1 1.1.2001. 
1225 Strel’tsov has been one of the Russian representatives in the international negotiations concerning cyber 
security norms and has written several articles and books on Russian information policy and international in-
formation security. He is a vice-chair of the National Association of International Information Security (NA-
MIB) which was established in 2017 and in which belong all the ‘household names’ of the Russian cyber diplo-
macy corps, i.e. people participating in the Russian international cyber norm-building project. NAMIB is sup-
ported by the Security Council. (Комов, С.А. (под общ. редакцией). Международная информационная 
безопасность: дипломатия мира. Сборник статей. М: Военинформ, 2009; Стрельцов, Анатолий Алек-
сандрович. ПИР-Центр [Online]. Available: http://pircenter.org/experts/918-streltsov-anatoly-a [Accessed: 
28th March 2019]; Газета.ru «Мы стоим перед новой угрозой» 12 апреля 2018 [Online]. Available: 
https://www.gazeta.ru/tech/2018/04/11/11714395/namib.shtml [Accessed: 28th March 2019]; НАМИБ.  
Устав Национальной Ассоциации международной информационной безопасности Протокол № 1 от 
«10» апреля 2018 г [Online]. Available: http://namib.online/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Ustav_ NA-
MIB.pdf [Accessed: 2nd January 2020]. 
1226 Емельянов Г.В., Стрельцов А.А. Проблемы обеспечения информационной безопасности субъектов 
Российской Федерации. Информационное общество, № 6 (1998), 38 - 41. 
1227 Садовничий В. А., Стрельцов А. А. Обеспечение информационной безопасности России: Теоре-
тические и методологические основы. — Моск. центра непрерывного математического образования. 
М.: 2002. 
1228 Later defined as “activities to prevent harm to the properties of the security object, conditioned by the 
information and information infrastructure, as well as the means and subjects of this activity.” Стрельцов А.А. 
(и др.) Организационно-правовое обеспечение информационной безопасности. М.: Академия, 2008, 
22. 
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equally important tools as technological and organizational measures.1229 Strel’tsov’s 
definition of information security is state-centric an obviously formulated in such a 
way that the state control of information is legitimized. 
 
Later, in 2009 Strel’tsov argued that Russia needed a state information policy to secure 
the stability and spiritual development of society, and the socio-economic develop-
ment of the state to strengthen the Russian state as a great power (derzhava).1230 Ac-
cording to Strel’tsov, the state information policy is about promoting values, strategic 
communications, and conducting an information-political (non-forceful) and military-
technological (forceful) struggle (protivoborstvo).1231 By 2011 Strel’tsov had updated 
his views on the information confrontation or struggle (protivoborstvo) to encom-
pass a global information struggle (global’noe informatsionnoe protivoborstvo). Fur-
thermore, he updated the concept of military-technological struggle to mean the cre-
ation of coercive (silovoi) means of information-technological influence against en-
emy governmental and military infrastructure, protection of own information and tel-
ecommunications systems related to critical infrastructure, and electronic radio and 
computer intelligence. The new technological means of confrontation enabled the 
achievement of political goals when other coercive means were unavailable or inef-
fective.1232 Strel’tsov’s views moved in a more state-interventionist, almost authoritar-
ian direction between 2003–2011. As he worked during that time in the Security 
Council of RF, his views can be considered to reflect influential ideas circulating inside 
the decision-making apparatus.  
 
Army General Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareev is perhaps the most influential Russian 
military scholar alive. He is Doctor of Science in History and Military Science and has 
been highly decorated.1233 Gareev’s views are quite traditional, and in 2003 he argued 
that Operation Iraqi Freedom was not an example of a kind of new type of war or 
warfare. He did however concede, that in that war, a wide variety of political, eco-
nomic, and informational actions were used to prepare the battlefield.1234 In 2005 
Gareev pointed out that although states pursued their interest in various harmful 
ways, the competition between states was not a war if it did not involve the violent 
use of armed forces. He argued that the initial period of war had gained in importance 
because of the dominance of aerospace, and information domains had become deci-
sive. Indirect actions with political, economic, and moral effects had become more 
important and armed combat was penetrated by information warfare (protivo-
borstvo). Gareev envisioned a war starting with a massive aerospace, information and 
EW operation followed by a conventional ground assault. To him, a ‘non-contact’ 
(beskontaktnyi) war would always be followed by a ‘contact’ war if the government, 
people, and most importantly the army (land forces) held together. Gareev openly 
criticized those Russian scholars promoting three-dimensional, network, asymmetric, 
                                              
1229 Стрельцов 2008, 41, 43-49. 
1230 Стрельцов А.А. Государственная информационная политика: основы теории. М.: МЦНМО, 2009. 
1231 Ibid., 48 & 51. 
1232 Стрельцов, А. А. Основные задачи государственной политики в области информационного проти-
воборства. Военная мысль, № 5 2011, 18-25. 
1233 Gareev has been the President of the Academy of Military Sciences since its establishment in 1995. His 
articles published in various military journals during the 2000-2018 provide an insight into how the Russian 
military officers, or at least, those working at the Academy have seen the development of interstate struggle 
and warfare. 
1234 Гареев, М.А. Уроки и выводы из войны в Ираке. Военная мысль, № 8 2003, 68-76. 
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non-contact, information warfare etc.1235 This included Vladimir Slipchenko, a fellow 
military scholar of Gareev, who promoted the idea of a future non-nuclear, non-con-
tact precision war which would be aimed at destroying the economic potential of the 
opponent. This kind of war would start and end with massive surprise precision strike 
attacks—possibly by both sides.1236 A similar view was promoted by the retired Gen-
eral-Lieutenant S. A. Bogdanov, a chief researcher of the Centre for Military Strategic 
Studies of the General Staff (TsVSI GSh VS RF), in 2003, although he emphasised 
the role of massive information-psychological pressure before the attack and infor-
mation superiority (prevoskhodstvo) through disinformation, deception and EW dur-
ing the attack.1237 
 
Despite the official Russian foreign policy, Gareev considered the United States and 
NATO as potential adversaries.1238 Consequently, in 2012 Gareev claimed that coun-
tries of the world were suffering from infringements on their sovereignty. Russia 
should work with countries who were prepared for equal partnerships, while at the 
same time strive to become an independent great power. As Russian national inter-
ests, Gareev listed, among others, the creation of a high-tech industry, the prepared-
ness to wage information, psychological and cybernetic war, strategic deterrence, 
moral-psychological factors and patriotism, which he considered a part of military 
power. Gareev subscribed to the view that Russia was threatened by a controlled 
chaos aimed at disturbing the internal stability of the state and overthrowing it.1239  
 
For Gareev an international confrontation or struggle are not the same as war.1240 
Before and after the annexation of Crimea, Gareev pushed back on the new concepts 
of war although he conceded that new forms of international confrontation (protivo-
borstvo) carried out on the brink of war by veiled or overt violence, required special 
attention.1241 Consequently, the U.S. and its allies would use information means to 
create ‘colour revolutions’ and used military force in local conflicts to weaken Rus-
sia.1242 Gareev also argued for more intragovernmental cooperation between power 
ministries and even a new state organ to counter new military and non-military 
threats.1243 In the middle of the far-ranging military reform Gareev defended an undi-
vided, unified and hierarchical command.1244 Although Gareev clearly dismissed fash-
                                              
1235 Гареев, М.А. О характере вооруженной борьбы будущего. Вестник Академии военных наук, №2, 
2005, 11-14; Гареев, М.А. Отстаивая национальные интересы. ВПК, № 48 (115) за 21 декабря 2005 года. 
1236 Слипченко, В. И. Войны шестого поколения: оружие и военное искусство будущего. М.: ИД Вече, 
2002. 
1237 Богданов, С. А. Вероятный облик вооруженной борьбы будущего. Военная мысль, № 12 2003, 2-7. 
1238 Гареев, М.А. Итоги деятельности Академии военных наук за 2009 год и задачи академии на следую-
щий год. Вестник Академии военных наук, № 1 (30) 2010, 8-18. 
1239 Гареев, М.А. Итоги деятельности Академии военных наук за 2011 год и задачи академии на 2012 год» 
Вестник Академии военных наук, 2(39) 2012, 6-17,12. 
1240 Гареев, М.А. Система знаний о войне и обороне страны на современном этапе. Вестник Академии 
военных наук, 2(43) 2013, 7-14. 
1241 Гареев, М.А. Итоги деятельности Академии военных наук за 2012 год и задачи академии на 2013 год. 
Вестник Академии военных наук, 1(42) 2013, 8-21, 13.  
1242 Гареев, М.А. Опыт Великой Отечественной войны и работа Академии военных наук по дальней-
шему развитию военной науки. Вестник Академии военных наук, 2(51) 2015, 16-25, 21-22. 
1243 Гареев 2013a; Гареев, М.А. Характер современных военных и невоенных угроз безопасности России 
и организация обороны страны. Вестник Академии военных наук, 4(45) 2013, 4-9. 
1244 Гареев, М.А. Итоги деятельности Академии военных наук за 2013 год и задачи академии на 2014 год. 
Вестник Академии военных наук, 1(46) 2014, 7-13. 
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ionable terms like ‘soft power’ (miagaia sila) and ‘hybrid war’ (gibrinaia voina) he ar-
gued that economic, politico-diplomatic, information warfare (bor’ba) and military 
means of confrontation (protivoborstvo) should be used in tight cooperation to 
achieve military objectives.1245 In a co-authored article in 2017 with Major General 
N.I. Turko, Gareev seems to have finally given up on the distinction between politics 
and war as the article claims that modern war can be divided to a lower layer consisting 
of hard non-military means and soft non-traditional means, and a higher layer con-
sisting of armed warfare.1246 Accordingly, Gareev continued to emphasised the im-
portance of whole-of-government cooperation, territorial defence and mobiliza-
tion.1247 In 2019 he argued that the new types of warfare, which were constantly chang-
ing, required international regulation. The importance of local wars and conflicts was 
rising as nuclear weapons prevented wars only between the great powers.1248 All in all, 
Gareev’s writings in the 2000s and 2010s promoted the Academy’s official version of 
the character of war which tried to resist ‘fads’ like cyber or hybrid wars but seems to 
have failed in the end.  
 
The discussion on information war and warfare in the military journals carried over 
from the 1990s into the 2000s. Military scholars studied the United States’ armed 
forces’ doctrine on information war and/or warfare (translated variously as either 
voina or protivoborstvo), compared Russian and American concepts and in some 
cases tried to merge them.1249 For example, in 2005 a renowned military historian Vla-
dimir Zolotarev described information confrontation (protivoborstvo) as a complex 
of measures and operations conducted in peace and wartime and as such distinct from 
war (voina). It included the destruction of the infrastructure of the government and 
military command, electromagnetic attacks on telecommunications (EW), communi-
cation and signal intelligence, data breaches and the destruction of data resources 
through ‘hacker wars’, and the spreading of mass disinformation. Zolotarev claimed 
that information had become important because the disorganization of national in-
frastructure had strategic effects, information enabled the struggle (protivoborstvo) 
between states in the post-Cold War era in the information sphere, and the means of 
information influence had become available to criminals and terrorists.1250 
 
In 2009 Colonel General Vice-Chief of General Staff Anatolii Nogovitsyn defined an 
information war (voina) as: “a confrontation [protivoborstvo] between states in the 
information space in order to damage information systems, processes and resources, 
critical structures, to undermine the political and social systems, as well as to massively 
psychologically influence the military personnel and the population in order to desta-
bilize society and the enemy’s state as a whole.” He claimed that its primary mission 
                                              
1245 Гареев 2015. 
1246 Турко, Н. И., Гареев, М.А. Война: современное толкование теории и реалии практики. Вестник Ака-
демии военных наук, 1(58) 2017, 4-10. Gareev seems to walk back on this in his next article (Гареев, М.А. 
Итоги деятельности Академии военных наук за 2016 год и задачи Академии на 2017 год. Вестник Ака-
демии военных наук, 2(59) 2017, 14-22). 
1247 Гареев 2018. 
1248 Гареев, М.А. Итоги деятельности Академии военных наук за 2018 год и задачи академии на 2019 год. 
Вестник Академии военных наук, 2(67) 2019, 12-18. 
1249 Лимно, А. Н., Крысанов, М. Ф. Информационное противоборство и маскировка войск. Военная 
мысль, № 5 31.5.2003; Комов, С. А., Коротков, С. В., Дылевский, И. Н. Об эволюции современной аме-
риканской доктрины “информационных операций”. Военная мысль, № 6 2008. 
1250 Крамар, Владислав. Любая война обходится дороже содержания мощной армии. ВПК, № 39 (106) 
за 19 октября 2005 года. 
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was “the destruction of the foundations of the national identity and the way of life of 
the opposing state.” Nogovitsyn argued that victory in a modern war was possible 
only through information superiority and victory over an enemy was in its essence a 
psychological act. According to him, the main characteristics of information war were 
its cheapness, perception management, difficulty in prediction and estimating dam-
ages, and the transformation of the information infrastructure of a state into a strate-
gic target.1251 Nogovitsyn’s ideas were not far from Western ideas of strategic infor-
mation warfare. 
 
In 2014 Retired Major General Kh. I. Saifetdinov, an ex-chief of the 27th TsNII of 
the MoD1252 defined information warfare (protivoborstvo) as “the purposeful use of 
information to achieve political, economic, military and other goals.” According to 
him, the objective of IW was to gain and maintain information superiority over the 
armed forces of the enemy and to create favourable conditions for the preparation 
and use of the Armed Forces. IW should be conducted continuously during peacetime 
as part of strategic deterrence, during threatening periods as supporting initiation of 
the defence plan, and during wartime to acquire superiority. The main tasks of IW 
should be monitoring and forecasting, deception, disorganization of enemy forces, 
degrading the psychological resilience of the enemy forces and population, supporting 
the moral-psychological state of one’s own forces, and protecting one’s own ASUs 
and weapons. Saifetdinov proposed that the Armed Forces should have a system of 
information warfare including multiple subsystems of offensive, defensive and sup-
porting measures.1253 
 
After the annexation of the Crimea and Russia’s intervention in Syria, military scholars 
became more interested in the psychological than the technological aspect of infor-
mation confrontation—mainly because of the perceived hostile and critical Western 
reaction.1254 The antagonistic approach shared by the Russian civilian and military 
scholars towards the United States and its allies was based on the perceived geopolit-
ical confrontation and the ‘premeditated’ fall of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the ar-
guably selective and highly interpretive study of Western doctrines and theoretical 
writings led to the interpretation of  the concepts of ‘network or netwars’ (setevaia 
voina) and ‘noonpolitics’ as a new type of Western warfare or even as a seventh gen-
eration ‘information-network warfare’ fought in the information environment and 
                                              
1251 Ноговицын, Анатолий. Некоторые аспекты обеспечения информационной безопасности Россий-
ской Федерации. Военная мусль, № 3 2009, 24-26; Ноговицын, Анатолий. Некоторые аспекты обеспе-
чения информационной безопасности российской федерации. Российское военное обозрение № 3 
(62) март 2009. 
1252 The 27th TsNII or Central Scientific-Research Institute of the Ministry of Defence was established in 1954. 
It has been responsible for the development of Soviet and Russian military ASUs and ASUVs under the guid-
ance of the General Staff and it develops systems for all services. (Протасов, А. А. Институт автоматизации 
и совершенствования управления войсками (силами): история и современность. Военная мысль, № 7 
2014, 3-8; ‘Сайфетдинов’ Академик 2019 [Online]. Available: https://dic.academic.ru/ dic.nsf/enc_biog-
raphy/ 109590 /Сайфетдинов. [Accessed: 30th January 2019]. 
1253 Сайфетдинов, Х. И. Информационное противоборство в военной сфере. Военная мысль, № 7, 
2014, 38-41. 
1254 Микрюков, Василий. Победа в войне должна быть достигнута еще до первого выстрела. Независи-
мое Военное Обозрение, № 1 15.1.2016; Балуевский, Юрий. Агрессия «общечеловеческого» Военными 
технологиями нематериального действия у нас никто не занимается. ВПК, № 18 (584) за 20 мая 2015 
года; Сивков, Константин. Захват будущего в теории и на практике. на форуме "АРМИЯ-2018" обсуж-
дены проблемы психологической обороны. ВПК, № 35 за 11 сентябрь 2018. 
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naturally directed against Russia.1255 After Western scholars and media began to use 
the terms ‘hybrid war’ and ‘hybrid warfare’ to describe Russian actions in Ukraine, 
Russian writers quite effortlessly began to use these same terms to describe the West-
ern use of ‘controlled chaos’ and ‘colour revolutions’, that is anti-government, possi-
bly violent activities supported by foreign powers, which partially merged with hybrid 
warfare.1256 
 
There were some critical views. I. M. Popov and M. M. Khamzatov pointed out in 
2016 that many Russians had misunderstood the American concept of network-cen-
tric warfare to mean a new kind of war, whereas it was just a doctrine or concept of 
command and control.1257 This observation did not prevent Popov and Khamzatov 
to claim that a new kind of ‘system-network war’ had been born. It was described as 
‘a technology to wage war’ and it had different forms depending on the level at which 
it was engaged (political, strategic, operational and tactical). At the highest level, it was 
a struggle between systems (governments) to weaken their opponents’ ‘critical nodes’ 
to win with as least bloodshed as possible by using state and non-state resources /ac-
tors. Conversely, the tactical level was reminiscent of the NCW.1258 Arguably, Popov 
and Khamzatov thus tried to combine all the Russian theories on warfare examined 
above under one concept. 
 
The character of future war has greatly interested Russian military scholars from the 
early 2000s. Retired Lieutenant General and Chief researcher of the Institute of Social 
and Political Studies of RAN, V. V. Serebriannikov continued (cf. Chapter 4) his the-
orizing about the changing character of war. He claimed that violent military means 
should be divided into direct (warfare) and indirect (intimidation and pressure) means. 
This produced a matrix of violent/non-violent, military/non-military, and direct/in-
direct means. Serebriannikov also noted that non-military means were being milita-
rized, e.g. the use of economic means against the military-industrial complex or infor-
mation-propaganda against the will of the people and armed forces.1259 The theme of 
indirect actions or strategy heavily influenced the way Russian scholars have handled 
information warfare. I will return to this issue when discussing asymmetric responses 
                                              
1255 Дугин А.Г. Теоретические основы сетевых войн. Информационные войны, № 1(5) 2008, 2-9; Бовду-
нов А. Л. Неправительственные организации: сетевая война. Информационные войны, № 3(7) 2008, 
30-39; Савин Л. В. Украина в сетевой войне. Информационные войны, № 3(7) 2008, 42-51; Никитенко 
Е.Г., Сергеев Н.А. «Мягкая сила» в контексте национальной безопасности России. Информационные 
войны, № 3(27) 2013, 36-52; Карякин В.В. Мир вступил в эпоху войн седьмого поколения – информа-
ционно–сетевых войн. Информационные войны, № 3(19) 2011, 2-7; Золотарев, Владимир. Когда нация 
становится жертвой: Концептуальные основы информационно-сетевых войн. ВПК, № 17 (485) за 1 мая 
2013 года. 
1256 Basically, ‘controlled chaos’ is the clandestine inciting of terrorism, separatism and insurgency by an adver-
sary power to enable regime change in its opponent. Лепский В.Е. Технологии управляемого хаоса – ору-
жие разрушения субъектности развития. Информационные войны, № 4(16) 2010, 69-78; Воробьев, И. 
Н., Киселев, В. А. Стратегии сокрушения и измора в новом облике. Военная мысль, № 3 2014, 45-57; 
Киселев, В. А., Воробьев, И. Н. Гибридные операции как новый вид военного противоборства. Военная 
мысль, № 5 2015, 41-48; Чекинов, С. Г., Богданов, С. А. Эволюция сущности и содержания понятия 
“война” в XXI столетии. Военная мысль, № 1 2017, 30-43; Бартош, А. А. Стратегия и контрстратегия 
гибридной войны. Военная мысль, № 10 2018, 5-20. 
1257 Попов И.М., Хамзатов М.М. Война будущего: концептуальные основы и практические выводы. 
Очерки стратегической мысли. – М.: Кучково поле, 2016, 428. 
1258 Ibid., 498-450. 
1259 Серебрянников, В. В. О понятии “война”. Военная мысль, 2004 № 10, 61-65. 
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because many military scholars have considered information warfare to be essentially 
indirect and asymmetric. 
 
By 2008 the General Staff had embraced the idea of information war and its techno-
logical and psychological component, the latter of which was perhaps seen as more 
important.1260 Following this view, Major General E. A. Derbin, the Head of the De-
partment of Information Security of the Military Academy of the General Staff1261, 
argued that information was the means of strategic confrontation (protivoborstvo) 
and strategic deterrence (sderzhivanie).1262 Derbin’s solution to information threats 
was a system of information security which consisted of multiple subsystems.1263 To 
this system could be incorporated systems protecting state secrets, securing commu-
nications, and protecting ASUs, which would increase the resilience (ustoichivost’) of 
the information infrastructure against threats. This system would protect Russia (and 
its allies) from direct and indirect actions of the enemy.1264 Derbin’s views must be 
taken as authoritative as he was the General responsible for training information se-
curity for high ranking officers. As the threats multiplied and became non-militarized, 
Derbin updated his views in 2019 and argued for the creation of the State Defence 
Committee, including STAVKA of the Supreme Command. This should have inte-
grated the security efforts of all ministries.1265 
 
A series of articles written in 2011-2012 by a senior researcher of the Military Acad-
emy of the General Staff, E. G. Shalamberidze, provided a complex model of inter-
national and largely indirect confrontation (mezhdunarodnaia protivoborstvo)1266 
which closely resembles the model of intergovernmental conflicts provided by the 
Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov in 2013.1267 They also echoed the ideas pre-
sented by Serebriannikov in the early 2000s. According to Shalamberidze, indirect 
                                              
1260 Бурутин, А. Войны будущего станут информационными. Новые вызовы и угрозы безопасности Рос-
сии. Независимое военное обозрение, № 5 2008, 2-3. 
1261 The Department of Information Security of the Military Academy of the General Staff offers education 
and training for mid- to high-ranking military officers for information security issues of the state and the Armed 
Forces on the strategic and operational level. It also conducts research on these subjects. (Военная академия 
Генерального штаба Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации. Кафедра информационной безопас-
ности [Online]. Available: http://vagsh.mil.ru/Struktura-akademii/Kafedra-informacionnoj-bezopasnosti 
[Accessed: 29th March 2019].) 
1262 Дербин, Е.А. Информационная безопасность союзного государства как основа его обороноспособ-
ности в условиях непрямых действий противника. Вестник Академии военных наук, № 2 (27) 2009, 31-
38. 
1263 The subsystems were: organization structural-functional, evaluation and forecasting of the situation, legal, 
educational and cadres, ideological work, linguistical, scientific, coordination and control, measures of infor-
mation security, and technical security. 
1264 Дербин 2009. Cf. also Дербин, Е.Л. О роли смысла в обеспечении информационной безопасности. 
Военная Мысль, № 11 2007, 68-77. 
1265 Дербин, Е.Л. О Совершенствовании Стратегического Руководства Обороной России. Вестник 
Академии военных наук, № 2 (67) 2019, 46-52. 
1266 Although the Bulletin of the Academy of Military Sciences offers warfare as the English translation, it is 
clear that Shalamberidze does not write about warfare understood as fighting or use of force, and so ‘confron-
tation’ is used here. 
1267 Шаламберидзе Е.Г. Непрямое противоборство в сфере военной безопасности в условиях мирного 
времени. Вестник Академии военных наук, № 1 (34) 2011, 20-30; Шаламберидзе Е.Г.  Теоретические 
вопросы развития политики национальной обороны России в условиях мирного времени с использо-
ванием системы мер невоенного и военного характера. Вестник Академии военных наук, № 4 (37) 2011, 
35-43; Шаламберидзе Е.Г.  Национальная оборона Российской Федерации: стратегические задачи и 
возможные перспективы. Вестник Академии военных наук, № 4 (41) 2012, 30-37; Шаламберидзе Е.Г.  
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means would be used to destabilize the opponent’s state system, to weaken its ele-
ments, to take out its critical control systems, to introduce failures in subsystems, and 
finally to transform it to a system suited to the attacker’s interests. The use of these 
means would be implemented according to a strategic plan during all phases of state 
relations.1268 Thus, Shalamberidze claimed that strategic goals could be achieved in 
peacetime without the direct armed use of force.1269 Shalamberidze’s model was based 
on a continuum of relations between the belligerents and various combinations of 
non-violent/violent (or persuasion/coercion), non-military/military, indirect/direct 
and low, middle and high intensity means.1270 Later, Shalamberidze argued that the 
strategic role of national defence was the prevention, reduction, and pre-emption of 
military threats and the achievement of the correlation of forces (sootnoshenie sil). 
To this effect, he introduced a functional structure for the optimization of national 
defence which resembles the system of information security proposed by Panarin et 
al.1271 
 
The ideas of Serebriannikov and Shalamberidze were clearly present in the speech 
given by the Chief of General Staff Colonel General Valerii Gerasimov in 2013.1272 
Gerasimov presented a model to visualize the relationship between the different 
stages of interstate conflict and military and non-military means.1273 Consequently, 
Gerasimov’s Chief of the Main Operational Directorate Andrei Kartapolov provided 
in 2015 three models of current and future war. The first was ‘a war of a new type’ 
(voina novogo tipa) which included ‘hybrid actions’ and ‘indirect actions’ and was 
based on the use of information, covert action, and non-military force to destabilize 
and delegitimize the target state, which was followed by ‘peace-keeping operations’. 
The second was a traditional war complemented by new environments and technol-
ogy. The third was asymmetric warfare, which was from the GS point of view the 
weaker side’s strategy (tactics) to level differences in power with minimal costs by 
acting against the vulnerabilities and weaknesses of the opponent in a coordinated 
way using all means available.1274 In 2016 Gerasimov stated that wars fell under the 
overall concept of interstate confrontation or struggle (mezhgosudarstvennoe pro-
tivoborstvo) and could be divided to wars using ‘global integrated operations’ (from 
                                              
Национальная оборона и информационная борьба государства в современных условиях мирного вре-
мени. Информационные войны, № 3(23) 2012, 11-19; Герасимов 2013a & 2013b. 
1268 Шаламберидзе 2011a. He later updates threats to measures (mera) and armed aggression to ‘direct violent 
reorientation of the policy of the opposing side’. Шаламберидзе 2011a. 
1269 Шаламберидзе 2011b. 
1270 Ibid. 
1271 Шаламберидзе 2012a & 2012b. 
1272 Gerasimov gave the original speech in the annual meeting of the Military Academy and the subsequent 
article based on it and published in Voenno-Promyshlenyi Kurier gained much attention in the West after the 
conflict in Ukraine began. This was mainly because the first interpretations mistook Gerasimov’s analysis of 
the character of war as a ‘Russian doctrine of hybrid warfare.’ (Герасимов 2013a & 2013b; Galeotti 2018; 
Bartles, Charles K. Getting Gerasimov Right. Military review, January-February 2016, 30-38). 
1273 In 2010 the previous Chief of General Staff N.E. Makarov gave a somewhat similar presentation on the 
character of future war. Makarov perhaps emphasized more than Gerasimov the changed geopolitical situation 
and the role of technology and was heavily influenced by American NCW concept. (Макаров, Н.Е. «Характер 
вооруженной борьбы будущего, актуальные проблемы строительства и боевого применения Вооружен-
ных Сил РФ в современных условиях». Вестник Академии военных наук, № 2 (31) 2010, 18-26.) Iurii 
Baluevskii, the Chief of General Staff in 2004-2008 did not provide such public presentations of the character 
of future war.  
1274 Картаполов, А.В.  Уроки военных конфликтов, перспективы развития средств и способов их веде-
ния. Прямые и непрямые действия в современных международных конфликтах. Вестник Академии во-
енных наук, 2(51) 2015, 26-36. 
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the U.S. doctrine) and wars using ‘hybrid methods’ (gibridnye metody). The latter was 
based on achieving political goals with the minimal use of armed force, which was 
substituted by economic and information-psychological means, and by support given 
to paramilitaries etc. to erode the stability of the opponent. Gerasimov stated that the 
Defence Plan of 2016-2020 had been drafted by keeping these threats in mind and 
was founded on an intragovernmental (mezhvedomstvennyi) approach, territorial de-
fence (territorial’naia oborona) and international cooperation (with allies, i.e. the Col-
lective Security Treaty Organization, the BRICS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Or-
ganization).1275 
 
The official Russian approach to hybrid wars etc. voiced by the General Staff has 
oscillated between 2016-2019 between acceptance to rejection. The main problem for 
the Russian military seems to have been the relationship between non-military threats 
and war. It was related to the larger issue of what was considered as war in the modern 
era and, thus, linked to the tasks of the Armed Forces.1276 In 2018 Gerasimov argued 
that the current era was characterized by ‘wars of a new generation’ (voina novogo 
pokaleniia) where the real opponent hides behind third parties (terrorists, insurgents 
etc.)1277 Terminological ambivalence has not stopped civilian or non-military scholars 
and commentators from using the term ‘hybrid’ to describe the character of future 
war.1278 Moreover, in his 2018 presentation at the conference of the AVN, Gerasimov 
argued that the character of war kept on changing to include more non-state actors 
and non-military means. Gerasimov listed the evolution of military strategy from the 
“strategy of annihilation” and the “strategy of attrition” to the strategies of “global 
war”, “nuclear deterrence” and “indirect actions”. The last one Gerasimov associated 
with regime change operations which used ‘fifth columns’ and precision weapon 
strikes in combination. Russia would, consequently, adopt a strategy of active defence 
based on a defensive doctrine. Despite this broadening definition of war, Gerasimov 
made the argument that it was the task of the Armed Forces to prepare for a confron-
tation (protivoborstvo) in the military sphere and non-military spheres were the re-
sponsibility of others—although coordination with different actors was important. 
Gerasimov further argued that the main principles of strategic action were surprise, 
decisiveness, and continuity (nepreryvnost’)—he was in effect declaring a pre-emptive 
                                              
1275 Герасимов, В.В. Организация обороны Российской Федерации в условиях применения противни-
ком «традиционных» и «гибридных» методов ведения войны. Вестник Академии военных наук, № 2 (55) 
2016, 19-23, 20. 
1276 Матвиенко, Ю.А. Невоенные угрозы как составная часть современного межгосударственного про-
тивоборства. Вестник Академии военных наук, 1(58) 2017, 35-41; Буренок, Василий. За рамками здравого 
смысла: Облик грядущих войн и новых систем вооружения определит только наука. ВПК, № 10 (478) 
за 12 марта 2013 года; Буренок, Василий. О некоторых видах межгосударственного противоборства. 
Вестник Академии военных наук, 2(43) 2013, 15-19; Сержантова, А.В. Современное понимание сущно-
сти и содержания войны. Вестник Академии военных наук, 2(43) 2013, 20-23; Новиков, Владимир, Го-
лубчиков, Сергей. Олимпиада по безопасности. ВПК, № 14 (678) 12–18 апреля 2017 года. 
1277 Герасимов, В.В. Современные войны и актуальные вопросы обороны страны. Вестник Академии 
военных наук, 2(59) 2017, 9-13; Герасимов, В.В. Мир на гранях войны: Мало учитывать сегодняшние 
вызовы, надо прогнозировать будущие. ВПК, № 10 (674) за 15 марта 2017 года. 
1278 Бартош, А. A. Гибридная война: интерпретации и реальность. Независимое военное обозрение, № 
35 (918) 16 сентября 2016; Чекинов, С. Г., Богданов, С. А. Прогнозирование характера и содержания 
войн будущего: проблемы и суждения. Военная мысль, № 10 2015, 41-49; Антонов С.Г., Гордеев С.В., 
Климов С.М. & Рыжов Б.С. Модели угроз совместных информационно-технических и информаци-
онно-психологических воздействий в гибридных войнах. Информационные войны, № 2(46) 2018, 83-
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(uprezhdat’) strategy.1279 Notwithstanding all these theoretical ideas, the Minister of 
Defence Sergei Shoigu claimed in June 2019 that Russia lacked a theory of ‘conflicts 
of the new generation.’1280 
 
Before moving on to official strategic planning documents it must be noted that in 
relation to the interstate struggle there exists a distinct continuum of interstate con-
frontation in Russian military thinking which is present in the texts analysed above 
and in the official documents. In relation to war, they can be categorized into the 
period of no direct military threat, the period of threat, the initial period of war, war 
proper, and the final stages of war.1281 In an article from 2005, retired Colonel Iu.E. 
Donskov and O. G. Nikitin, scholars from the Scientific and Research Test Institute 
of the Electronic Warfare of Military Educational and Scientific Centre of the Air 
Force, divided the phases of conflict into the beginning, escalation, crisis and war. 
Different means of diplomatic, economic, disinformation, EW and computer and fi-
nally kinetic means would be used in different phases.1282 Igor’ Popov and M. M. 
Khamzatov divided the ‘military-political situation’ into phases of military-political 
stability, tension, crisis, and military conflict (war).1283 Igor’ Popov has divided the 
military conflict itself into the preparation period (from hours to months), the active 
phase of military conflict (which has three subphases i.e. massive aerospace strike, 
land attack, and consequent operation to destroy enemy forces), and the post-conflict 
regulation period.1284 Valeri Gerasimov has presented a somewhat similar vision of the 
development of modern interstate conflicts which divides interstate conflict into 
phases of hidden initiation, aggravation, start of conflict actions, crisis, resolution, and 
post-conflict management.1285 He has also used the term ‘period of threat’ to denote 
a time before open hostilities.1286 
 
According to Evgenii Shalamberidze, confrontation is defined as “the actions of the 
subjects of international relations to resolve their disagreements.” This is divided into: 
peaceful relations where non-violent means of confrontation are used; foreign policy 
conflict involving the use of non-violent direct and indirect non-military means and 
indirect military means; and military conflict where all means are used, primarily direct 
                                              
1279 Герасимов, Валерий. Векторы развития военной стратегии. Красная звезда 4.3.2019 [Online]. Availa-
ble: http://redstar.ru/vektory-razvitiya-voennoj-strategii/ [Accessed: 4th March 2019]. 
1280 ТАСС. Шойгу заявил, что Россия должна выработать новую теорию ведения войн. ТАСС, 18 июня 
2019 [Online]. Available: https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/6561643 [Accessed: 2nd July 2019]. 
1281 Горбунов, В. Н., Богданов, С. А. О характере вооруженной борьбы в XXI веке. Военная Мысль, № 
3 2009, 2-15; Чекинов, С. Г., Богданов, С. А. (2012b) Начальные периоды войн и их влияние на подго-
товку страны к войне будущего. Военная Мысль, № 12 2012, 14-27; Герасимов 2013; Герасимов 2013; 
Герасимов 2015; Картаполов 2015.  
1282 Донсков, Ю.Е., Никитин, О. Г. Место и роль специальных информационных операций при разре-
шении военных конфликтов. Военная мысль, № 6 (2005), 30-34. 
1283 Попов & Хамзатов 2016, 122. 
1284 Попов, Игорь. Военные конфликты: взгляд за горизонт: Технологическая революция в "традици-
онной" войне. Независимое военное обозрение, № 13 (754) 2013. 
1285 Герасимова 2013a. 
1286 Герасимов 2015. Time period which is usually followed by the beginning of war. “Characterised by an 
extreme aggravation of the international situation and the confrontation between the probable opponents, the 
increase in military threats and a sharp activation of direct preparations for war, expansion of arms conflicts.”  
‘Угрожаемый период’. Военного энциклопедического словаря. М.: Воениздат, 2007 [Online]. Available: 
http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/details.htm?id=10643@morfDictionary [Accessed: 30th 
March 2019]. Similar concept is ‘a threatening period’ or ‘period of threat’ (ugrozhaemyi period) which is related 
to military security and has been used officially since 1993 (Известия 1993). 
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military means.1287 In the context of information warfare, Manoilo divided state rela-
tions into four stages: ‘peaceful coexistence’ (mirnoe sosushchestvovanie), ‘conflict 
of interests’ (stolknovenie interesov) or continuous ‘natural rivalry’ (estestvennoe sop-
ernichestvo), ‘armed confrontation’ (vooruzhennaia konfrontatsiia), and ‘war’ 
(voina).1288  
 
The initial period of war is a distinctly Soviet/Russian concept. According to Cheki-
nov and Bogdanov, it was originally defined in the 1920s–930s as the length of time 
between the declaration of war and the beginning of fighting between the main forces 
deployed in a theatre of operations. During this time fighting may occur between 
border guards and other permanently deployed units covering the mobilization and 
deployment of the main forces. Later Soviet military theorists concluded that war 
would begin without the declaration of war with a surprise attack of previously de-
ployed battle-ready formations to achieve the initial strategic goals. Chekinov and 
Bogdanov claim that the initial period is now preceded by non-military operations 
and the initial period itself will be the main and decisive period of war.1289 
 
On the official side, the Russian military doctrine differentiates the national security 
situation between peacetime, the time of immediate aggression, and wartime.1290 Ad-
ditionally, the armed forces have been given operational requirements based on the 
categorization of peacetime, times of emergency, times of aggravated military-political 
and military-strategic situations, and times of war.1291 The Russian federal law also 
recognizes the concepts of ‘a state of emergency’ and ‘a state of war’ which are both 
connected to security threats against the state. The former gives the state the authority 
to restrict the freedom of mass communications, to increase the protection of objects 
vital to the population, and to manage the use of public communication networks. 
The latter gives the state the authority to control communication systems. The state 
has the mandate to mobilize human and material resources, including communica-
tions, for war already in peacetime.1292 
 
The official and semi-official national security and strategic planning documents have 
included some aspects of the idea of the interstate struggle. The so-called Ivanov 
Doctrine of 2004 stated that ‘armed struggle’ was undergoing change. In short, it sub-
scribed to a vision of high-tech, long-range aerospace warfare, but retained the im-
portance of conventional land forces. According to the doctrine, military power was 
used as an instrument of foreign policy very frequently and the Armed forces were 
faced with external, internal, and transborder threats.1293 The Foreign Policy Concept 
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1290 Указ Президента РФ 2014 
1291 Mil.ru. Задачи Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации [Online]. Available: https://structure.mil.ru/ 
mission/tasks.htm [Accessed: 28th March 2019]. 
1292 Федеральный конституционный закон 2001; Федеральный конституционный закон 1997; Федераль-
ный конституционный закон 2002; Федеральный закон 2003. 
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of 2008 argues that unilateral actions of some states are a threat to the balance of the 
world. It also states that the Russian foreign policy should support Russia’s influence 
in the global information space and sphere through public policy.1294  The National 
Security Strategy (NSS) of 2009 stated that disagreements between states had intensi-
fied. Information confrontation (protivoborstvo) is intensifying which threatens the 
stability of states. Nevertheless, Russia had survived the crisis of the end of 20th cen-
tury and was transforming into one of the great world powers.1295 The military doc-
trine of 2010 defined armed confrontation (vooruzhennoe protivoborstvo) as con-
sisting of larger-scale, regional, and local wars, and armed conflicts. It mentioned the 
strengthening of information confrontation and the development of its forces and 
means to achieve political goals without the use of force. In contrast to information 
confrontation the document used the term warfare (bor’ba) in relation to armed war-
fare and terrorism.1296  
 
The 2013 Foreign Policy Concept states that the world was transferring towards pol-
ycentrism as the West’s dominance in the world economy and politics was waning. 
Global competition was acquiring civilizational dimensions as different political and 
economic models emerged. ‘Soft power’ had become a new and potentially dangerous 
instrument used to infringe on the internal affairs and sovereignty of states. Russia 
would therefore pursue strategic and regional stability and protect its national and 
international information security. The most important direction of foreign policy 
would be to support Russian information influence in the world and the priority di-
rection would be the counties of CIS.1297 The current Military Doctrine of 2014 states 
that the world is characterized by global competition, tension, and rivalry between 
value orientations and developmental models. Military conflict consists of interstate 
and intrastate use of military power consisting of large-scale armed confrontations 
(vooruzhennoe protivoborstvo), regional and local wars, and armed conflicts. Infor-
mation confrontation (informatsionnoe protivoborstvo) is strengthening and its 
forces and means are developing. Military dangers and threats are shifting into the 
information space (prostranstvo) and into the internal sphere of Russia. Information 
and communication technology are being increasingly used against the sovereignty, 
political independence, and territorial integrity of states and present a threat to global 
stability. An adversary can operate in the whole depth of information space and affect 
critical infrastructure and people. Russia will improve the information security system 
of the Armed Forces, other troops and agencies, develop information cooperation 
between agencies (including the creation of a unified information space), develop 
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85021/ [Accessed: 30th March 2019]. 
1295 Указ Президента РФ от 12 мая 2009 года N 537 (2009b). О Стратегии национальной безопасности 
Российской Федерации до 2020 года Указ Президента Российской Федерации [Online]. Available: 
http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102129631 [Accessed: 21st March 2019]. 
1296 Указ Президента РФ от 05.02.2010 N 146 “О Военной доктрине Российской Федерации” [Online]. 
Available: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_97325/ [Accessed: 30th March 2019]. 
1297 Концепция. Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации (утв. Президентом РФ 
12.02.2013) [Online]. Available: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_142236/ [Accessed: 
30th March 2019]. 
 
182 
forces and means for information confrontation, and develop an information man-
agement system for the Armed forces which will connect weapons control and auto-
mated command and control systems from the strategic to the tactical level.1298  
 
The NSS of 2015 states that Russia faces threats from the direction of the United 
States and its allies who deploy multiple types of pressure and challenge Russia’s na-
tional interests. Global and regional instability has increased and instruments of power 
have diversified. In the areas near Russia, militarization and an arms race are devel-
oping. The information confrontation/struggle (informatsionnoe protivoborstvo) is 
strengthening as some countries use information and communications technology to 
manipulate social consciousness and falsify history. There are threats in the infor-
mation sphere and so the information infrastructure and spiritual-cultural values need 
to be protected. Information means should be part of the strategic deterrence. Infor-
mation security in the context of national strategic priorities should be paid special 
attention in implementing the strategy.1299 The Foreign Policy Doctrine of 2016 states 
that contradictions (protivorechiia) continue to increase in the international system as 
does the role of force. It mentions information security and threats, and the infor-
mation space and sphere but does not define them. Information is seen as a tool of 
‘soft power’. Information/communication technology can be used for military-polit-
ical purposes. According to the Doctrine, Russia takes necessary actions to ensure 
equitable management of the Internet.1300 
 
It is interesting that the Information Security Doctrine of 2016 uses the term ‘pro-
tivoborstvo’ only once and then in the context of military policy and defence when 
referring to the Armed Forces and means of information warfare as a part of the 
military use of force. Nevertheless, the document states that Russia has national in-
terests in the information sphere including the constitutional rights of citizens (inc. 
spiritual-cultural values), resilience of critical information infrastructure, development 
of the Russian IT industry, public diplomacy, creation of an international system of 
information security including the protection of Russian sovereignty in the infor-
mation space. These are threatened by transborder information threats that are used 
among other things for military and geopolitical goals. The Doctrine divides these 
threats into information-technological and psychological threats. The Doctrine claims 
that some states are attempting to use technological superiority to dominate the in-
formation space, and because the Internet is not regulated and managed in an equal 
manner, strategic stability is difficult to achieve.1301 
 
To summarize, the interstate struggle or confrontation is a constant theme in Russian 
strategic thought. Its characteristics have changed but the core idea has stayed recog-
nizably the same: it is the constant zero-sum struggle between great powers, and civ-
ilizations or systems grouped around them for power, status, independence and the 
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right to exist by any means necessary. The idea of the interstate struggle in the writings 
of the Russian information war theorists naturally transforms into information strug-
gle.  It can be argued that the idea is based on a geopolitical promise of control over 
globalization, a future eschatological confrontation, and a struggle between systems 
with the emphasis on historical continuity. There is a shared understanding of the 
distinct technological and psychological aspects of the information space and their 
interconnectedness. However, this has not produced a unified terminology or theory 
on the information struggle.1302 During the timeframe under analysis the element of 
information has been perhaps the major addition to the interstate confrontation, and 
it has, at least in the material analysed here, occupied a somewhat central position. 
Depending on the writer and the text, information has become either the means, ways 
or ends of this struggle. However, it is worth noting that the idea of an information 
confrontation remains a subject of intense discussion in Russian strategic thought. 
 
There are at least two separate meanings for the idea of ‘protivoborstvo’ present in 
the material analysed here.1303 The first is related to the great power struggle con-
ducted as a continuum in all stages of interstate relations. The second is related to the 
forces, means, forms and methods of conducting warfare in the context of a con-
flict.1304 The first is more closely related to strategic cultural thinking, the second is 
associated with studying and adopting Western ideas. The challenge in analytically 
separating these two meanings is that throughout the 2000s and 2010s the meaning 
of war has been broadened by some, mainly civilians, to include non-military and non-
violent actions, while some military scholars have pushed back on this formulation. 
The appearance of the concept of intergovernmental confrontation (mezhgosudar-
stvennogo protivoborstvo) which highlights intrastate or interagency, i.e. whole-of-
state approaches is a resurrection of comprehensive Russian security thinking based 
partly on Soviet era ideas. The interstate struggle requires the mobilization of all state 
resources through the vertical of power.1305 This is not comprehensive security in the 
sense of broadening the sources and objects of threats, but it is comprehensive in the 
sense of the means and actors of state power. Most notably, it requires vertical cen-
tralised organizations or ‘systems.’ 
 
By analysing Western theories and military operations, and through the prism of ge-
opolitical and sometimes civilizational confrontation in which globalization is a threat 
and state sovereignty under attack, the Russian strategic thought has tried to find a 
way to forecast future wars. The sixth-generation high-tech precision strike warfare 
of Slipchenko was challenge by those who did not agree with the diminishing role of 
the conventional ground and nuclear forces. At the same time foreign and domestic 
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ideas of netwars, soft power, controlled chaos and ‘mutiny wars’1306 offered a third 
view. Thus, long before the Western military theorists began to write about Russian 
hybrid warfare the Russians themselves had analysed the Western way of conducting 
war in similar terms. This new threat blurred the lines between war and peace, as well 
as political competition and military confrontation and led to some ‘course correc-
tions’ by the General Staff and criticism from independent writers. The NCW was 
embraced and then criticized for being too Western. Hybrid wars were officially 
adopted and then abandoned, then adopted again. Defensive strategy was first en-
shrined as morally superior and then abandoned for ‘active defence.’ There was also 
a clear tension between emphasising the promises of technology versus spiritual and 
moral issues—which was a traditional conflict in Russian military thinking.1307 The 
core of the problem was the relationship of ‘protivoborstvo’ and ‘voina’, and how and 
by whom the security issues related to them should be handled. Ultimately, infor-
mation means were widely accepted to have strategic effects either as a destructive 
power or related to the political objectives of a confrontation. Moreover, the dual 
military operational-tactical and strategic-geopolitical nature of information confron-
tation seems to have stabilized. 
 
In the context of the use of information, the distinction between information-tech-
nological and information-psychological aspects is conceptually quite clear.1308 As one 
comes down from the great political power struggle level to the military strategic, 
operational and tactical level the importance of the first increases. At this point, it 
should be noted that those whom previous studies have named as ‘holists’ define 
information warfare through its political and political-strategic level objective which 
is achieved by making the opponent do what you want by whatever means possible 
primarily by affecting the will of the opponent even during peacetime. However, at 
least for some Russian theorists, ‘systemist’ would be a better name for this. They 
perceive the information struggle as a struggle between systems, perhaps inside an 
even larger system, and are interested in how the technological and psychological sys-
tems affect (control) each other. ‘Systemists’ emphasise the importance of knowing 
the opponent and tailoring your own responses accordingly.  
 
Based on the definitions given by different authors, information-technological war-
fare has been used as a synonym for cyber warfare and its substance and form have 
similarities to Western ideas. There are differences however, and no single accepted 
definition exists. Still, military scholars have associated it with counter command and 
control warfare and the idea of achieving information superiority. Thus, information 
has become part of military power. Moreover, the idea that information and telecom-
munications systems are critical for state power and sovereignty was formulated by 
both Russian civilian and military theorists already in the 2000s. 
 
                                              
1306 This a concept coined by Russian emigrant Evgeni Messner (1891-1975) (Месснера, Е.Э. Хочешь мира, 
победи мятежевойну! Москва: Военный университет русский путь, 2005). 
1307 Cf. Bukkvoll 2011. 
1308 The Russian emphasis on information-psychological warfare might be a result of the narrative that the 
Soviet Union fell because of Western information operations or because there was a tradition of psychological 
warfare in the KGB, ex-members of which have had a major impact on Russian thinking about information 
warfare. It might also be the result of emphasising morale as an important part of warfare, and it might be 
connected to the views of geopolitical and civilizational minded theorists who highlight the need to protect 
‘Russianness’ in the face of Western decadence. 
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Based on the texts discussed here, there has been a distinct and persistent tendency 
to promote centralized and systematic solutions to the information struggle, warfare 
and security. There is a shared understanding between civilian and military scholars 
that the new threat emanating from the Internet and global mass media can and must 
be controlled through the means of state power. Additionally, this threat must be 
prevented from materializing and deterred even in peacetime because (technological 
and psychological) information superiority is a necessary requirement to win future 
wars. There are differences of opinion as to how this ‘system of information security’ 
should be built and what its tasks should be. As time has passed a more versatile, 
adaptive, distinctly cybernetic, and whole-of-government approach has gathered 
more support instead of a defensive system controlled by one ministry or agency. 
Writers with a military background have argued for an offensive role for this system. 
This is reflected in the recent change in the Russian doctrine characterised by a more 
aggressive, offensive, and active use of non-violent and violent military power.1309 
 
The idea of ‘protivoborstvo’ was already present in the official documents at the be-
ginning of 2000s. Still the strategic planning process revitalized in 2013-2014 seems 
to have given the idea more emphasis—it produced multiple documents referring to 
the geopolitical information confrontation and arguably prioritized its psychological 
aspect as a national threat. This continuous struggle even during peacetime is aimed 
at ‘information superiority’ which would affect the strategic balance. Thus, the new 
threats born from informatization and globalization were incorporated into the Soviet 
era balance of power and zero-sum security thinking. The official documents did not 
directly refer to information power or potential, but science, technology, and the con-
trol of information were perceived as something measurable which affected great 
power relations. 
 
5.3 Strategic deterrence 
 
The Russian idea of strategic deterrence in the Putin era has generated some interest 
among Western scholars.  The term ‘deterrence’, as it features in the Russian discourse 
according to previous studies, implies compellence, prevention of the threat or war 
from materialising, deterrence in peacetime and the use of force during wartime to 
shape the battlefield, not just threatening the opponent with retaliation or by denying 
it of its objectives through intolerable risks and costs.1310 Some previous studies, alt-
hough recognizing the information struggle or warfare as part of strategic deterrence, 
have approached the Russian policies and strategy in the information space as inher-
ently offensive.1311 Pentti Forsström has argued that the current Russian deterrence 
                                              
1309 Герасимов 2019. 
1310 Kristin Ven Bruusgard has defined it as “a clustered term used to describe all of the following: activities 
aimed at containing any threat from materialising against Russia; activities aimed at deterring any direct aggres-
sion against Russia; and, lastly, activities focused on coercing an adversary to cede in a confrontation to terms 
dictated by Russia.” (Ven Bruusgaard, Kristin. Russian Strategic Deterrence. Survival, Vol. 58, No.4 (2016), 7-
26, 19.) Dimitry Adamsky has argued that the current military strategy of Russia combines three elements. The 
first is the nuclear component, the second is the integration of non-nuclear, informational, and nuclear types 
of deterrence and compellence, and third is holistic informational (cyber) operation consisting of cognitive-
psychological and digital-technological aspects which merges military and non-military capabilities across nu-
clear, conventional, and sub-conventional domains. He names this ‘cross-domain coercion’ to distinguish it 
from the term ‘strategic deterrence’. (Adamsky 2015, 12.) 
1311 The approach has been based on what Russia is doing to others, not on what Russia is doing to information 
or cyberspace or to protect itself. This ‘active’ and ‘offensive’ approach obscures the Russian perception of 
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‘pidäke’ is a system consisting of a comprehensive set of ways and means meant for 
controlling the security situation gradually, preventively and proactively. The means 
of deterrence have no predetermined order in which they should be used which ena-
bles flexibility and surprise. Thus, the border between deterrence and the use of mil-
itary force has been purposefully faded.1312 Strategic deterrence has become a unique 
Russian concept, at least in the eyes of Western scholars. Some of this ‘hype’ is how-
ever based on forgetting that already the Soviets were highly interested in the preven-
tion of war.1313 
 
As was noted when analysing the 1990s discussion about the strategic deterrence, the 
idea had already started to move away from purely strategic nuclear deterrence to a 
wider concept which included multiple means and spaces. Nevertheless, strategic nu-
clear weapons and the theoretical and practical difference between intimidation (us-
trashenie) and deterrence (sderzhivanie) continued all through the 2000s and 2010s. 
The discussion was primarily related to the U.S.–Russia nuclear arms treaty negotia-
tions and the United States’ ballistic missile defence system. These discussions had a 
highly politized nature.1314 The problem for Russians was and would also be in the 
future the United States’ strategy which included non-nuclear long-range precision 
strike weapons and limited ballistic missile defences. Russia could not reduce its stra-
tegic nuclear weapons stockpile if the United States could securely perform a decapi-
tating non-nuclear strike from behind its missile defence which would degrade Rus-
sia’s ability to retaliate. Claims were made that Russia strived for a ‘strategic balance’ 
whereas the United States strived for superiority.1315 
 
The debate about the nuclear deterrence was renewed in the context of 2010 with the 
signing of the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) between the United 
States and Russia. As, the Deputy Director of the Institute of Political and Military 
Analysis Alexander Khramchikhin 1316 wrote in a (only) slightly ironic manner: “nu-
clear weapons are ‘our everything’. A means of deterrence, a factor of prestige, and 
the only real attribute today, which allows us to be considered a great power.”1317 As 
long as the Russian armed forces were in a state of decay, strategic nuclear weapons 
were the only means of deterrence but their usability was highly restricted and they 
                                              
‘deterrence’ as a constant struggle and competition – you are never safe because stability is only a theoretical 
concept. On this cf.  Renz, Bettina. Russia and ‘hybrid warfare’. Contemporary Politics, Vol.22, No.3 (2016), 
283-300; Fink, Anya Loukianova. The Evolving Russian Concept of Strategic Deterrence: Risks and Responses. 
Arms Control Today, Vol. 47, No. 6 (Jul/Aug 2017), 14-20. 
1312 Forsström 2019. 
1313 Donnelly 1988, 62-63; Scott & Scott 1988, 102-103; Gartoff 1990, 16-17.  
1314 Брезкун, Сергей. Полемика. Подкоп под стратегическую стабильность. ВПК, № 50 за 29 декабр я 
2004 года; Арбатов, Алексей. Ядерное сдерживание: реальности и химеры. Независимое военное обо-
зрение, № 17 (377) за 14 мая я 2004 года; Рогова, Сергей, Есин, Виктор, Золотарева, Павел. Эксперты 
предлагают комплекс мер доверия по стратегическим вооружениям. Независимое военное обозрение, 
№ 24 (384) за 02 июля 2004 года; Arbatov, Alexei, Dvorkin, Vladimir (Eds.) Missile Defense: Confrontation 
and Cooperation. Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2013. 
1315 Коробушин, Варфоломей. Метаморфозы стратегического сдерживания. Независимое военное обо-
зрение, № 14 (423) за 15 апреля я 2005 года; Бочаров, Игорь. Парадоксы ядерного сдерживания. Неза-
висимое военное обозрение, № 15 (424) за 222 июля я 2005 года. 
1316 The Institute of Political and Military Analysis was created in 1996. It is a non-governmental think thank 
specialised in geopolitical and ideological research and lobbying mainly related to domestic politics (Иванов 
2014). 
1317 Храмчихин, Александр. Иллюзия ядерного сдерживания. ВПК, № 11/2010. 
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were highly vulnerable to U.S. precision strike weapons.1318 Retired Major General 
Vladimir Dvorkin, who has taken part in drafting almost all the major nuclear arms 
control treaties,1319 argued in 2010 that strategic stability was based on strategic nuclear 
equilibrium, which in its turn was based on quantitative and qualitative indicators of 
the counterforce potential, the potential for retaliation, and the potential of deter-
rence. The point was that strategic stability was composed of different factors that all 
could destabilize the situation.1320 Although people like Dvorkin, Arbatov and others 
offered a more sophisticated approaches to nuclear deterrence, the quantitative mis-
siles-to-megatons analysis continued on the pages of Russian military journals.1321 The 
failure of strategic arms control talks after 2012, the perceived militarization of space, 
worsened Russia – West relations, and the fear of a massive long-range precision 
strike seems to have highlighted the importance of the strategic nuclear component 
of the strategic deterrence between 2015 and 2018.1322 
 
Although strategic nuclear weapons were originally seen as the backbone of Russian 
strategic deterrence, the substance of the idea changed. Makhmut Gareev is one of 
the main developers of a more comprehensive idea of deterrence. In 2005 he stated 
that: “In modern conditions, the concept of ‘strategic deterrence’ implies coordinated 
and purposeful implementation of all measures (intelligence, counterintelligence, in-
creased combat readiness of strategic and conventional forces if necessary, develop-
ment of armaments, preparation of TVDs, and training the population and many 
other measures) so that on the one hand, they reliably deter the threats with the min-
imum necessary defence sufficiency, and on the other, they do not provoke them.”1323 
Basically Gareev claimed that the defence security (oboronnaia bezopasnost’) had to 
be secured through diplomatic, economic, information and other non-military means. 
The deterrence had to be tailored to all possible military threats which for Gareev 
were still quite conventional.1324 Gareev was, of course, not the only one writing about 
strategic deterrence. For example, researchers from TsVSI GSh VS RF retired Colo-
nels A. L. Khriapin and V. A. Afanas’ev wrote in 2005 that “strategic deterrence is a 
complex of measures in the political, economic, military and other areas undertaken 
by the state unilaterally or on a coalition basis, and aimed at signalling to the opposing 
                                              
1318 Ibid. 
1319 Дворкин Владимир Зиновьевич. Военного энциклопедического словаря. М.: Воениздат 2007. 
[Online]. Available: http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/details_rvsn.htm?id=12996@morf-
Dictionary [Accessed: 1st April 2019]. 
1320 Дворкин, Владимир. СНВ на весах стратегической стабильности. Независимое военное обозрение, 
№ 14 за 16 апреля 2010 года 
1321 Бойцов, Маркелл. Калькулятор стратегического сдерживания. Независимое военное обозрение, № 
30 за 31 августа 2012 года. 
1322 Arbatov & Dvorkin, 2013; Тадтаев, Георгий. Трамп подписал указ о создании космического коман-
дования США, РБК, 18.12.2018 [Online]. Available: https://www.rbc.ru/politics/18/12/2018/ 
5c191a289a79473887d59637 [Accessed: 11th February 2019]; Рыбаченков, Владимир. Стабильность под 
прицелом. ВПК, № 38 (702) за 4 октября 2017 года; Валеев, Марат, Беломытцев, Александр. Сдержива-
ние неопределенностью. ВПК, № 26 (690) за 12 июля 2017 года; Послание Президента РФ Федераль-
ному Собранию от 01.03.2018 [Online]. Available: http://www.consultant.ru/document/consdoc_ LAW_ 
291976/ [Accessed: 27th March 2019]. 
1323 Гареев 2005a. 
1324 Ibid. 
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side the impossibility of achieving military-political goals by force because of the un-
acceptable consequences of retaliatory action.”1325 They argued that strategic deter-
rence was based on intimidation (ustrashenie), restraining or limiting (ogranichenie), 
and coercion (prinuzhdenie). Like Gareev, they too argued for tailored, multivariant 
and flexible responses but were primarily concerned about military threats.1326 
 
For Gareev the greatest threat for Russia was the losing of its great power status which 
could occur through covert and overt politico-diplomatic, economic, information etc. 
actions meant to interfere in its internal affairs.1327 Consequently, in 2008 Gareev pro-
posed a new concept of strategic deterrence, which he saw as an inherently asymmet-
ric response to the challenges Russia was facing.1328 It was “a complex of interrelated 
political, diplomatic, information, economic, military and other measures aimed at 
deterring, reducing, and preventing threats and aggressive actions by any state (or 
coalition of states) by means of responses that reduce the concerns of the opposite 
side or threaten it with unacceptable consequences for its actions.” It was based upon 
the defence power of the state derived from the economy and high-technology indus-
try, active politico-diplomatic and information policy, demonstration of military 
power, intelligence and counterintelligence, military cooperation, protection of air-
space and coastal areas with military force, preparation of infrastructure and TVDs, 
organization of territorial defence, cooperation between security agencies, and peace-
keeping and antiterrorist activities.1329 Gareev’s definition was a clear departure from 
the traditional nuclear weapons-based definitions.  
 
Around the same time as Gareev proposed his idea, V. V. Serebriannikov analysed 
the difference between the Russian terms of prevention of war (predotvrachshenie 
voiny) and military-political deterrence (voenno-politicheskoe sderzhivanie). He 
claimed that deterrence was part of the inhibition of war distinguished by its counter-
threat to use military force against a potential threat, whereas prevention aimed at 
neutralizing the threat before it even become potential or real mainly through non-
military means. Serebriannikov claimed that “the prevention of war is a policy of con-
structing such a common and especially military-political situation (internal and ex-
ternal) which reduces and eliminates military threats, makes the collapse of military 
aggression unavoidable, establishes the personal legal and moral responsibility of the 
inspirers and organizers of aggression, and sets up the rejection of war.”1330 In 2009 
Colonel V. N. Gorbunov from TsVSI GS and S.A. Bogdanov from TsVSI GSh VS 
RF offered a more operational and traditional view on strategic deterrence, which 
stated that a combination of all possible military means including strategic deployment 
(strategicheskoe razvertyvanoe) must be initiated already during the period of threat 
so as to deny aerospace and information superiority of the enemy in the initial period 
                                              
1325 Хряпин, А. Л., Афанасьев, В. А. Слово юбилярам. Концептуальные основы стратегического сдер-
живания. Военная мысль, № 1 2005, 8-12. 
1326 Ibid. 
1327 Гареев, М.А. Структура и основное содержание новой военной доктрины. ВПК, № 3 (169) за 24 
января 2007 года; Гареев, М.А. Национальные интересы и национальная безопасность россии на совре-
менном этапе. Вестник Академии военных наук, №1 (22) 2008, 8-22. 
1328 Гареев, М.А. Стратегическое сдерживание: проблемы и решения. Красная звезда, № 183, 8.10.2008; 
Гареев, М. А. Проблемы стратегического сдерживания в современных условиях. Военная мысль, № 4 
2009, 2-9. 
1329 Ibid. 
1330 Серебрянников 2008. 
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of war and deter its attack. However, deterrence should be as minimal as possible so 
as not provoke potential opponents.1331 It should have deterred the war of ‘a new 
generation’ (novoe pokolenie) which consisted of kinetic, electronic, technological 
and psychological means which would be used at a high tempo and in coordination 
to destroy the opponent’s capability to command its forces, to demoralize its people, 
and to disrupt its military-industrial complex.1332  
 
Although Gareev’s formulation seems to have gained wide support, some wanted to 
reserve the concept of strategic deterrence for the strategic nuclear forces. Accord-
ingly, in 2010, V. V. Matvichuk and A. L. Khriapin from TsVSI argued that strategic 
deterrence was based on the state’s ability to mobilize its conventional and nuclear 
forces to inflict incommensurable damages to the threating state.1333 They changed 
their views in 2015  to conform to Gareev’s and divided forces of strategic deterrence 
into offensive and defensive, nuclear and non-nuclear, global and regional forces and 
measures into military and non-military measures. However, the primacy of the stra-
tegic nuclear deterrence was still paramount.1334 Others wanted to make the concept 
of strategic deterrence even wider by including even more spheres of threats and 
counteraction.1335 
 
Unsurprisingly the concept of an information confrontation affected the concept of 
strategic deterrence. If information weapons had strategic effects, as was argued by 
many Russian (and Western) information theorists, then they had to be considered 
when discussing strategic deterrence. The team of Russian military cyber diplomats I. 
N. Dylevskii, S. A. Komov, S. A. Korotkov, S. V. Rodionov and A. A. Fedorov argued 
in a 2006 article that ‘the leading countries’ of the world had decided that the infor-
mation space was a sphere of military action and, accordingly, it had become the ob-
ject of a contest over superiority. The writers claimed that the ‘weapons of mass ef-
fect’ defined in the U.S. National Military Strategy of 20041336 were aimed at influenc-
ing populations across the globe through the ‘unified global electronic information 
space’. They also argued that ‘a group of states’ impeded the creation of norms re-
stricting the use of these weapons to support their hegemonic aspirations. This led to 
the conclusion that one of the main tasks of the military policy of Russia in the field 
of ensuring international information security was the deterrence (sderzhivanie) of 
                                              
1331 Горбунов & Богданов 2009. 
1332 Горбунов & Богданов 2009; Горбунов, В. Н., Богданов, С. А. Военно-стратегическое противобор-
ство: формы и способы воздействия на экономический потенциал противника. Военная Мысль, № 12 
2007, 50-59. 
1333 Матвичук, В. В., Хряпин, А. Л. Система стратегического сдерживания в новых условиях. Военная 
мысль, № 1/2010, 11-16. 
1334 Хряпин, А. Л., Калинкин, Д. А., Матвичук, В. В. Стратегическое сдерживание в условиях создания 
США глобальной системы ПРО и средств глобального удара. Военная мысль, № 1 2015, 18-22. 
1335 Чекинов, С. Г., Богданов, С. А. Стратегическое сдерживание и национальная безопасность России 
на современном этапе. Военная мысль, № 3 2012, 11-20. 
1336 The definition was based on “chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced high explosive weap-
ons as well as other, more asymmetrical weapons.” It can be argued that the Russian writers either misunder-
stood this definition or purposefully added their own interpretation. (The National Military Strategy of the 
United States of America. A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow, 2004 [Online]. Available: 
https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/docs/NMS2004.pdf [Accessed: 27th February 2019]). 
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foreign countries from the possible use of means and methods of waging an “infor-
mation war” against Russia.1337 
 
Throughout the 2000s and 2010s the somewhat same group of authors argued for a 
similar international cooperation and regulation concerning information weapons as 
had been developed around weapons of mass destruction.1338 In 2017 cyber diplomats 
argued that information weapons affected the strategic stability, and that the General 
Staff viewed cybersecurity (kiberbezopasnost’) as a part of information security. 
Moreover, the ‘cyber deterrence’ doctrine adopted by the United States was a threat 
to Russia. In this context strategic deterrence would include ensuring the resilience 
(ustoichivost’) of strategic nuclear forces and the decision-making related to them 
from information effects, deterring aggressive information measures, and denying the 
use of the Internet and mass media to affect the internal affairs of states.1339 It should 
be noted that at least Andrei Kokoshin shared the Western view on deterrence which 
emphasised the ‘politico-psychological’ impact on the opponent, that is convincing 
through demonstration or signalling.1340 
 
Two interconnected issues are related to the development of the idea of the strategic 
deterrence: strategic planning and territorial defence. The basics of strategic planning 
have been discussed above.  The idea of strategic deterrence, in the form Gareev has 
formulated it, is central to the development of strategic planning. According to 
Gareev, in 1991 the Soviet Union (or Russia) did not have a plan for the time preced-
ing war that would link the activities of various government organs to defend the 
country.1341 In 2012 the deficiency was noticed by the leaders of the country and a 
plan was ordered to be drafted. Gareev argued that this plan would ensure the coor-
dination of the strategic actions of the Armed forces with other law enforcement 
agencies, the mobilization plan, and a plan for converting the national economy to a 
state of war. It would include political-diplomatic, economic, information, technolog-
ical, and psychological measures.1342 Gareev repeated these arguments up until 
2019.1343 Strategic planning is, thus, partly a tool of strategic deterrence. 
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Territorial defence has had an important role in the whole-of-government approach 
manifested in strategic planning. In the Law on Defence, territorial defence is defined 
as system of measures for the protection of critical infrastructure, civil society, and 
the operations of armed forces.1344 The concept is well established in Russian official 
documents and law, although it went through a process of clarification in 2017.1345 It 
is basically a process or a function which is implemented when a state of war is de-
clared on a territory of the Russian federation. A headquarters of territorial defence is 
formed as an intergovernmental organ of cooperation. This ensures the upholding of 
military laws, and the coordination of mobilization, civil defence, and antiterrorism 
activities. It commands the forces specifically designated for territorial defence and 
represents federal power on the territory.1346 It creates ‘the platform’ upon which the 
strategic commands operate their forces on Russian territory. The idea of territorial 
defence is based on the threat of large-scale conventional war and also on the ‘colour 
revolutions’ discussed above—it enables a defence in total depth of the nation and 
society.1347 Territorial defence is connected to the reorganization of the Armed Forces 
in 2010 into combined military districts and joint (operational) strategic commands 
(JSCs) and the creation of the National Guard in 2016.1348 Although territorial defence 
might not be a strategic cultural idea in itself, it highlights the importance of geogra-
phy and defensive depth in the Russian military thinking. 
 
The concept of strategic deterrence appeared in the 2004 Ivanov Doctrine as one of 
the tasks of the Russian armed forces to guarantee the protection of sovereignty, ter-
ritorial integrity and other vital national interests of Russia and its allies. It referred to 
strategic deterrence forces and capabilities which were defined as the ability of strate-
gic nuclear forces to inflict retaliatory damage. It also introduces the concept of de-
escalation as “forcing the enemy to halt military action by a threat to deliver or by 
actual delivery of strikes of varying intensity with reliance on conventional and (or) 
nuclear weapons.”1349 The Foreign Policy Concept of 2008 did not mention deterrence 
in relation to Russian activities.1350 The NSS of 2009 defined strategic deterrence under 
national defence as “the development and systemic implementation of a complex of 
interrelated political, diplomatic, military, economic, information and other measures 
aimed at anticipation or reduction of the threat of destructive actions.”1351 The Military 
Doctrine of 2010 did not define strategic deterrence but mentioned it in relation to 
the use of nuclear weapons to deter threats.1352 The Foreign Policy Concept of 2013 
                                              
1344 Федеральный закон от 31.05.1996 N 61-ФЗ (ред. от 3.8.2018) “Об обороне” [Online]. Available: 
http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_10591/ [Accessed: 29th March 2019]; 
‘Территориальная оборона’. Военного энциклопедического словаря. М.: Воениздат, 2007. http://ency-
clopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/details.htm?id=10959@morfDictionary. 
1345 Кардаш, И. Л. О совершенствовании системы территориальной обороны. Военная мысль, № 2 2014, 
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1348 Cooper 2016, 19-20; Bartles 2011; Grau & Bartles 2018b; Цыганок, Анатолий. Меняется время - меня-
ется и военная доктрина. ВПК, № 43 (209) за 7 ноября 2007 года; Кардаш 2018. 
1349 The Defence Ministry of the Russian Federation 2004. 
1350 Концепция 2008. 
1351 Указ Президента Российской Федерации 2009b. 
1352 Указ Президента Российской Федерации 2010. 
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mentioned only nuclear deterrence and even that only once.1353 The 2014 Military 
Doctrine is a bit confused with its use of terms and mentions nuclear and non-nuclear 
strategic deterrence. The system of non-nuclear deterrence is defined as “a complex 
of foreign policy, military and military-technical measures aimed at preventing aggres-
sion against the Russian Federation by non-nuclear means.”1354 The NSS of 2015 
states that strategic deterrence is part of military policy of the state. It juxtaposes stra-
tegic deterrence and prevention of conflicts which seems to indicate they are two 
different things. Nevertheless, the strategy relates strategic deterrence to interrelated 
political, military, military-technical, diplomatic, economic, informational and other 
measures. The military means are based on strategic nuclear deterrence and on con-
ventional military forces which are held in sufficient readiness.1355 The Foreign Policy 
Concept of 2016 does not use deterrence in the context of Russian actions.1356 The 
2016 Information Security Doctrine states that to ensure information security in the 
field of defence the military policy of the Russian federation consists of strategic de-
terrence and the prevention of conflicts arising from the use of information technol-
ogies.1357 
 
To summarize. The modern Russian deterrence theory is characterized by the ac-
ceptance of the Western theories as the basis of Russian theorizing. There is, however, 
a tension between the ‘American’ and ‘Russian/Soviet’ types of deterrence, where 
Western deterrence is seen as intimidation and containment and Russian as prevent-
ing and deterring. Gareev has been the main proponent of a strategic deterrence un-
derstood as a continuum of creating defensive power, preventing threats from mate-
rializing, and deterrence through denial and retaliation. This version of strategic de-
terrence involves all state actors as it is based on the participation of strategic intelli-
gence assets, the military-industrial complex, civilian administration of territorial de-
fence, mobilization organization and other semi-civilian organizations. The inclusive 
concept of deterrence spanning all environments requires a systemic approach, and 
perhaps, as some have argued, a new organization to control the multiple security 
systems. It is also directed against a full-spectrum of threats, including information 
threats. There is some divergence on the role of information. Some consider it as a 
threat, some as a sphere or means of strategic deterrence, and some as both.  
 
The current Russian idea of strategic deterrence has two sides which have been in 
slight competition with one another. The first and traditional version is connected to 
the strategic nuclear weapons while the newer one is based on a much wider under-
standing of the tools and domains of deterrence. The understanding that strategic 
deterrence is a continuum of strategy from peacetime to wartime to neutralize threats, 
prevent wars and deny objectives using all possible means of statecraft seems to be 
quite established. Nevertheless, quite often the term of strategic deterrence is reserved 
for the strategic nuclear forces, and the prevention of conflict is disconnected from 
deterrence. Arguably, the broadening of the concept might have led to some doctrinal, 
organizational and resourcing choices which might have caused contention between 
government organs and the armed forces.  
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Strategic deterrence is inherently connected to strategic stability and the great power 
struggle. It cannot be understood outside the ideas about the correlation of forces 
and the constant analysing and forecasting of the balance of power between Russia 
and the United States (and perhaps also China). Strategic deterrence as a concept has 
evolved in the 2000s and 2010s to one of the central pillars of Russian military policy. 
Although its official definition has remained a bit vague, it has materialized in the law 
and process of strategic planning in 2013-2014. This process incorporates Gareev’s 
and others’ ideas of the broader understanding of deterrence—most importantly the 
idea that wars can be prevented by shaping the Russian security environment through 
multiple, non-violent means. Most recent definitions include information and cyber-
space and their critical systems in the sphere of strategic deterrence. The importance 
of the ideas of strategic deterrence, strategic planning, and territorial defence stems 
from the way they arrange current and future military threats, the territorially bound 
view on security, and the whole-of-state responses on a continuum of interstate strug-
gle. This forms a framework for understanding the thinking of the Russian elites on 
military security. 
 
5.4 Asymmetric response 
 
The Russian idea of asymmetric actions and responses has lately been an object of 
interest for Western analysts.1358 Admittedly, the occupation of Crimea in 2014 by 
Russia and recent Syrian operations have made Western analysts interested in the 
Russian military thought about indirect action and asymmetry, and, consequently, 
something that has been part of traditional Russian thought has been ‘rediscov-
ered.’1359 Some have disputed this interpretations and offered their own views.1360 
More critical assessments have noted that the Russians have sometimes got them-
selves caught in their own ‘asymmetric dreams’.1361 Many have forgotten that just 15 
years ago the whole concept of asymmetry was under heavy criticism by the Western 
analysts themselves.1362 
 
The discussion on asymmetric responses has continued under President Putin from 
where it had been left under Yeltsin’s reign. In 2000, the Director of the Centre for 
International and Strategic Studies of the Russian-Armenian University Professor Va-
lerii Belous defined asymmetric responses, when discussing the Soviet Union’s 1980s 
policy against American BMD, as creating better offensive strategic nuclear weapons 
against defensive systems.1363 When speaking in a military-scientific conference of the 
                                              
1358 Kipp 2014; Thomas, Timothy. Russia’s Military Strategy and Ukraine: Indirect, Asymmetric—and Putin-
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Academy of Military Sciences in 2003, General-Lieutenant V. A. Sapozhinskii argued 
that Russian Armed forces were lagging behind the developed West and they must 
find forces, means, forms and methods to counter the asymmetric actions of the en-
emy.1364 Other speakers in the conference mentioned asymmetry only as a new but 
useless name for old wars and types of warfare.1365 By 2006 the Russian military ana-
lysts had noticed the Western interest in asymmetric wars and associated these wars 
with the tsarist era Colonel Evgenii Messner’s concept of insurrection or mutiny wars 
(miatezhvoina). Messner’s concept was a collection of different tactics: terror, gang-
sterism, rebellions, riots and even demonstrations and manifestations aiming at revo-
lution.1366 Nevertheless, for Russian commentators the war in Chechnya was not in-
terpreted as ‘an asymmetric war’ or even related to the concept.1367 
 
Asymmetry was debated in the context of military reform during the first two terms 
of Vladimir Putin. The Chief of the General Staff Army General Iurii Baluevskii in 
2006 declared that Russia will “reject the principle of symmetry” or numerical parity 
and build its armed forces based on ‘asymmetry’. Because the General did not offer 
any facts or substance to support his argument the reception of his declaration was 
somewhat critical.1368 One commentator ironically pointed out that the whole concept 
rested on the idea that Russia could create miracle weapons based on identifying the 
vulnerabilities of the weapons of potential adversaries, creating asymmetric and sym-
metric weapons through advanced technology, and successfully forecasting the future 
development of weapons. At the same time, it should avoid direct force-on-force 
confrontation.1369 G. Ter-Arutiuniants claimed in 2007 that a new Cold War, which 
was fought between powers rising from under the weakening Unites States, was by 
its nature asymmetric. It was a war between civilizations fought with using soft power, 
terrorism, energy, and nuclear blackmail by weaker states.1370 
 
Although the idea of asymmetric responses had not been forgotten in the early 2000s, 
it was reawakened around 2006–2008 as Vladimir Putin used the concept in his 2006 
Annual Statement to the Federal Assembly.1371 He was perhaps influenced by Andrei 
Kokoshin, who was an influential academician and politician at that time. In the con-
text of the negotiations on the reductions of strategic nuclear weapons and missile 
defence, Kokoshin claimed that the strategy of asymmetric response of the Soviet 
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Union had worked as the United States eventually froze the development of the SDI. 
According to Kokoshin, the strategy of asymmetric response was based on the idea 
that the SDI, however complete and efficient, could be bypassed with new weapons 
and by disrupting the SDI itself, and that the Soviet strategic weapons could be made 
more secure from a surprise first-strike. Furthermore, Kokoshin argued that parallel 
to technological solutions, a psychological campaign was launched to turn the Amer-
ican elite against the SDI. Kokoshin has compared the strategy of asymmetric re-
sponse to Sun Tzu’s principle of not doing what the enemy wants or what the enemy 
does but acting in a way that increases one’s own strengths and minimizes the possi-
bilities of the enemy. This principle, he claims, is also found in the works of A. A. 
Svechin.1372 Kokoshin’s proposals and views on asymmetry were criticized for being 
simplistic and being based on a model that had already failed once.1373 Furthermore, 
his writings were meant to influence current events which apparently worked. For 
instance, in 2007 when President Vladimir Putin stated that “our response will be 
asymmetrical, although highly effective” when discussing the United States’ missile 
defence he was explicitly quoting Mikhail Gorbachev from 1986.1374 
 
The idea of asymmetric responses eventually reached the Academy of Military Sci-
ences. Gareev had written about an indirect strategy already in 1995 but in 2009 he 
argued that “With the relative weakness of our economic potential, the main emphasis 
should be placed on creating asymmetric means and methods of response.”1375 Later, 
Gareev, for example, promoted the exploitation of weaknesses in C3 systems.1376 He 
also connected asymmetric actions to international confrontations and to the so called 
colour revolutions.1377 These thoughts led Gareev to conclude that “The Soviet Union 
had nuclear weapons, these weapons remained, but the Soviet Union did not. There-
fore, due attention must be paid to the development of general-purpose forces, in-
cluding the land forces, air force and navy, and to place the main emphasis on asym-
metric means and ways to neutralize the technological superiority of the enemy.”1378 
Gareev’s views were echoed by Gerasimov who argued that Russia should not just 
copy and catch up but to work “ahead of the curve” and be in a leading position 
itself.1379 In 2015 Gareev argued that to counter the aggression of opponents with 
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overwhelming technological superiority and non-contact weapons, Russia had to ei-
ther develop new weapons or to develop ‘operational strategic actions’ that would 
neutralize the advantage of the enemy.1380 
 
The idea of an asymmetric response also reached information warfare theorists. Ras-
torguev, for example, argued that against the efforts to restrict Russia’s geopolitical 
status, Russia’s response should be asymmetric which meant the dismantling of the 
mechanism of self-destruction.1381 This statement must be understood in the context 
of Rastorguev’s theory of self-destructive systems. An asymmetric response is then 
an act to remove possible weaknesses in the algorithms of the systems.1382 Others like 
Manoilo et al. argued that information was inherently an asymmetric object as it was 
always changing, and its change reshaped the environment.1383 
 
Historical studies produced somewhat anachronistic historical interpretations which 
included the cruise missiles developed during the Soviet times and the Soviet Navy’s 
blue water fleet programme in the 1970s as asymmetric responses.1384 On a more dip-
lomatic level, Russia’s moratorium of CFE was offered as an asymmetric response.1385 
Russia’s permanent representative to NATO Aleksandr Grushko stated in 2016 that 
Russia would “prepare an asymmetric response” to the increased NATO forces near 
its borders which would be maximally effective but not extremely costly.1386  In this 
context, S. A. Syachev had already proposed in 2009 that in the case an enemy man-
aged to disable Russian strategic forces with a surprise attack, the rapid mobilization 
of Russian irregular forces against the attacker’s land forces could be considered an 
asymmetric action.1387 Conversely, strategic nuclear weapons and ballistic missile de-
fences have been a constant source of different interpretations of an asymmetric re-
sponse.1388 For example, Alexei Arbatov has associated asymmetry with the idea that 
the defence against strategic nuclear weapons must be perfect, while offence must 
succeed to inflict intolerable damage only once .1389 Asymmetry was also implied when 
Major General S. V. Kuralenko from the Military Academy of the General Staff 
pointed out that as warfare had expanded include the air and space, the information 
systems of air defence, missile defence, and electronic warfare had become decisive. 
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He indirectly offered these systems as asymmetric responses of Russia to a techno-
logically superior opponent.1390 
 
The idea that electronic warfare could be considered an asymmetric response surfaced 
from time to time in the Russian debate during the 2000s and 2010s. The importance 
of EW was at least partly emphasised because of the influence of the American high-
tech doctrine and military campaigns—although the Soviet tradition of EW also had 
an influence.1391 For example, General-Major L. N. Il’in, and retired Colonels P. A. 
Dul’nev and V. T. Kobalev have proposed anti-NCW warfare as an asymmetric re-
sponse to the American technological superiority. It would consist of weapons that 
can disrupt the command, control and communication systems behind NCW.1392 In a 
similar manner I. I. Korolev, V. N. Pavlov and A. V. Ganin, who are representatives 
of the EW troops, have proposed an ‘electromagnetic blockade’ as an asymmetric 
response to NCW.1393 Electronic warfare combined with aerospace defences has also 
been proposed as an asymmetric response to the so-called sixth generation of Western 
warfare.1394 In contrast to the view that EW is an asymmetric response to NCW, I.N. 
Vorob’ev and V. A. Kiselev have argued that one of the principles of NCW (in this 
case understood as a doctrine of command and control) is asymmetry. This sets NCW 
apart from conventional modern tactics where the guiding principle is ‘combat activ-
ity’ or retaining the initiative.1395  
 
The discussion on indirect actions, which had already began in the 1990s, had a direct 
relationship with the military’s understanding of asymmetry. Retired Major General I. 
N. Vorob’ev and Colonel V. A. Kisilev, both academicians of the Military Education-
Training and Research Centre of the Ground Forces (VUNTs SV “OVA VS RF”)1396, 
wrote in 2006 that because of technological changes, an indirect (nepriamyi) strategy 
has surpassed the direct strategy of destruction based on material superiority. Modern 
indirect strategy is based on a large variety of forms and methods and it has manifested 
as the use of deception (obman), stratagems (khitrost’), and intimidation (ustrashenie) 
to destroy the enemy without the use of weapons through information superiority. 
Thus, information-psychological weapons have strategic effects and EW has become 
an inherent part of all operations.1397 
 
                                              
1390 Кураленко, С. В. Тенденции изменения характера вооруженной борьбы в военных конфликтах пер-
вой половины XXI века. Военная Мысль, № 11 2012, 40-46. 
1391 Горбачев, Юрий. РЭБ в операциях XX и XXI века. ВПК, № 44 (61) за 17 ноября 2004 года. 
1392 Дульнев, П. А., Ковалев, В. Т., Ильин, Л. Н. Асимметричное противодействие в сетецентрической 
войне. Военная Мысль, № 10 2011, 3-8. 
1393 Королев, И. И., Павлов, В. Н., Ганин, А. В. Радиоэлектронно-информационная блокада - перспек-
тивный способ применения разнородных сил и средств РЭБ. Военная Мысль, № 4 2013, 16-23. 
1394 Лузан, Александр. Воздушно-космическое нападение. В войнах нового поколения резко возрастает 
роль высокоточного оружия и средств борьбы с ним. Независимое Военное Обозрение, № 10 (846) 
20.3.2015. 
1395 Воробьев, И. Н., Киселев, В. А. От современной тактики к тактике сетецентрических действий. 
Военная Мысль, № 8 2011, 19-27. 
1396 Part of the Combined Arms Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation after 2009 (Obchs-
hevoiskovaia akademiia Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiiskoi). The Academy trains officers for the Ground Forces 
and conducts defence research on various subjects. (ВУНЦ СВ «ОВА ВС РФ» [Online]. Available: 
http://ova.mil.ru/ [Accessed: 29th March 2019]. 
1397 Воробьев, И. Н., Киселев, В. А. Стратегия непрямых действий в новом облике. Военная мысль, № 9 
2006, 2-10; Воробьев, И. Н., Киселев, В. А. Военная наука на современном этапе. Военная мысль, № 7 
2008, 26-31. 
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Indirect methods also fascinated the Chief of the Centre for Military Strategic Studies 
of the General Staff (TsVSI GS) Colonel S. G. Chekinov, and S. A, Bogdanov who 
wrote in the 2010s that military science had to include indirect and non-military 
measures in its corpus as interstate confrontation (mezhgosudarstvennoe protivo-
borstvo) now included them.1398 Chekinov and Bogdanov seemed to discard the nec-
essary requirement of ‘weak against strong.’ An asymmetric strategic approach to 
them was based on non-identical capabilities that enabled the avoidance of direct con-
frontation and enabled the potential opponent’s vulnerabilities to be threatened.1399 
For them indirect measures were inherently associated with asymmetry, military cun-
ning and surprise. The concept also included maskirovka and stratagems.1400 Further-
more, in 2017 Chekinov and Bogdanov elaborated their views on the role and sub-
stance of modern military strategies and claimed that all strategy was asymmetric—a 
claim that has been made by the Western theorists also, although, as a criticism toward 
the whole concept of asymmetry.1401 The scholars argued that Russia must therefore 
develop its own asymmetric response which should consist of demonstrations, read-
iness, deterrence, denial and the ability to inflict unacceptable damage to the military 
and non-military assets of the enemy.1402  
 
Perhaps a bit more critical and social-scientific definition of asymmetry has been of-
fered by E. A. Stepanova from the Primakov National Research Institute of World 
Economy and International Relations.1403 She has redefined asymmetric war or actions 
as an asymmetric confrontation (asimmetricheskaia konfrontatsiia) where asymmetry 
relies on the dialectical relationship of the adversaries instead of one-sided capabili-
ties.1404 A similar dialectical view was shared by retired Colonel and Professor Iu. V. 
Krinitskii who has argued that the concepts of asymmetry, superiority in power, and 
correlation of forces are intertwined. He has claimed that although asymmetry could 
be achieved through actions on operational-tactical level, on a strategic level it was 
based on economy and technology and thus it was never cheap. Additionally, asym-
metry was never a stable state because an advantage in technology is only tempo-
rary.1405  This temporary nature of asymmetry resonated with Colonel General M. M. 
                                              
1398 Чекинов, С. Г., Богданов, С. А. Влияние непрямых действий на характер современной войны. Воен-
ная мысль, № 1 2011, 3-13, 13; Чекинов & Богданов 2015b; Чекинов & Богданов 2017. 
1399 Чекинов, С.Г., Богданов, С.А. Влияние асимметричных действий на современную военную безопас-
ность России. Вестник Академии военных наук, № 1 (30) 2010, 46-53. 
1400 Чекинов, С. Г., Богданов, С. А. Военное искусство на начальном этапе XXI столетия: проблемы и 
суждения. Военная мысль, № 1 2015, 32-43. 
1401 Чекинов, С. Г., Богданов, С. А. Военная стратегия: взгляд в будущее. Военная Мысль, № 11 2016, 3-
15, 7; Чекинов & Богданов 2017; Milevski, Lucas. Asymmetry is Strategy, Strategy is Asymmetry. JFQ, Vol. 
75, No. 4 (2014), 77-83. 
1402 Чекинов, С. Г., Богданов, С. А. Асимметричные действия по обеспечению военной безопасности 
России. Военная Мысль, № 3 2010, 13-22. 
1403 The Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) is a 
federal public institution created in 1956 and functions under RAN. It is a research institution which concen-
trates on international relations and the world economy and has multiple divisions and a staff of over 500 
persons. (Иванов 2014). 
1404 Степанова, Е. А. Асимметричный конфликт как силовая, статусная, идеологическая и структурная 
асимметрия. Военная Мысль, № 5 2010, 47-54. 
1405 Криницкий, Ю. В. Асимметричные средства и способы ведения войны. Военная Мысль, № 11 2010, 
25-30. 
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Kucheriavyi, the Vice-Governor of St. Petersburg, who defined information asym-
metry as a selective, limited response to the aggressive information effects of the en-
emy with no need to maintain quantitative parity with the opponent.1406 
 
By 2015 the General Staff was ready to offer an official definition of asymmetric ac-
tions. General-Lieutenant A. V. Kartapalov argued that ‘asymmetric actions’ would 
be used in ‘a new type’ of future wars to level the technological superiority of the 
enemy. They would be used by weaker adversaries who had limited resources. These 
actions could be economic, diplomatic, information as well as non-direct and direct 
military actions aimed at the vulnerabilities of the opponent for maximum effect at 
the minimum cost to one’s own forces and resources. There were no universal asym-
metric actions as conflicts differed and opponents adapted to them. Their effective-
ness depended on the completeness and timeliness of their implementation which 
should be achieved through coordination of multi-departmental forces throughout 
the state organizations. 1407 What Kartapalov was describing was a whole-of-govern-
ment, state-based approach to asymmetry as a tactical action in peace and wartime, 
and as such it diverges from the ‘asymmetric response’ idea of Kokoshin. It is a more 
traditional definition of asymmetry than some Russian writers have proposed as it 
concentrates on the means of the weaker side. 
 
Kartapalov’s definition did not end the debate. In 2017 A. V. Kiselev claimed that the 
principles of asymmetric actions include secrecy, the search and identification of 
weaknesses, the concentration of efforts against the most vulnerable points of the 
adversary, in addition to the imposition of the desired course of the conflict and will 
on the adversary. The following of these principles should result in low costs com-
pared to the enemy and superiority or, at least, equality in an armed confrontation.1408 
In 2017 Aleksandr Bartosh managed to combine strategic deterrence, hybrid war and 
a Russian asymmetric response in a concept that included all the hyped-up terms but 
did not manage to offer anything beyond a show of loyalty for the official rearmament 
programme.1409 Perhaps the latest addition to the Russian debate on asymmetry has 
been V. V. Selivanov’s and Iu. D. Il’in’s article where they proposed a methodology 
to find an asymmetric response to high-technology opponents.1410 The idea was to 
avoid a symmetric, costly response which would lead to an arms race and the exhaus-
tion of the economy of the weaker side. Selivanov’s and Il’in’s model was based on 
comparing the time-cost-effectiveness values of competing systems.1411 This ‘levelling’ 
(nivelirovanie) of the military-technological superiority of the enemy by locating and 
                                              
1406 Кучерявый, Михаил Михайлович. Информационное измерение политики национальной безопас-
ности России в условиях современного глобального мира. Диссертация на соискание ученой степени 
доктора политических наук по специальности. Санкт-Петербург, 2014, 266. 
1407 Картаполов 2015. 
1408 Киселев, В. А. К каким войнам необходимо готовить Вооруженные Силы России. Военная Мысль, 
№ 3 2017, 37-46. 
1409 Бартош, Александр. Трудно обеспечить безопасность Евразии в условиях "новой холодной войны" 
Независимое Военное Обозрение, № 30 (961) 18.8.2017. 
1410 Селиванов, В. В., Ильин, Ю. Д. Методические основы формирования асимметричных ответов в 
военно-техническом противоборстве с высокотехнологичным противником. Военная Мысль, № 9 
2019, 33-41. 
1411 Ibid.  
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striking against its critical strategic objects using creative ways and means is also pro-
moted others.1412 
 
The concept of asymmetric response was accepted by many commentators by 2017 
as an official Russian strategy against the United States and its allies.1413 However, 
none of the official national security and strategic planning documents use the term 
asymmetric. It can always be argued that with an asymmetric response, even if it had 
a certain cultural resonance with the positive aspects of Russian traditions like strata-
gems, creativity and cunning, it was not politically wise to admit that Russia was a 
weaker side in any geopolitical struggle. After the United States and the European 
Union imposed sanctions on Russia due to the annexation of Crimea, the asymmetric 
response became an economic issue. Russian Prime Minister Dmitrii Medvedev, for 
example, stated that economic sanctions are always political and thus asymmetric.1414 
The economic aspect highlights the issue that there is, as was in the case of strategic 
deterrence, a noticeable under-current of institutional fighting over resources behind 
the different formulations of an asymmetric response. 
 
To summarize. The Russian texts analysed here contain multiple meanings of asym-
metry and asymmetric response which shows that the Russians have been interested 
in the idea. Asymmetric response can be described as overcoming an adversary’s of-
fensive and defensive systems while at the same time protecting one’s own systems. 
It can be a cost-effective solution and/or an innovative technological breakthrough 
in the spirit of dialectical weapon–counter-weapon progress. For politicians it might 
be an economic solution or a new direction in politics such as emphasising regional 
cooperation. For military scholars it has often meant ways to neutralize an adversary’s 
superiority through technology or creative, innovative action. The substance of this 
response has depended on the affiliation of the writer as different services, forces and 
troops have been offered as the asymmetric response. Some of the most vocal pro-
ponents have been those claiming that electronic warfare measures and denying the 
electromagnetic spectrum from the advanced opponent, i.e. the United States would 
counter the advantages of the NCW. By 2017-2018 the Russian Armed Forces seem 
to have adopted asymmetry, i.e. exploiting the weaknesses of the opponent, as a part 
of its official doctrine. Information has had a role in almost all of the definitions of 
asymmetry proposed in the timeframe of 2000-2018. Clearly, it has been considered 
as something new or having a disruptive quality, which has made it a variable that 
could affect the correlation of forces and, thus, everything from the battlefield to the 
strategic balance. This asymmetric quality of information is applied to both techno-
logical and psychological aspects of information. 
 
                                              
1412 Фадеев, А. С., Ничипор, В. И. Военные конфликты современности, перспективы развития способов 
их ведения. Прямые и непрямые действия в вооруженных конфликтах XXI века. Военная Мысль, № 2 
2019, 5-14, 7 
1413 Иванько, Анатолий. Эшелонированная брешь Мысль всегда будет эффективнее самого высокоточ-
ного боеприпаса. ВПК, № 12 (627) за 30 марта 2016 года; Казеннов, Сергей, Кумачев, Владимир. Хочешь 
мира - готовься... к чему? Независимое Военное Обозрение, № 19 29.5.2015; Казеннов, Сергей, Кумачев, 
Владимир. Ах, если б вам служить на суше... Независимое Военное Обозрение, № 28 7.8.2015;   Ивашов, 
Леонид. Удар Валдая. Выступление президента России на собрании дискуссионного клуба в Сочи стало 
главной мировой новостью. ВПК, № 41 (705) за 25 октября 2017 года. 
1414 Лысова, Татьяна, Стеркин, Филипп, Харатьян, Кирилл. “Есть вещи пострашнее ограничения поста-
вок”. Ведомости, 8.9.2014 [Online]. Available: https://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/articles/2014/09/08/ 
est-veschi-postrashnee-ogranicheniya-postavok-dmitrij#ixzz3Ci26r445 [Accessed: 14th February 2019]. 
 
201 
An asymmetric response is a prime example of a strategic cultural idea which is carried 
by epistemic communities and which resurfaces from time to time when the state’s 
external environment calls for it. It is also a good example of how these ideas are 
made to ‘fit’ the current needs and environment. The asymmetric response is what-
ever any individual scholar or lobbyist wants it to be. It holds legitimizing power and 
as such is contested between different groups—the strategic nuclear weapon and EW 
professionals serve as an example. It is also offered as a ‘deus-ex machina’ to rebalance 
the great power relationship. It is usually a cost-effective but technologically innova-
tive solution offering to replace quantitate with qualitative power. As such, its roots 
are in the Cold War era correlation of force calculations and in the never ending strive 
towards strategic parity. However, asymmetric response and asymmetric action 
should be separated—they are two interconnected but different ideas. The first oper-
ates on the political and strategic level while the other is a more tactical and opera-
tional concept more tied to the character of war (the borders of which with peace 
have faded) than strategic stability. Nevertheless, both versions should be understood 
in the context of ‘protivoborstvo’, i.e. the continuous struggle to find advantages in 
the zero-sum game which is international politics. Whereas asymmetric response has 
been framed as a ‘Russian’ idea, asymmetric actions were first observed as something 
Western, but by 2018 were incorporated into the Russian strategic thought.  
 
5.5 Digital sovereignty  
 
As was argued in Chapter 4, the concept of digital sovereignty did not come into being 
before the 2000s but had its roots in previous Russian ideas about territorial state 
sovereignty. Its appearance in the 2010s has been noted in previous studies. It has 
been primarily interpreted as an example of the importance the Russian regime places 
on sovereignty, state control, and territorial integrity now reflected upon the Inter-
net.1415 For example, Julian Nocetti has argued that Russia approaches cyberspace as 
a territory with virtual borders corresponding to physical state borders and state sov-
ereign rights and responsibilities.1416 Eneken Tikk and Mika Kerttunen have claimed 
that this sovereignty-based vision of cyberspace has led to a collision between Russian 
and Western views emphasising human rights and existing international laws.1417 
Moreover, in a 2017 journal article Mari Ristolainen argued that ‘digital sovereignty’ 
is a central concept to understanding Russian state cyber security thinking.1418 She 
claimed that “Consequently, RuNet has evolved from an alternative social universe 
to a state-controlled ‘safe and secure’ digital environment that manifests ‘digital sov-
ereignty’.”1419 
 
                                              
1415 Soldatov, Andrei and Borogan, Irina. Russia’s Surveillance State. World Policy Journal, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Fall 
2013), 23-30, 29; Soldatov 2017; Vendil Pallin 2017, 17. Here Vendil-Pallin refers to Alena Ledeneva’s concept 
of ‘sistema’ or clusters of informal networks. Ibid., 28-29; Jaitner & Rantapelkonen 2013, 69. 
1416 Nocetti 2015, 112. 
1417 Eneken & Kerttunen 2017. 
1418 Ristolainen, Mari. Should “RuNet 2020” be taken seriously? Contradictory views about cybersecurity be-
tween Russia and the West. Journal of Information Warfare, Vol. 16, No. 4 (2017), 113-131. The article is an 
updated version of earlier conference paper (Ristolainen 2017a). 
1419 Ristolainen 2017b, 118. Ristolainen, Kukkola and Nikkarila have continued to research the subject of Rus-
sian theoretical thought on digital sovereignty.  This chapter is based on that research and expands it by intro-
ducing new material.  Kukkola, Ristolainen & Nikkarila 2019; Ristolainen & Kukkola 2019a. 
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The Russian understanding of digital sovereignty is intertwined with its cyber norm 
building efforts which have been spearheaded by a group of people composed of ex-
military and ex-KGB/FSB officers, MGIMO academicians and other institutes, and 
retired or serving diplomats.1420 These ‘cyber diplomats’ are essential to understanding 
the Russian idea of ‘digital’ or ‘information sovereignty’. The previously mentioned 
Anatolii Strel’tsov belongs to this group and has written about international cyber 
security norms mainly in the context of the UN GGE process during 2011-2018. His 
texts are not personal theoretical treatises but arguments for the Russian proposals in 
the UN and as such represent the official view of the Russian regime.1421 Their main 
point is that there is a lack of international rules on the military use of information-
communication technology (ICT) and no shared concept of ‘information war’ or 
‘weapons’ which is an inherently dangerous state of affairs. Strel’tsov’s texts highlight 
the main issues of Russia’s cyber diplomacy, that is, the primacy of state sovereignty, 
the territorial view of cyberspace’s infrastructure, and the understanding of infor-
mation being both psychological and technological. One of the main points of con-
tention here is that Russia pursues the official banning of the ‘malicious use of ICT’. 
It is important to note that ‘malicious use’ does not mean only destructive use but 
also denial, manipulation and exploitation. Consequently, in 2014 Andrei Krutskikh 
and Anatoli Strel’tsov pointed out that Russia had not signed the Council of Europe’s 
Convention on Cybercrime because it presumably allowed unsanctioned access to 
networks of other countries which violates the sovereignty of the target state.1422 
 
Strel’tsov has argued that state dominion (verkhovenstvo) in cyberspace is delineated 
into three areas: information and telecommunication networks located in the national 
territory, the ICT means to collect, transfer, store, receive or distribute information, 
and local or distributed ASUs.1423 Strel’tsov considers it problematic that things are 
designated in cyberspace by their address because these addresses do not conform to 
state borders or designate a physical infrastructure on a state territory and are more-
over administrated by international non-governmental organizations with no interna-
tionally recognized legal status (i.e. ICANN).1424 Consequently, Strel’tsov has argued 
                                              
1420 For example, beginning from 2007, these people have organized the yearly Russian cyber security confer-
ence in Garmisch-Partenkirschen. They know each other, write academic or semi-academic papers together 
and the most prominent of them belong to the National Association of International Information Security 
(NAMIB). The group has published multiple books and their bios are included in Комов 2009. Based on the 
ISTINA database, these people write and publish together (ИСТИНА webpage [Online]. Available: 
https://istina.msu.ru/ [Accessed: 2nd April 2019]). On NAMIB cf. ТАСС 2018; Пядышева 2018. 
1421 Крутских, Андрей, Стрельцов, Анатолий. Международное право и проблема обеспечения междуна-
родной информационной безопасности. Международная жизнь, № 11 (2014); Стрельцов, Анатолий. 
Основные направления развития международного права вооруженных конфликтов применительно к 
киберпространству. VIII международный форум по международной информационной безопасности. 
21-24 апреля 2014 года. Гармиш-Партенкирхен, Германия, место издания Издательство Московского 
университета. Москва: 2014, 52-70; Стрельцов, А.А. Адаптация международного права безопасности к 
информационному пространству. Девятый международный форум «Партнерство государства, бизнеса 
и гражданского общества при обеспечении международной информационной безопасности» и Один-
надцатая научная конференция МИКИБ 20–23 апреля 2015 года. Гармиш-Партенкирхен, Германия. М.: 
2015, 81-86; Стрельцов, А.А. Применение международного гуманитарного права к вооруженным кон-
фликтам в киберпространстве. Российский ежегодник международного права 2015. Санкт-Петербур: 
“Россия-Нева”, 2015, 152-169; Стрельцов, Анатолий. Суверенитет и юрисдикция государства в среде 
информационно-коммуникационных технологий в контексте международной безопасности. Журнал 
Международная жизнь, № 2. 2017. 
1422 Крутских & Стрельцов 2014. 
1423 Крутских & Стрельцов 2014, 155-156. 
1424 Ibid., 156. 
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that the United States is the only state enjoying sovereignty in cyberspace because it 
indirectly controls ICANN. To remedy the situation Strel’tsov argues, among other 
things, for developing an international treaty recognizing state sovereignty in cyber-
space, delimiting state borders in cyberspace, and the creation of a map designating a 
national infrastructure.1425 In line with this thinking, Strel’tsov argued in 2017 that 
there is a national ICT segment which is juridically located on Russian territory, and 
thus under Russian federal state powers. This claim is the basis for the term ‘national 
segment of the Internet’ which denotes state sovereignty on the Internet through its 
infrastructure.  Strel’tsov then logically concludes that the state has the right to control 
the national segment to ensure its security, resilience, and development in accordance 
with national interests.1426 In another article Strel’tsov and Anatolii Smirnov1427, ar-
gued that ‘the ICT environment’ is a widely recognized concept based on a UN GGE 
report. They then proceed to define this environment—something that the UN GGE 
report clearly tries to circumvent as it would support Russia’s demands for interna-
tionally recognized information sovereignty.1428 Strel’tsov’s texts demonstrate an in-
tentional effort to create an intellectual basis for the state claims of authority over the 
Internet. 
 
Associate professor Elena Zinov’eva from MGIMO1429 is an interesting scholar be-
cause she is connected to Andrei Krutskikh who is one of the central figures of the 
Russian cyber diplomacy team.1430 He has co-authored articles with almost all of the 
leading Russian ‘cyber diplomats’—including Anatoli Strel’tsov who was discussed 
above.1431 In this group Zinov’eva represents the younger generation. Zinov’eva’s 
basic argument is based on the inherent inequality of globalization and the reactions 
of authoritarian regimes to the free flow of information. This development creates a 
divide between ‘the info rich’ and ‘the info poor’, or the ‘digital divide’, and is a source 
of new types of conflict.1432 Zino’eva has argued that the multi-stakeholder model of 
governing the Internet, which Russia has opposed contributes to the ‘digital divide’1433 
                                              
1425 Ibid., 163. 
1426 Стрельцов 2017. 
1427 Smirnov is a Russian diplomat and a leading researcher at the Center of International Information Security 
and Scientific-Technological politics in the MGIMO. 
1428 The United Nations General Assembly Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of 
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. A/70/174 22 July 2015 
[Online]. Available: https://undocs.org/A/70/174 [Accessed: 29th March 2019]. 
1429 Zinov’eva has a PhD in Political Science and is an Associate Professor at the Department of World Politics, 
and Deputy Director of Centre for International Information Security, Science and Technology Policy MGIMO 
University (Зиновьева Елена Сергеевна. МГИМО Online. Available: https://mgimo.ru/people/zinoveva/ 
[Accessed: 2nd April 2019]). 
1430  Krutskikh is a Professor at the Department of World Politics, the Director of the Center for International 
Information Security and Science and Technology Policy, and the vice-chair of the National association of 
international information security. Krutskikh is a career diplomat and has worked with arms control issues. 
Zinov’eva’s book on Internet governance has been written under the guidance of Krutskikh (Зиновьева, Е. С. 
Международное управление Интернетом: конфликт и сотрудничество: учеб. Пособие. М.: МГИМО-
Университет, 2011.) 
1431 Крутских Андрей Владимирович МГИМО Online. Available: https://mgimo.ru/people/krutskikh-an-
drey/ [Accessed: 2nd April 2019]. 
1432 Зиновьева, E.C. Международно-политические аспекты развития интернета. Вестник МГИМО-Уни-
верситета № 4 (31) 2013, 135-140, 139. Also Зиновьева, E.C. Международное управление интернетом: 
проблемы, подходы, перспективы. Вестник МГИМО-Университета № 6 (15) 2010, 167-174. 
1433 The ‘digital divide’ is a concept which was used in the Okinawa Charter on Global Information Society in 
2000 (Okinawa Charter on Global Information Society, 2000 [Online]. Available: https://www.mofa.go. 
jp/policy/economy/summit/2000/documents/charter.html [Accessed: 2nd April 2019].) 
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as digitally underdeveloped states do not have the resources to protect their inter-
ests.1434 The borders of state control, sovereignty, and the balance of power in the 
information sphere are under threat.1435Zino’eva  has claimed that the current status 
quo serves the interests of the United States, although her arguments are somewhat 
contradictory as she claims that the United States does not want to give up its sover-
eignty in the face of globalization and degrading power position but at the same time 
claims that Russia (and others) are entitled to their sovereignty and control over the 
Internet.1436 Zinov’eva has argued that Russia’s place in the global information society 
is based on its scientific and educational potential, quality of information infrastruc-
ture, the level of the development of electronic business and commerce and electronic 
government. It is noteworthy that these elements can be measured.1437 Zinov’eva sum-
marized Russian national interests in the information sphere as being based on the 
respect for state sovereignty, interstate governance of the Internet, and the stability, 
security, and uninterrupted functioning of the Internet.1438 
 
In 2014 Zinov’eva wrote that the interstate confrontation (mezgosudarstvennoe pro-
tivoborstvo) had transferred into the information sphere. Accordingly, Russia had 
expanded its list of information threats from the use of ICT to terrorist, criminal, and 
military-political ends to include interfering in the internal affairs of states.1439 She 
stated that in this context Russia pursued ‘the broad understanding’ of international 
information security including technological and politico-ideological aspects, whereas 
the West pursued only a narrow understanding which was technological and named 
‘cyber security’ (kiberbezopasnost’).1440 Russia has pursued the demilitarization of the 
information space and the formation of an international normative regime as the basis 
of international information security.1441 Zinov’eva also argued in 2016 that infor-
mation flows draw together culturally similar countries and that the regionalization 
and Balkanization of the Internet was a natural and beneficial phenomenon resisted 
by the status quo powers.1442 She claimed that in this context Russia strives to shape 
the information space to correspond to the multipolar world order—one polar of 
which is Russia—and to the idea of ‘digital sovereignty’.1443 This strategy of increased 
state control she claimed was optimal as, “on the one hand, it provides the openness 
necessary for the development of Internet business and related industries, and on the 
other hand, it provides controllability and controllability of the Russian segment of 
the Internet.”1444 Although Elena Zinov’eva is far from original, her texts offer a 
glimpse of the changing worldview and ideas, or at least political argumentation, of 
the ‘cyber diplomats’. 
                                              
1434 Зиновьева 2010. 
1435 Зиновьева 2013. 
1436 Ibid., 171-172. 
1437 Зиновьева 2011. 
1438 Ibid. Also Зиновьева, E.C. Глобальное управление Интернетом: российский подход и международ-
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The Russian struggle to define international information security and sovereignty is 
also present in the texts of other cyber diplomats. In 2003 ex-KGB Colonel General 
Vladislav Sherstiuk1445 wrote that the globalization of information society did not 
make the securing of national interests in the information sphere irrelevant. He dis-
tinguished the four directions of Russian information security policy as: ensuring cit-
izens’ rights to obtain and use information together with preserving moral values and 
patriotism; securing the information policy, i.e. public relations of the state which 
requires the regulation and control of mass media; developing domestic information 
technology; and protecting information and information systems.1446 In 2009 Sher-
stiuk defined the Russian position on international information security as based on 
information security rather than cyber, security. Sherstiuk claimed that the military-
political use of information-communication technology included the pursuit of polit-
ical goals in the interstate struggle on tactical, operational, and strategic levels. This 
was something that the Western concept of cyber did not allegedly capture. In this 
context ICT became both the target and the weapon of war and this was the basis for 
the Russian argument for new international law to regulate its use.1447  
 
Beginning from 2003 the Voennaia mysl’ has published a string of articles by the 
‘military contingent’ of the Russian cyber diplomacy corps. This group includes colo-
nel S. A. Komov, Colonel I. H. Dylevskii, Major General S. V. Korotkov, Major Gen-
eral S. N. Rodionov, A. V. Fedorov, Colonel S. M. Boiko, V. O. Zapivakhin, A. N. 
Petrunin, and V. P. El’ias. These articles describe the Russian international norm-
building efforts from 1998 onwards. The basic argument and narrative in the early 
2000s was that Russia had alerted the world to the threat arising from the malevolent 
use of ICT, i.e. information weapons, which could affect international stability and 
security. Russia opposed the efforts of ‘some countries’ to prepare for information 
war and sought to approach information weapons as an arms control issue.1448 The 
author collective argued that in the timeframe of 2007-2010 the most developed coun-
tries would achieve the capability to wage a large-scale war in the information sphere. 
This would be a civilizational conflict and Russia should protect itself through re-
gional cooperation and by promoting international norms inhibiting the use of infor-
mation weapons.1449 They proposed, for example, a joint monitoring system and joint 
responses to threats in the SCO states’ networks to deter geopolitical competitors.1450 
At the heart of the reasoning of the cyber diplomats was the technological superiority 
of the United States which threatened Russian sovereignty and the larger balance of 
                                              
1445 Sherstiuk has made an impressive career in national security. He was the Director of FAPSI from 1998-
1999, the First Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation from 1999-2004, and the 
Undersecretary of the Security Council from 2004-2010. He is the Director of the Institute of Information 
Security Problems at the MGU. (Шерстюк, Владислав Петрович. Wikipedia [Online] Available: 
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Шерстюк,_Владислав_Петрович [Accessed: 2nd April 2019].) 
1446 Шерстюк, В.П. Актуальные проблемы обеспечения информационной безопасности Российской 
Федерации. Военная мысль, № 6 2003, 28-32. 
1447 Комов 2009, 112-114 
1448 Комов, Коротков & Родионов 2003. 
1449 Дылевский И. Н., Комов С. А., Короткое СВ., Родионов С. Н., Федоров А. В. Военная политика 
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power.1451 The way Dylevskii et al. have used strategic weapons arms control as a basis 
for their discussion reveals the underlying understanding that international infor-
mation security is a subject matter for sovereign states and great powers.1452 By 2015 
Dylevskii et al. were ready to admit that Russia  had failed to obtain the cooperation 
of the West in regulating information weapons and recognizing state sovereignty in 
the information space.1453 The last article by the military collective in the Voennaia 
mysl’ was published in 2016 and its subject and tone had become defensive and dealt 
with the deterrence of military conflicts in the information era. Military diplomats 
argued that the United States’ build-up of information weapons necessitated the Rus-
sian build-up of national information power (potentsial’) to deter possible aggression 
and conserve the balance of power. 1454 
 
Sergei Boiko, the Head of the Department of the Security Council of the Russian 
Federation and a leading expert from the Centre of International Information Security 
and Science and Technology Policy of the MGIMO, wrote two articles in 2018 which 
were in effect a continuation of the articles of the cyber diplomats. According to him, 
Russian cyber diplomacy interests had not changed in 20 years—they still consisted 
of strategic stability and an equal strategic partnership. However, the conceptual ap-
proach had changed somewhat: each state had the sovereign right to independently 
decide state policy issues concerning the Internet and the right to protect its national 
segment of the global network including critical infrastructure. Additionally, the em-
phasis was now on ICT instead of ‘information weapons’—the psychological aspects 
were toned down but still present. These principles would form the basis for Russia’s 
renewed effort to push for a new round of the UN GGE process in 2019.1455 Conse-
quently, in 2018 Vladislav Sherstiuk used the term ‘digital sovereignty’ to denote 
states’ sovereign right to manage ICT on their territory and to determine policies in 
the field of international information security. This sovereignty could be realised 
through the authentication of users, routing of traffic through designated points, and 
through virtual borders.1456 In 2018’’digital sovereignty’ was finally presented as an 
official title of a round table discussion at the Russian international cyber security 
forum of 2018.1457 
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стемы международной информационной безопасности: российские подходы и инициативы. 
Международная жизнь, №11 (2018). 
1456 Шерстюк 2018. 
1457 Пядышева 2018. The arguments used by cyber diplomats provide one reason for why the Russians officially 
use the term information instead of cyber and why Russia has not established cyber force but instead infor-
mation troops. The Russian international norm-building policies require abstaining from the public endorse-
ment of cyber warfare. This is apparent in an interview of Andrei Krutskikh where he effortlessly uses the terms 
cyber potential, cyber structure, cyber war, cyberattack etc. but then transfers to using ‘information’ when de-
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207 
The Russian information warfare theorists have discussed ‘information sovereignty’ 
since the early 2000s. Manoilo referred to ‘national segments of the information space’ 
in the context of sovereignty and Manoilo et al. wrote about the control of infor-
mation infrastructure as a necessary requirement for sovereignty. Griniaev argued that 
‘virtual state borders in cyberspace’ were being erected by states and Panarin wrote 
about the ‘spiritual sovereignty’ of Russia.1458 Nevertheless, although IT-expert Igor 
Ashmanov, Director of the company Ashmanov and Partners, may not have coined 
the term ‘digital sovereignty’ he is the first who has publicly provided a theoretical 
and systematic analysis of the concept.1459  
 
Ashmanov gave a presentation titled ‘Information sovereignty—The new reality’ at 
the iForum conference in Kiev in May 2013.1460 In it Ashmanov listed the ‘traditional’ 
forms of sovereignty—military, diplomatic, economic, political and cultural—and ar-
gued that a new ‘digital sovereignty’ had appeared. The traditional forms of sover-
eignty were eroding because of globalization and informatization, and the loss of dig-
ital sovereignty could lead to further loss of other forms of sovereignty. He defined 
‘digital sovereignty’ as the right and possibility of the state to: 1) autonomously and 
independently determine both domestic and geopolitical national interests in the dig-
ital sphere; 2) pursue an independent internal and external information policy; 3) man-
age own information resources to form the infrastructure of the national information 
space; 4) guarantee the electronic and information security of the state. Digital sover-
eignty had two sides: electronic sovereignty and information sovereignty both defined 
by their resilience against attacks. This type of sovereignty required both electronic 
and information ‘shields’ which basically meant domestic programs, operating sys-
tems, network equipment, mobile systems, Internet infrastructure, media, social me-
dia services, search engines, and a national system for information warfare, and ‘ide-
ological services.’ Ashmanov argued that a ‘cold’ information war was already ongo-
ing, and that information dominance was analogous to the air dominance in the pre-
vious wars. The United States was the only truly ‘digitally sovereign’ state in the 
world—although China was catching up—and it used freedom of speech as a weapon 
to keep Russia from reaching ‘digital sovereignty’. Ashmanov argued that it was im-
possible for a regional actor like Russia to attain full information sovereignty. There-
fore, Russia had to form alliances with CIS countries and China and to build a shield 
consisting of a system for monitoring the information space, as well as legal regula-
tion, and means of active counterinfluence.1461 
 
If one compares Ashmanov’s ideas to the ones that were present in the framework of 
CIS in the timeframe of 2008-2012  it becomes clear that Ashmanov just elaborated 
ideas that were already circulating amongst security and foreign policy elites of the 
post-Soviet countries.1462 This has been argued also by Vladislav Bukharin, a senior 
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lecturer at the Faculty of Public Administration, at the Department of International 
Organizations and Problems of Global Governance of Moscow State University. He 
has claimed that the main analyst of the company Infowatch, N. N. Fedotov, in fact 
came up with the term in 2010 and that the concept of ‘digital’ or ‘information sov-
ereignty’ appeared early on in the Ukrainian and Belorussian official documents, as 
well as in Chinese documents in the form of ‘Internet sovereignty’. Bukharin claimed 
that for Russia ‘digital sovereignty’ was more important than ‘information sover-
eignty.’ He defined the most important components of technically ensuring national 
security would be a domestic search engine, social networks, operating system and 
software, microelectronics, network equipment, a national segment of the Internet, 
payment systems, autonomous means of protection, cryptographic algorithms and 
protocols, and a navigation system.1463 Therefore, Bukharin associated digital sover-
eignty with the domestic ownership of services and infrastructure and the quality of 
national information-technological development.  
 
As Bukharin had claimed, the Russians were not the only ones thinking about infor-
mation or digital sovereignty. In 2016 Russian and Belorussian civilian academics au-
thored a book on information security in the context of CSTO and CIS and proposed 
multiple definitions for the concept of information sovereignty.1464  Based on these it 
would seem that as the Russian and post-Soviet countries’ legal experts began to in-
vestigate ‘information sovereignty’ four elements were deemed important: states’ 
rights to determine their interests, to conduct policy, to dispose of resources or to 
affect the information infrastructure, and to be the (sole) provider of security in the 
national information/cyberspace. 
 
Anatoli Strel’tsov and Pavel Piliugin1465, both members of the Russian cyber diplo-
matic corps, wrote a series of articles on the Internet and sovereignty in 2016-2017.  
Strel’tsov claimed in 2016 that cyberspace lacked national borders because the net-
work addressing of objects and subjects was unregulated and unconnected to national 
territories.1466 Later, Pavel Piliugin and Strel’tsov wrote a joint paper “On the issue of 
digital sovereignty” in which  they approached digital sovereignty through the concept 
of territorial state sovereignty.1467 Based on this approach, the inviolability of state 
borders in cyberspace would be ensured through an international regime designating 
how borders are crossed. Consequently, Piliugin and Strel’tsov introduced the BGP 
protocol and its autonomous system of addresses as a tool to control traffic between 
nations. Furthermore, SDN technology is presented as a method to flexibly control 
cross-border traffic as the connections of the national ISPs can be shaped from de-
fence lines into borders. Piliugin and Strel’tsov also claimed that anonymity and the 
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problem of attribution could be solved through software solutions, certificates and 
registers, although this would require national and international agreements.1468 
 
In a paper published in 2017 Piliugin continued to propose different ways to under-
stand ‘digital borders’ based on BGP and SDN technologies.1469 Piliugin was aware of 
the high computational and other requirements generated by filtering traffic on a na-
tional scale, and thus he proposed a system where the subsystems of the control sys-
tem would be placed in different parts of the network with less resource intensive 
systems at the borders and more intensive systems in the depths of the national net-
work. Moreover, incoming traffic would be registered at the border and the subsys-
tems would exchange information about established routes. This would enable na-
tional firewall control and the monitoring of traffic, and a centralized control of BGP 
routing. Strel’tsov wrote in 2017 about ‘the segment of Internet’ which denoted state 
sovereignty on the Internet. He argued that sovereignty required state control of bor-
ders and the information space itself.1470 Together in 2018 Piliugin and Strel’tsov stated 
that the “demarcation” of digital borders could be based on a set of points of contact 
between digital spaces (autonomous systems) of different states. This would require 
international agreements which would regulate how and what traffic was routed and 
where.1471 The Russian media began to use the term ‘digital borders’ around 2018, 
which is a clear indicator that the ideas about delineating the borders of the Russian 
segment of the Internet had started to spread.1472 
 
‘Digital sovereignty’ has also been analysed from a legal point of view. The first to 
approach the issue seems to have been V. B. Naumov in 1999.1473 He argued that the 
information space has changed international relations because it is a new environment 
like the sea and air were in their time. As states projected their interests to these new 
spaces a redefinition of sovereignty was required. Naumov also pointed out that the 
lack of international norms concerning ‘the Internet’ would lead to sovereign net-
works inside the global information space. According to Associate Professor A. A. 
Efremov, also Senior Researcher of the Centre for Public Administration Technolo-
gies at RANEPA, one of the first Russian political scientific definitions of ‘infor-
mation sovereignty’ was presented by A. V. Rossoshanskii, Doctor of Law and a 
member of the Faculty of Law at the University of Saratov State University, in 2011 
as the ability and intention to produce, distribute, and consume information and to 
use information resources based on political interests.1474 In his 2012 article Ros-
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soshanskii, however, argued that ‘information sovereignty’ is a nationally and cultur-
ally bound concept so Western liberal notions of the freedom of information might 
not be applicable to Russia.1475 
 
Eferemov also pointed to three articles written by V. S. Polikarpov, E. V. Polikarpova 
and V. A. Polikarpova in 2014 on ‘information sovereignty’. They use Ashmanov’s 
definition of ‘digital sovereignty’ to argue that the development of ICT and cyber-
space have created a new virtual world where states struggle with each other to main-
tain their sovereignty. The context of this struggle is bound to the United States’ fail-
ing power position and the rise of challengers.1476 This connection of sovereignty to 
the international struggle is also made by others, such as M. M. Kucheriavyi who 
divided ‘information sovereignty’ into information-technological, information-psy-
chological, and information-political components.1477 Kycheriavyi proposes that to se-
cure ‘information sovereignty’ Russia’s information security should be based on, 
among other things, forming secure national information systems and creating Rus-
sia’s own information troops, forces and means, and controlling information flows 
inside the country and those coming from outside.1478 
 
Efremov has argued that the concept of information sovereignty was gaining popu-
larity in Russia in 2016-2017 but its definitions were mainly based on threats.  He has 
offered his own legalistic definition of it as “the ability of a state through national and 
international law to exercise the regulation of a specific information space.”1479 
Efremov has also pointed out that ‘information sovereignty’ cannot be defined na-
tionally because its relationships and technological basis are transnational. Moreover, 
he has argued that sovereignty cannot be defined based on technological and physical 
understandings of cyberspace—the information space is a sphere of human relations 
and activity.1480 In 2017, Efremov narrowed his definition to ‘the state sovereignty in 
cyberspace’ (gosudartsvennyi suverenitet) and distinguished three aspects of sover-
eignty: state borders, the capability to exercise sovereignty, and the level/quality of 
sovereignty.1481 Another legal expert, L. V. Terent’eva, an associate professor at the 
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Moscow State Law University,1482 argued that the idea of ‘information sovereignty’ 
conforms to the traditional Russian view on sovereignty with different horizontal 
spheres (economic, political etc.) and on the supremacy of the state throughout its 
territory. She proposed a definition for ‘digital sovereignty’ which is understood as 
“The right and the possibility of a national government to autonomously and inde-
pendently determine both internal and geopolitical national interests in the digital 
sphere. As well as the state’s right to pursue an independent internal and external 
information policy, to dispose of their own information resources to govern the, and 
to guarantee the electronic and information security of the state.”1483  
 
The idea of digital sovereignty is deeply rooted in the concept of information security. 
However, according to A. A. Paroshin (in 2010) only the Information Security Doc-
trine of 2000 explicitly mentions information security as the state of protection of 
Russia’s national interests in the information sphere. Nevertheless, multiple docu-
ments have linked state security to information technology or the information 
space—mainly because of threats emanating from technology.1484 Furthermore, inter-
national agreements and foreign policy documents of Russia include their own defi-
nitions (cf. Chapter 6). Russia has also pursued joint standards and common norma-
tive bases for information security in the framework of CIS and CSTO.1485 M. A. Vus 
and O. S. Makarov claim that the Russian definition of information security instead 
of cyber security has been accepted into the CIS and CSTO lexicon.1486 Many of the 
information warfare theorists analysed above have offered their views on or concepts 
of information security. They are mostly based on the state of protection of the object 
of security—usually state interests or the information systems and information up-
holding those interests—or on the measures for securing something. Threats are usu-
ally derived from the object of security.1487 
 
The authors of the admittedly propagandistic Informatsionnye voiny journal have 
been very interested in the concept of information security.1488 They have pointed out 
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and to the monitoring of the public opinion. (Петрунин, А. Н. Информационное обеспечение как способ 
реализации государственной информационной политики в области обороны. Военная мысль, № 8 
(2008), 36-44.) 
1487 Стрельцов 2008; Садовничий & Стрельцов 2002; Ноговицын 2009; Тучков Ю.Н. и др. Словарь тер-
минов и определений в области информационной безопасности. 1-е изд Москва: ВАГШ ВС РФ, НИЦ 
информационной безопасности, 2008; Бачило, И.Л. Информационное право. Учебник 3-е издание. 
М.: Издательство Юрайт, 2013. The Russian understanding of the concept of security has been analysed, 
among others, by professor A. S. Malin who distinguishes two versions: “in the broad sense, it is the result of 
social activities to ensure the security of the individuals, society and the state from external threats, while in the 
narrow sense it is the state of protection of the vital interests of the individual, society and the state from 
internal threats.” Малин, А.С. Содержание понятия безопасность. вестник академии военных наук, № 
4(21) 2007.  
1488 The journal is published by the Academy of Information Self-Defence, an independent organization estab-
lished in 2007 and sponsored by the Center of Security Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the 
Academy of Military Sciences. It is connected to such academics as S. P. Rastorguev and V. V. Tsyganov and 
publishes the journal Information Wars (Informatsionnye voiny) (Иванов 2014). 
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three important aspects of information security in the Russian understanding. Firstly, 
that it is an object of a geopolitical and civilizational struggle in the context of global-
ization. Secondly, that the state must have control over the Internet to win in this 
struggle. And thirdly, that although spirit, moral and cognition are the target of the 
information struggle, an information-technological basis is still required for infor-
mation security and thus sovereignty.1489 
 
The concept of cyber security did not manage to break through into the Russian of-
ficial lexicon, although, in 2013 Professor Iurii Borodakii, an academician of the RAS 
and a life-long developer of military ASUs in the FGUP Sistemprom, as well as Ale-
ksandr Dobrodeev and Igor’ Butysov stated in an article published in a journal con-
nected to the FSB, MoD and FSTEK that cyberspace had become a new environment 
of interstate confrontation.1490 They defined cyberspace as a technological environ-
ment and cyber security in a philosophical sense as “a property or state of a system to 
preserve the reliability and functional stability in the context of a modern information 
confrontation [informatsionnoe protivoborstvo].”1491 The article was published and 
the journal was established in a moment when Russia seemed to be on the verge of 
adopting the concept of cyber security—this moment did not materialise as the draft 
Cyber Security Strategy floundered and the Russian regime adopted the more inclu-
sive concept of information security.1492 The tides are, however, turning yet again as 
‘cyber security’ has from 2018 been increasingly used by academicians and even Putin 
himself.1493 
 
The narrative about information threats, security and sovereignty has not been shared 
by all Russians. There exists an active and critical opposition to the security and mili-
tary elite’s ideas in Russian civil society. The arguments of civil society are mainly 
based on human rights and the resistance to state control, whereas ICT companies 
and liberal economists point out that ‘digital sovereignty’ is bad for the economy.1494 
                                              
1489 Сергеев 2010; Володенков, С.В. Технологии интернет-коммуникации как фактор обеспечения ин-
формационной безопасности современного государства. Информационные войны, № 3(19) 2011, 89-
95; Мельников, В.П. Информационная война и современные оружейные технологии. Информацион-
ные войны, №3 (43) 2017, 28-35; Лепский В.Е., Мельников А.А., Пойкин А.Е. Информационные войны 
за доминирование в инновационной сфере россии и на евразийском пространстве. Информационные 
войны, № 4(36) 2015, 12-20. 
1490 In 2013 a company named Echelon began to publish a journal called ‘Voprosy kiberbezopasnosti’ (Cyber-
security Issues). What is significant in this journal is that Echelon is accredited as a testing laboratory for the 
MoD of Russia, FSTEC and the FSB and also functions as a certification centre for the MoD and FSTEC (АО 
«НПО «Эшелон» [Online]. Available: https://npo-echelon.ru/ [Accessed: 2nd April 2019].) 
1491 Бородакий Ю.В., Добродеев А.Ю., Бутусов И.В. Кибербезопасность как основной фактор нацио-
нальной и международной безопасности хх! века (часть 1). Вопросы кибербезопасности, № 1 (1) 2013, 
2-9, 5-6. 
1492 Cf. Chapter 6. 
1493 Шеремет, И.А. Обеспечение кибербезопасности в условиях развития цифровой экономики. Вест-
ник Московского университета. Серия 25. Международные отношения и мировая политика. Т. 11. № 1 
(2019), 3-19; Латухина, Кира. Защита цифры Президент призвал вместе бороться с киберугрозой. 
Российская газета, 8.7.2018 [Online]. Available: https://rg.ru/2018/07/08/putin-nazval-borbu-s-kibera-
takami-gosudarstvennoj-zadachej.html [Accessed: 3rd January 2019]. 
1494 Агора 2018; Кодачигов, Валерий. Закон Яровой пока не работает: Для его выполнения операторам 
не хватает документации. Ведомости, 01 октября 2018 [Online]. Available: https://www.vedomosti.ru 
/technology/articles/2018/10/01/782493-zakon-yarovoi#galleries%2F140737489014365%2Fnormal%2F1 
[Accessed: 1st March 2019]; Баленко, Евгения, Галимова, Наталья, Посыпкина, Александра, Балашова, 
Анна.. Атака изнутри: операторы протестируют закон об устойчивости Рунета. РБК, 8 фебраля 2019 
[Online]. Available: https://www.rbc.ru/technology_and_media/08/02/2019/5c5c51069a7947bef4503927? 
from=center_16 [Accessed: 1st March 2019]. 
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Moreover, the ‘Sinicization’ of the national segment is seen by some as a negative 
phenomenon.1495  
 
State sovereignty is a defining and central element of the Russian political culture and 
it shows in the national security documents. The 2008 Foreign Policy Concept men-
tions information threats to sovereignty.1496 The NSS of 2009 connects sovereignty to 
national security, and ensuring this security to the spiritual resilience and access to 
modern information-communication technology.1497 The Military Doctrine of 2010 
acknowledges the need to develop information-technological means to protect the 
independence and sovereignty of Russia.1498 The Foreign Policy Concept of 2013 rec-
ognises the danger that ‘soft power’ and information threats pose to sovereignty.1499 
The Military Doctrine of 2014 refers to the use of information and communication 
technology for military-political ends and against the sovereignty of the state. It de-
fines as military dangers activities conducted to harm the information infrastructure, 
to destabilize the political situation, and to influence the spiritual values of the people, 
and emphasises the need to build a system of information security. The Doctrine 
suggest that the information space is a sphere of military action.1500 The NSS of 2015 
mentions information-technological threats to critical information infrastructure, the 
threats emanating from the use of telecommunications technology for propaganda 
purposes, as well as the threats of terrorist or criminal use of information technology. 
It also points to the vulnerabilities of information infrastructure that could affect eco-
nomic growth, which is a strategic objective, and the destructive use of information-
psychological means against the cultural sovereignty of Russia.1501 The Foreign Policy 
Concept of 2016 repeated the points of the NSS, emphasised the respect for sover-
eignty and mentioned the equitable access to the Internet.1502 ‘Sovereignty in the in-
formation space’ (suverenitet v informatsionnom prostranstve) was officially men-
tioned in the 2016 Information Security Doctrine where the task to ensure “the pro-
tection of the sovereignty of the Russian Federation in the information space was 
considered as the main direction of information security and a national interest.1503 
Furthermore, the term ‘digital sovereignty’ was first used in the 2017 State programme 
‘The Digital Economy of the Russian Federation’.1504 The state would protect this 
sovereignty by conducting autonomous and independent politics to realize its national 
goals in the information space.1505 
 
To summarize. Digital and information sovereignty are parallel concepts although 
with distinct substances. The idea of information and later digital sovereignty devel-
                                              
1495 Роскомсвобода. «Китаизация» Рунета входит в активную фазу и начнȍтся с точек обмена трафиком, 
18-8-2017 [Online]. Available: https://roskomsvoboda.org/31224/ [Accessed: 1st May 2019]; Роскомсво-
бода. Цифровая оборона интернета [Online]. Available: https://roskomsvoboda.org/45308/ [Accessed: 1st 
March 2019]. 
1496 Концепция 2008. 
1497 Указ Президента Российской Федерации 2009b. 
1498 Указ Президента РФ 2010. 
1499 Концепция 2013. 
1500 Доктрина 2014. 
1501 Указ Президента РФ 2015. 
1502 Указ Президента РФ 2016a. 
1503 Указ Президента РФ 2016b. 
1504 Распоряжение Правительства РФ 2017. 
1505 Указ Президента РФ 2016b. 
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oped along two different tracks. The first was external and was based on the under-
standing that information weapons and operations posed a new kind of threat to the 
security of the state. The threat was especially acute because the Russian defence and 
security elites considered Russia to be significantly weaker than its great power rivals 
in developing and utilizing these weapons. Thus, Russia launched its cyber diplomacy 
effort in 1997-1998 to contain and regulate this threat. The idea of non-state control 
of any space was alien to Russian security thinking, and therefore cyberspace and its 
different elements needed to be controlled. The concept of information sovereignty 
developed from the state’s right to an absence of threat and then to a state’s right to 
control its ICT and thus to the delineation of cyberspace along the lines of state ju-
risdiction. This version of information sovereignty was probably based on the ideas 
of those retired and servicing security and military professionals and academicians 
who took part in the drafting to the first Information Security Doctrine. 
 
The second track of information security is internal and based on the writings of 
Russian information security and warfare scholars at the turn of the millennium. It 
naturally draws also from the ideas of territorial state sovereignty, juridical concepts 
and geopolitics which had wider support amongst the Russian intelligentsia at that 
time. This information sovereignty is based on the idea that the state has the right and 
responsibility to control information, creation and use, as well as its flow and sub-
stance, inside its borders—like the resources of any other dimension. Additionally, it 
seems plausible that the Russians were also influenced by the thinking of their coun-
terparts from ex-Soviet countries. Whatever the case, by 2010-2013 the idea was de-
veloped to such an extent that it was adopted by the elites, although haltingly. This 
so-called internal information sovereignty, like the diplomatic version, is based on 
threats which have changed as time has passed from devastating attacks against the 
information infrastructure, cyber terrorism, information-psychological operations, 
and data security to military-political, subversive, terrorist, and criminal operations.  
These attacks had from the start technological and psychological aspects and, conse-
quently, so did the information sovereignty. Its elements were shaped around the state 
protection and control of information, as well as the information infrastructure and 
services, the state’s ability to promote domestic information technology research and 
production, and the ability to protect and cultivate the values, culture and civilization 
of Russia. As the importance of information technology increased, and society 
changed, information sovereignty acquired the sub-concepts of electronic, technolog-
ical and digital sovereignties. This development connected sovereignty to national 
power as the quality of the information infrastructure and technological-scientific de-
velopment became sources of power or potential. 
 
The different definitions of information sovereignty proposed by the writers analysed 
above can be grouped into three categories. The first are the technocratic definitions 
that are based on the information infrastructure and systems residing in the territory 
of a state. The second are the judicial definitions, which are based on the regulation 
of human or societal relationships. The third are political definitions which flow from 
a certain understanding of state interests and security. The last has been perhaps the 
most common and includes such elements as the right and ability to determine inter-
ests, to conduct internal and external policies, to use national information resources, 
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and to guarantee the security of the national information space. Many of the defini-
tions analysed here follow the supposed Russian legal tradition, which considers sov-
ereignty to be manifested in different spheres but flowing from one source. 
 
Based on the above it can be argued that digital sovereignty developed from sover-
eignty over the information space to sovereignty in the information space and in the 
end to information or digital sovereignty, that is, to one of the aspects of state sover-
eignty. This is based on the interaction of the Russian understanding of territorial 
state sovereignty and the emergence of cyberspace. Therefore, the idea of inserting 
sovereignty into cyberspace and the delineation of borders has been quite easy to 
understand and adopt. The idea of digital and information sovereignty is very much 
connected to the balance of power thinking. Russia cannot be sovereign if some other 
state has ‘more’ sovereignty. Moreover, it resonates with the traditional security and 
foreign policy thinking and ideas about sovereignty, strategic stability, and great power 
(derzhavnost’). From the Russian perspective ‘digital sovereignty’ can then be under-
stood as the extension of the authority and control of a territorial state over and into 
the national segment of the Internet, which consists of Internet and other network-
related ICT systems located on its territory or under its jurisdiction. A wider concept 
is thus ‘information sovereignty’ which additionally includes the information residing 
or flowing through those ICT systems and the interaction of its users. 
 
These definitions demonstrate why it is imperative to control the space and borders 
of national information space and the national segment of the Internet. The cultural 
and political aspects of sovereignty also legitimize Russian state actions outside the 
borders of its information space. Although there might be a dose of Soviet nostalgia 
mixed into the dream of creating an independent, domestic ICT industry, digital sov-
ereignty has military strategic relevance as it creates a platform for the national infor-
mation economy which is a national source of power. In the world of ideas, digital 
sovereignty gathers all the other strategic cultural ideas under its wings. 
 
5.6 Unified information space 
 
The idea of a unified information space (EIP) carried over from the Soviet times into 
the 1990s and ultimately into the 2010s. This continuity has been noted, among oth-
ers, by Professor Nikolai Il’in, the Deputy Head of the Special Communications Ser-
vice (Spetssviazi) of the FSO.1506 According to him, the first era of the information 
systems of governmental control was the Soviet era with its central planning systems. 
During that time some complexes of crisis management situation centres were cre-
ated. The second era consisted of the years between 1991-2000, which were charac-
terized by the localization of systems. The FAPSI created local centres to collect so-
cial-economic data, the construction of national information-telecommunications sys-
tem began, and federal- and presidential-administration-level situation centres were 
created. The third and current era is characterized by centralized systems. Il’in de-
scribes this complex as a ‘state control system’ based on geographically distributed 
management systems at the federal and regional levels and on the unique information 
                                              
1506 Ильин Н.И. Эволюция информационных систем государственного управления. Информационные 
войны №1 (41) 2017, 54-57.  
 
216 
and analytical systems for strategic planning, assessment, and analysis of national se-
curity.1507  
 
The idea of EIP was established among the defence and security elites as the Armed 
Forces adopted the Concept of Unified Information Space of the Armed Forces in 
2004.1508 According to A.V. Pankov and S. V. Shevchenko, the EIP of the Armed 
Forces was defined as “a collection of databases and data banks, technologies of their 
management and use, information and telecommunication systems, and networks op-
erating on the same principles and general rules to ensure the information based in-
teraction and the exchange of information of the military administration.”1509 Colonel 
and Professor G. A. Lavrinov and Major A. A. Chumichkin, both members of the 
Academy of Military Sciences, defined EIP as “in a broad sense […] a specially or-
dered set of all the information available in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federa-
tion, and narrowly as an aggregate of information resources of the RF Armed Forces, 
organized according to uniform principles and rules of formation, formalization, stor-
age, distribution.”1510 The EIP was, thus, a space with borders, common rules, pro-
cesses and systems, and standardized information. 
 
Although, the idea of EIP was shared, the discussion of how it should be implemented 
was not. In 2003 V. V. Baraniuk, a leading researcher at 27th TsNII and the Chief 
Researcher of the Information Technology Department of TsNII EISU1511 wrote that 
the armed forces required a unified information space (edinnoe informatsionnoe 
prostranstvo) for effective command and control.1512. Baraniuk claimed that the infor-
mation space of the Armed Forces was currently not unified, and he argued for inte-
grating different networks and resources. He divided the definition of EIP into broad 
and narrow versions which corresponded to Lavrinov’s and Chumichkin’s defini-
tion.1513 This kind of information space would increase the efficiency (operativnost’), 
validity, and quality of decisions by providing up-to-date, reliable, timely, and com-
prehensive information. Baraniuk proposed that the EIP should be constructed based 
on a model of the Armed Forces command and control system, which consisted of 
subsystems and information flows, and structural, functional and information com-
ponents.1514 Later, Baraniuk together with the Head of the Centre of Information Re-
sources of TsNII EISU I. N. Akhmadishin proposed the creation of the ‘Information 
Service of the Armed Forces’ to solve the problems the increased amounts of infor-
mation and new technology were posing for the command and control system of the 
                                              
1507 Ibid., 57. 
1508 Копытко, В. К., Шептура, Владимир. Проблемы построения единого информационного простран-
ства Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации и возможные пути их решения. Военная мысль, № 10 
(2011), 16-26. 
1509 Панков, А. В., Шевченко, С. В. Обоснование роли и формирование концептуальной модели си-
стемы интеллектуальной обработки информации в едином информационном пространстве ВС РФ. 
Известия СПбГЭТУ «ЛЭТИ» № 1/2018, 38-43. 
1510 Лаврино, Г.А., Чумичкин, А.А. Опыт создания единого информационного пространства для реше-
ния задач технического оснащения Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации. Вестник академии воен-
ных наук, № 1(26)/2009. 
1511 Рамм, Алексей. На острие экономики и автоматизации Уникальному научно-исследовательскому 
институту экономики, информатики и систем управления исполняется 45 лет. ВПК, № 19 (537) за 28 
мая 2014 года. 
1512 Баранюк, В. В. Единое информационное пространство вс рф: проблемы создания. Военная мысль 
№ 3 (2003), 36-38. 
1513 Ibid., 36. 
1514 Ibid. 
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Armed Forces.1515 They argued for a centralized and hierarchical system which would 
have been extended to the military-industrial complex and all the relevant minis-
tries.1516 
 
In 2004 Colonel General E. A. Karpov, Lieutenant General N. I. Burenin and Colonel 
N. A. Ziuzin argued that information superiority in modern warfare, where troops 
were spatially distributed and their management was decentralized, required ‘a unified 
military information space’ (edinoe voennoe informatsionnoe prostranstvo) to ensure 
the accuracy and timeliness of information.1517 According to Karpov, Burenin and 
Ziuzin, the continuity of EIP could be achieved through multiple redundant commu-
nication channels, integration of local and regional and services, and branch networks. 
Its infrastructure would consist of interconnected computer networks, databases, ap-
plication programs and subscriber devices, interfaces of weapons and security sys-
tems.1518 This system would be based on sharing information to all participants, it 
would be ‘transparent’, and it would be flexible and able to change configuration if 
the military situation so demanded. What the authors had in mind was similar to the 
U.S. Defense Information Systems Network (DISN), and they were ready to admit 
that the Russian Armed forces had nothing like it.1519 Similarly, ten years later retired 
General-Lieutenant S. I. Skokov and Senior Lieutenant L. V. Grushka argued that the 
United States’ Global Information Grid gave it technological superiority as it en-
hanced administration and enabled a constant and flexible modification of their de-
fence network.1520 
 
On the civilian side, in 2005 D. Chereskin, G. Smolian and V. Tsygichko argued that 
Russia had to build a sovereign information and communications infrastructure to 
ensure the security of the country and its development. To this effect, they presented 
a National Strategy for Information Development developed by the Institute for Sys-
tem Analysis of the RAS.1521 According to the strategy, the networks of the ministries 
and departments should be integrated into a single vertical network supported by a 
system of distributed databases and a system for identifying and analysing threats. 
Moreover, Russia needed a single, multi-level, all-Russian information security system. 
These efforts, and others, would create a unified information space for the country, 
would ensure Russia’s equal participation in the global information society, and guar-
antee its economic-social development.1522  
                                              
1515 Ахмадишин, И. Н., Баранюк, В. В. Организационные вопросы создания информационной службы 
ВС РФ. Военная мысль № 4 (2004), 45-49. 
1516 Ibid., 46. 
1517 Карпов, Е. А., Буренин, Н. И. Зюзин, Н. А.  Единое военное информационное пространство: про-
блемы создания.  Военная мысль № 8 (2004), 45. 
1518 Ibid., 47. 
1519 Ibid., 49. 
1520 Скоков, С. И., Грушка, Л. В. Влияние концепции сетецентризма на эволюцию и функционирование 
системы управления Вооруженными Силами Российской Федерации. Военная мысль, № 12 (2014), 33-
41. 
1521 The Institute for System Analysis (FITs IU RAN) is a federal theoretical and applied sciences research 
institution established in 1976 in the field of informatics, cybernetics, mathematical modelling etc. It is special-
ized in studying technological, economic and ecological complex systems. In 2014 it was incorporated with two 
other institutes into the organization of the Federal Research Centre ‘Informatics and management’ of the RAS. 
(Институт системного анализа ФИЦ ИУ РАН [Online]. Available: http://www.isa.ru/ index.php [Accessed: 
3rd April 2019].) 
1522 Черешкин, Д. С., Смолян, Г. Л., Цыгичко, В. Н. Информационное развитие России – путь к инфор-
мационному обществу. «Информационные ресурсы России» №1, 2005 [Online]. Available: 
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The military reform and rearmament programme and the Russian government’s re-
newed efforts to develop the information society and economy around 2008 coin-
cided with a fresh interest in the idea of the EIP. In military journals the concept was 
used to analyse Western networks despite the fact that Western scholars had not used 
the term when discussing Western networks.1523 In the context of Russian military 
networks, the Chief of the General Staff Iuri Baluevskii argued in 2009 that the Armed 
Forces were on the threshold of creating a single information space for the Armed 
Forces.1524 This view was contested by the Chief of Communication of the Russian 
Armed forces Evgenii Maichik who claimed that the Russian military still had a long 
way to go.1525 The drive to create unified information and telecommunications systems 
also affected other ministries and forces.1526 The EIP was also connected to Russian 
foreign policy as  S. M. Boiko et al. proposed that the SCO required a joint monitoring 
mechanism of communication networks which should include national subsystems 
interconnected by a special information and telecommunications network with a 
shared monitoring centre.1527 The idea of the EIP was also present when M. A. Gareev 
argued for a unified system of aerospace defence for the country to defend against 
aerospace attacks in 2007.1528 Unified systems were also incorporated into the slowly 
developing common air defence system of the CIS which should have connected the 
air defence and surveillance assets of Russia and its neighbours to a unified system.1529 
Lastly, the ESU TZ or ‘the unified system of command and control of the tactical 
level’ had been under development from the year 2000.1530 Quite obviously the military 
saw the EIP as an inherent part of the future armed forces and an element of a net-
work-centric warfare capable force. 
 
The scientists at the 27th TsNII were not the only ones to make a pitch for unified 
information systems. In 2008 E. A. Perov and A.V. Pereverzev from the 16th  
                                              
http://www.aselibrary.ru/press_center/journal/irr/2005/number_1/number_1_2/digital_re-
sources515273747787/ [Accessed: 4th March 2019]. 
1523 Cf. Молитвин, А. О реализации концепции единого информационного пространства НАТО. Зару-
бежное военное обозрение, № 1 (2008), 23-27; Азов, В. Концепция создания единой информационно-
управляющей структуры ВС США. Зарубежное военное обозрение, № 1 (2003), 3-10; 4.  The authoritative 
texts by Rona, Waltz, Arquilla, Ronfeldt, Libicki, Alberts, Gartzka, Cebrwoski, Smith et al. do not use the term 
‘unified information space’. Nevertheless, in 2005 the U.S. Joint Chief of Staff published the Net-Centric Op-
erational Environment Joint Integrating Concept, for which Grishkovets, for example, has translated ‘network-
centric environment’ as единое информационное пространство (edinnoe informatsionnoe prostranstvo). 
(The United States Department of Defence Joint Chiefs of Staff. Net-Centric Operational Environment Joint 
Integrating Concept, 31 October 2005 [Online]. Available: https://dodcio. defense.gov/Portals/0/Docu-
ments/netcentric_jic.pdf [Accessed: 3rd March 2019]; Гришковец, Е. Формирование в США единой ин-
формационной инфраструктуры вооруженных сил. Зарубежное военное обозрение, № 3 (2018), 19-2). 
1524 Кедров, Илья. АСУ для оружия будущего. ВПК, № 36 (152) за 20 сентября 2006 года. 
1525 Мейчик, Евгений. На пути к единому телекоммуникационному пространству. Россииское военное 
обозрение, № 9 (2009), 17-18. 
1526 Мирошников, Алексей. Войска переходят на “цифру”. Независимое военное обозрение, № 39 
(2009). 
1527 Бойко et al. 2010. 
1528 Гареев 2007. 
1529 Plopsky, Guy. Russia’s Big Plans for Air Defense in Eurasia Big plans, indeed, but will they materialize? 
The Diplomat, April 07, 2017 [Online]. Available: https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/russias-big-plans-for-
air-defense-in-eurasia/ [Accessed: 4th March 2019]; Тезиков, Андрей, Моренков, Владислав. АСУ ОС ПВО 
СНГ: сегодня и завтра. Журнал «Воздушно-космическая оборона» 17 августа, 2014 [Online]. Available: 
http://www.vko.ru/oruzhie/asu-os-pvo-sng-segodnya-i-zavtra [Accessed: 27th June 2016]. 
1530 Старых, Геннадий. ЕСУ ТЗ: время делать следующий шаг. Независимое военное обозрение, 24 
фебраль 2012. 
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TsNIII1531 argued that the communication system of the Russian Armed Forces 
should be developed into an Integrated Automated Digital Communication System 
(ob’’edinennaia avtomatizirovannaia tsifrovaia sistema sviazi) (OATsSS). OATsSS 
was defined as “a communication system that is an organizational-technical combina-
tion of interconnected, technologically joined, advanced automated communication 
systems of different command and control levels (while maintaining their chain of 
command). It would be established by integrating the digital resources of the primary 
and secondary networks of the participants, and by using modern telecommunications 
technologies and protocols to format and transfer messages in a digital form.”1532 
Perov and Pereverzev claimed that similar system had been attempted during the 
1980s with poor results, but now new technology enabled the creation of a system 
based on a single digital form of messages and uniform algorithms which could be 
integrated in the common telecommunications space of Russia through standardizes 
interfaces. OATsSS could be introduced in phases so that the Armed Forces analog-
ical systems could be replaced, and the networks could be connected to the ‘Unified 
network of electronic communications of Russia’ in a controlled way.1533 It should be 
noted that the concept or at least the acronym OATsSS was, in fact, adopted and is 
under construction.1534 
 
Another concept that has been implemented was proposed by retired Major General 
V. F. Samokhin, Colonel V. N. Luk’ianchik and Major A. N. Artiushenko from the 
Military Signal Communications Academy in 2011 who argued that Russian should 
build ‘a military Internet.’ It was to be built on the basis of inter-service and interde-
partmental communication networks, which were to be digitalized and integrated into 
a single information space of the RF Armed Forces. This network would be closed, 
restricted, and technologically autonomous with native DNS and routing services and 
meant for day-to-day administration in the peacetime and for operational use in war-
time. Administratively this network should be based on the organization of military 
districts. The static backbone network and services were to be complemented by field 
communications and air and space assets which would enable warfighting based on 
NCW principles. It would also connect the military to other force structures and agen-
cies.1535 The ‘military Internet’ was claimed to be operational in 2016.1536 
 
The drive to integrate and unify networks accelerated in the 2010s. The military con-
tinued to see the unified information space and NCW as connected and if the Russian 
Armed Forces were to be reformed based on the principles of NCW, then a unified 
                                              
1531 The 16th TsNIII was established in 1923, combined with the 27th TsNII in 2010 and in 2014 again estab-
lished as a separate institution. It is a research and testing institute for the Armed Forces communication sys-
tems and equipment and cooperates with the other institutes of the MoD and the military-industrial complex. 
(Жужома, Валерий Михайлович. 16 ЦНИИИ МО РФ: история и современность. Связь в Вооруженных 
Силах Российской Федерации – 2018. Москва: Информационный мост, 2018, 68-70 [Online]. Available: 
https://army.informost.ru/2018/pdf/29.pdf [Accessed: 4th March 2019].) 
1532 Перов, Е. А., Переверзев, А. В.  О перспективной цифровой системе связи Вооруженных Сил Рос-
сийской Федерации. Военная мысль, № 3 (2008), 7-11, 8. 
1533 Ibid. 
1534 Cf. Chapter 6. 
1535 Самохин, В. Ф., Лукьянчик, В. Н., Артюшенко, А. Н. Перспективы создания военного (боевого) 
интернета в рамках нового облика ВС РФ. Военная мысль, № 8 (2011), 57-64. 
1536 Зыков, Владимир, Рамм, Алексей. В России появился военный интернет. Закрытый сегмент пере-
дачи данных позволяет подразделениям Минобороны безопасно обмениваться секретной информа-
цией. Известия, 19 октября 2016 [Online]. Available: https://iz.ru/news/639221 [Accessed: 18th April 2019]. 
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information space was also required.1537 According to General Gerasimov, the main 
directions of communication systems development were the wide use of advanced 
information telecommunications technologies and the creation of geographically dis-
tributed information banks, and the transition from a hierarchical stovepiped control 
of troops and weapons to a form of distributed network-centric control.1538 Many 
Russian proponents of NCW considered the EIP to be a critical component of the 
concept but were cognizant of the difficulty of integrating the multiple, non-compat-
ible, pipelined, legacy networks of the Russian Armed Forces.1539  
 
The basics of the EIP concept were still being discussed in the late 2010s. Major 
General E. B. Khachenko, Colonel V. G. Ivanov and Professor V. N. Luk’ianchik 
from the Military Signal Communications Academy (St. Petersburg) wrote in 2018  
that the EIP of the Armed Forces required a multi-level territorially distributed or 
zonal communication system covering the entire territory of the Russian Federation 
capable to ensure the continuous exchange and processing of information between 
command posts of all levels.1540 The networks and systems of Russian abroad-de-
ployed forces should become separate fragments of such a system. The system would 
have land-, sea-, air-, and space-based echelons of communications systems with 
static, reserve, field, and mobile components.1541 The interesting point here is that the 
EIP is extended outside the territorial borders of the Russian federation and that it 
was envisioned to be divided into separate zones. 
 
The integrating characteristics of the EIP became more pronounced as the Russian 
environment changed. It was proposed in the context of the military reform that an 
the EIP could connect all the authorities responsible for the procurement of weapons, 
the users of the weapon systems, research institutions, and the OPK.1542 Moreover, a 
vertical and horizontal national security command structure should be created based 
on shared information networks and the ASUs of all power ministries and security 
agencies to respond to new military and non-military threats.1543 Consequently, the 
military required an all-encompassing, automated command and control system. It 
would consist of a decision-making support system, an information-communication 
system and a system to acquire and store information.1544 In 2018 Colonel V. A. Skiba 
                                              
1537 Гареева 2014; Герасимов 2018; Харченко, Е. Б. Проблемы безопасности инфокоммуникационных 
систем Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации. Военная мысль, № 11 (2014), 14-19). 
1538 Герасимов, Валерий Васильевич. Приоритеты развития системы вооружения Вооруженных Сил 
Российской Федерации. Федеральный справочник. Оборонно-промышленный комплекс России, Том 
№ 10, 2014, 117-120 [Online]. Available: http://federalbook.ru/files/OPK/Soderjanie/OPK-10/III/ Gerasi-
mov.pdf [Accessed: 5th March 2019]. 
1539 Воробьев & Киселев 2011; Дульнев, Ковалев & Ильин 2011; Чаднов, А. П. Роль военных сетевых 
технологий Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации при создании и боевом применении высокотех-
нологичных систем вооружения, военной и специальной техники нового поколения. Военная мысль, 
№ 7 (2018), 33-39, 34; Копытко & Шептура 2011; Шептура, Владимир. Единое информационное про-
странство ВС РФ. Защита и безопасность, № 2 (2016), 32-34; Панков & Шевченко 2018; Лаврино & 
Чумичкин 2009. 
1540 Харченко, Е. Б., Иванов, В. Г., Лукьянчик, В. Н. Научно-теоретические положения по построению 
технической основы системы управления Вооруженными Силами Российской Федерации. Военная 
мысль, № 8 (2018), 46-53. 
1541 Ibid. 
1542 Лаврино & Чумичкин 2009. 
1543 Чекинов & Богданов 2015a. 
1544 Выговский, И. И., Давыдов, А. Е. Направления совершенствования организации автоматизирован-
ного управления в военной сфере. Военная мысль, № 9 (2017), 37-42. 
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provided a technological concept for these ideas. It was a national command and 
control system for all military and non-military forces (a unified, interconnected sys-
tem of military and state administration (EUSAPU)) which would be based on leased 
civilian networks, military networks (OATsSS), cloud services, data centres, SDN 
technology, VPNs and virtualized solutions. SDN technology could be used to ensure 
the combat resilience of the services provided by the networks and data centres.1545  
 
Similarly to Skiba, a group of Russian scientists from federal ICT corporations offered 
a clear tribute to Soviet cybernetists in 2017 when they proposed to create a nation-
wide decision support system of automated management systems of complex organ-
izational and technical objects for cosmonautics, nuclear energy, ecology, logistics, 
military applications, etc. These systems offer prognoses and optimal solutions.1546 As 
I. V. Professor Solov’ev and Associate Professor C. M. Zlobin of the Military Acad-
emy of the General Staff argued in 2018, the rise of new centres of power and the 
intensified competition between them required better information cooperation be-
tween the elements of the military organization of the state.1547 Against this back-
ground it is not surprising that a group of scholars from the 4th TsNII1548 of the MoD 
proposed that to counter information-psychological and technological actions ex-
ploiting the vulnerabilities of information-telecommunications and information sys-
tems in the context of ‘hybrid war’, a system to monitor and prevent attacks must be 
built to protect Russian sovereignty.1549 The EIP was thus transforming from an in-
formation sharing network to the ‘information security system’ envisioned by the 
Russian information warfare theorists. 
 
As the military reform initiated in 2009 by the Defence Minister Anatoli Serdiukov 
progressed, the new command structure required new command, control, and com-
munications solutions.1550 The forces of different branches and services were subor-
dinated directly under the command of the military districts and joint strategic com-
mands (OSK).1551 Moreover, the reorganization of territorial defence and its ‘whole-
of-government’ approach required new ways to share information and to command 
forces under different agencies.1552 These needs were recognized by Major General 
Major P. N. Kriazhev,  a professor at the Military Training and Research Centre of 
the Ground Forces, who wrote in 2011 that automated control systems must be in-
terconnected both vertically (at the strategic, operational-strategic, operational, and 
                                              
1545 Скиба, В. А. Синтез информационно-коммуникационного пространства эргатических систем воен-
ного назначения. Военная мысль, № 11 (2018), 39-48, 41. 
1546 Автамонов П.Н., Немыкин С.А., Охтилев М.Ю., Соколов Б.В., Юсупов Р.М. Методологические и 
методические основы разработки и внедрения интегрированных систем поддержки принятия решений 
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2017, 39-48. 
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1548 The 4th TsNII is one of the largest scientific institutions of the MoD and conducts research in the area of 
strategic nuclear weapons and missiles. (Mil.ru. 4-й Центральный научно-исследовательский институт Ми-
нистерства обороны Российской Федерации [Online]. Available: http://ens.mil.ru/science/SRI/ in-
frmation.htm?id=10807%40morfOrgScience [Accessed: 4th April 2019].) 
1549 Антонов et al. 2018. 
1550 Giles, Keir. A New Phase in Russian Military Transformation, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 
27 No.1 (2014), 147-162. 
1551 Кряжев, П. Н. Развитие военно-административной территориальной структуры Вооруженных Сил 
Российской Федерации. Военная мысль № 11 (2011), 30-42. 
1552 Ibid.; Кардаш 2014; Кардаш 2018. 
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tactical level) and horizontally (at the inter-service, and interdepartmental level) and 
that they should enable the mutual exchange of information between all military and 
security authorities. Moreover, they should enable a smooth transition from peace-
time management to wartime operational command and control in any conditions.1553 
Four years later General Gerasimov demanded that the network described by 
Kriazhev should be constructed, and that it should enable centralized and unbroken 
command and control as far as the operational-tactical level, and be able to function 
under difficult conditions and enemy influence.1554 Some even argued that the electro-
magnetic sphere should be taken under centralized and vertical control.1555 
 
The uses envisioned for the EIP transcended purely military-operational issues. The 
EIP was to be a platform upon which a complex of systems for automated collection, 
processing and modification of information would be built to help manage the mili-
tary-industrial complex by connecting different ministries, agencies and companies.1556 
This could, for example, be a ‘unified information space for the military-technological 
policies of the MoD’ (EIP VTP RF) which would enable more efficient management 
of state weapons procurement programmes.1557  Some argued that special purpose 
networks of the military and security services should be physically and logically sepa-
rated from the common telecommunications networks.1558 The principles of open 
communication networks were not acceptable for managing special networks and 
therefore a centralized ASU of these networks was required.1559 These ideas have 
found purchase as a closed management network of the OPK is being built.1560 
 
The establishment of the National Defence Management Centre (NDMC) in 2014 
was a reflection of the above-mentioned ideas. It is meant to be a command centre 
for the Security Council, the General Staff and other federal organs in all situations 
and phases of conflict. According to A. P. Shabanov, a leading researcher at the In-
stitute of the Problems of Informatics at RAN, the NDMC enables a nation-wide 
system of information-analytics ,which in its turn supports the management of many 
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1557 Боков, С. И., Желтухин, П. С., Пьянков, А. А. Основные подходы к созданию единого информаци-
онного пространства военно-технической политики Российской Федерации. Военная мысль, № 4 
(2018), 5-12. 
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other spheres of life than just the national defence.1561 The ideas behind the establish-
ment of the NDMC have also guided the construction of centralized and integrated 
aerospace defence and early-warning radar and satellite networks.1562 It would seem 
that despite the construction of the NDMC, the creation of the EIP for  the Armed 
Forces has advanced slowly and ineffectually. Moreover, the national EIP is being 
independently constructed by different government agencies. Therefore, Lieutenant 
General A. Ia Cherysh and Colonel V. V. Popov have proposed the construction of 
an EIP based on the NDMC which would integrate all the different networks, stand-
ards, and technologies of the power ministries.1563 
 
The EIP is not exclusively a military concept, reserved for the military or offered only 
as a solution to military or security problems. The EIP has been extensively deployed 
to define information networks, abstract or real, that unify subjects and objects of 
information and services and is a virtual reality of social relationships.1564 The EIP 
could have been a hierarchical administrative system of databases to collect infor-
mation for the management of the society.1565 More modestly and concretely, it was 
to be a national public electronic system of documentation and services—similar to 
the electronic government concepts formulated in other parts of the world in the early 
2000s.1566 To summarize, already in 2004 Professors S. V. Konovchenko and A. G. 
Kiselev could argue that the concept of a ‘unified information space’ was being used 
from multiple perspectives: geopolitical, information-noonspherical, social-infor-
mation, and social relations.1567 
 
Practical solutions for the EIP were proposed also on the civilian side, for example 
by the Federal Information and Management Research Centre of the RAS (FITs IU 
RAN).1568 In 2015 A. A. Zatsarinnyi and E. V. Kiselev published a series of articles 
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ния отражением ударов средств воздушно-космического нападения противника. Военная мысль № 9 
(2018), 48-53. 
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about the creation of the EIP of the Russian Federation which they called ‘a mega 
system’. The mega system consisted of multiple systems of coordination, control and 
management which would be used to support strategic planning, centralization of 
scientific-technological development, and monitoring of national security. Techno-
logically, Zatsarinnyi’s and Kiselev’s system would been based on federal and regional 
data centres that would exchange information in a protected environment outside the 
Internet and would access the Internet through one controlled gateway. Information 
exchange would be conducted through the already existing System of Electronic In-
teragency Cooperation (CMEV)—or federal governmental intranet—and there 
would be monitored and protected gateways between open, confidential, and secret 
(closed) resources.1569 In fact, what Zatsarinnyi and Kiselev were describing in theory 
was being already built (cf. Chapter 6).  
 
The ideas connected to the EIP were also carried over to the cyber and information-
technological security issues. By 2011 the Russians were just as worried about the 
vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure as the rest of the world.1570 For example, A. V. 
Kortokov and E. S. Zinob’eva argued that because critical infrastructure is the key to 
public order, economic stability and national security of states, the protection of crit-
ical infrastructure falls within the competence of the state.1571 They argued that the 
information infrastructure should be included in the Russian definition of critical in-
frastructure and objects.1572 In 2015 the FSB declared that it would create a National 
Coordination Centre for Computer Incidents (NKTsKI) which was described as a 
unified, centralized, geographically distributed complex to respond to computer inci-
dents.1573 Russia also adopted laws concerning the CII in 2017 (cf. Chapter 6). Conse-
quently, A. A. Sidak, for example, proposed that a segmented and layered information 
security system should be built. The layers consisted of perimeter protection, data 
network protection, server protection, protection of automated workstations, protec-
tion of application services, and data protection. The segments and layers should form 
a national system of CII protection.1574 
 
The parallel or applied concept of the EIP, ‘the national segment of the Internet’ 
(natsional’nyi segment Interneta), appeared in academic and journalistic sources long 
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before it was introduced officially (cf. below). Even on the official side it appeared 
first outside of Russia. For example, the Model Law on the Basics of Internet Regu-
lation adopted by the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the CIS used the concept of a 
national segment of the Internet in 2011 and defined it based on DNS country code 
top-level domains.1575 The concept of the national segment was used in Belorussia in 
2010 when the President gave an edict (ukaz) titled, ‘On Measures to Improve the 
Use of the National Segment of the Internet’. It defined this segment as “a set of 
information networks, systems and resources connected to the Internet, located on 
the territory of the Republic of Belarus and (or) using the hierarchical names of the 
national segment of the Internet.”1576 The roots of the Russian use of the concept of 
the national segment seem to reside in the idea that the Internet can be divided based 
on language, technology (primarily DNS ccTLDs), and governance.1577 In the unoffi-
cial Russian use, the concept of the national segment seems to have originally referred 
to the governance of the country code top-level domains of the DNS system and of 
the IP -address blocks.1578 Possibly because of the technological framing of the issue, 
the concept of the national segment does not really appear in the Russian military 
journals. Nevertheless, the military was familiar with the concept of the national seg-
ment of the Internet at least from 2009 onwards.1579 
 
The concept of the national segment of the Internet is connected to the emergence 
of the RuNet concept, or the Russian Internet. There is no agreed definition of 
RuNet.1580 Neither is there a definite point of time when RuNet appeared. For exam-
ple, in 2003 Iu. Iu. Perfilev proposed to define it either as the collection of telecom-
munications networks in Russia, the collection of all information resources related to 
the domain zones of .ru and .su, or the collection of all Russian language information 
resources.1581 Nevertheless, it was given a semi-official status as RuNet and awards 
were given in 2004.  The ‘RuNet award’, i.e. ‘a national award for the contribution to 
the development of the Russian segment of the Internet’ is an annual award for the 
best initiatives, applications, and companies issued by the Federal Agency of Press 
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and Mass Communication (Rospechat).1582 As Ristolainen and Kukkola have argued, 
‘RuNet’ represents the ‘sociocultural basis’ for ‘the Russian segment of the Inter-
net’.1583 According Ristolainen, RuNet refers to a relatively closed, online environment 
that is based on the Russian language but includes also a social aspect—a Russian way 
of doing things.1584 RuNet has also been defined by Gorny as “a totality of infor-
mation, communications and activities which occur on the Internet, mostly in the 
Russian language, no matter where the resources and users are physically located, and 
which are somehow linked to Russian culture and Russian cultural identity.”1585 RuNet 
forms a ‘RuNet community’ that provides a sense of belonging to its members 
through the use of common Russian  language social media, news and search engine 
services, most of which are Russian in origin.1586 According to Andrei Soldatov, since 
2012 RuNet has become a more political and also securitized space as the Russian 
state has sought to control it through legislation and censorship.1587 
 
The ‘unified information space’ did not appear in the 2004 Ivanov Doctrine but it 
was implicitly  mentioned in the 2009 NSS which stated that information security 
threats would be prevented by creating a unified information-telecommunications 
support system for the needs of national security.1588 Concomitantly, Associate Pro-
fessor Nikolai Sergeev of the RARAN claimed that the 2009 NSS ordered the creation 
of a national, hierarchical, distributed and specialized system or ‘information manage-
ment system’ (informatsionno-upravliaiuchshaia sistema) which consisted of ‘infor-
mation-analytical centres’ (informatsionno-analiticheskie tsentry) to counter infor-
mation threats and especially Western ‘network-centric warfare’. This vertical system 
should be supported by a horizontal one which connects government organizations 
to society’s structures.1589 The Military Doctrine of 2010 mentions ‘a unified infor-
mation field of the Armed Forces and other military forces’ which would be created 
and would form a part of the information space of the Russian Federation. It also 
mentions ‘information management’ or ’command and control’ systems which would 
be integrated with the automated command and control systems, weapon systems, 
and military command systems of all levels.1590 The 2014 Military Doctrine was as 
sparse on the EIP as the previous ones had been. It noted that the Armed Forces had 
to improve its unified information space as part of the information space of the Rus-
sian Federation.1591 The 2015 NSS used the term ‘single’ or ‘unified’ (edinyi) much 
more freely. It identified a single or unified transportation space, cultural space, sys-
tem for emergency situations, and system for preventing crimes. It did not use the 
terms ‘EIP’ or the ‘national segment of the Internet’.1592 The Information Security 
Doctrine of 2016 introduced the concept of ‘the national segment of the Internet’ by 
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stating that, “The main directions of ensuring information security in the field of stra-
tegic stability and equal strategic partnership are: […] the development of a national 
system for managing the Russian segment of the Internet.”1593 The Doctrine did not 
use the concept of the EIP. It only referred to the ‘unified network of electronic 
communications of the Russian Federation’ the resilience and uninterrupted func-
tioning of which should be ensured in peacetime, in times of threat and during the 
times of war. Although this is a clear reference to a legal concept it is also related to 
the concept of the information infrastructure of the Russian Federation, which is de-
fined to reside on the territory and/or under the jurisdiction of Russia.1594 The foreign 
policy documents did not really touch upon the subject of the EIP more than has 
been already discussed in the context of the interstate struggle and digital sovereignty, 
and it was already noted that the concept of the national segment of the Internet was 
used in CIS documents. 
 
To summarize. The idea of a unified information space has two aspects: civilian and 
military. The civilian aspect has been analysed here less extensively than the military 
one, but it can be argued that they both share the same characteristics of vertical 
control and horizontal integration, centralization, and delimitation of borders. The 
EIP is not merely a space but a system of integrated and standardized communication 
networks and data resources, a system of security and management, and a system of 
operational, political, social and/or economic control and management. The refer-
ence point of the EIP of the Armed Forces was consistently the Western or more 
precisely the doctrinal and technological development of the United States. In some 
cases, the EIP is simply understood as a shared information space or a network in the 
context of NCW. However, it should be noted that the Russian understanding of the 
EIP differs somewhat from the American one because it is connected to the idea of 
territorial and total defence. It encompasses all forces (military and other), national 
leadership, economy, and society. It is geographically bound. It is not originally based 
on a globally projected military network meant for expeditionary operations—alt-
hough that was envisioned as an end-state. Thus, it might be understood as a vertically 
and horizontally integrated system of systems enabling total situation awareness and 
control over the Armed Forces and the state. The EIP as a concept is also a tool for 
forcing the ‘power vertical’ onto cyberspace as the separated networks of different 
ministries and agencies are collected under one management system. Consequently, it 
can be argued that the EIP, with its multiple variations between different academic 
communities, is based on both the Soviet era idea of EIP and on the analysis and 
adaptation of Western, mainly American theory and practice of NCW. 
 
Nevertheless, the EIP, in its civilian or military versions, is not some mystic all-en-
compassing concept. On the most basic level, the EIP is a common information net-
work shared by users. For many of the military journalists it is just a catchword which 
points to an information network that provides total situation awareness and control 
to commanders or top administrators. Furthermore, many texts use the EIP as a syn-
onym for WAN or corporate networks that are mostly based on international stand-
ards and technologies and there is nothing particularly Russian about them. Still, many 
in the military have used the EIP to conceptualize an operational, organizational, and 
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technological system of unified information resources and ASUs which should be 
operational from peacetime to wartime and be organized around the Armed Forces 
command structure. The OATsSS is a one proof that these ideas have been put into 
practise. 
 
Although they are connected concepts in many ways, RuNet and the EIP should not 
be confused. The EIP refers to a defined space which becomes delineated and con-
trolled through state power whereas RuNet is a socio-cultural phenomenon which 
has arisen from below and through the spontaneous interaction of individuals, com-
munities and commercial interests. The official transformation of ‘the unified infor-
mation space’ to ‘the national segment of the Internet’ around the time of the drafting 
of the 2016 Information Security Doctrine is indicative of the how the information 
space was brought into more direct contact with state sovereignty and national secu-
rity interests. There was a clear interaction with the elites and the epistemic commu-
nities as the EIP was debated during the 2000s and 2010s and some ideas were even-
tually put into action. Various institutes and individual scholars offered their views on 
the subject, and it can be argued that these views were usually more grandiose than 
the ones presented in the official strategic level documents or what really materialized.  
 
5.7 Information superiority  
 
Information superiority was a central concept in the Russian understanding of the 
information struggle and war already in the early 2000s. The Russians quite intensely 
followed the Western doctrinal debates about IW and borrowed concepts from it.1595 
Consequently, an information security specialist Sergei Griniaev could argue in the 
early 2000s that information superiority is the ability to collect, process and distribute 
a continuous stream of information about the situation, and to prevent an adversary 
from doing the same. It can also be defined as the ability to designate and maintain a 
pace of operations that surpasses any opponent’s possible pace, thus allowing the 
protagonist to dominate, remain unpredictable, and act ahead of the opponent 
throughout the duration of the confrontation. This is based on a real understanding 
of the situation.1596 Grinaev, among others, was basically introducing Western ideas to 
the Russian speaking audience.1597 However, as was already noted above, information 
warfare had distinct technological and psychological aspects for Russians and so in-
formation superiority also had two aspects. Here I will concentrate on the technolog-
ical part.1598  
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In addition to Griniaev, Fedorova and Tsygichko have claimed that information su-
periority based on the capability to acquire more information, to process it faster, and 
to make more efficiently decisions, will decide future wars.1599 Panarin has claimed 
that states fight in the unified global information space for information superiority.1600 
Manoilo et al. defined information superiority as the ability to collect, process and 
distribute an uninterrupted information flow of the situation, while at the same time 
denying the same from the enemy and doing it faster than the enemy.1601 Vorob’ev 
and Kiselev argued that the enemy could be destroyed without weapons through in-
formation superiority and Nogovitsyn claimed that victory in modern war without 
information superiority was impossible.1602 Moreover, Gorbunov and Bogdanov ar-
gued that information superiority had to be acquired already in peacetime.1603 Generals 
Karpov, Burenin and Ziuzin understood information superiority as the ability to ob-
tain more truthful and accurate data on the situation than the adversary and to obtain 
it faster and, moreover, the ability to utilize this advantage in commanding forces.1604 
These views hardly differ from their Western versions. 
 
Information superiority was connected to informatization which was defined, for ex-
ample, as an organised process of “collecting, transmitting, processing, storing, and 
using information in order to create and use information resources to increase the 
effectiveness of the Armed Forces and meet the information needs of the military 
officials.”1605 Informatization was accompanied by the concept of digitalization, which 
meant updating analogue communication systems and ASUs with modern technol-
ogy.1606 In this context, the feeling that Russia was lagging further and further behind 
the United States was prevalent.1607 It was also understood that superiority was not 
only about technology but also required doctrinal and organizational changes in the 
hierarchical and commander-centred traditions of the Russian Armed Forces.1608 Nev-
ertheless, domestic or “Russian” solutions were proposed from the start—as were 
reinterpreted Western concepts.1609 In 2005, for example, retired Major General Igor 
Sheremet, a professor, member of RAN and member of the Military Industrial Com-
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mission under the Government of the Russian Federation and the Board of the Mil-
itary Industrial Complex of Russia, proposed that Russia should adopt the concept of 
NCW as a system of mean and anti-means and should not concentrate on separate 
technologies of networking, sensors etc.1610 The early Russian theorists were also very 
aware of the fact that the concept of command and control of the NCW did not 
follow traditional hierarchical, vertical models with tight, unbroken control of the 
commander over his subordinates.1611 M. M. Khamzatov, for example, argued implic-
itly that the self-synchronization of units did not mean self-control but the ability to 
share capabilities to achieve the objectives ordered from above in tight cooperation 
with all the other TVD forces.1612  
 
In the early 2000s electronic warfare specialists argued that EW combined with com-
puter attacks, disinformation, and kinetic strikes would provide information superi-
ority in the initial phase of war. Thus, the role of information systems and networks 
built already in peacetime was decisive. Air defence specialists argued for the integra-
tion of all air defence assets, sensors, network and weapon platforms, to achieve in-
formation superiority through improved speed, more comprehensive information, 
and secrecy. However, most specialists were at least a little sceptical of such “Ameri-
can ideas.”1613 The debates about the role of various services, branches and troops in 
relation to information superiority, NCW and IW in general among the military 
should be understood in the context of the military reform and competition for re-
sources. The concept of NCW was officially adopted as a guideline in the so-called 
Serdiukov reforms in 2008.1614 
 
One of the foremost Russian military theorists of NCW is Professor Aleksandr Kon-
dratev of the Academy of Military Sciences. Kondratev has extensively studied the 
Western concept of the NCW and its implementation and argued that the develop-
ment of information technology had led from a platform-centric to a network-centric 
form of warfare which offered synergistic effects.1615 Kondratev disputed the claim 
that the system of NCW had anything to do with the Soviet concepts of RUK and 
ROK—they were instruments of non-contact war. Russia had to comprehensively 
overhaul its doctrines, organizations and military-industrial complex if it wanted to 
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achieve the benefits of NCW. 1616 Kondratev’s views were challenged by Colonel V. 
I. Vypasniak from the 27th TsNII of MoD who saw a direct connection between the 
NCW and RUK/ROK and he argued for vertically and centrally controlled sys-
tems.1617 Somewhat similarly, retired Major General V. F. Samokhin, Colonel V. N. 
Luk’ianchik and Major A. N. Artiushenko claimed in 2011 that the basic military-
administrative unit of the Russian AF was the military district and NCW should be 
applied on this basis. The Russian EIP should connect the territorial nodes of com-
mand and control though digitalized systems.1618 Nevertheless, as an article by retired 
Lieutenant-Colonels V. A. Knizhitskii and V. E: Zav’ialov and Lieutenant-Colonel S. 
M. Savarenkov showed, new ‘universal’ ideas of command and control penetrated 
Russian military thought.1619 The authors basically introduced the U.S./NATO Guide-
lines for Operations as a more flexible and reactive ‘algorithm of command and con-
trol’ without referring any Western sources.1620 
 
In 2010 Vasii Burenok argued that information superiority was not about the amount 
of information but instead about the achievement of a deeper awareness and under-
standing of the situation, a more accurate understanding of the advantages and disad-
vantages of the enemy. It was also the ability to form a plan based on this awareness, 
to immediately communicate decisions to subordinates, and to monitor and control 
their implementation.1621 Basically, Burenok transformed the concept of NCW to cor-
respond to the Russian understanding of command and control and updated it with 
the results of earlier Western self-criticism. Thus, he criticised those Russian views 
that saw automatization and technology as the essence of a network-centric war and 
over-emphasised the meaning of time. For Burenok the human component, i.e. the 
professionalism of subordinate commanders was a critical factor.1622 This importance 
of the human, social and psychological aspects was shared by others.1623 
 
Iurii Borodakii, a lecturer at the Military Academy of the General Staff and a member 
of the Scientific Council of the Security Council of RF also attempted to combine 
Russian theories of command and control and Western ideas of NCW.1624 According 
                                              
1616 Ibid., 96. 
1617 Выпасняк, В. И. О реализации сетецентрических принципов управления силами и средствами во-
оруженной борьбы в операциях (боевых действиях). Военная мысль, № 12 (2009), 23-30, 27. 
1618 Самохин, Лукьянчик & Артюшенко 2011. 
1619 Кижицкий, В. А., Завьялов, В. Е., Саваренков, С. М. Об уточнении содержания терминов “органи-
зация” и “управление” в терминологической системе теории военного управления. Военная мысль, № 
10 (2014), 59-64. 
1620 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). An Introduction to Operations Planning at the Operational 
Level - A summary of the Allied command operations comprehensive operations planning directive, 4 Oct 13 
[Online]. Available: http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2016/sfpdpe/copd_v20_summary.pdf 
[Accessed: 10th March 2019]. 
1621 Буренок 2010. 
1622 Ibid. 
1623 Попов, Игорь. Сетецентрическая война. Красная звезда, № 169 (2012); Зиновьев В.Н., Колдунов 
А.И., Груздев Н.В. Перспективы применения информационных сетей в военном деле. Информацион-
ные войны, №1 (33) 2015, 37-40, 40. 
1624 Бородакий, Ю.В. Информатизация вооруженных сил. Развитие методологических основ построе-
ния информационно-управляющих систем военного назначения. Военная мысль, № 6 (2009), 33-41; 
Бородакий Ю. В., Боговик А. В., Курносов В. И., Лободинский Ю. В., Масановец В. В., Паращук И. Б. 
Основы теории управления в системах специального назначения. М.: Управление делами Президента 
Российской Федерации, 2008. 
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to him and others1625 ‘the Russian version of OODA-loop’ consisted of monitoring, 
analysing, forecasting the situation, making decision, commanding forces, making 
plans, coordinating actions, preparing forces, organizing support for them, and sub-
sequently controlling the implementation of orders.1626 This ‘loop’ was seen by some 
to be based on the principles of resilience (ustoichivost’), continuity (nepreryvnost’), 
efficiency (operativnost’), secrecy and expediency (validity) and undivided and cen-
tralised control.1627  
 
In connection to NCW, Chekinov and Bogdanov have argued that military activities 
should be carried out with increasing intensity in time and space which will deprive 
the enemy of initiative and freedom of manoeuvre. However, as they understand mil-
itary activities as three-dimensional (ob’’emnyi) and having electronic, economic, psy-
chological, informational and kinetic (force) effects, their definition of technological 
and psychological information superiority emphasizes deception and obfuscation. 
Consequently, they argue that information superiority demands the integration of all 
state agencies in a unified system.1628 Others have also associated the principles of 
NCW to the way the defence of the state had to be organized and argued that this 
required tight cooperation between all “49 agencies and ministries” which would form 
the basis for national system of command and control.1629 
 
By 2011, Russian IW and NCW thinking had achieved a state of self-reflection and 
adaptation. Professor A. V. Kopylov analysed the Western criticism towards the con-
cept of NCW and argued that knowing the weaknesses of NCW enabled an opponent 
to use them to its advantage and also allowed the Russian Armed Forces to avoid 
some of the problems the United States had faced when implementing NCW. V. I. 
Kovalev, G. G. Magnitskii and Iu. A. Matvinenko repeated this view in 2015 and 
argued that Russia did not have to prepare for a war dictated by the United States. 
They viewed the NCW as based largely on technology and if Russia could not afford 
it then NCW would be ‘a mental trap’.1630 Similar ideas had been voiced already in 
2008 by A. V. Raskin and V. S. Peliak who argued that information parity could be 
achieved by influencing the global information networks that enabled the United 
                                              
1625 For other who use the ‘cycle of command’ cf. Грудинин, И.В., Майбуров, Д.Г. Содержание и структура 
категории «информационно-управленческий ресурс отражения удара средств воздушно-космического 
нападения противника». Вестник академии военных наук, № 1 (62) 2018, 104-111; Выпасняк, В.И., Тиха-
нычев, О.В. Автоматизированные системы управления войсками (силами): тенденции, методы и пер-
спективы развития. Вестник академии военных наук, № 4 (29) 2009, 61-69. 
1626 The Soviet and Russian concept of command and control (upravlenie voiskami (silami))  has stayed essen-
tially unchanged and was defined in the Military Encyclopaedia of 2007 as ”the purposeful activity of the com-
mand […] to maintain constant combat and mobilization readiness of troops (forces), prepare them for oper-
ations (combat actions) and lead them in carrying out assigned tasks.” (Управление войсками (силами). Во-
енного энциклопедического словаря. М.: Воениздат, 2007 [Online]. Available: http://encyclopedia. 
mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/details.htm?id=10705@morfDictionary [Accessed: 10th March 2019]; Ри-
пенко, Ю. Б., Волков, А. Б. О терминологии в теории управления войсками (силами) и уставных доку-
ментах. Военная мысль, № 8 (2014), 10-18, 11.)  
1627 Анисимов, Е. Г., Анисимов, В. Г., Солохов, И. В. Проблемы научно-методического обеспечения 
межведомственного информационного взаимодействия. Военная мысль, № 12 (2017), 45-51; Бытьев, 
А.В., Смирновa, Л.А. К вопросу о научном понятии «военное управление». Вестник академии военных 
наук № 1 (66) 2019, 43-49. 
1628 Чекинов & Богданов 2015b. 
1629 Скоков & Грушка 2014, 41. 
1630 Ковалев, В.И., Малинецкий, Г.Г., Матвиенко, Ю.A. Концепция «сетецентрической» войны для ар-
мии России: «множитель силы» или ментальная ловушка? Вестник Академии военных наук, 2(51) 2015, 
94-100. 
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States and its allies to fight according to NCW principles.1631 Subsequently, Iu. I. 
Starodubtsev, V. V. Bukharin and S. S. Semenov from the Military Academy of Signal 
Corps proposed an alternative approach on NCW based on Russian cybernetic theo-
ries about ASUs which basically characterized the future warfare as warfare between 
systems.1632 In 2013 Russian scholars V. I. Kovalev and Iu. A. Matvinenko from the 
Academy of Military Sciences argued that NCW was not about new forms and meth-
ods of warfare, or a new paradigm of war, but a functional concept based on the 
principles of command and control of forces and means and thus it might not work 
against a well-prepared state.1633 
 
The dialectical approach present in the above mentioned arguments was ‘operation-
alized’ by I. I. Korolev, V. N. Pavlov and A. V. Ganin in 2013 who argued that infor-
mation superiority could be blocked by a ‘radio electronic information blockade’ 
which would be a complex, multifunctional and adaptive system of EW.1634 The idea 
was further developed in 2017 when researchers from NIII EW VUNTs (re)intro-
duced the concept of command and control warfare. In this context superiority was 
defined as an advantage in the effectiveness and efficiency of command and control 
in relation to a certain situation and opponent and the ability to use EW as a tool of 
counter-C2 warfare.1635 Information superiority was thus replaced by command and 
control superiority. 
 
An additional aspect of information superiority was based on the Russian interpreta-
tion of ‘netwars’ and ‘network wars’ as wars conducted by horizontally organized 
forces that were geographically dispersed, connected by global information networks 
and controlled through them.1636 This approach tended to incorporate the concept of 
‘network-centric warfare’ into itself by transforming the term to mean a warfare using 
and targeting all-kinds of networks, primarily social, with mostly non-military non-
direct means.1637 These ideas gave information superiority its distinct information-psy-
chological and perhaps even social aspect.1638 The element of great power competi-
tion in informatization meant that information superiority would not only be used in 
a military-operational context. Therefore, both civilian and military commentators ar-
gued that Russia needed an information policy that would enable Russia to counter 
the technological-scientific and psychological information superiority of its potential 
                                              
1631 Раскин & Пеляк 2008. 
1632 Стародубцев, Бухарин & Семенов 2012. 
1633 Ковалȍв В.И., Матвиенко Ю.А. «Сетецентрическая» война как новая парадигма вооружȍнной 
борьбы. Информационные войны №2 (26) 2013, 2-9; Ковалев, Виктор, Малинецкий, Георгий, Матви-
енко, Юрий. Концепция «сетецентрической» войны для армии России: «множитель силы» или менталь-
ная ловушка? Экономические стратегии № 5/2013, 40-51. 
1634 Королев, Павлов & Ганин 2013; Донсков, Ю. Е., Морареску, А. Л., Беседин, П. Н. Завоевание пре-
восходства в управлении как цель применения войск радиоэлектронной борьбы в операциях объеди-
нения Сухопутных войск. Военная мысль, № 1 (2018), 28-32. Also, Донсков, Беседин & Ботнев 2017. 
1635 Донсков, Ю. Е., Беседин, П. Н., Ботнев, А. К. Превосходство в управлении - обязательный фактор 
реализации основных закономерностей оперативного искусства. Военная мысль, № 11 (2017), 28-31;. 
Донсков, Морареску & Беседин 2018. 
1636 Раскин, А. В., Пеляк, В. С. К вопросу о сетевой войне. Военная мысль, № 3 (2005), 21-27. 
1637 Герасимов, Н. Н., Шакирова, Е. Ю. Социально-сетецентрические войны современности: реаль-
ность информационной эпохи. Военная мысль, № 10 (2017), 79-87. 
1638 Савин, Л. В. Сетецентричная и сетевая война. Введение в концепцию. Москва: Евразииское движе-
ние, 2011; Татаринов, В.В. Элементы сетецентрической защиты. Вестник Академии военных наук, № 1 
(42) 2013. 
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adversaries even in peacetime.1639 Thus the concept became part of the great power 
competition 
 
The connection between kibernetik ideas and the Western NCW doctrine was not 
lost to Russian commentators and scholars.1640 By 2012 the leading Russian NCW 
theorist Aleksandr Kondrat’ev argued the West had, if not stolen, then at least bor-
rowed the ideas of Marshal Ogarkov.1641 Petr Cherkassin claimed that, firstly, NATO 
had stolen the Soviet ‘Maneuvr’ automated command and control system and, sec-
ondly, that Western systems were developed for aggressive, offensive actions—con-
trary to Russian defensive needs.1642 Others claimed that the Russian Evgeni Messner 
(1891-1975) was the true creator of networked warfare.1643 Furthermore, some argued 
that the American concepts contained nothing new, and that people remained at the 
heart of military action, not machines.1644 Military historian Vasilii Mikriukov even 
managed to thrice change his views on NCW until he finally argued on a Russian 
theory of command and control.1645 
 
The 2004 ‘Ivanov Doctrine’ notices the importance which foreign armed forces place 
on information superiority and is clearly designed to guide the Russian Armed Forces 
in the same direction.1646 However, in later documents the emphasis of NCW and 
information superiority is more muted. The term of superiority was used in the NSS 
of 2009 and the Military Doctrines of 2010 and 2014 in connection to the great power 
competition and strategic weapon systems, and the “politics of some leading countries 
directed at the achievement of superiority in the military sphere.”1647 Superiority on 
land, at sea and in space, in addition to strategic surprise and the resilience of state 
and military command and control, were seen as decisive factors in achieving military 
objectives in war.1648 The 2015 NSS omitted the term altogether.1649 Neither was it 
used in official foreign policy documents. The Information Security Doctrine of 2016 
noted information superiority only implicitly arguing that “the state of information 
security in the field of strategic stability and equal strategic partnership is characterized 
                                              
1639 Прудников, Д. П. Государственная информационная политика в области обороны: исходное опре-
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by the desire of individual states to use technological superiority to dominate the in-
formation space.”1650 However, the document made it explicitly clear that differences 
in information-technological and psychological capabilities between states were stra-
tegic issue of balance of power. 
 
To summarize. Information superiority is a central concept and idea for understand-
ing the importance the Russian military and security scholars and elites have placed 
on information warfare. In the timeframe of 2000-2018 the interest in information 
superiority was based on the need to reform the Russian Armed Forces, and the the-
ory of NCW seemed to offer a successful and proven way to achieve it. The defence 
and security elites bought into these ideas, which was apparent in the objectives of 
the Serdiukov’s military reform. By the 2010s, Russian scholars were quite familiar 
with the NCW and its Western self-criticism and, consequently, began themselves to 
approach the NCW more critically. This led to the further study and development of 
the idea of information superiority on the one hand and to the study of the vulnera-
bilities of the NCW solutions on the other hand. The result was, firstly, an emphasis 
of knowledge, understanding, and efficiency of command and control, instead of the 
quantity and speed of information. Secondly, the Russians began to develop counter-
NCW theories around 2008-2012. From 2013-2014 onwards the idea of information 
superiority and the principles of NCW appeared in the context of strategic planning, 
mobilization and state security. Thus, they had ascended from the tactical level to the 
strategic and subsequently acquired an increasingly Russian outlook with the emphasis 
of centralized control and vertical and horizontal synchronization. The ideas of infor-
mation superiority and the EIP were therefore more and more intertwined. 
 
The chronology presented above is a simplification of a complex process. It has in-
cluded heated debates about the nature of the NCW and the relevancy of information 
superiority in winning a war. The NCW was variously described in terms of means 
and methods, or as tactics, a doctrine or theory of command and control, philosophy 
or a paradigm. The concept of information superiority is important for Russians be-
cause it seems to explain why the West has been militarily so successful, and what the 
West did to the Soviet Union and was doing to Russia and other countries, and so 
offered an explanation and solutions for future warfare and the broader interstate 
struggle. Later, this approach developed into criticism towards adopting Western con-
cepts in Russian military thought. Information superiority as a real phenomenon was 
not disputed but the NCW’s applicability to the Russian way of conducting war was. 
Moreover, ‘netwars’ and Western concepts altogether were seen by some as an insid-
ious political technology to subvert the Russian society and weaken its military. 
 
There is also a geopolitical version of information superiority and the NCW. This 
version points to an important Russian idea: Information superiority is not only about 
the quality or speed of the flow of information, it is more about the result of the ability 
to manipulate the adversary already during the time of peace. Superiority is as much 
about processes as it is about space—superiority over the minds of the people over 
certain territory or at least the ability to influence an important segment of that pop-
ulation. Thus, information superiority is not only about information. It has techno-
logical and psychological aspects and political, social, economic and military effects. 
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It can appear on any level of political and military action from international politics 
down to tactical warfighting level. Moreover, this superiority is based on scientific, 
technological, economic and spiritual potential, and the ability to control information. 
 
Information superiority is related to the Soviet and Russian theory of command and 
control. This is apparent in the way the Russian theory of the cycle of command was 
compared with Boyd’s theories. Information superiority is also related to other stra-
tegic cultural ideas. It is connected to the interstate struggle as it is seen as something 
that the main competitor or adversary is striving to achieve already in peacetime. From 
this follows that information superiority, its denial or conquest, becomes part of stra-
tegic deterrence. Moreover, the strategy of denial is connected to the control of the 
EIP and the national segment. Ultimately, as Russian scholars admit that Russia is 
weaker than the United States in information technology, an asymmetric response is 
required. The last two ideas of information-technological warfare and automated 
command and control systems give substance to the means and ways information 
superiority can be achieved. 
 
5.8 Information-technological warfare  
 
The examination of previous studies and the analysis of other strategic cultural ideas 
above and in Chapter 4 has shown that the Russian understanding of information 
warfare has two aspects: technological and psychological. It was also established that 
the means and objectives of information warfare change depending on the state of 
interstate relations and the level of analysis from military tactical to geostrategic. Here 
the idea of information-technological warfare in all its variants is analysed more ex-
haustively. 
 
Russian ideas on information-technological warfare were well developed by the end 
of the millennium. An article in ‘Vobrosy Bezopasnosti’ (Issues of security) in 2000 
claimed that the creation of a unified global information space had generated concerns 
that ‘information-cybernetic technologies’ would be used to attain foreign policy and 
military objectives, and that they opened up the prospect of a new arms race.1651 The 
article claims that information weapons were first used in the Gulf War and it provides 
a list of information-technological weapons such as computer viruses, logic bombs, 
means of suppressing telecommunications networks and the falsification of infor-
mation, and supply-chain attacks. Information weapons were “designed to achieve 
information superiority, as well as to damage information, information resources, pro-
cesses and systems; to improve traditional weapons and to create new types of weap-
ons and military equipment deployed for direct military impact against the enemy; to 
incapacitate civilian objects and life support systems; to disorganize public administra-
tion; to organize economic chaos and sabotage; to damage national financial systems 
based on information and computer networks; and to influence the population psy-
chologically in order to socially destabilize society.” According to the article, the prop-
erties of information weapons were, among others, universality, radicalism of effects, 
and accessibility. These are economical, their use is easily disguised, and the identity 
of the user is hidden. They are not affected by geographical distances or state borders, 
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and they can be used in secret without a declaration of war and even without the 
target knowing it is under attack. They are also difficult to counter. Information weap-
ons, the article claims, change the character of military conflicts, may destabilize the 
strategic stability, and empower criminals and terrorists (non-state actors).1652 The ar-
ticle could very well have been written by the leading Western cyber warfare theorists 
of the time. 
 
Professor Vitalii Tsygichko voiced similar alarmism when he argued in 2004 in an 
article named “Weapons akin to nuclear”1653 that the interaction of informatization, 
globalization, and geopolitical developments were creating new global threats. 
Tsygichko claimed the American experts believed that information-technological 
weapons would provide an advantage over those countries that do not have them. 
Moreover, the weapons would enable the termination of a confrontation even before 
active kinetic hostilities. Accordingly, Tsygichko claimed that information weapons 
could therefore be used as weapons of mass destruction, for pressuring, and for de-
terrence like nuclear weapons.1654 These arguments were also were akin to the con-
temporary Western views. 
 
By 2008 the Military Academy of the General Staff had collected and produced at 
least one public dictionary of information (cyber) terms. In it information-technolog-
ical effects/actions/influence (vozdeistvie) was defined as “a complex of computer 
programs (software) and radio-electronic means, aimed at manipulating the function-
ing of information-technological objects and also at suspending (hindering) their ac-
tivity or putting them out of order for a defined period of time.”1655 Objects included 
information-telecommunications systems and communications networks, industrial 
systems, and other services. Information-technological weapons could be used against 
equipment (tekhnika) and were divided to strategic (state resources – strategic opera-
tion), operational (operation at the TVD level) and tactical (combat action level) 
weapons.1656 However, the definitions of the General Staff were not publicly used by 
the Russian Ministry of Defence.1657  
 
A less ‘kinetic’ view was offered by retired Colonel Professor V. I. Lutovinov from 
the Russian Presidential Academy of Public Administration, later RANEPA, who ar-
gued in 2009 that information-technological means belonged to the strategy of indi-
rect actions.1658  In his view the strategy would be applied in the opening of hostilities, 
in covert operations, and in the securing of defence secrets. These functions were the 
responsibility of the SVR, FSB and GRU. Lutovinov defined the objectives and tasks 
of IW to include collecting information about the adversary, disrupting enemy plans 
and command and control systems, planting disinformation, protecting information 
resources, and neutralizing the information resources of the adversary on strategic, 
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женных Сил Российской Федерации в информационном пространстве, 2011 [Online]. Available: 
http://ens.mil.ru/files/morf/Strategy.doc [Accessed: 30th January 2019]. 
1658 Лутовинов, В. И. Развитие и использование невоенных мер для укрепления военной безопасности 
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operational and tactical level to gain information superiority.1659 Basically Lutovinov 
argued that information-technological operations belonged to the secret services and 
the special forces. 
 
The interest in the foreign use of cyber concepts became acute when the United States 
created its Cyber Command in 2010 and subsequently adopted the Department of 
Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace in 2011.1660 Basically, the Russians were 
trying to understand the concepts used by their great power competitor. Ultimately, 
their understanding of the subject was not so different—they just avoided the word 
cyber and wrote about information-technological warfare and information space.1661 
This was apparent in a round-table discussion of cyber security experts organized in 
2013 by Nezavisimaia Gazeta.1662 M. V. Iakushev from the PIR Centre argued that 
cyberspace was related to the electronic environment and digital signals, and conflict 
in cyberspace consisted of state or state-proxy actions in cyberspace which would lead 
to physical destruction or death. An independent military expert D. N. Kandaurov 
defined cybernetic warfare (protivoborstvo) in terms of computer (apparatno-pro-
grammyi)1663 attacks on computerized military and civilian systems of ASUs, aimed at 
disrupting their normal functioning. M. M. Khazmatov argued that cyber means and 
operations could decide the result of a conflict if the target did not have defensive 
capabilities. However, no war could be conducted through cyberspace alone. I. M. 
Popov argued against understanding cyberspace as a new ‘theatre of military action’ 
as it should be understood only in terms of computers connected by networks used 
to accumulate, store and circulate data. Popov argued that actions in networks were 
characterized by their high tempo, possibly non-destructive effects and non-attribu-
tion, unrestricted scope of effects, unpredictability of enemy actions, and the threat 
of catastrophic effects.1664 Cyber terms were clearly familiar to these experts and their 
rejection of the concept of a cyber war reflected the thinking of the Western theorists. 
Furthermore, at least some Russian scholars by the 2010s were ready to accept that 
information-technological actions had primarily enabling and supporting effects 
through information superiority, instead of direct strategic effects.1665 This did not, 
however, mean that Russia and the West would or could officially agree upon infor-
mation and cyber security terms.1666 
                                              
1659 Ibid., 4-8. 
1660 The U.S. Cyber Command. U.S. Cyber Command History [Online] Available: https://www.cyber-
com.mil/About/History/ [Accessed: 3rd May 2019]; The United States Department of Defence. Department 
of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, July 2011 [Online]. Available: 
https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/ISPAB/documents/DOD-Strategy-for-Operating-in-Cyber-
space.pdf [Accessed: 13th March 2019]. 
1661 Паршин, С. А., Гобачев, Ю. Е., Кожанов, Ю. А. Кибервойны – реалная угроза национальной без-
опасности? М.: КРАСАНД, 2011; Чекинов & Богданов 2012a; Макаренко & Чукляев 2014. 
1662 Независимое военное обозрение. Война в киберпространстве: уроки и выводы для России. Круглый 
стол в редакции “Независимого военного обозрения”. Независимое военное обозрение. № 46 (787) 
2013 [Online]. Available: http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2013-12-13/1_war.html [Accessed: 4th April 2019]. 
1663 The Russian term ‘apparatno-programmyi’ is usually translated into English as ‘software and hardware’. 
This is not in fact accurate as the term refers to a elements such as BIOS chips, processors, industrial control 
systems, and telecommunication equipment. It is more akin to programmed hardware than software as such. 
1664 Ibid. 
1665 Горбачев, Юрий. Кибервойна уже идет. Независимое военное обозрение, № 13 (754) 2013. 
1666 The confusion over terminology is evident in the efforts to find common ground between the American 
and Russian use of different terms and concepts (Godwin et al. 2014). Western efforts to define cyber warfare 
issues, i.e. the Tallinn Manual, which was published in 2013, was mostly received by the Russians negatively as 
a ‘NATO document’. (Кранс, Максим. Кибероружие в арсенале НАТО. Независимое военное обозрение, 
№ 21 (762) 2013.). 
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The above examined debates were taking place in a time when the Russian govern-
ment had begun to discuss of the necessity of creating cyber troops. The idea was first 
voiced by vice-premier Dmitrii Rogozin in the March of 2012. In 2013 Interfax re-
ported that a Russian Cyber Command would be created in 2014 as a new branch of 
the Armed Forces “for operations in the virtual space both in peacetime and in war-
time.”1667 The issue of cyber or information troops was debated amongst military 
scholars. Major General and Professor Vladimir Zolotarev argued that a new kind of 
troops were needed because new ‘information-network war’ aimed at transferring de-
fender’s strategically important resources to the geopolitical aggressor. This type of 
war would be fought in geographic, economic, ideological and network dimensions 
and the main task was to hinder access to reliable and truthful information.1668 Zolo-
tarev’s views were supported, among others, by Konstantin Sivkov who argued that 
because IW was a complex issue it required a systematic approach—not such a frag-
mented approach as the U.S. was taking by creating a separate military command. On 
the contrary, Russia required a unified, centralized organ of information warfare com-
mand, i.e. the General Staff of Information Security of Russian Federation under the 
Information Security Ministry.1669  
 
In 2014 Major General Igor’ Sheremet summarized the developments of the ‘global 
information infrastructure’ over the last twenty years.1670 He claimed that the evolved 
infosphere now exposed ‘the technosphere’ and ‘the anthroposphere’ to new threats 
as it connected everything to everything. Sheremet divided information security into 
technological and psychological areas, the former of which he also called cybernetic. 
Cyber security was defined as “the safety of the material and information objects of 
the technosphere, that is, their protection from threats realized through the use of 
special information technologies for destruction or for the illegal use of these ob-
jects.” In this context, states were trying to affect each other’s information infrastruc-
ture while protecting their own.  Sheremet conceded that Russia was lagging other 
world powers in technology, but it could catch up. Russia should protect its own 
technosphere’s resilience (ustoichivost’) and security by continuously monitoring the 
technosphere and identifying and neutralizing threats. It should also ensure the man-
ageability (upravliaemost’) of the state institutions and the population in the case of 
systemic destruction of critical infrastructure. Sheremet argued that these tasks, in the 
form of a ‘mega-project’ ensuring the resilience and security of the Russian techno-
sphere should be given to the Ministry of Defence.1671 Later in 2019 Sheremet wrote 
about the ‘cyber threats’ threatening Russian ‘socio-technological systems’ which 
could cause a catastrophic fall of society, financial collapse, and a change in military-
technological parity—just like the use of nuclear weapons. Russia would only be saved 
                                              
1667 Независимое военное обозрение. В бой идет новый род войск. Кибероперации приравняли к нане-
сению ядерного удара. Независимое военное обозрение, № 7 (938) 2017. 
1668 Золотарев, Владимир. Психологическая война уже в киберпространстве. Войска информационных 
операций способны обойтись без применения военной силы. ВПК, № 16 (484) за 24 апреля 2013 года; 
Золотарев 2013a. 
1669 Сивков, Константин. Хуже иприта Информационные средства ведения борьбы уже можно прирав-
нивать к оружию массового поражения. ВПК, № 31 (499) за 14 августа 2013 года; Сивков, Константин. 
Четвертое измерение войны. Каким должен быть Генеральный штаб информационной безопасности. 
ВПК, № 39 (752) за 9 октября 2018 года. 
1670 Шеремет 2014a. 
1671 Шеремет, Игорь. Киберугрозы России растут — часть II. Ситуация в этой области изменяется в 
лучшую сторону гораздо медленнее, чем того требует развитие геополитической обстановки. № 6 (524) 
за 19 февраля 2014 года. 
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through fully domestic hardware and software production and by creating a new ‘class 
of cybertariatom’, that is, a digital age working class.1672 
 
As has been seen in previous chapters, many Russian scholars took a more systematic 
approach to the information threats than just creating new troops and weapons to 
answer new threats. This became more evident during and after 2014. One of the 
more ambitious and theoretical models of society’s information security system was 
presented by V. V. Tsyganov and Iu. G. Bochkareva in 2014. They defined it as “a 
hierarchical adaptive self-organizing system with two types of functions: the adaptive 
management of public safety objects and the development of public safety subjects 
through self-organization.”1673 This system would have multiple levels and subsys-
tems. It would have adaptive subsystems that would enable it to react to changes in 
the environment and functional subsystems that would enable it to react to different 
threats.1674 In effect Tsyganov’s and Bochkarev’s model would have transformed the 
Russian state into a cybernetic system for controlling public security. 
 
V. K. Novikov, a professor of the RVSN Academy offered a more philosophical ap-
proach.1675 He argued that information permeated everything and thus information 
warfare (bor’ba) was a confrontation in peace and war time between two or more 
sides (systems) that try to attack the opponent’s information resources while protect-
ing their own information resources. Novikov divided the weapons used in this war-
fare into information technological, psychological, and reconnaissance. The first 
group included means of radio suppression (EW), functional destruction (EW, EMP, 
laser, ‘special program-technical means’), changing the conditions of radio wave prop-
agation, and electromagnetic degradation.1676 Another systematic approach was of-
fered by S. I. Makarenko, an associate professor at the Department of Networks and 
Communication Systems of Space Systems and a professor of the Academy of Mili-
tary Sciences, who in 2017 described his vision of information conflict as a dynamic 
model of a bidirectional information conflict. It consisted of two (or more) multilevel 
organization-technical systems which tried to affect each other through information-
telecommunications space with hardware-software and radioelectric means. The sys-
tems had subsystems of surveillance and observation, control, action (vozdeistvie), 
and information, and they used surveillance, capturing of resources, and blocking of 
resources to affect each other in constant struggle.1677  
 
The cyber or information-technological issues discussed among the military scholars 
were not limited to direct warfare. Supply-chain vulnerabilities were highlighted by 
the researchers from the 18th  TsNII of the MoD1678 and Internet anonymizers and 
                                              
1672 Шеремет 2019. 
1673 Цыганов & Бочкарева 2014, 65. 
1674 Ibid. 
1675 Новиков, В. К. Информационное оружие – оружие современных и будущих войн. М.: Горячая ли-
ния-Телеком, 2013. 
1676 Ibid. 
1677 Макаренко, С. И. Динамическая модель двунаправленного информационного конфликта с учетом 
возможностей сторон по наблюдению, захвату и блокировке ресурса. Системы управления, связи и 
безопасности №1 (2017), 60-97. 
1678 The 18th TsNII specialises in the research of protected and secret communications, satellite and long-range 
communications and polymaterials. (Петелин, Герман, Баринов, Владимир. Разведка Минобороны тре-
бует от ученых неустойку в 30 млн рублей. Главное разведывательное управление отстаивает в суде свои 
права. Известия, 15 марта 2013 [Online]. Available: https://iz.ru/news/546680 [Accessed: 5th April 2019]; 
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crypto currencies were seen by some as a part of the U.S. State department policy of 
the Freedom of the Internet1679—which was aimed at keeping other states open and 
vulnerable to American influences. The new technologies had the power to change 
the balance of power.1680 By 2012 the Russians were debating the protection of indus-
trial control systems from cyber-attacks. For example, professor Iu. A. Matvinenko 
of the AVN wrote an article on the subjects by using only Russian language sources 
on critical infrastructure protection. He defined a ‘cyber strike’ as a weapon for infor-
mation-psychological operations to destabilize the target state for geopolitical pur-
poses. The strike had psychological components such as disinformation and PR cam-
paigns and technological components to penetrate and affect automated industrial 
control systems.1681 Despite the growing shared understanding of the need to protect 
the CII, the lack of official terminology and unresponsive Russian government poli-
cies were criticized in 2013-2016.1682 
 
The basic concepts of Russian IW thought created in the 1990s survived into the 
2010s. A. A. Bartosh repeated the views of Tsymbal in 2016 as he  categorized infor-
mation war into broad and narrow variants where the latter was military confrontation 
in the information sphere targeting information infrastructure.1683 Moreover, Profes-
sor I. A. Kryglova, a senior research fellow from RAS,  argued in 2016 that a new 
form of geopolitical information warfare had appeared and it was directed against the 
information security of the state. It consisted of information-technological actions 
against information-technological systems and, conversely, their protection, and in-
formation-psychological actions against the psyche of elites and the population and 
their protection. Information-technological warfare is part of military operations and 
used against communication networks and centres to disorganize the command and 
control of the enemy and suppress its will to fight.1684 
 
Kryglova’s article highlights the Russian way of defining information warfare through 
‘who is doing what to whom’. Thus, the concept of information-technological warfare 
                                              
Балыбин, С.В., Белов, Е.Н., Федорец, В.Н. Информационная безопасность военной техники, исполь-
зующей интегральные схемы иностранного производства. Военная мысль № 12 (2011), 11-21). 
1679 The President of the United States. International strategy for cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Open-
ness in a Networked World, 2011 [Online]. Available: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/ rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf [Accessed: 14th March 2019]. 
1680 Роговский, Евгений. Новое кибероружие. Станут ли электронные деньги средством поражения. Не-
зависимое военное обозрение, № 8 (796) 2014. 
1681 Матвиенко Ю.А. Комплексная информационная атака типа «киберстачка» на промышленную авто-
матизированную систему: анатомия явления и подходы к защите. Информационные войны №1 (21) 
2012, 85-94. 
1682 Борисов, Сергей. СОИБ. Безопасность критической информационной инфраструктуры (КСИИ), 
13 Августа, 2013 [Online]. Available: https://www.securitylab.ru/blog/personal/sborisov/32175.php 
[Accessed: 14th March 2019]; Калашников, А. О. Управление информационными рисками объектов кри-
тической информационной инфраструктуры Российской Федерации. Вопросы кибербезопасности 
№3(4) 2014, 35-41; Муравник В.Б., Захаренков А.И., Добродеев А.Ю. Некоторые предложения по под-
ходу и порядку реализации политики и стратегии импортозамещения в интересах национальной без-
опасности и укрепления обороноспособности Российской Федерации. Вопросы кибербезопасности 
№1(14) 2016, 2-8; Массель Л.В., Воропай Н.И., Сендеров С.М., Массель А.Г. Киберопасность как одна 
из стратегических угроз энергетической безопасности России. Вопросы кибербезопасности №4(17) 
2016, 2-10. 
1683 Бартош, А.А.  Адаптивные стратегии информационной войны (Часть 1). Вестник академии военных 
наук, № 2 (55) 2016, 85-93; Thomas 2001. 
1684 Крылова, И.А. Информационные войны и безопасность России. Информационные войны №3 (39) 
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is used when discussing Russian information or cybernetic theory, and cyber warfare 
when discussing American strategies, concepts, and actions.1685 Thus in contrast to 
Kryglova, Vorob’ev and Kiselev argued that the West could use ‘cyberspace’ for elec-
tronic invasion into Russia by using destructive attacks against networks, systems, and 
information. They claimed that warfare in ‘cyberspace’ was a new level of military 
confrontation, now in the electronic sphere, and the United States had for same time 
strengthened its superiority in ‘cyberspace.’1686 
 
Others used the cyber-prefix more objectively. Retired General-Lieutenant B. I. Kuz-
netsov, Colonel Iu. E. Donskov and Lieutenant-Colonel O. G. Nikitin from the In-
stitute of EW of the Gagarin Air Force Academy claimed, “Cyberspace is an integral 
part and the material basis of another, more general, information space.”1687 Cyber-
space consisted of infrastructure and information circulating in it and as an element 
or dimension of the battlespace (boevoe prostranstvo) it defined new forms and 
methods of battle and thus would influence the processes of battle, for example,  by 
affecting command and control.1688 In 2011 Colonel P.I. Antonovich, an associate 
professor of the Faculty of EW of the Combined Arms Academy of the Armed 
Forces of the Russian Federation, argued that cyberspace was a virtual space because 
it described systems which were not altogether material.1689 Cyber-attack was an action 
against cybernetic systems, information resources or information infrastructure and a 
weapon gained its effectiveness through the vulnerability of the target.1690 Although 
Antonovich offered a definition of cyber war he argued that it was a theoretical con-
struct and in real life it would be better to talk about military actions is cyberspace or 
cybernetic warfare (protivoborstvo).1691 
 
The idea that cyber warfare involved ASUs was expressed by Professor B. I. Vy-
pasniak from the Academy of Military Sciences, and O. V. Tikhanychev and V. R. 
Gakhov from the 27th TsNII of the MoD.1692 They listed kinetic (ognevoi), radio elec-
tronic, and cyber threats as the means of damaging ASUs. These means could mate-
rialize through backdoors, cyber sabotage (intentional actions by personnel), and re-
mote attacks using software, EW, kinetic effects, exotic weapons, and hacking 
through networks.1693 V. V. Kabernik from MGIMO also used ASUs in defining dif-
ferent types of cyber weapons. He distinguished four types based on their complexity 
and autonomy.1694 Clearly by 2013 Russian scholars were becoming more systematic 
in their analysis of information-technological means of warfare but also closer to the 
                                              
1685 Cf. Тихонов, М.Н., Богословский, М.М. Кибернетические войны и информационная безопасность. 
Атомная стратегия, № 104 (2015), 15-20; Гриняев 2000; Паршин, Гобачев & Кожанов 2011; Иванов, Вла-
димир. Армия США готовится к кибервойне. Независимое военное обозрение, № 6 (984) 2018; Дылев-
ский, И. Н., Комов, С. А., Коротков, С. В., Петрунин, А. Н. Операции в киберпространстве: вопросы 
теории, политики и права. Военная мысль, № 8 (2011), 72-78. 
1686 Воробьев, И. Н., Киселев, В. А. Киберпространство как сфера непрямого вооруженного противо-
борства. Военная мысль, № 12 (2014), 21-28, 25. 
1687 Кузнецов, В. И., Донсков, Ю. Е., Никитин, О. Г. К вопросу о роли и месте киберпространства в 
современных боевых действиях. Военная мысль № 3 (2014), 13-17, 15.  
1688 Ibid. 
1689 Антонович, П. И. О сущности и содержании кибервойны. Военная мысль, № 7 (2011), 39-46. 
1690 Ibid., 42. 
1691 Ibid., 45.  
1692 Выпасняк, В.И., Тиханычев, О.В., Гахов, В.Р. Кибер-угрозы автоматизированным системам управле-
ния. Вестник Академии военных наук, № 1 (42) 2013, 103-109. 
1693 Ibid., 108. 
1694 Каберник, В.В. Проблемы классификации кибероружия. MGIMO 2 (29) 2013, 72-78. 
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way the English-speaking cyber security specialists defined and categorized cyber 
threats. 
 
The way the idea of information-technological warfare is formulated is fundamental 
to the discussion about who should be responsible for it. As was noted in Chapter 4 
EW troops were put forth as a one possible candidate at least in wartime.1695 EW was 
connected to IW in Russian military thinking early on through the potential to affect 
command and control communications as both the weapon and target systems be-
came more complicated.1696 EW was ‘fitted’ to the new theories of IW. For example, 
Makarenko defined modern NCW to consist of electronic warfare and information 
confrontation where the latter was further divided into psychological and technolog-
ical aspects.1697 For others, EW was about reconnaissance, warfare, and maskirovka 
(deception). Therefore, the general argument was that the concept of information 
could be attached to the target list of EW troops and thus they could be transformed 
to cyber troops able to acquire information superiority.1698 
 
The concept of resilience of (critical) information infrastructure has appeared in many 
of the sources analysed in this and the previous chapter and is central to understand-
ing the defensive side of information-technological warfare.1699 In Chapter 4 it was 
argued that the Russian term ‘ustoichivost’’ could be translated to mean resilience or 
resiliency—both are derived from the adjective ‘resilient’.1700 It was also noted that 
‘ustoichivost’’ was one of the four requirements for command and control, others 
being continuity, efficiency, and secrecy. Furthermore, the Information Security Doc-
trine of 2016 states that one of national interests of Russia is “the ensuring of resilient 
(ustoichivost’) and uninterrupted (bespereboinoi) functioning of the information in-
frastructure, primarily the critical information infrastructure of the Russian Federation 
[…] and the unified telecommunications network of the Russian Federation, in peace-
time, during the immediate threat of aggression and in wartime.”1701  
                                              
1695 The theoretical ruminations about EW, IW and cyber must be understood in the context of the EW troops 
trying to strengthen their position in the Armed Forces. Cf. Никитин, О. Г. Направления повышения эф-
фективности организации боевого применения войск радиоэлектронной борьбы в операциях объеди-
нений Сухопутных войск. Военная мысль, № 5 (2017), 23-29; Андреев, В. В., Никитин, О. Г., Марасанов, 
А. В. Особенности методического обеспечения обоснования состава органов управления разнород-
ными силами и средствами радиоэлектронной борьбы объединений Сухопутных войск. Военная мысль, 
№ 6 (2017), 51-54.  
1696 Горбачев 2004. 
1697 Макаренко, С.И. Информационное противоборство и радиоэлектронная борьба в сетецентриче-
ских войнах начала XXI века. СПб.: Науко-емкие технологии, 2017. 
1698 At least according to the “year books” of EW troops they had not been tasked with cyber or information-
technical tasks by 2018 (Ласточкинб Ю. И. (ред.) Радиоэлектронная борьба в Вооруженных Силах Рос-
сийской Федерации – 2018. Москва: Информационный мост, 2018 [Online]. Available: https://reb.infor-
most.ru/2018/sod.php [Accessed: 14th March 2019]). On the arguments cf. Ильин, А. П. Шакин, Д. Н. К 
вопросу о месте радиоэлектронной разведки, радиоэлектронной борьбы и радиоэлектронной маски-
ровки в информационной борьбе. Военная мысль, № 1 (2008), 25-30; Кузнецов, В. И., Донсков, Ю. Е., 
Коробейников, А. С. О соотношении категорий “радиоэлектронная борьба” и “информационная 
борьба”. Военная мысль, № 3 (2013), 14-20; Балыбин, В. А., Донсков, Ю. Е., Бойко, А. А. О термино-
логии в области радиоэлектронной борьбы в условиях современного информационного противобор-
ства. Военная мысль, № 9 (2013), 28-32; Горбачев 2013. 
1699 Федорова & Цигичко 2001, 11-13; Дербин 2007 & 2009; Расторгуев 2014, 73-77; Стрельцов 2015, 163. 
1700 Resilience. Oxford Dictionary. [Online]. Available: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/resilience 
[Accessed: 15th March 2019]; Resilience. The Cambridge Dictionary [Online]. Available: https://dictionary. 
cambridge.org/dictionary/english/resilience?q=resiliency [Accessed: 15th March 2019]. In this thesis I will use 
the form resilience. 
1701 Указ Президента РФ 2016b. 
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Makhutov et al. have defined ‘ustoichivost’’ in the context of critical infrastructure as 
follows: “A system that is resilient (ustoichivyi) to extreme influences must meet the 
following requirements: survivability, (zhivuchest’), i.e. the ability to function and to 
a certain extent perform the prescribed functions in the presence of local damage 
arising from extreme influences; redundancy, (izbytochnost’), i.e. the availability of 
redundant links, alternative load transfer routes and redundant elements that may be 
involved in an emergency situation; resource availability, (resursoobespechennost’), 
i.e. availability of resources in the system that can be used in case of extreme exposure; 
the ability to quickly recover, (sposobnost’ k bystromu vosstanovleniiu) determined 
by the interval of time during which damage can be repaired, that is, to restore the 
system and reach the nominal level.”1702 A more formal definition can be found in the  
Russian national standard on risk management which states that the resilience of an 
organization is its ability to adapt in a complex and changeable environment.1703  
 
In 2016 representatives from the PIR Centre and the Information Security Institute 
of MGU used a trinity of Russian terms—stabilnost’, bezopasnost’ and ot-
kazoustoichivost’—to refer to the Western concepts of stability, security and resili-
ence when writing about Internet governance.1704 The definition of resilience is taken 
from ICANN and is “the capacity of a system to effectively withstand/tolerate/sur-
vive malicious attacks and other disruptive events without disruption or cessation of 
service.”1705 The writers do not explain where they derive the term ‘ot-
kazoustoichivost’’ from although it has similarities to concepts of dependability 
(nadezhnost’), reliability (bezotkaznost’) and durability (zhivuchest’).1706 The Russian 
national standard ГОСТ Р 56111-2014 defines ‘otkazoustoichivost’’ in English as 
“failure-related durability1707 and ГОСТ 28806-90 defines it as “fault tolerance”.1708 
Accordingly, it can be argued that neither ‘ustoichivost’’ or ‘otkazoustoichivost’’ truly 
capture the Western definitions but they are similar enough to denote the same idea 
of preparing for, withstanding and recovering from an outside negative influence on 
a system. However, Igor Sheremet has used the term ‘ustoichivost’’ to denote the 
English terms of sustainability and resilience and argued that in the context of ‘soci-
otechnical systems’ and digital economy resilience means the ability of a system to 
fulfil its function under a successful cyber-attack. Sheremets’ definition allows for a 
certain degradation of services until the attack has been neutralized.1709 
 
Both Military Doctrines of 2010 and 2014 recognized the importance of the infor-
mation infrastructure and information technology in the military sphere but do not 
explicitly discuss information-technological warfare. Nevertheless, a comparison of 
                                              
1702 Махутов, Н.А., Резников, Д.О., Петров, В.П. Особенности обеспечения безопасности критических 
Инфраструктур. Безопасность в техносфере, №1 (январь–февраль), 2014, 3-14. 
1703 ГОСТ Р 51897-2011. Менеджмент риска. Термины и определения. Дата введения 2012-12-01 [Online]. 
Available: http://docs.cntd.ru/document/gost-r-51897-2011 [Accessed: 15th March 2019]. 
1704 Медриш, М.А. (ред.) Стабильность, безопасность, отказоустойчивость глобальной инфраструктуры 
Интернета: технические и правовые вопросы. Москва - Лос Анджелес: ПИР-Цеитр, 2016, 17-18. 
1705 Ibid., 18. 
1706 Ibid., 19. 
1707 ГОСТ Р 56111-2014. Интегрированная логистическая поддержка экспортируемой продукции воен-
ного назначения [Online]. Available: http://cals.ru/sites/default/files/downloads/56111_.pdf [Accessed: 
15th March 2019]. 
1708 ГОСТ 28806-90. Качество программных средств. Термины и определения [Online]. Available: 
https://meganorm.ru/Data2/1/4294825/4294825913.pdf [Accessed: 15th March 2019]. 
1709 Шеремет 2019, 9-10. 
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these two documents makes it clear that the more recent one emphasizes the military 
aspects of information technology and expresses the need for cooperation with allies. 
Both documents associate information technology with deterrence and both express 
concern for the vulnerability of systems of management and command and control. 
Russia is thus presented as a non-aggressive defender. It is noteworthy that these 
documents do not make the explicit difference between technological and psycholog-
ical information warfare—which the 2004 Ivanov Doctrine did.1710 The 2009 NSS is 
quite explicit in stating that threats to the national information-telecommunications 
infrastructure and critical objects of infrastructure are threats to national interests.1711 
The 2015 NSS makes the same points with more emphasis. It also connects infor-
mation technology to national security and interests which is understandable in the 
context of Western sanctions. The 2015 Strategy is perhaps more ‘psychologically’ 
than ‘technologically’ oriented. The 2013 Foreign Policy Concept states as one of its 
priorities the strengthening of international security to counter threats in the infor-
mation space arising from the hostile use of ICT.1712 The 2016 Foreign Policy Concept 
follows the same lines although it emphasises the “equitable internationalization of 
the control of the information-telecommunications network Internet.”1713 Perhaps 
more important in the international context than the Foreign Policy Concepts are the 
Basics of Government Policy in the Area of International Information Security 
adopted in 2013 which clearly states that information technology is an issue of strate-
gic parity and, therefore, the hostile use of information and communication technol-
ogy is a threat to Russia.1714 
 
The Information Security Doctrine of 2016 states that one of the basic negative fac-
tors influencing information security, which is a part of national security, is the use of 
information-technological actions (vozdeistvie) for military purposes. Information 
technology can be used to inflict damage to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and 
social and political stability of Russia. Other states can use their technological superi-
ority to dominate the information space. One of the strategic goals of the Russian 
federation is the protection of the CII which can be affected by information-techno-
logical means. For the defence of the country a system of information security will be 
created, and it will be built on the principles of vertical and centralized control. Alt-
hough the Doctrine does not explicitly define information-technological and psycho-
logical aspects of IW, it is clearly built upon them and uses both terms.1715 
 
To summarize. The idea of information-technological warfare is very much related to 
the idea of interstate (information) confrontation. Therefore, the discussion here 
should be approached in the context of the material analysed in Chapter 5.2. It is quite 
possible that the categorization of information warfare or struggle into technological 
and psychological aspects comes from the ex-KGB and FSB people who served dur-
ing the Cold War in various cryptography and signal intelligence positions and taught 
                                              
1710 Указ Президента РФ 2010; Доктрина 2014; The Defence Ministry of the Russian Federation 2004. 
1711 Указ Президента Российской Федерации 2009. 
1712 Концепция 2013. 
1713 Указ Президента РФ 2016a. 
1714 Основы. Основы государственной политики Российской Федерации в области международной ин-
формационной безопасности на период до 2020 года (Утверждены Президентом Российской Федера-
ции В.Путиным 24 июля 2013 г., № Пр-1753) [Online]. Available: http://www.scrf.gov.ru/security/ infor-
mation/document114/ [Accessed: 30th March 2019].. 
1715 Указ Президента РФ 2016b. 
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at security service and military academies. At least the categorization appears early-on 
in their texts and ends up in official documents which have been partly drafted by 
them. A direct connection is, of course, difficult to prove. 
 
Information-technological activities and warfare are partly defined by their psycho-
logical counterpart which includes mass media, social media, and the Internet as a 
means. Psychological warfare often uses technological means, but an inverse relation-
ship is not so common. Arguably, the psychological aspect is almost always present 
in the texts of the Russian IW scholars and it is more directly connected to the political 
goals of modern and future confrontation or war than its technological counterpart—
thus the technological aspect is slightly secondary to the psychological. Both are 
rooted in the rise of the information society but also to the Soviet past—the psycho-
logical aspect is related to the theories of reflexive control, deception, and maskirovka, 
and the technological aspect to reconnaissance strike and fire complexes 
(RUK/ROK), command and control warfare, and EW. Computers and computer 
networks were incorporated into the technological aspects and social media and the 
Internet to the psychological aspects when the information revolution really kicked-
off in the 1990s.   
 
The Russian debate on information-technological warfare draws heavily on Western 
and particularly American concepts and theories. The early views were quite like the 
‘strategic cyber war’ ideas of, for example, the RAND Corporation and Gregory J. 
Rattray.1716 Furthermore, the Russians later discarded the idea of cyber war like their 
Western counterparts and concentrated on analysing different information-techno-
logical means, forms and effects, which might be used in warfare but also outside of 
it. Ideas about defence migrated towards cybernetic systems theories whereas ideas 
about offensive concentrated on categories of different attacks. By the end of 2010s 
these included kinetic (precision), software, hacking, electromagnetic, EMP, laser and 
other exotic means of attack. Thus, the idea of information-technological warfare is 
much broader than its Western counterpart of cyber warfare. Moreover, the divide 
between offensive and defensive measures is not as black-and-white as perhaps in the 
Western thinking (up until late 2010s). Many Russian scholars see information warfare 
as an interaction between systems during peace and wartime where offensive and de-
fensive actions are difficult to separate.  However, military sources have been quite 
consistent in arguing that information-technological warfare and means have an ex-
plicit role in the context of actual warfare. These means are directed against the will, 
decision-making capabilities, infrastructure, and armed forces of the opponent to 
achieve different effects in different phases of confrontation depending on the objec-
tives.  
 
The problem, and perhaps a source of confusion, is that the discussion about infor-
mation-technological threats and the responses to them has been affected by geopo-
litical theories and ideologies on the one hand and institutional battles for authority 
and resources on the other. Cyber (technological) events have been interpreted 
through the lens of great power competition and an anti-globalization ethos. There-
fore, the proposed solutions to threats have combined the technological and psycho-
logical aspects with political, economic, military and cultural elements and the results 
                                              
1716 Molander, Riddile & Wilson 1996; Rattray 2001. 
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have been things like ‘information troops’ and ‘national information security systems.’ 
Even if this use of an all-encompassing concept of information is a version of double-
talk and deception on the part of the Russian authorities, it still leaves even Russian 
scholars and experts confused about the real state of the Russian information-tech-
nological capabilities. This confusion is exacerbated by the ‘politically correct’ use of 
the term cyber and information depending on whose operations a particular scholar 
is writing about. Whereas cyber is the work of ‘the adversary’, information confron-
tation is an interactive state-to-state relationship in which Russia, as a great power, 
takes part even if reluctantly. Thus, although many Russian scholars have conceded 
that the United States had acquired temporary dominion or superiority in cyberspace, 
they did not recommend passive defence. The use of weapons should be varied and 
flexible. Defence should be built upon the resilience, continuity, efficiency and secrecy 
which would guarantee the information-technological foundation for information su-
periority. 
 
5.9 Automated command and control systems  
 
The concept of an automated management or command and control system has re-
tained its relevancy in the Putin era. The Military Encyclopaedia of 2001 offers a def-
inition for the automation of command and control (avtomatizatsiia upravleniia 
voiskami/silami) (ASUV(S)) and definitions for its sub-concepts automated system 
of command and control of battle systems (weapons) (avtomatizirovannaia sistema 
upravleniia boevymi sredstvami) (ASU BS), automated systems of command and con-
trol of communication (avtomatizirovannaia sistema upravleniia sviazi) (ASS or 
ASUS), and automated systems of command and control of troops (avtomatizirovan-
naia sistema upravleniia voiskami/silami) (ASUV). Basically, automation means the 
use of computers in the process of command and control, i.e. gathering information, 
making decisions, giving orders, making plans, and controlling the implementation of 
tasks.1717  
 
The ASUV is a complex man-machine system based on the collecting, processing and 
transmitting information to enable the efficient control of its objects, that is, troops, 
forces, weapon systems etc. through the use of calculating machines, i.e. computers 
and special technologies. This system is supposed to increase the efficiency (opera-
tivnost’), reliability (nadezhnost’), flexibility (gibkost’) and secrecy (skrytnost’) of the 
process of command and control. Efficiency is defined by speed, reliability by conti-
nuity of control, flexibility by the ability to quickly adapt to changes in the organiza-
tion and secrecy by confidentiality of information.1718 The ASUS is part of ASUV and 
an aggregate of interconnected automated networks, nodes, lines of communication 
and systems of command and control organized according to single or unified plan 
to enable the command and control of troops.1719 The ASU BS is defined as a man-
                                              
1717 Горкин, А. П., Золотарев, В. А., Карев, В. М., Манилов, В.Л., Милованов, В. И.  Военный энцикло-
педический словарь в двух томах. Москва:  Большая Российская энциклопедия, 2001, 27. 
1718 Ibid., 29. 
1719 This system operates based on the principles of constant readiness (postoiannaia gotovnost’), survivability 
(zhivuchest’), noise immunity (pomekhoustoichvost’), reliability (nadezhnost’), throughput (propusknaia 
sposobnost’), reconnaissance-resistance (razvedzachshichshennost’), mimic resistance (imitostoikost’), mobility 
(mobil’nost’), timeliness (svoevremennost’), and secrecy (skrytyi) and reliable (dostovernyi) transmission of in-
formation. Ibid., 28. 
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machine system which is based on computational technology to collected information 
for optimization of primarily fire control resolutions.1720  
 
These definitions have basically been retained in the current 2007 version of the Mil-
itary Encyclopaedia.1721 ASUV is defined as an organizational-technological complex 
of technical means designed to increase the effectiveness of control by automating 
the basic processes of command and control. It collects information about the situa-
tion (friendly and enemy), offers decision-making support, transmits orders and col-
lects information of their implementation.1722 The definition of ASUS uses the term 
‘core or backbone network’ instead of single or unified plan and highlights the mod-
ern capabilities of the system. The principles of operation have changed to constant 
readiness, stability, mobility, high bandwidth, secrecy and security of communication. 
The ASS of AF RF is supposed to be based in the future on the Integrated Automated 
Digital Communication System (OATsSS).1723 The definition of ASU BS now includes 
a mention of the capability to manage groups of weapon systems on the tactical, op-
erational, operational-strategic and strategic level including long-range precision 
weapons. Its principles are efficiency, reliability, noise resistance and survivability.1724 
ASUs are much more than computers and networks. They are complex systems with 
inherent rules and principles connected to their organizational and hierarchical envi-
ronment. ASUs have a predetermined, goal-oriented and contextual functionality. 1725 
 
The ASU concept also has civilian definitions. It is defined in the government stand-
ards as “a system consisting of personnel and a complex of automation equipment 
for personnel’s activities, or implementing information technology for the perfor-
mance of set functions.”1726 The type of the system depends on its purpose and the 
system consists of multiple subsystems designed for different functions. The Great 
Encyclopaedic Dictionary defines an automated system of management as “a set of 
mathematical methods, technical means (computers, communication devices, infor-
                                              
1720 Ibid., 28. 
1721 Автоматизация управления войсками. Военного энциклопедического словаря. М.: Воениздат, 2007 
[Online]. Available: http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/details.htm?id=2639@morfDiction-
ary [March 17th 2019]. 
1722 Автоматизированная система управления войсками (силами). Военного энциклопедического сло-
варя. М.: Воениздат, 2007 [Online]. Available: http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/ de-
tails.htm?id=2643@morfDictionary [March 17th 2019]. 
1723 Автоматизированная система связи. Военного энциклопедического словаря. М.: Воениздат, 2007 
[Online]. Available: http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/details.htm?id=2640@morfDiction-
ary [March 17th 2019]. 
1724 Автоматизированная система управления боевыми средствами. Военного энциклопедического сло-
варя. М.: Воениздат, 2007 [Online]. Available: http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/ de-
tails.htm?id=2642@morfDictionary [March 17th 2019]. 
1725 Автоматизированная система управления войсками и оружием (АСУ В и О). Соловцов, Н. Е., Шлыч-
ков, В. Р. (Общ. ред.) Энциклопедия ракетных войск стратегического назначения. М-во обороны РФ. 
М.: Белгород, 2009 [Online]. Available: http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/details.htm?id 
=12536@morfDictionary [March 17th 2019]; Буренка В.М (Общ. ред.) Толковый словарь в области воен-
ного управления, связи и информационных технологий: Военно-теоретический труд. М.: РАРАН, 2017, 
11-12. 
1726 ГОСТ 34.003-90. Информационная технология. Комплекс стандартов на автоматизированные си-
стемы. Автоматизированные системы. Термины и определения. 1992-01-01 [Online]. Available: 
http://docs.cntd.ru/document/gost-34-003-90 [March 17th 2019]. 
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mation display devices, etc.) and organizational complexes ensuring rational manage-
ment of a complex object (process) in accordance with a given goal.”1727 The Law on 
the Security of the Critical Information Infrastructure of the Russian Federation de-
fines ASU as “a set of software and hardware designed to control technological and 
(or) production equipment (control devices) and the processes they produce, as well 
as to manage such equipment and processes.”1728 Thus, in the realm of cyber security, 
ASUs are a hypernym for all controlling devices, functions and processes with various 
amounts of autonomy to achieve a given task. ASUs are still very much rooted in the 
cybernetic and systems analytic thinking. 
 
The discussion about ASUs continued in the military journals during the Putin era 
and arguably was intensified when Serdiukov’s military reform and rearmament pro-
gram began to gather steam. Between 2001-2002 Colonel I. A. Grachev, Vice-Direc-
tor of 27th TsNII, authored or co-authored multiple articles under the title ‘Informati-
zation of the Armed Forces’.1729 He argued that information technology (IT) should 
enable the unity of control both vertically and horizontally. Intellectualization of in-
formation management should make command and control more efficient in the ever 
more complex situation—this included analysing, modelling and forecasting situa-
tions. Grachev conceptualized special mathematical and programmatic support (sys-
tem) for troops which should support the whole cycle of command and control in-
cluding forecasting if required on all levels of command. The system should have 
been tailored according to the organization using it and should be built on a function-
ally hierarchical modular basis. Grachev’s ideas show how Russian military scholars 
were adapting to the information era but still hanging on to the Soviet era dreams of 
integrated systems that would be able to ‘scientifically’ forecast the future. Grachev’ 
articles also reveal how there were many similarities between ASUs and American 
automated battle-management systems despite dissimilar and foreign terms.1730  
 
In 2006 Captain of 1st rank V. R Grin’ proposed a conceptual approach to efficiently 
develop ASUVs. He argued that the ASUVs consisted of technological, programmatic 
(software), mathematical, information, linguistic, ergonomic support, and information 
protection tools.1731 Grin basically defined ASUVs through subsystems, principles, 
and goals. His article points to official technical Russian military standards adopted in 
2005-2006, which show that the Armed Forces were actively engaged in conceptual-
izing modern ASUs. Later, in 2012, Grin’ together with Iu. H. Golubev and A. V. 
                                              
1727 Автоматизированная система управления. Прохоров, А. М.  (Гл. ред.) Большой энциклопедический 
словарь, 2000 [Online]. Available:  https://dic.academic.ru/contents.nsf/enc3p/ [March 17th 2019]. 
1728 Федеральный закон 2017. 
1729 Грачев, И. А., Каргин, В. Н. Информатизация вооруженных сил. информационные технологии в 
автоматизированных системах военного назначения. Военная мысль, № 6 (2001), 19-22; Грачев, И. А. 
Информатизация вооруженных сил. к вопросу об информационно-методической согласованности мо-
делей военных действий. Военная мысль, № 2 (2002), 53-57; Грачев, И. А. Принципы построения спе-
циального математического и программного обеспечения АСУ войсками (силами). Военная мысль, № 
6 (2002), 64-68. 
1730 For the American views at the turn of the millennium cf. Ullman, Harlan K. and Wade, James P. (eds.) 
Shock and Awe - Achieving Rapid Dominance. Washington: National Defence University, 1996; Khalilzad, 
Zalmay and M., White, John P. (eds.) The Changing Role of Information in Warfare. Santa Monica: RAND, 
1999; Alberts, David S., Garstka, John J., Hayes, Richard E. and Signori, David A. Understanding Information 
Age Warfare. Washington, D.C.: CCRP, 2001. On the comparison of the Russian ESU TZ  and American 
FBCB2 cf. Богданов, Попов & Иванов 2014; Выпасняк &Тиханычев 2009. 
1731 Гринь, В.Р. Информатизация вооруженных сил. Качество и безопасность автоматизированных си-
стем управления войсками (силами): единство целого и частного. Военная мысль, № 12(2006), 26-31. 
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Shrialov, all from the 27th TsNII, argued that the introduction of ‘information’ to the 
scientific lexicon had muddled previous theoretical and technological terms and con-
cepts. The concept of ASU as a closed system with fixed requirements of automation 
was not suited for a network-centric environment. Grin’ et al. wanted to replace the 
concept of ASU, with the concept of information infrastructure which signified the 
reality that all command and control is now dependent on information technology 
with horizontal networks and uniform rules.1732 A similar worry about the terms and 
concepts was expressed in 2011 by a group of researchers from TsNII EISU1733 who 
argued that from the 1960s to the 1980s Russia had already had ASUs and now the 
same mistakes were being repeated, i.e. each service and branch was creating its own 
incompatible systems.1734 
 
The issue Grachev and others were writing about had already been noted by the Rus-
sian MoD as the 2000 Military Doctrine and the Actual Tasks of the Development of 
the AF RF in 2003 required the development of automated systems of command and 
control.1735 The deplorable state of the Russian Armed Forces vis-á-vis the United 
States was also noted by the commentators and this was considered to be a critical 
vulnerability.1736 As the interest in ASUs and ASSs grew so did the number of articles 
about their Soviet and Russian era history.1737 By 2010 then-Prime Minister Putin took 
a personal interest in the development of ASUVs as their development had not met 
expectations during the last ten years.1738 Consequently, the Director of the Military 
Academy of the GS General-Lieutenant Anrdei Tret’iak was ready in 2012 to admit 
that the transfer to new ASUs had no scientific basis and was difficult because the 
systems of services and branches were not interoperable.1739 Around 2015 the prob-
lems of creating interoperable ASUs for the Armed Forces were still openly discussed 
but not after that.1740 
 
                                              
1732 Ibid., 51. 
1733 The Central Research Institute for the Economics of Informatics and Management Systems (TsNII EISU) 
was established in 1969 to research and support the management of the OPK. It was transferred in 2010 from 
the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation to the Ministry of Defence. Currently its main 
task is officially to develop the technical base for the systems of command and control of the Armed Forces 
(ASU TOSU VS). (ЦНИИ ЭИСУ [Online]. Available: http://cniieisu.ru/ [Accessed: 5th April 2019]). 
1734 Толмачев, А.П., Баранюк, В.В., Тютюнников, Н.Н. Информационное обеспечение управления Во-
оруженными силами Российской Федерации. Вестник академии военных наук, № 3 (36) 2011, 102-105. 
1735 Военная доктрина Российской Федерации 2000 г. (Шаклеина 2002); Красная звезда 2003. 
1736 Красная звезда. Актуальные задачи развития вооруженных сил Российской Федерации. Красная 
звезда, 11 октябя 2003; Растопшин, Михаил. Как управлять войсками и оружием? ВПК, № 22 (39) за 16 
июня 2004 года; Маслов, Алексей. Чтобы нейтрализовать военные угрозы. ВПК, № 7 (223) за 20 февраля 
2008 года; Постников, Александр. Время “автоматизированных” войн. Независимое военное обозре-
ние, № 1 (2010). 
1737 Безель, Яков. Этапы развития АСУ авиацией и ПВО. Воздушно-космическая сфера, № 4 (2014), 23-
27; Моренков, Владислав, Тезиков, Андрей. Исторический аспект развития АСУ ПВО. Воздушно-кос-
мическая сфера, № 1 (2015), 59-64. 
1738 Мясников 2010. 
1739 Фаличев, Олег. Интервью начальника академии Генштаба А. Третьяка. ВПК, 10 декабря 2012 
[Online]. Available: https://vpk-news.ru/articles/13536 [Accessed: 18th March 2019]. 
1740 Иванов, Валерий. Поршневое управление. Чтобы достичь прорыва в разработке межвидовой АСУ, 
Минобороны должно сделать ставку не на кустарей, а на государственниковвпк. ВПК, № 33 (599) 2-8 
сентября 2015 года; Павлов, Вячеслав. «СКАЙНЕТ», которого нет. Создание автоматизированной си-
стемы управления Вооруженных сил РФ – залог победы в современной войне. ВПК, № 39 (605) 14 –20 
октября 2015 года. 
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Practical problems did not stop theoretical work. In 2013 V. V. Kolodiazhnyi, Iu. E. 
Kuleshov and H. P. Shekhovtsov, provided a concept of a three-dimensional struc-
ture of command and control composed of hierarchy, services and functions. This 
structure was combined with the cycles of preparing for military action, conducting 
military action, and fighting, from which they derived three circuits of command and 
control with different interconnected functions. Kolodiazhnyi et al. then argued that 
their model gave theoretical grounds for creating at least two distinct ASUs, i.e. a 
decision-support system and battle command and control system.1741 On a more ‘stra-
tegic level’ in 2012 professor V. I. Orlianskii, retired Colonel P. A. Dul’nev and Colo-
nel A. N. Kostenko VUNTs RF argued that the creation of the EIP of the AF RF 
was necessary for the further development of command and control and for the adop-
tion of ‘network-centric’ warfare. They argued that the EIP was not a space as such, 
but an instrument of real-time command and control created through unified data-
bases, networks, command posts, common C2 software and information—a Univer-
sal Automated Command and Control System (UASUV). This system could be used 
to command anything from a battle up to a whole conflict. Despite utilizing elements 
of NCW, it is clear Orlianskii et al. refuted the ideas of NCW and instead preferred a 
unified, hierarchical command.1742 Based on the above ideas, it would seem that the 
ideas of the EIP and ASU began to coalesce into a comprehensive cybernetic system 
at least in the minds of some military specialists. 
 
In 2014 Iu. Ia. Bobkov and N. N. Tiutiunnikov, both former employees of the 27th 
TsNII and currently employed by the private sector, wrote a book called Conceptual 
basis of building an ASU for the Ground Forces of the AF RF.1743 Bobkov and Tiuti-
unnikov argued that Zhukov and Ogarkov had discovered the principles of NCW but 
that the American model of NCW was not suitable for Russia: it was considered of-
fensive in nature.1744 Russia had its own theory of command and control based on the 
cybernetic theoretical work done in the 1970s which would provide a theoretical base 
for Russian NCW.1745 Bobkov and Tiutiunnikov proposed, in addition to an asym-
metric response (cf. above), that ASUVs should be developed as integrated systems 
of systems operating in automated or automatic modes. This meant that the EIP of 
the AF should, in principle, be an integrated ASUV with weapons, forces, and sensors. 
This EIP/ASUV should be based on multiple reserve communication channels, com-
mand posts and strategic-operational countermeasures, i.e. missiles, UAVs and EW 
capabilities.1746 Despite their criticism, Bobkov’s and Tiutiunnikov’s vision was based 
on the United States’ Global Information and Control Network not some imaginary 
‘Skynet.’1747  
                                              
1741 Колодяжный, В.В., Кулешов, Ю.Е., Шеховцов, Н.П. Методический подход к совершенствованию 
автоматизации управления войсками: информационный аспект. Вестник академии военных наук, № 1 
(42) 2013, 109-115. 
1742 Орлянский, В. И., Дульнев, П. А., Костенко, А. Н. Универсальная автоматизированная система 
управления войсками - принципиальное условие успешного ведения сетецентрических войн. Военная 
мысль, № 12 (2012), 12-20, 18. 
1743 Бобков, Ю. Я., Тютюнников, Н. Н. Концептуальные основы постарения АСУ Сухопутными вой-
сками ВС РФ. М.: Палеотип, 2014. 
1744 Ibid., 27-28. 
1745 Ibid., 31. 
1746 Ibid. 
1747 The replication of the GICN was supported by the military-industrial complex. Скокова, С.И. Сетецен-
трическая система управления ВС РФ и необходимые меры по ускорению развития АСУ войсками (си-
лами). Вестник академии военных наук, № 1 (46) 2014, 52-54, 52. 
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S. V. Morozov, O. A. Kudrenko and R. S. Dolin took a more operational-strategic 
level approach and analysed the requirements of the ASU and EIP of a military dis-
trict. They noted, among other things, that it should be able to integrate the infor-
mation resources of the troops (units) in a changing environment where centralized 
data centres were out of reach. Moreover, it should also enable the exchange of in-
formation with other military and security forces (agencies). Morozov et al. used the 
phrase ‘centralized and noncentralized automated command and control’ as an ex-
pression for the fact that their EIP did not include NCW-type self-synchronizing 
semi-independent units.1748 Others also had grandiose visions of ASUs and the EIP, 
for example, for repulsing aerospace attacks on an operational-strategic level.1749 On 
a tactical level, the ESU TZ ASU was defined by others as a multifunctional distrib-
uted system built on a single information and technical basis, observing the principles 
of hierarchy, i.e. compliance with the organizational and staff structures of a tactical 
unit, openness and simplicity.1750  
 
In 2015 a group of scholars from the 27th TsNII proposed a concept for building an 
information infrastructure for the ASU of the whole Armed Forces which they named 
a ‘corporative automated information system’ (KAIS).1751 It would support territorially 
separated transmission networks and data centres and be able to flexibly change its 
functions from peacetime, to times of threat and to wartime. This system of systems 
should be built on the modern principles of data management (cloud) and virtualized 
user environments. Its subsystems would consist of computational complexes, data 
storage, and systems of information security, physical security and maintenance. The 
KAIS would have a central data centre for providing common AF RF services and its 
reserve (warm) and secure (cold) nodes and a regional data centre would provide ser-
vices for regional force groups. The main and reserve data centres should be geo-
graphically separated but connected with high-bandwidth connections—making the 
system disaster-proof. Like the OATsSS concept of E. A. Perov and A.V. Pereverzev, 
the KAIS concept may have influenced the way the Russian military is now construct-
ing its networks (cf. Chapter 6).  
 
In 2017, M. O. Bets, V. A. Kiselenko and C. C. Orlov claimed that under the Main 
Directorate for the Development of Information and Telecommunications Technol-
ogy of the MoD, there already existed a functional Territorially Distributed Disaster-
Proof Centre of Data Processing for the AF RF (TrKTsOD VS RF), which was based 
on cloud-technology and geographically distributed data-centres.1752 Bets et al. called 
it ‘our fortress in cyberspace’ which through the EIP enabled the achievement of 
information superiority. This ‘military cloud’ could in the future include quantum 
                                              
1748 Морозов, С. В., Кудренко, О. А., Долин, Р. С. Основные направления развития автоматизированных 
систем управления военного округа. Военная мысль № 4 (2018), 29-34. 
1749 Грудинин & Майбуров 2018. 
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computers, more advanced tools for managing big data etc.1753 According to the MoD, 
this network of military district-based data centres should be operational by 2020.1754  
 
People from civilian institutions also had ideas about ASUs in the military or national 
security contexts. Professor Elena Veduta, Head of the Department of Strategic Plan-
ning and Economic Policy for the Faculty of Public Administration of MGU, for 
example, argued that Russia must avoid the Soviet mistakes of the OGSU but that 
the ‘kibernetik’ ideas were in themselves still useful and Russia had the chance to 
create a kibernetik economy by harnessing the digital revolution and its massive 
amounts of data.1755 The Soviet roots behind the ‘sovereign Internet’ draft law were 
also noted by the Russian Internet ombudsman Dmitrii Marinichev.1756 A group of 
engineers and scholars proposed in 2017 that an automated system of management 
of decision-making support for complex organizational-technological systems (SPPR 
ASU SOTO) should be created. It would basically be a national-level military and 
security monitoring, modelling, forecasting and decision support system. According 
to the group, Russia would have to create this system if it wanted to remain an inde-
pendent state.1757 In a similar nation-level approach, a group of professors and associ-
ate professors from the Krasnodar Higher Military Academy presented three different 
classifications for protecting national information infrastructure. These included: 
moving physically away from the opponent, controlling impact channels, and control-
ling the information streams. They judged the first to be outdated in the context of 
information societies, the second always to lag behind the attacker, and the third to 
be the most promising. It would be based on some sort of system-to-systems of com-
munications.1758 Around 2018 intelligent information systems and language processing 
had entered the discussions on automated systems.1759 AI could, according to Vasili 
Burenok, offer adaptability, self-learning and intuition in comparison to static algo-
rithms of ASUs.1760 Kokoshin has argued that AI could enhance ISR capabilities, sit-
uation analysis, filtering of disinformation and even the ability to detect imminent 
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surprise attacks. Thus, the military-political leadership would be guaranteed maximal 
situation awareness.1761 
 
Official and public national security documents rarely refer directly to ASUs. The 
Military Doctrine of 2009 mentions the increasing efficiency of command and control 
as a result of the transition from a strictly vertical command and control system to a 
global network of automated control systems. It also notes “the creation of basic in-
formation management systems and their integration with weapons control systems 
and complexes of automation equipment for command and control of organs of stra-
tegic, operational-strategic, operational, operational-tactical and tactical levels.”1762 
The 2014 Military Doctrine repeated the need to create automated systems and stated 
that one of the characteristics of modern military conflicts was “the increasing cen-
tralization and automation of command and control of troops and weapons as a result 
of the transition from a strictly vertical control system to global networked automated 
systems of command and control of troops (forces) and weapons.”1763 The Infor-
mation Security Doctrine of 2016 mentions as one of directions of the national infor-
mation security the improvement of the automated command and control systems of 
the military.1764 Arguably, ASUs have a distinct presence and role in the national secu-
rity documents as integral instruments of national power. 
 
To summarize. ASUs, ASSs and ASUVs are inherently Soviet and Russian concepts. 
They make concrete the idea of systemic and centralized control of complex systems. 
As has been shown in Chapter 4 and here, these systems could be military, economic 
or societal. Arguably, the ASUs and cybernetic ideas behind them have influenced the 
Russian civilian and military thought on information security issues emphasising cen-
tralization, systemization and hierarchy. As the theory dictates, there must be a subject 
of control to affect the object of control through various sub-systems and feedback 
channels to achieve designated goal. 
 
ASUs have been conceptualized as tools but also as infrastructure and later as univer-
sal systems combining control mechanisms with the space in which they are used. 
Their function is based on the automation of parts of the ‘cycle of command’ but not 
on displacing humans from the loop, yet. The concept of AIs and related technologies 
is just starting to penetrate the discussions in the military journals and information 
security communities in Russia. It is conceivable that this new technology will change 
the whole concept of ASUs and perhaps even lead to their rejection. Thus, ASUs have 
been seen in the texts analysed here as a Russian solution to NCW, but their applica-
bility has also been questioned. Perhaps the most contested issue has been the rela-
tionship between the EIP and ASUs, as the former has incorporated ever more ele-
ments into itself and the latter has perhaps suffered from its legacy definitions which 
are hard to combine with modern ICT concepts. The essence of the Russian theory 
on ASUs, in contrast to NCW, was expressed in terms of its Soviet roots as a ‘cycle 
of command and control’ and a systemic and/or cybernetic approach. It can be ar-
gued that the whole idea of ASUs is implicitly centralized and vertical. They are meant 
as a support for the commander who makes the decisions. ASUs provide forecasts 
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but are at best only semi-automated. Creativity is a trait and property of the human 
commander.  
 
ASUs are also inherently connected to the function and tasks of the organization they 
are tailored to support and the environment in which they are supposed to operate. 
Therefore, ASUs are not purely technological concepts, and because of this they 
shape the environment in which they are deployed. Moreover, they are connected to 
the historical principles of command: efficiency, readiness, stability, reliability, secrecy 
and, flexibility and mobility. Thus the principles of ASUs and the ‘cycle of command’ 
form a self-replicating triangle. ASUs affect the way in which command and control 
is organized and have perhaps increased the tendency to emphasise resilience and 
continuity as a factor of information superiority instead of speed and totality of infor-
mation.  The idea of ASUs influences the idea of EIP which thus becomes a system-
of-systems, i.e. a space created, maintained and controlled by automated systems. This 
entity can be protected by moving away it away from the threat, removing the source 
of the threat, controlling information channels including setting barriers, controlling 
information itself, and through self-modification. 
 
5.10  Cyber power and the life of strategic cultural ideas 
 
Based on the above analysis of strategic cultural ideas it can be argued that although 
the Russians do not use the terms of cyberspace, cyber power or cyber warfare they 
have an understanding and concepts for these real phenomena. Below I offer one 
interpretation of this understanding. I start by first examining the relationship of the 
Russians concepts of military power, policy, strategy and doctrine, so that I can inter-
pret cyber/information-technological issues through them. 
 
The current version of the Military Dictionary defines military power as “(defence 
power, defence might), the power of state (a coalition of states), its ability to influence 
other political actors, the system of international relations through indirect (through 
demonstration) or direct use of the means of armed violence, and the successful con-
duct of armed warfare.”1765 This power is based on the geopolitical situation of the 
state, its territory and population, and the ability to mobilize material and immaterial 
resources. Potential, according to V. V. Kirillov, consists of the material and spiritual 
resources that might be mobilized. Potential has different forms such as military, sci-
entific, economic etc. The relationship between potential and power is one between 
opportunity and actualization.1766 Military policy is related to potential and power and 
is defined in the Military Doctrine as “the activity of the state in organizing and im-
plementing defence and ensuring the security of the Russian Federation, and also the 
interests of its allies.” It includes deterrence, prevention of military conflicts, devel-
opment of the armed forces, and increasing the mobilization readiness of the coun-
try.1767 Military policy is related to countering both internal and external threats to 
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independence, integrity, and sovereignty of the state, and to the sustainment and de-
velopment of the military organization of the state.1768 Strategy has been quite consist-
ently defined as the highest part of the military art and the practice of preparing the 
country and armed forces to war, of planning the conduct of war and strategic oper-
ations through and conducting those operations with a later addition of preventing 
war. Strategy has interactive relationship with politics and doctrine.1769 Doctrine is a 
codified and relatively compulsory guidance based on the laws of military science and 
the analysis of current and future politico-social and technological situation.1770 
 
To summarize then, military potential consists of all material and spiritual resources 
that can be mobilized as military power through a state’s military policy. Strategy uti-
lizes military power by planning, organizing, and conducting the use of force by uti-
lizing forces, means, forms and methods. Military policy builds potential and creates 
possibilities for taking action, whereas military strategy plans the actual conversion to 
power and enables the use of that power as force if necessary. Doctrine provides 
guidance on preparing for war and on conducting it. The substance of policy and 
strategy arguably overlap and the adoption of the above discussed concept of strategic 
planning might have been an effort to address this issue. 
 
No commonly accepted or widely shared Russian concept of information or cyber 
power is available in open sources. Russian scholars have, nevertheless, provided 
some definitions. Rastorguev mentions the potential resources of systems to affect 
each other.1771 The power of state (state understood as a system) is defined by the 
quantity of its elements and their functional possibilities and the capability of the sys-
tem to reproduce itself. Despite his formal logical and mathematical approach, Ras-
torguev emphasized the importance of creativity.1772 Kruglov argued that only through 
the management of information, intellectual potential, and other resources better than 
potential rivals, could a state prevail.1773 Tsyganov and Bukharin are more interested 
in controlling systems of information confrontation than power or potential. Still, in 
the context of cybernetic models, control is power.1774 Panarin mentions information-
psychological potential of a nation and defines it as the ability to control information 
flows and to create a civilization. He also mentions scientific-technological, intellec-
tual, and creative potential, among others.1775 Makhmut Gareev has emphasized the 
unity of people and moral forces in addition to the technological and scientific poten-
tial of the state.1776 
                                              
1768 ‘Военная политика’. Рогозин, Д. О. (общ. Ред.) Война и мир в терминах и определениях [Online]. 
Available: http://www.voina-i-mir.ru/article/64 [Accessed: 5th April 2019]. 
1769 ‘Стратегия’. Гречкоб А. А., Огарков, Н. В. (Гл. ред.)  Советская Военная Энциклопедия, Том. 7(8). 
М.: Военное издательство Министерства обороны СССР, 1976—1980, 556; ‘Стратегия’. Военный энцик-
лопедический словарь в 2 томах (ВЭС). / Редкол.: А. П. Горкин, В. А. Золотарев, В. М. Карев и др. М: 
Большая Российская энциклопедия; Рипол классик, 2001, 607-608; ‘Стратегия’ Военный энцикаопеди-
ческий словарь. М.: Воениздат, 2007 [Online]. Available: http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/ encyclopedia/diction-
ary/details.htm?id=10395@morfDictionary [Accessed: 5th April 2019]. 
1770 Lalu 2014, 331; Forsströn 2019; ‘Военная доктрин’. Рогозин, Д. О. (общ. Ред.) Война и мир в терминах 
и определениях [Online]. Available: http://www.voina-i-mir.ru/article/74 [Accessed: 5th April 2019]. 
1771 Расторгуев 1999, 144.  
1772 Ibid., 169; Расторгуев 2014, 24. 
1773 Круглов 2006 & 2006. 
1774 Цыганов & Бухарин; Бухарин & Цыганов. 
1775 Панарин 2003 & 2006. 
1776 Гареев 2016, 2017a, 2017b & 2018. 
 
257 
Manoilo et al. mention information-communication potential which enables infor-
mation imperialism. This potential consists of intellectual, technological, spiritual and 
scientific potential, but also the ability to manipulate information in relation to oth-
ers.1777 For Novikov the ability of systems to influence each other was based on re-
sources, i.e. capabilities to manipulate information.1778 Griniaev approaches infor-
mation potential through a geopolitical lens and argues that it is something that can 
be measured and compared and translated into power rivalling nuclear and conven-
tional military power. This potential must be created already during peacetime and 
mobilized into power very rapidly if a war is to be won because information superi-
ority will be a decisive factor in future wars.1779 Rastorguev and Manoilo refer to V. N. 
Ustinov who seems to have been one of the first modern-era Russians to write about 
information power. According to secondary sources, Ustinov saw information war as 
the use of information and information technology against military and civilian cyber-
netic systems. Power would thus be based on information and information technol-
ogy.1780 The cyber diplomats of the MGIMO considered Russia’s place in the global 
information society to be based on scientific and educational potential, quality of in-
formation infrastructure, the level of the development of electronic business and 
commerce, and electronic government. These were all measurable qualities.1781 The 
strategic planning documents of the Russian Federation also acknowledge the im-
portance of developing the scientific-technological, economic, human and spiritual 
resources of the state and thus the potential of information power. 
 
Power is an abstract idea. If one would attempt to form some sort of synthesis of the 
Russian idea of cyber or information power based on the ideas analysed above it 
would include at least the following elements: power is control over systems, flows, 
information and the opponent; power is continuity, effectiveness, efficiency, resili-
ence (reliability and stability), flexibility and secrecy; and power is scientific, techno-
logical, creative, spiritual, economic, and human potential. It has a function, principles 
and resources. This power is state power. It is both an end and means, as the protec-
tion of state interests, especially sovereignty, has been the paramount principle of the 
Russian foreign and security policy from the late 1990s. Power is relative and meas-
urable, with value only in relation to the power of others and it is inherently volatile 
as it can be undermined, negated, and changed through creativity and technology. 
Power is not directly proportional to material resources or spent wealth because asym-
metry can be created through human will, innovation, and the forever changing sub-
stance of information itself. Power has both a qualitative and quantitative character. 
Thus, power is always in flux and the interstate information struggle is a permanent 
feature of great power relations. Absolute parity is a mirage but stability and balance 
as a condition can be achieved. Therefore, the Russian understanding of information 
power is decidedly material and corresponds to the theoretical definition of power 
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proposed in Chapter 2 and 3. Information-technical (cyber) power is a component of 
information power, more material, more connected to technology. 
 
The Russian views on cyberspace are much clearer than on power. Cyberspace is 
viewed as an information infrastructure composed of information, systems, and re-
sources and sometimes of users—although then it is a sphere of action and not a 
space. It is penetrated by power, the relationships of subjects and objects. It is as 
material as electromagnetic emissions can be and, thus, has borders. It forms the basis 
of the information space, which includes the substance of information, human minds 
and societies. It is sometimes called information-telecommunications space to high-
light its most important function which is the transfer of information. The Russian 
understanding of this space and its principles and laws are very similar to those pro-
posed by foreign scholars. 
 
The Russian understanding of information warfare is ambivalent. As previous studies 
have shown, and the analysis in this chapter has confirmed that the Russian view of 
information-technological warfare is very similar to Western understandings of cyber 
warfare. Nevertheless, computer attacks are only one element of information-techno-
logical warfare—electronic warfare, exotic weapons, and kinetic force directed against 
information systems are also included. Cybernetic ideas and systems theory give the 
Russian approach to cyber warfare its distinct character as does the distinction be-
tween geopolitical information confrontation and operational-tactical warfare. Yet, 
the intentional use of different terms should not obfuscate the fact that the reality of 
cyberspace is the same for all who operate in it. 
 
Neither official nor unofficial Russian sources refer to the concept of a cyber strategy. 
The Information Security Doctrine of 2016 is the closest official document to such 
an effect. It defines threats, interests, general objectives, and organizational responsi-
bilities but it does not prepare or plan, or ‘do’ anything  in that regard. Russian cyber 
strategy is part of the strategic planning process, and its implementation is dispersed 
into multiple processes and documents as will be demonstrated in the next chapter. 
It is inherently connected to the wider information sphere, and the creation of eco-
nomic, technological and even cultural power—and guided by the Russian under-
standing of the strategic environment and its threats. 
 
What then can be said about the change and continuity of the strategic cultural ideas? 
The interstate and class struggle have changed from there Soviet era ideological forms 
to a geopolitical great power issue, and the information struggle has become one of 
its main manifestations. Based on official documents and statements it has retained 
its place in the minds of the Russian elites quite persistently—perhaps excluding short 
periods in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The Western ideas of deterrence were in-
troduced to Russia in the 1990s through civilian academicians and they were accepted 
as part of the national security thinking by 2000. Nevertheless, they have also mor-
phed into strategic deterrence—to an almost grand-strategy-like national policy con-
cept. This has been promoted by the military from 2006-2008 onwards and it involves 
all spheres of life and the whole state and society and it has contributed to the evolu-
tion of the whole-of-state strategic planning. Preserving the balance of power and 
stability, prevention of war, deterrence, and defence now form a systematic, although 
sometimes, ambivalent group of ideas defining the interests of the state. 
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The asymmetric response was discovered in 1986 and then rediscovered multiple 
times as a tool to balance Russia’s obvious weaknesses in the peer to peer competition. 
Its roots are arguably in the Russian tradition of stratagems and cunningness. Its cost-
effective, measure to counter measure dialectic has remained the same, but its means 
and methods have changed with the character of war. Although scholars have offered 
different applications of asymmetric responses from the late 1990s, the elites have 
employed the idea more sparingly. Asymmetry has acquired two distinct manifesta-
tions: tactical and operational actions and strategic and national responses. Both have 
found substance in indirectness, creativity, information, and technology. Although, 
asymmetry has become a semi-official part of military doctrine it has not yet become 
an accepted part of the codified language of strategic planning.  
 
Digital or information sovereignty was developed after 1999 from the idea of territo-
rial state sovereignty which has roots in the Soviet era and beyond. It has changed 
from sovereignty over the information space to sovereignty in the information space 
and in the end to information or digital sovereignty. The concept had become by 2017 
an officially recognized, although poorly defined, aspect of state sovereignty. Sover-
eignty has been tied to the concept of the national segment of the Internet which has 
developed into the territorial basis of digital sovereignty. The RuNet has become its 
socio-cultural reflection. Digital sovereignty is Russia’s response to the global quest 
to define cyberspace. 
 
The unified information space was first introduced in the late 1950s as a Soviet kiber-
netik dream. During the 1990s it rapidly changed from an idea of open and shared 
information flows to technological and organizational concepts of building the na-
tional information space. The elites (re)adopted the idea of EIP already in the mid-
1990s but it has been resurrected and redefined multiple times after that. It has re-
tained its roots in the cybernetic dreams of the Soviet scientists but also incorporated 
modern concepts and technologies which have their own rules and principles of in-
formation management. Both its military and civilian versions are based on vertical 
control and horizontal integration, centralization, and delimitation of borders. Its lat-
est incarnations from the early 2000s onwards include visions involving a system of 
systems for controlling the national information space as part of digital sovereignty. 
 
The idea of information superiority was already discussed by the Soviet military the-
orists in the 1970s and 1980s—although its substance was a bit different than it is 
today. Since 1991, information superiority has become a central concept in Russian 
security thinking explaining why things are as they are. However, it has also offered 
solutions for changing the balance of power at least from 2006–2008 onwards in the 
context of the military reform. It has, perhaps more than any other idea analysed here, 
changed the way Russians perceive competition, warfare, and power in the interna-
tional system. Therefore, it also has two interconnected manifestations: one related 
to warfare and the other to interstate struggle. Information superiority was accepted 
by the military as a defining principle quite early in the 2000s but in national strategic 
documents it did not appear until 2016. 
 
The distinction between information-technological and psychological warfare was an 
almost instinctive definition offered by the Russian academicians in the early 1990s. 
After that, these aspects have retained their distinct natures but have also changed 
 
260 
with the times. Information-technological warfare has interacted with the Western 
ideas of NCW, CII and cyber warfare. It has perhaps been left in the shadow of psy-
chological ends, ways, and means but has also developed its own distinct Russian 
character with a definite role in achieving politico-military goals. The distinction be-
tween the psychological and technological aspect has been accepted and used by the 
elites from 2000 onwards although the umbrella term of information warfare or con-
frontation has been more popular. 
 
Perhaps the most consistent and constant idea has been the ASU. The idea was de-
veloped during the Soviet times and different concepts built around it are still in use. 
It has required an official status and has been defined in the official state standards. 
ASU’s cybernetic heritage has affected other ideas by producing ideas about systems 
versus systems warfare and a system of systems in the information space. However, 
the ASUs themselves are now facing flexible, self-controlling, mutating, deep learning 
AIs which might doom the idea into the dust bin of history—or create a basis for new 
scientific breakthroughs based on a Russian way of thinking. 
 
The ideas analysed above have been quite widely shared in the texts of officials, of-
ficers, academicians, and journalists representing different institutions. Thus, it can be 
argued that there is a group of people sharing a certain set of common ideas. Never-
theless, these people do not have the same interests or agendas. The Academy of 
Military Sciences strives to set guidelines to the military academic discussion about 
military theory and has some latitude in proposing new ideas but is nevertheless under 
the oversight of the General Staff. The Centre for Military Strategic Studies of the 
General Staff and the Military Academy of the General Staff and its departments with 
their mandates on strategic planning and forecasting represent a more official view 
on military security issues. In this context their representatives can and will take con-
trary views on certain issues proposed by retired officers and academicians. The dif-
ferent TsNII(I)s of the MoD usually pursue more limited agendas and quite often 
their researchers promote solutions to problems that would bring resources to their 
institutions. Similarly, the military training centres and academies of various services 
and branches have their own agendas but also take part in the more general discus-
sions. Although there are many institutions, the group of officers and scholars writing 
about strategic issues is rather small.  
 
The non-military authors and scholars publishing in various civilian and military jour-
nals form a network, but it is highly suspect as to whether they form any sort of 
community with professional ethos, values or agendas. Nevertheless, there are some 
groups that can be called communities such as the ex-KGB information and cryptog-
raphy professionals including Rastorguev, Manoilo, and Strel’tsov. Another group of 
Russian military and cyber diplomats is tightly connected to this group. There is some 
evidence to support the claim that the group of information security specialists which 
was formed around 1995-1997 under the Security Council has, in fact, formed a very 
influential community, some members of which have become part of the elite. This 
group is now established institutionally as the NAMIB. Moreover, many of the so-
called civilian academicians working in civilian research institutions have military 
backgrounds. Thus, the Russian information security academia is highly penetrated 
 
261 
by ex-military and ex-special services personnel, which might explain some of com-
monality of the shared ideas. Another explanation is the prevalence of systems theo-
retic thinking in Russian academia. 
 
Based on the analysis of journals, monographs and national security documents be-
tween 2000–2018 it can be argued that the strategic cultural ideas of the communities 
have reached the elites. However, it is possible that the ideas had already been held 
by the elites and that the communities might have been echoing the ideas of the re-
gime to gain resources. The early discussion about information warfare before the 
initiation of the 1998 UN norm-building initiative and the adoption of the  first Putin 
era national security documents in 2000 was perhaps the purist example of an epis-
temic community offering ideas to the elites. However, many of those who took part 
in the discussions represented security elites themselves or were ex-members in aca-
demic guises. After the 2000 Information Security Doctrine had made information 
warfare and threats a legitimate subject of national security discussions, Russian civil-
ian and military scholars produced large amounts of literature on the subject. Their 
ideas were reflected in the 2009-2010 national security documents and more strongly 
in 2014-2016 strategic planning documents. However, many of the writers concen-
trated on providing substance to the basic ideas that had been adopted already in 2000 
and not so much on arguing for completely new ideas or radical changes. Every po-
litical system has its own characteristics, and the way in which ideas move between 
the academia and the decision-making elite points to a certain characteristic of the 
Russian system. Some of these will be examined in the next chapter. 
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6  
THE RUSSIAN NATIONAL SEGMENT OF THE            
INTERNET 
 
his chapter examines the Russian policies concerning cyberspace. It continues 
to provide answers to the thesis’ research problem’s analytical part by asking: 
How have the strategic environment and strategic cultural ideas given reason 
to the Russian strategy of shaping and controlling a part of cyberspace into a national 
segment of the Internet? I begin with an analysis of the environment in which the 
Russian security and military policy decision-makers have operated between 2000 and 
2019. Firstly, I analyse how the Russian segment of Internet has developed, and  then 
I explore the wider international environment and its cyber security aspects to gain 
an understanding of the Russian elite’s strategic environment to demonstrate that 
there was a real and significant change in its nature during the time period under 
analysis. Secondly, I examine the different actors taking part in the process of making 
and implementing strategy to better understand how Russian cyber strategy is made. 
I will also examine the international treatises and the early policies and laws of 2000–
2011 to understand how Russian elites tried to manage cyber and information issues 
before 2012. Thirdly, I will analyse the strategies, policies and laws that have been 
formed by the Russian government to tackle the new security issues brought forth by 
the changes in the strategic environment after 2011. Fourthly, I will examine the ci-
vilian and military information systems and networks that the Russian regime is build-
ing or directing the private sector to build. Fifthly, I will present a model of the Rus-
sian national segment of the Internet as a system of systems in a continuum of inter-
state relations to understand how a closed national network could function. 
 
My main argument throughout this chapter is that in the 2011–2012 period and then 
again in 2014 the Russian elites perceived a clear, new, and threatening change in 
Russia’s international environment which required ‘fitting’ new and old strategic cul-
tural ideas to find ways to reasonably answer the new challenges. This has led to a 
reasonable adoption of policies and laws which will form a national segment of the 
Internet that can be considered as a manifestation of a theoretical closed national 
network. This national segment is Russia’s answer, which has distinct Soviet roots, to 
the challenges of digitalization and the threats emanating from cyberspace. 
 
6.1 The environment 
 
The development of the Internet in Russia and the birth of RuNet were discussed 
briefly in Chapter 5. This chapter will examine the penetration of the Internet and its 
services amongst Russian society, the development of the information infrastructure 
and services, and the importance of digital economy between 2000–2019. Then Rus-
sia’s position in the international system is examined in order to understand how the 
Russian decision-making elites might have perceived the strategic environment be-
tween 2000–2019. This analysis is complemented with an analysis of the develop-
ments in the cyberspace. The chapter ends with a discussion on whether there is 
T 
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enough evidence to argue that a change in Russia’s environment required the fitting 
of new and old ideas and if the strategic cultural ideas examined in Chapters 4 and 5 
helped the elite to make sense of the situations and thus guided it towards reasonable 
solutions. 
 
6.1.1 Development of the Russian Internet and the information society 
 
The Russian Internet was born out of a territorially disconnected group of networks 
operated by scientific institutions, small IT companies, and regional telecom operators 
during the 1990s and began to really develop only after the economic crisis of 1998.1782 
The penetration (percentage of users of the Internet in the population) of the Internet 
in 2000 was only 2.1% and the Internet had just spread to cover most of the big cities 
and mainly the European part of Russia.1783 However, the Russian Internet began to 
develop rapidly so that in 2007 the penetration was approximately 20.8%, and then in 
2008 it was 25%, in 2009 33%, 2010 37%, 2011 44%, 2012 53 %, 2013 57%, 2014 
67%, 2015 70%, 2016 71%, 2017 73% and in 2018 it was 75.4%.1784 Thus, the fastest 
growth rate was experienced from 2001–2008 but the use of the Internet became 
socially and politically significant only since 2011–2012. In 2000 Russia was behind 
almost all the advanced industrial countries in the usage of the Internet and by 2018 
it was still behind the Western countries and China, where the penetration is around 
90%.1785 Russia has followed global trends in the mobile use of the Internet which 
covered 59% of the population in 2017 or 73 million people and the number of those 
using just the mobile Internet surpassed desktop users in 2017. Around 50–60% of 
the population depending on the region have a desktop computer or a mobile 
phone.1786 Mobile phones began to spread in Russia around 2011–2013.1787 Russians 
seem to rely more on mobile data connections than on fixed broad-band connections, 
the development of which has stalled after 2010–2012.1788 
 
The first and still functioning Russian non-state conference on the Internet—the Rus-
sian Internet Forum—was convened in 1997.1789 Although the Rambler.ru search en-
gine was launched in 1996, the first online store (Ozon) had opened in 1998, the email 
                                              
1782 Перфилев 2003, 44-45. 
1783 Internet World Statistics [Online]. Available: https://www.internetworldstats.com/euro/ru.htm  [Ac-
cessed: 10th April 2019]; Перфилев 2003, 48, 53. 
1784 GfK. Исследование GfK: Проникновение Интернета в России, 15 января 2019 [Online]. Available: 
https://www.gfk.com/ru/insaity/press-release/issledovanie-gfk-proniknovenie-interneta-v-rossii-1/ [Ac-
cessed: 10th April 2019]; ФОМ. Интернет в России: динамика проникновения. Зима 2017–2018 гг., 04 
Апреля 2018г [Online]. Available: https://fom.ru/SMI-i-internet/13999 [Accessed: 10th April 2019]. 
1785 РАЭК. Интернет в России в 2017 году: Состояние, тенденции и перспективы развития.  М.: 
Типография «Форвард Принт», 2018 [Online]. Available: http://www.fapmc.ru/rospechat/activities/ re-
ports/2018/teleradio/main/custom/0/0/file.pdf [Accessed: 10th April 2019]. 
1786 РАЭК. Экономика Рунета 2018. РАЭК, 2019 [Online]. Available: https://raec.ru/upload/files/ru-
ec_booklet.pdf [Accessed: 12th April 2019]. 
1787 РАЭК. Экономика Рунета 2015–2016 [Online]. Available: http://files.runet-id.com/2016/presentation-
research/presentations/EconomicaRunetaItogy2016.pdf [Accessed: 10th April 2019]. 
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Аудитория интернета, 21.11.2018 [Online]. Available: https://mediascope.net/upload/iblock/ea0/ 
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service Mail.ru started in 1998, and the first Internet magazine Lenta.ru had begun to 
operate in 1999, at the beginning of the 2000s Internet news services and the online 
economy were still a marginal phenomenon in Russia. They began to develop rapidly 
around 2001.1790 The Yeltsin era oligarchs tried to take advantage of this development 
but failed as the Putin regime turned against their media empires.1791 Andrei Soldatov 
has argued that after Putin met with the leaders of the Internet companies in 1999 a 
kind of unofficial non-intervention policy between the Internet companies and the 
regime was agreed. Moreover, the Internet companies managed to block or modify 
bills directed against Internet freedoms. This arrangement was broken when Putin 
took a more critical view of the Internet in 2014.1792 
 
Around 2010 over 90% of Russians got their news from the television. Thus, John 
Dunn has argued that the Internet was left outside state control because it served a 
minority of the population, functioned as a politico-social safety-valve, and promised 
social and economic benefits for the state.1793According to Levada, in 2018 73% of 
Russians declared that they got their news from TV but the share of Internet 
webpages and social network was 65% combined (multiple answers were permitted 
in the survey) and their importance has continuously risen since 2013.1794 Peterson has 
claimed that at least until around 2005 the Internet remained a largely apolitical space, 
so the government had no significant incentive to control it and the IT industry was 
able to defend its independency.1795 There is some proof that Russian state television 
and the Internet currently live in a symbiosis where television sets the agenda and the 
Internet provides a platform for further discussion and the dissemination of ideas.1796 
Although, social media’s challenge to television’s monopoly of the news is intensify-
ing, its main impact has been in connecting people from the early 2010s.1797 
 
Google and Facebook entered Russia in 2006, the same year that the Yandex search 
engine was launched.1798 The Russian social media platforms competed successfully 
with primarily English-language services and LiveJournal (1999), Ondoklassniki 
(2006), and VKontankt (2006) had established their pre-eminence by 2012.1799 This 
pre-eminence of Russian language social media has been one of the building blocks 
of the RuNet phenomenon.1800 Nevertheless, in 2017–2018 Russians quite frequently 
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used international services like Google, Twitter, WhatsApp, YouTube, Instagram, Fa-
cebook and Wikipedia.1801 Moreover, the Google Chrome browser (54.5%) and An-
droid OS (49.5%) by far dominate other browsers and OSs.1802 Chinese social media 
platforms or browsers are not used in Russia. At least according to LiveInternet, visits 
from Russian IP -addresses are directed predominantly to Russian language 
webpages.1803 Thus, the social media or content sharing aspect of RuNet is technolog-
ically not as insular as the idea of RuNet would suggest. Further isolation is favoured 
by the Kremlin as Putin has, for example, called for the creation of a Russian alterna-
tive to Wikipedia.1804 
 
Despite its promising start, the IT crisis of 2000 negatively affected the developing 
Russian Internet industry.1805 The development of information society seemed to need 
government support. The Russian government was, however, a bit slow to react to 
the development needs.1806 By 2002 the Russian government began to develop strate-
gies on the development of informatization and the electronic government of Russia, 
and in 2004 the Premii Runet prizes were first awarded. The first prize was given for 
the development of ‘the Russian segment of Internet’.1807 These early state-led efforts 
largely failed because of corruption, state-centrism, utopianism, and the lack of lead-
ership.1808 Not until President Dmitri Medvedev embraced the Internet in 2008–2009 
did things start to move forward.1809 Based on advertisement data, the commercializa-
tion of the Internet began around 2011 but it  would take additional seven years before 
the Internet would catch up with television.1810 According to RAEK’s estimations, 
which are perhaps somewhat optimistic, the share of the Internet economy of the 
Russian GDP was 1% in 2011, 1.3% in 2012, 1.6% in 2013, 2.2% in 2014 and 2.4% 
in 2015, and 2.42% in 2017.1811 In 2018 RAEK decided not to calculate the share of 
Internet economy but still announced a total of 5.1% of GDP.1812 In 2018 the Internet 
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economy was estimated to be worth of 3.9 trillion roubles.1813 For comparison, Rus-
sian arms sales in 2018 were worth 19$ billion and energy revenues were expected to 
be around 129$ billion from the export of oil and 49$ billion from the export of 
natural gas.1814 
 
The Russian ICT industry has not been able to develop a popular domestic operating-
system,1815 although in 2012 Yandex launched its own browser which has gained 
around 10-12% share of the searches done in the Russian segment of Internet.1816 The 
state has actively supported the domestic IT industry against foreign competition.1817 
The President’s Internet ombudsman German Klimenko has even hinted that Mi-
crosoft would have to ‘leave’ Russia because of the restrictions the U.S. government 
has imposed on the cyber security firm Kaspersky.1818 Despite efforts to develop the 
Russian digital economy it has been reliant mostly on Western software and hardware. 
After 2017 domestic and Chinese software solutions have increased their market share 
as the IT sector has become the most rapidly growing sector in the Russian econ-
omy.1819 RAEK noted that in 2018 the ‘common legislative vector’ continues to be 
prohibitive to the Internet economy and referred to the legal regulations which began 
around 2012-2013.1820 The state has tried to support the domestic online economy 
against the growing influence of foreign companies and Russian banks and Internet 
companies have allied to finance and establish Russian online market platforms.1821 
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говли в России. Результаты 1 полугодия 2017 года, 28 синтября 2017 [Online]. Available: 
http://www.akit.ru/ исследование-рынка-интернет-торговл/ [Accessed: 12th April 2019]. 
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The possibilities of a crypto currency have been intensely debated in the Russian me-
dia and the government and the Bank of Russia have considered how to regulate them 
and/or to incorporate them into the official Russian economy.1822  
 
The trend of state-led and state-centric innovation policy has affected the whole ICT 
sector. For example, the techno-park Skolkovo was established by the state in 2011 
to copy the success of the Silicon Valley.1823 It has, however, been called a failure by 
people involved in the project.1824 Skolkovo has been subsequently divided into re-
gional centres.1825 The concept was repeated in 2017 when the state created the Era 
technology park in Anap for innovative military scientific-technological research, 
where by 2020, 2000 scientists should be working. In principle Era is supposed to 
combine civilian and military scientific research with the practical experience and re-
sources of the companies of the military-industrial complex.1826 The Russian regime 
has also created the Russian Foundation for Advanced Research Projects in the De-
fence Industry to mimic the success of the United States DARPA in 2012.1827 Despite 
all these state-led efforts, Internet ombudsman Klimenko noted in 2018 that although 
Russian software was good, everything from the interface level downwards was 
‘bad’.1828 
 
Vendil Pallin has examined the state-ownership of Russian Internet companies after 
2013 and argues that in 2014 the largest companies providing Internet infrastructure 
and services were directly state owned or owned by people connected to the re-
gime.1829 She makes the same claim about some of most popular Russian websites and 
social services.1830 In addition to controlling the Internet and wider ICT industry 
through ownership, the state uses soft takeovers to transfer companies to trusted ol-
                                              
1822 Известия. Путин считает, что криптовалюты несут с собой серьезные риски. Известия, 10 октября 
2017 [Online]. Available: https://iz.ru/656864/2017-10-10/putin-schitaet-chto-kriptovaliuty-nesut-s-soboi-
sereznye-riski [Accessed: 12th April 2019]; Аношин, Иван, Петухова, Людмила. Биткоин от дилера: по-
чему россияне не купят криптовалюту без посредника. РВК, 25 января 2018 [Online]. Available: 
https://www.rbc.ru/money/25/01/2018/5a699d3a9a79471460896e07?from=center_5 [Accessed: 12th April 
2019]. 
1823 Soldatov & Borogan 2015, 132; Budnitsky & Jia 2018, 12; Susiluoto 2006. 
1824 Сухова, Светлана. “Пропагандой выиграть нельзя. Доминированием в технологиях — можно”. Жур-
нал "Огонȍк" №40 от 10.10.2016 [Online]. Available: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3106914 [Accessed: 
11th April 2019 
1825 Едовина, Татьяна “Сколково” обретет всероссийский масштаб Компании из регионов получат 
льготы и сервисы центра. Газета "Коммерсантъ" №73 от 26.04.2018 [Online]. Available: https://www. 
kommersant.ru/doc/3614096 [Accessed: 11th April 2019]. 
1826 ТАСС. Минобороны РФ увеличит число научных рот в 2018 году. ТАСС, 30 марша 2018 [Online]. 
Available: https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/5080737 [Accessed: 11th April 2019]; ТАСС Путин посетит в Анапе 
новый военный технополис и проведет итоговое совещание по “оборонке”. ТАСС, 21 ноября 2018 
[Online]. Available: https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/5819998 [Accessed: 11th April 2019]; Сидоркова, Инна. Во-
енное «Сколково»: зачем Шойгу строит технополис в Анапе. РВК, 13 марша 2018 [Online]. Available: 
https://www.rbc.ru/politics/13/03/2018/5a9e82869a7947860d0516ca [Accessed: 11th April 2019]; Буренок, 
Василий. Интеллект по призыву. ВПК, № 46 (710) за 29 ноября 2017 года [Online]. Available: 
https://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/40134 [Accessed: 7th July 2019]. 
1827 Коммерсантъ. Госдума приняла законопроект о Фонде перспективных оборонных исследований. 
Коммерсантъ, 28 сентября 2012 [Online]. Available: https://www.vedomosti.ru/technology/news/ 
2012/09/28/gosduma_prinyala_zakonoproekt_o_fonde_perspektivnyh [Accessed: 17th May 2019]. 
1828 Коммерсантъ 2018. 
1829 Vendil Pallin 2017, 22. 
1830 Ibid., 24-27; Soldatov 2017. 
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igarchs and applies indirect pressure and non-transparent negotiations to affect Inter-
net media companies’  policies.1831  For example, in 2019 a draft law on restricting 
foreign ownership of Internet resources was first introduced but then withdrawn after 
the governance structure of Yandex was reformed to enable better control by the 
Kremlin.1832 Thus, it can be argued that by 2019 the state presence in and influence 
on the Internet and IT industry was significant. 
 
The Russian segment of the Internet was unofficially born on April 7, 1994 when the 
.ru Internet country code top-level domain (ccTLD) for the Russian Federation was 
introduced.1833 Later in 2009 the state supported the creation of the .рф domain in 
addition to .ru and in 2010 approximately three million .ru and 700,000 .рф domain 
names were registered. By 2019 these figures were five million and 779,500 respec-
tively.1834 Currently, the Coordination Centre of National Domain of Internet func-
tions as the administrator of the national top-level domains of .ru and .рф and ac-
credits the registrars of these domains. Between 2001–2010 the Coordination Centre 
created official relations with IANA and ICANN as Russia’s representative and with 
the Ministry of Telecommunications and Mass Media (Minkomsviaz’) to establish its 
position as the national administrator of ccTLDs. In 2010 it also signed an agreement 
with the autonomous company Technical Centre Internet (TTsI) on the technical 
operation of the registration system and domain name registries.1835 TTsI operates two 
primary ccTLD name servers for .ru, .рф, .su, .дети, and .tatar in Moscow and Saint 
Petersburg and has subcontracted a network of secondary DNS servers. This network 
is geographically located in 8 federal districts (okrug) and partly outside Russia.1836 In 
2015 the Minkomsviaz’ became a participant organization in the Coordination Cen-
tre.1837 In January 2018 the Coordination Centre relinquished its mandate to operate 
national domain servers for the state-owned telecommunications company Rostele-
kom which acquired the TTsI.1838 This was done in order to ensure “the reliability, 
stability and resilience of the registry.”1839 Rostelekom had already in 2017 acquired 
the Safedata group which has the controlling stake in MSK-IX, the first and most 
important IXP in Russia.1840 MSK-IX operates a network of 11 .ru and .рф domain 
name servers in Russia, (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Rostov-na-Donu, Stavropol’, Sa-
mara, Kazan, Ekaterinburg, Novosibirsk, Vladivostok) and 18 in Europe, Asia, and 
                                              
1831 Vendil Pallin., 24-25. 
1832 Seddon, Max. Inside the deal between the Kremlin and Russia’s top search engine. Financial Times, De-
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2cd704?from=main [Accessed: 10th April 2019].  
1839 Ростелеком. Функции Технического центра Интернет передаются компании «РТК – Центр обра-
ботки данных» 24.1.2018 [Online]. Available: http://www.rtk-dc.ru/press/rostelekom-v-voronezhe-prinyal-
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1840 Королев, Игорь. «Ростелеком» поглотил «сердце Рунета». CNews, 06.03.2017 [Online]. Available: 
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North and South Africa for the TTsI.1841 Russia got its first root name server (F) in 
2003 and in 2012 an L -server.1842 Despite the slow start, in spring of 2019 there were 
12 root name servers physically located in Russia (Novosibirsk, Ekaterinburg, Mos-
cow, and St. Petersburg) which were operated by ICANN, RIPE NCC, Internet Sys-
tems Consortium, Inc., Verisign, Inc., NASA Ames Research Centre, and Netnod.1843 
Arguably, Russia has managed to acquire a reasonable amount of root and ccTLD 
servers to enable the stability of its networks.1844 The Russian state now directly or 
indirectly controls the national segment of the domain name system which is in ac-
cordance with the plans laid out by the Minister of Telecommunications Nikolai Ni-
kiforov in 2015.1845  
 
The physical infrastructure of the national segment of the Internet has been founded 
on the national telecommunications network of the Soviet Union. This network con-
sisted of spoke-and-wheel-like constellations around the main population centres 
along the main railroad lines. The system was complemented by satellite and HF-radio 
communications in the northern regions and submarine cables to Sakhalin, Kam-
chatka and Magadan.1846 Currently, according to publicly available data, the physical 
infrastructure and ownership of the Russian Internet is the following. In 2018 the 
length of the backbone network of Rostelekom was 500,000 km and it had cross-
border fibre-optic links to Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Ja-
pan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Poland and Ukraine. Its backbone was 
connected to the domestic MSK-IX and foreign IXPs. The joint stock company (JSC) 
MTS had 213,000 km of network and it had cross-border connections to Belarus, 
Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. Its back-
bone was connected to the domestic MSK-IX and foreign IXPs. Vimpelcom (Bee-
line/VEON) had 183,370 km of network which had cross-border connections to 
Azerbaijan, Germany, Kazakhstan, Netherlands, Sweden and Ukraine. Its backbone 
is connected to foreign IXPs as it is a multinational telecommunications company. 
JSC Megafon had 121,100 km of network which had cross-border connections to 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia and Ukraine. 
Its backbone was connected to the domestic MSK-IX and foreign IXPs. TransTele-
Kom (TTK), which is part of the Russian Railways, had 78,000 km of network which 
had cross-border connections to Abkhazia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Estonia, Fin-
land, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, North Korea, Poland, and 
Ukraine. Its backbone was connected to the domestic MSK-IX and foreign IXPs. The 
                                              
1841 MSK-IX. [Online]. Available: https://www.msk-ix.ru/dns/ [Accessed: 10th April 2019]. 
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rest of the ISPs operate much smaller networks, have only one or two foreign con-
nections, and are mainly connected to domestic IXP networks.1847 An exception is JSC 
RetnNet which is a multinational European company with headquarters in the United 
Kingdom. Its network basically forms a physical and logical peninsula inside the Rus-
sian Internet.1848 According to the Russian self-declared Tier 1 ISPs, the Russian seg-
ment of Internet is highly interconnected.1849 
 
Russian IXPs are also quite well interconnected.1850 Based on the cable connections 
which mainly follow railroads and major highways, and the location of the IXPs, the 
main nexuses West of Volga are St Petersburg, Moscow, Voronezh, Belgorod, Vol-
gograd, Rostov-na-Donu, Krasnodar, Sochi and Saratov, and east of Volga Kazan, 
Samara, Perm, Ufa, Ekaterinburg, Chelyabinsk, Tyumen, Kurgan, Omsk, Novosi-
birsk, Khabarovsk and Vladivostok. Since the 1990s the network has gained resilience 
as two parallel backbone lines of have been constructed from east to west. Moreover, 
on the logical level the Russian networks are highly interconnected inside Russian and 
into Europe. On a physical level there are multiple connections to the Caucasus and 
Central-Asia although countries in these regions have very limited networks and pro-
vide limited global connectivity. On the IXP-level in the east, China and Hong-Kong 
are the main thoroughfares.1851 Data on IXPs and cable connections does not, how-
ever, tell the whole picture as Tier 1 and 2 ISPs do not always publicly share data on 
their commercial connections. 
 
There have been plans on the cross-border and international level from 2012 to build 
a network between the BRICS countries by constructing a submarine cable exclusively 
between them, although this project seems to have stalled.1852 Russia is also planning 
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№ 9 (188) September 2018 [Online]. Available: https://www.comnews.ru/standart/issue/400 [Accessed: 11th 
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1848 RETN. Networkmap [Online]. Available: https://retn.net/networkmap/ [Accessed: 11th April 2019]; RIPE 
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to build an Artic sea cable for military use which would connect Severomorsk and 
Vladivostok. At the same time Finland and some other countries are planning a sim-
ilar civilian cable.1853 Additionally, the CIS has adopted a declaration to create ‘a unified 
information space’, although this project too has faced difficulties and is very much 
uncompleted.1854 There are also ambitious plans for massive LEO Internet satellite 
constellations, 5G networks, and Smart Cities.1855 Many of the state-led projects were 
in a state of negotiation in the autumn of 2019.1856 Some more critical voices have 
claimed that the new infrastructure is being built upon the basis of legacy networks 
and the regions outside of the main population centres were not being developed.1857 
However, official and semi-official statistics claim that the telecommunications infra-
structure is in a relatively good condition across the country.1858 
 
Based on the 2019 RIPE NCC report, approximately 3 percent of Russian internal 
traffic was routed outside its borders in 2019 and that traffic went mainly to Western 
Europe. Moreover, Russian entities had registered 6,228 ASNs which makes the na-
tional segment’s connectivity quite robust with many different paths of traffic—at 
least on the logical level. Russia holds 45.5 million IPv4 addresses from RIPE NCC 
which are distributed amongst 1927 Local Internet Registries. There were multiple 
connections between Russian and foreign ASs which supports the claim that there is 
no monopoly on international IP connectivity.1859 Russian ASs are highly connected 
but there are a few central ones. According to one site, the BGP IPv4 neighbourhoods 
are concentrated in the St. Petersburg and Moscow areas with Rostelekom, 
TransTeleCom, MegaFon and MTS with the greatest number of neighbours. South-
ern Russia (Voronezh, Krasnodar, Rostov, Rostov-na-Donu, Tambov, Vladikavkaz), 
the Volga region (Saratov, Kazan, Samara), the Urals (Perm’, Ekaterinburg, Tiumen), 
Siberia (Nizhnevartovsk, Barnaul, Novosibirsk, Irkutsk) and the Far East (Vladivos-
tok) form their own clusters. ASs registered in St. Petersburg and Moscow offer the 
most cross-border connections with Voronezh, Rostov,  Vladikavkaz, Ekaterinburg, 
Nizhnevartovsk, Barnaul and Chita following.1860 Based on cable maps, IXP locations, 
and BGP routing data, it would seem that the triangle of Nizhnevartovsk, Surgut, and 
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Noiabrusk in Northern Siberia is a hub for Internet services—although Moscow is 
clearly the nexus of the Russian Internet infrastructure. 
 
The largest mobile network operators in Russia are MTS (owned by Sistema and oli-
garch Vladimir Evtushenkov), MegaFon (owned by the USM Group and oligarch 
Alisher Usmanov), Beeline (owned by VimpelCom) and Tele2 (owned by Ros-
telecom).1861 Based on data from the Ministry of Telecommunications in 2019, 2G and 
3G networks of every company except Tele2 covered all the big cities and transpor-
tation routes in Russia. Tele2 lacked coverage in parts of the Far Eastern regions. 4G 
coverage was sparser and more concentrated on population centres and western parts 
of Russia. Only MegaFon and MTS provided service in Novaia Zemlia.1862 Despite 
the official statistics, according to (even) Roskomnadzor there was in 2017 a stretch 
of 400 km in Siberia and the Far East where none of the four mobile operators pro-
vided coverage. The problems with mobile connectivity continued in the Far East in 
2018.1863 It should be noted that much of Russia is uninhabited and, therefore, there 
is no need for fixed telecommunications. 
 
Cloud data storage and services have developed quite rapidly in recent years but ac-
cording to some sources there is a real gap between supply and demand.1864 Currently, 
according to RAEK the biggest data centre providers are Rostelekom with 19 centres 
on Russian territory (Moscow, Sochi, Novosibirsk, Nizhnii Novgorod, Krasnodar, 
Ekaterinburg, Stavropol’, Kaliningrad, Chelyabinsk, Kazan, Khabarovsk, Ryazan), 
DataLine with 7 (Moscow), Linxdata-centre with 2 (Moscow, St. Petersburg), Ixcel-
lerate with 1 (Moscow), and Selectel with 6 (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Leningradskii 
oblast).1865 In 2018 Yandex launched its own cloud service platform.1866 Russian private 
data servers are concentrated in Moscow or the Western part of Russia and it has 
been left to Rostelekom to establish a nation-wide network of data centres.1867 There 
seems to be some cooperation between state corporations to secure connectivity, ca-
pacity, and energy-supply for the most critical data-centres, although private compa-
nies are, at least in principle, invited to construct data centres providing state ser-
vices.1868 
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Overall, the Russian segment of Internet has been classified as highly resilient to out-
side interference as it is internally comprehensively interconnected and has multiple 
physical and logical connections across its borders.1869 By 2019 over eighty decisions 
to build ground telecommunications lines from Russia to neighbouring countries had 
been made.1870 According to Oleg Demidov and Alena Makhukova the real number 
could be somewhere around 150-200.1871 They also claim that the resilience of the 
national segment was proven by the state level cyber exercise conducted in 2014, alt-
hough the state ultimately claimed contrary results.1872 
 
The information infrastructure and services described above form the basis for ‘the 
information-telecommunications network Internet’ of Russia which is recognized by 
the Russian federal law as part of the Unified Network of Electronic Communications 
of the Russian Federation. The component parts of this network are the public com-
munication network, separated communication networks (private and closed net-
works), technical communication networks (industrial management networks), and 
special networks (networks of government organs including the Armed Forces).1873 
For the sake of clarity the component parts of this network and the different public 
and governmental information systems are examined in Chapter 6.3. 
 
6.1.2 Development of the international environment 
 
This Chapter will explore Russia’s strategic environment in the period between 2000-
2018. The main argument will be that in 2011-2014 Russian elites perceived a clear, 
new and threatening change in Russia’s international environment which required the 
‘fitting’ of new and old strategic cultural ideas to find ways to reasonably answer to 
the new challenges.  
 
There is widespread view among Western scholars of Russian foreign policy that the 
contours and directions of Russia’s foreign policy (RFP) after the Cold War must be 
analysed in relation to the West or more precisely to the United States.1874 This ap-
proach has produced a view according to which the RFP has been influenced in dif-
ferent times by the ‘Westernist’ or ‘Atlanticist’, Statist, and Nationalist or Civilizational 
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schools of thought. Based on the changing fortunes of these schools different chro-
nologies and narratives of RFP have been presented.1875 I will base my approach on 
these previous observations, although I will not limit myself purely to the Russia – 
West relationship as the RFP has been ‘multidirectional’ at least from the period of 
Foreign and the Prime Minister Evgenii Primakov (1996—1999).1876 
 
Previous studies have given multiple reasons for why the RFP has developed after 
2000 as it has.1877 Continuity is a consistent theme. Before Putin came to power, Rus-
sia’s relationship with the United States and NATO had soured which produced 
Evgeni Primakov’s foreign policy based on ‘multipolarism’ or Eurasianism. This was 
based on the understanding and vision that Russia could not rely on the West’s help 
in reforming itself and would yet again seek the status of a great power to which it 
was entitled, and thus had ‘privileged interests’ in Eurasia and Post-Soviet countries. 
For this reason it would pursue a world based on multiple poles of power in opposi-
tion to perceived American unilateralism and hegemony. Primakov thus put the na-
tional interest at the centre of the RFP.1878 When Putin came to power first as prime 
minister in 1999 and then as President in the spring of 2000 he continued with Prima-
kov’s policy—influenced by Western policies, domestic politics, Chechen terrorism, 
and his own background in the KGB and FSB.1879  
 
However, when Vladimir Putin and the new American President George Bush Jr. met 
in the summer of 2001 and especially after Putin pledged Russia’s support for the 
United States’ War against Terror after 9/11 the Russia – U.S. relationship changed 
dramatically. Western scholars have argued that this turn in Putin’s policy was driven 
by the understanding that by jumping on the bandwagon with the U.S. Russia could 
pursue its national interests. These included: the fight against Islamist extremism in 
the Caucasus and Central Asia; economic recovery through integration with the world 
economy as the U.S. helped Russia to gain access to the G8 and WTO; strategic 
weapon reductions which were necessary because Russia did not have the resources 
to keep up parity with the U.S., and the legitimation of great power status through 
bilateral and equal cooperation with the United States. Putin thus conducted a prag-
matic and strategic choice.1880 The 2001–2002 partnership produced the Strategic Of-
fensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) and enabled the U.S. to withdraw from the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty without much opposition from Russia.1881 This was against 
Russia’s long-term interests, as Russia tried to connect the issues of ballistic missile 
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defence and strategic weapon’s reductions to entice the United States to renounce its 
missile defence plans and thus to preserve strategic parity, restrain U.S. global hegem-
ony, and preserve Russia’s status as a nuclear super power.1882 The partnership also 
enabled the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council which gave Russia more in-
fluence in NATO than the arguably failed Permanent Joint Council (1997–2002) as 
Russia could take part, within limits, in the internal discussions of NATO.1883  
 
There are multiple reasons why Putin’s ‘strategic choice’ failed to produce persistent 
change and they all contributed to the downward spiral of the Russia–U.S. relation-
ship from late 2002 onwards. Firstly, the United States ignored Russia’s economic, 
status and military interests in attacking Iraq in 2003.1884 Secondly, the second round 
of NATO enlargement began in 2002 and was completed in 2004 despite semi-official 
promises given to Russia in the 1990s to not to expand the alliance. Furthermore, 
Ukraine and Georgia entered intensified dialogue with NATO in 2005-2006, although 
they were not ultimately offered membership in 2008.1885 This brought NATO to the 
borders of Russia and showed that the NATO-Russia Council did not really give Rus-
sia any power to influence NATO decision-making. For the Russian military this 
meant that the Western military alliance was again a legitimate and potential adver-
sary.1886 Thirdly, the Bush administration revived the ballistic missile defence pro-
gramme which Russian military considered a direct threat to its strategic deterrence 
and great power status.1887 The issue became even more divisive as the U.S. stated in 
2006 that it would deploy parts of the system in Europe and began negotiations with 
Poland and the Czech Republic in 2007 and concluded agreements with them in 
2008.1888 Fourthly, the Russian regime and the Armed Forces interpreted the so-called 
‘colour revolutions’ in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005) as West-
ern efforts of regime change under the umbrella of democratization in the Russian 
sphere of interests. This view was enhanced by the United States’ increased military 
presence in the Caucasus and Central Asia which resonated with nationalistic and 
civilizational ideas that Russia was yet again being encircled and contained.1889 
Fifthly, the Russian economy began to recover between 2003–2007 as a result of high 
energy prices. With a recovering economy also came a more assertive foreign policy 
as Russia was able to pay off its foreign debts and was able to conduct independent 
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policy in its near-abroad.1890 Russia began to more vigorously pursue its energy inter-
ests by acquiring pipelines and assets in Post-Soviet countries which collided with the 
United States’ interests which had sought access to Russian and Eurasian energy mar-
kets.1891 Moreover, Russia engaged in natural gas price negotiations and even coercion 
by disconnecting natural gas exports to Ukraine in 2006, 2007 and 2009. This caused 
a diplomatic backlash from Europe which was dependent on the gas transiting 
through Ukraine and Belarus.1892 
 
Sixthly, the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 demonstrated that Russia 
was willing to use force to protect its interest.1893 It also pushed forward the long-
awaited military reform which (re)started in 2008 and, together with the state arma-
ment program initiated in 2010 (GPV 2020), managed to produce a significant change 
in the Russian Armed Forces’ fighting capability by 2014.1894 And seventhly, various 
Russian human right violations, fraudulent elections and authoritarian domestic poli-
tics were constantly criticized by the United States, the European Union, the Council 
of Europe and the OSCE unceasingly from the 1990s.1895 This was a somewhat self-
fulfilling process and led to further ‘great power assertiveness’, mistrust towards the 
West’s ‘democratizing’ tendencies. It intensified conservative and nationalist domestic 
policies in Russia and produced policies like ‘sovereign democracy’ which basically 
called for freedom from outside influence and control, national control of strategic 
resources, and state-driven modernization.1896 Moreover, the Soviet past began to be 
rehabilitated by Putin which led to consternation in Russia and in the West.1897 Rus-
sian assertiveness was most visibly present in Putin’s speech at the Munich Confer-
ence on Security Policy in February 2007 in which he argued that the United States 
mistakenly thinks that it operates in a unipolar world and disregards the basic princi-
ples of international law.1898 Putin’s speech produced the first debate about the new 
Cold War.1899 
 
Although Dmitri Medvedev became president before the war with Georgia in May 
2008, his term was ultimately characterised by the ‘Reset’ policy of the Obama admin-
istration, the pursuance of economic modernization after 2008–2009 financial crisis, 
which hit Russia hard, and the search for alternative foreign and economic policy 
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directions in China and Eurasia. With hindsight it is easy to argue that although Vla-
dimir Putin stepped aside to become the prime minister his influence on RFP re-
mained strong. However, during Medvedev’s term in 2008–2012 this was not so self-
evident.1900 The ‘Reset’ managed to produce the new START treaty (2010), provided 
Russian support for a new UNSC resolution against Iran’s nuclear program, and over-
flight permission for the U.S. Afghanistan supply flights. Russia got its WTO mem-
bership, freeze on Ukraine’s and Georgia’s NATO membership process, and peaceful 
elections in Ukraine which brought to power pro-Russian Yanukovych, and  less crit-
icism about Russia’s democratic deficiencies but, ultimately, little else.1901 Medvedev’s 
2008 proposal on a new European security architecture was practically pushed aside 
by NATO and the United States.1902 Economic cooperation on energy or high tech-
nology between Russia and the U.S. stalled and remained competitive. The issue of 
ballistic missile defence was not solved. The ‘Reset’ did not bring about the conver-
gence of values, threats or interests. Moreover, there was internal political resistance 
to it in both countries.1903 However, the Russian economy did recover from the 2008 
crisis and performed relatively well up until 2012—2013. Still, the Russian economy 
remained depended own energy incomes, and structural reforms and modernization 
were not successful.1904 
 
In 2011-2012 the relationship between Russia and the United States turned for the 
worse. There were multiple reasons, although as Donaldson and Nadkarni have ar-
gued, the ‘Reset’ had only been a tactical measure on both sides and antagonistic in-
terests from 2003-2008 had remained under the surface.1905 The United States and 
many European countries were disappointed as Putin declared that he would seek a 
third term as president. Consequently, the demonstrations first against the fraudulent 
Duma elections in 2011 and then against Putin in 2012 were supported, at least in 
spirit, by the West.1906 Furthermore, the Arab spring, i.e. the demonstrations and rev-
olutions which began in the Middle-East and North Africa in 2011 raised multiple 
threats to Russia. It was perceived as a Western attempt to spread democracy—not 
altogether without proof.1907 It threatened to give power to extremist Islamic groups 
and increase terrorism. It affected Russian economic interests and threatened author-
itarian political leaders which had been ready to do business with Russia. Moreover, 
the West was ready to bypass Russian interests in handling the issues raised by the 
events and, thus, marginalize Russia and its status.1908 Russia considered its fears vali-
dated as NATO helped to remove Muammar Gaddafi from power in Libya. As Russia 
with the support of China vetoed any similar resolutions in 2011–2012 against Bashir 
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al-Assad’s regime in Syria, relations with the West became strained.1909 In December 
2011 Dmitri Rogozin claimed that the United States had influenced the uprisings in 
North-Africa and was waiting for Russia to become weak to do the same to it.1910  
 
Putin’s 2012 election campaign emphasised Russia’s great power status, its Eurasian 
character, and was quite critical of the West.1911 Consequently, Russia was used as a 
threat in the United States’ 2012 presidential campaigns, and U.S.–Russia relations 
soured.1912 The U.S. Congress passed the Magnistky Act which sanctioned Russian 
officials based on alleged human rights violations. Russia responded with its own 
sanctions.1913 In this heightened state of political rhetoric, the new laws that Russia 
began to draft and adopt restricting political freedoms in the name of national security 
were seen as a proof of Putin’s inherent authoritarian tendencies.1914 The way in which 
Putin presented himself as the defender of national values versus Western depravity 
and decadence did not lessen the criticism.1915 
 
In 2012 Putin was faced with multiple foreign policy problems compounded with 
demonstrations directed against him, worsening economic performance and an econ-
omy still reliant on energy exports, a decaying infrastructure, income inequality and 
poor public health and burdened by promises of increased social and military spend-
ing. Moreover, the United Russia party had been weakened after the election scandal 
of 2011.1916 The situation did not get better in 2013 although there were some prom-
ising developments and the demonstrations ended in the summer of 2012 after they 
had been suppressed with a combination of new laws, media manipulation and police 
operations.1917 Russia managed to mediate a deal to remove chemical weapons from 
Syria and took constructive part in the negotiations concerning the Iran nuclear pro-
gramme.1918 Arguably, in both cases Russia tried to protect Syria and Iran from the 
U.S. use of force. The revelations of Edward Snowden on NSA’s cyber espionage 
programme and his consequent flight to Russia in the summer of 2013 gave Putin the 
chance to present himself as a defender of the freedom of speech.1919  
 
When the revolution in Ukraine reached its zenith in February 2014 Russia offered 
sanctuary for the ex-president, did not acknowledge the interim government, occu-
pied and annexed Crimea, and instigated and supported an uprising in the Eastern 
parts of Ukraine.1920 The 2014 change of government in Ukraine was portrayed by the 
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Russian politicians and media as an unconstitutional coup d’état engineered by ex-
tremist and anti-Russian forces.1921 Although Russia participated in mediating the two 
ceasefire agreements (Minsk I and II) it has unofficially and covertly supported the 
Donbass rebels against Ukraine’s Armed Forces.1922 The United States and the Euro-
pean Union have imposed multiple economic and financial sanctions against Russian 
companies and individuals—to which Russia has countered with its own sanctions.1923 
Moreover, NATO adopted the Readiness Action Plan and the Enhanced Forward 
Presence policy to enhance its military readiness and deterrence against the possible 
military threat from Russia.1924 Furthermore, the EU has adopted the  Joint Frame-
work on countering  hybrid threats and NATO and EU have agreed to cooperate in 
the fight against hybrid threats.1925  
 
In the autumn of 2015 Russia sent military forces to support the Syrian regime against 
the rebels and has protected President al-Assad from the Western demands for regime 
change.1926 Western accusations of Russia’s interference in elections, of covert support 
for far-right parties, and of other diversionary actions and information warfare in 
2015–2018 have further eroded the Russia–West relationship.1927 Moreover, the Rus-
sian economy suffered from a slump and the sanctions in 2014–2015, and its recovery 
has been slow.1928 The economic and financial isolation from the West (and Ukraine) 
has especially hit the high-technology sector.1929 The import substitution programmes 
devised to help the economy have been criticised for transferring state resources to 
non-profitable and rent-addicted sectors.1930 In 2018 the director of the Federal anti-
monopoly service called Russian economy ‘semi-feudal’.1931 The Russian economy ap-
peared to stagnate in early 2019 despite government investments through Putin’s 
twelve national projects.1932 These projects emphasising the ‘hand control’ of the head 
of state were accompanied by the discreet normalization of the Stalinist past.1933 
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On the military strategic front, Russia has been unable to stop the deployment of the 
elements of ballistic missile defence system to Turkey, Germany, Romania and Poland 
and to the maritime areas near its borders.1934 The election of the new American Pres-
ident Donald Trump has not brought aid to Russia’s situation. The U.S. has accused 
Russia officially of interfering in its elections, withdrew from the INF treaty in 2018, 
has declined to cooperate with Russia in the Middle-East, and has accused Russia of 
interfering in the situation in Venezuela.1935 Russian military spending has risen be-
tween 2011 and 2017 from 3.5% GDP to 5.5% GDP although it fell back to 3.5% 
GDP in 2018 and it has become the second or third biggest arms exporter. The mili-
tary expenditure of the U.S. and China have also grown at the same time.1936 Moreover, 
both the United States and Russia are modernizing their strategic nuclear weapons, 
and Russia has introduced new weapons systems to demonstrate the capability to 
strike the United States.1937 All this has produced a second debate on the new Cold 
War.1938 
 
The reasons for Russia’s actions and its regime’s interpretations of the international 
environment cannot be understood only in the context of the Russia–West relation-
ship.1939 Russia tried half-heartedly to manage the Post-Soviet space through the Col-
lective Security Treaty (1992) which, however, provided little concrete collective ac-
tion or cooperation in the 1990s. The treaty was updated to the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 2002 on the initiative of Russia and now includes 
Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The CSTO’s tasks 
have developed from the mid to late 2000s to include promoting regional stabiliza-
tion, addressing non-traditional threats like terrorism, separatism and extremism, and 
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providing security guarantees to its members in the event of a conventional war. Fur-
thermore, it has annual exercises, rapid deployment and anti-terrorist forces, and a 
collective air defence system—at least on paper. For Russia, in addition to creating a 
Russia-centred normative security zone, the CSTO legitimizes its military presence, 
and thus a buffer zone, in Post-Soviet countries, especially Central Asia. It also ena-
bles force projection and offers balancing tools towards the United States and China. 
However, practice has shown that Russia’s ability to control the organization and re-
ceive its member states’ political support has been limited in the 2010s.1940 
 
After the 2008 financial crisis Russia began to genuinely develop the economic rela-
tionship with Post-Soviet countries. A customs union between Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan was established in 2010.1941  Consequently, Putin adopted Eurasian eco-
nomic integration in his 2011–2012 election campaign, and an economic integration 
road-map was developed in 2013. The creation of the Eurasian Economic Union 
(EEU) was confirmed by Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in May 2014. The EEU was 
launched in January 2015 and Armenia and Kyrgyzstan joined the same year. How-
ever, the EEU has not been able promote trade between its members and has been 
hindered by internal disputes.1942 Ukraine’s decision to not join the EEU has been a 
major complication.1943 By analysts, the EEU project has been variously described as 
neo-imperial, pseudo multilateralism, new regionalism, and a vehicle of great power 
geo-economic competition.1944 
 
The CSTO and EEU projects are related to Russia’s so-called pivots to the East 
which, according to Natasha Kuhrt, there have been at least three: in 2009, 2012 and 
2014. She argues that these pivots have been more reactions to events than voluntary 
choices and have concentrated on China. Moreover, they have resulted in partner-
ships more than alliances as Russia has lacked other options. Identity, status and eco-
nomics have all driven Russia’s approach to China.1945 China’s economic and military 
rise was still viewed suspiciously by the elite during Putin’s first term although energy 
cooperation began to influence the relationship and by Putin’s second term the co-
operation grew even more important.1946 During Medvedev’s term voicing the idea 
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that China poses a military threat become a taboo.1947 In 2018 China was Russia’s 
largest single trade partner but the exports were almost inclusively energy and the 
relationship is not economically optimal for Russia.1948 Although Russia’s military co-
operation with China goes back to the mid-2000s, starting from 2012, China–Russia 
military relations have deepened with more military contacts and more complex mil-
itary exercises, and interestingly, increasingly less arms exports from Russia to 
China.1949  
 
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization which was established in 2001 is an integral 
part of Russia’s strategy towards China.1950 Russia began to resist the United States’ 
presence in Central Asia by mobilising the support of the SCO from 2005 onwards 
and by 2014 had managed to facilitate the removal of U.S. forces from ex-Soviet Cen-
tral Asian countries.1951 Russia’s fears of the United States’ influence were at least 
partly legitimate as the United States’ declared policy was to promote “freedom 
through reform” in Central Asia.1952 On the other hand, Russia may have promoted 
the institutionalization of the SCO and the enlargement of its membership pool to 
counter China. Initially, the SCO had a security emphasis on combating terrorism, 
separatism and extremism but its agenda has grown to include information security 
and more importantly economics, which is China’s priority. Consequently, Russian 
efforts to use the organization as a political tool have been constrained and eclipsed 
by the ever-increasing Chinese influence in the Central Asia.1953  
 
Russia has also promoted the BRICS from 2006 as an alternative forum for the West 
dominated G-8, G-20, IMF and World Bank. Its first summit was organized in 
2008.1954 Bobo Lo argues that the BRICS is an effort to realize Putin’s idea of the 
multipolar world, but the organization and its members lack the real resources to truly 
bring such an order into existence. Moreover, they do not represent any like-minded 
community of states in any sense.1955 However weak the BRICS might be as an organ-
ization it still offers Russia a platform in which and from which to promote and co-
ordinate its ideas in other international frameworks.1956 
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The crisis in the relations between Russia and the United States, NATO and the EU 
is related to the above discussed integration projects of Russia and to their collision 
with Western integration projects.1957 In brief, the EU’s European neighbourhood 
policy and the Eastern Partnership Programme offered to post-Soviet countries 
threatened Russian political and economic interests. Moreover, the possibility of 
Ukraine’s and Georgia’s NATO membership was unacceptable for Russia.1958 The re-
sultant crisis has been argued to have been either a result of the EU’s arrogance, 
Putin’s personality, Russian elites’ deep-seated fear of regime change, or the West’s 
intentional disregard of Russia’s security interests.1959 Be that as it may, aggressive for-
eign policy secured support for the faltering regime as Putin’s approval rating shot 
above 80% in 2014.1960 Additionally, according to Levada, it stayed there until May 
2018 after which it has declined to 63% in March 2019.1961  
 
6.1.3 Development of cyberspace 
 
Cyberspace is part of Russia’s strategic environment and its security. This means that 
normative and technological developments need to be considered when examining 
the situations in which the Russian elites have operated. Previous studies have argued 
that the Russian elites were caught off-guard by the development of the Internet as a 
new political information channel in 2011. The regime reacted based on domestic 
interests and authoritarian instincts and began to force the Russian Internet under 
state control.1962 However, domestic issues and political control are only one part of 
the puzzle. As I demonstrated in Chapter 3.2.2 the development of cyberspace in-
cluding its ICT, cryptography, use of outer space, digitalization of infrastructure, gov-
ernance issues, and all the new related threats challenged states’ sovereignty, their 
ability to provide security, and the  overall balance of power. 
 
Already in the late 1990s the Russian security services were undoubtedly aware of the 
risks the Internet posed to Russia’s national security. The United States government 
was openly discussing cyber threats to its national infrastructure and the NSA was 
developing secret cyber offensive capabilities by 1996.1963 The Clinton administration 
adopted Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63 in 1998 which stated: “I [President 
Clinton] intend that the United States will take all necessary measures to swiftly elim-
inate any significant vulnerability to both physical and cyber-attacks on our critical 
infrastructures, including especially our cyber systems.”1964 Between 1997–1999 the 
U.S. Armed Forces and the CIA used cyber capabilities against Russia’s allies the Serbs 
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in the former Yugoslavia.1965 The Russians themselves were already hacking the U.S. 
DoD networks—an incident which became to be known as the Moonlight Maze.1966 
This breach lead Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre to claim in 1999 that the 
United States was in a “cyberwar.”1967 
 
Between 2000 and 2007 most state-level cyber activity seems to have concentrated on 
espionage although this is difficult to know for sure as the only data available for 
scholars comes from primarily public Western sources.1968 China activated its opera-
tions around 2000 and began to use the Internet for industrial espionage to secure its 
national development to such a magnitude that the U.S. began to complain about it 
in 2006–2007.1969 Cyber criminality became an international threat.1970 From a Russian 
point of view the Chechen rebels’ presence on the Internet posed a threat, as did the 
possibility that other radical Muslim groups in Russia or Central Asia might use the 
Internet to gather global support.1971 Importantly, the United States DoD and NSA 
cyber forces went through multiple reorganizations in an effort to find the right bal-
ance between espionage, cyber defence, and offensive operations—a process that 
Russia quite probably monitored.1972 
 
The threats and possibilities inherent in the development of cyberspace produced in-
ternational cooperation, or at least efforts to that effect such as the Budapest Con-
vention of Cyber Crime, which was adopted quickly after 9/11. However, Russia and 
China have not signed it and have criticized it.1973 The United Nations ITU created 
the World Summit on Information Security (WSIS) in 2001 and the Working Group 
on Internet Governance (WGIG) in 2003 to operate between the summits (2003, 
2005). The ITU’s approach to Internet governance set certain developing countries, 
(including Russia which argued multilaterally for a state governed Internet) against 
ICANN, IETF, W3C and the multi-stakeholder model promoted by the United 
States.1974 In 2006 the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) was established as a multi-
stakeholder open discussion forum with no regulatory functions. Its latest session was 
held in Paris in 2018.1975 Another arena for developing Internet governance norms 
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have been the working groups of the UN GGE process beginning from 2004/2005. 
They have approached cyber security as a disarmament issue.1976 
 
Somewhere around 2006–2007 more serious and militarized state-to-state cyber-at-
tacks began to surface or were at least made public.1977 Before this,  the U.S. had prob-
ably used offensive cyber measures against Iraq in 2003 and against Islamist extremist 
from 2001 onwards.1978 There is evidence and even acknowledgements on this and it 
was also a real belief held by the Russian and Chinese elites.1979 Quite probably the 
U.S. together with Israel initiated the Stuxnet or Operation Olympic Games in 2006 
(which was discovered in 2010). Israel allegedly used cyber tools in its attack against 
Syrian air defences in 2007. Russian state sponsored hackers managed to cause major 
disturbances in Estonian financial and public services in 2007, and Russia allegedly 
used cyber-attacks against the Georgian government and media in 2008.1980 These op-
erations raised fears of catastrophic attacks against national infrastructure and the in-
frastructure of the Internet itself—a resource that state economies were becoming 
ever more reliant on.1981 
 
Between 2006–2009 the United State adopted the National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan, the Comprehensive National Cyber Security Initiative, and the DoD National 
Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations and chose to militarize cyber issues by 
designating cyberspace as a military domain. The U.S. Cyber Command was estab-
lished in June 2009.1982 This militarization was arguably a Western led process as China 
and Russia did not really discuss these issues in public and concentrated on criticizing 
the U.S. while at the same time advancing their own espionage operations.1983 The 
establishment of the U.S. Cyber Command forced all other states to take a similar 
action, choose some other strategy to secure their national cyber security, or do noth-
ing. The United States also led the discussion on securing critical infrastructure and 
how to establish public-private partnerships to do it, although its own success was 
not exemplary.1984 In addition to the threats emanating from the military steps taken 
by the United States, the Russian information society had developed to a phase where 
cyber criminality had started to become a domestic problem and awareness of infra-
structural threats also increased.1985 
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The other rising great power, China, had built up its Internet censorship system called 
the Golden Shield or the Great Firewall of China already in 1996–2006.1986 Between 
2009 and 2013 China significantly increased the censorship of social media and 
pushed foreign, mainly Western Internet companies, out of the Chinese markets. The 
Communist party was partly suppressing national minorities who had discovered so-
cial media and partly establishing rules of national self-censorship concerning all Chi-
nese.1987 By 2015 the Chinese Internet was tightly under government control, and cen-
sorship was pervasive.1988 This arguably provided Russia with an example to follow as 
the Arab Spring and the demonstrations of 2011–2012 began. 
 
Before the Arab spring of 2011, the Iranian Green revolution of 2009 gave a glimpse 
into how the social media could be used to organize support for a regime change.1989 
Consequently, the Arab Spring had its cyberspace dimensions as cyber means were 
first used to support the revolutions but then used to cut their wings as authoritarian 
countries began to ‘switch off’ mobile and Internet services in the event of demon-
strations.1990 The ‘shut down’ of the Internet was not a new phenomenon but gained 
popularity as a measure of political control in the 2010s.  The idea had already been 
discussed even in the United States in 2010, although it was ultimately discarded.1991 
Additionally, the importance of protecting the critical (information) infrastructure in-
creased. In 2012 ENISA reported that cyber-attack methods and tools had reached 
such a maturity that they could be used for cyber warfare and that the threats against 
critical infrastructures were on the rise.1992 The fear of cyber attacks against industrial 
control systems with possibly catastrophic consequences increased as Stuxnet, Sha-
moon and then the attacks against the Ukraine’s electricity networks occurred in 2015 
and 2016.1993 
 
Before the war in Ukraine and the alleged Russian cyber operations against the polit-
ical systems and critical infrastructure of the West—and other major cyber incidents 
like NotPetya etc. which were blamed on Russia with or without evidence—there was 
an effort to build bilateral regimes of cyber security between the United States, China 
and Russia.1994 After the revelations by Edward Snowden about the massive U.S. cyber 
espionage campaigns in 2013 and the downturn in West–Russia relations in 2014 the 
efforts faltered. However, in the midst of the Snowden affair the Obama administra-
tion agreed to establish a ‘cyber-hotline’ and increase cooperation between national 
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CERTs with Russia.1995 Additionally, in 2015 Obama was able to push the Chinese to 
conclude an agreement on restricting economic cyber espionage and establish a hot-
line for handling incidents.1996 Russian efforts towards a similar or deeper pact have 
fallen flat.1997 In fact, after the Obama–Xi agreement, Chinese cyber-attacks against 
Russia increased significantly in 2016–2017 and were directed against Russia’s South-
Asian diplomatic efforts and arms sales and also against industrial targets in Russia.1998 
This happened despite the signing of the Russia–China information security agree-
ment in 2015 which forbid computer attacks against information resources between 
the states.1999 
 
The militarization of cyberspace was completed in the latter half of the 2010s. In 2014 
NATO included cyber-attacks in its collective defence clause and in 2016 recognized 
cyberspace as a domain of military operations. In 2018 it established a Cyberspace 
Operations Centre.2000 In 2015 China established its own military cyber force under 
the Strategic Support Forces.2001 Countries over the world followed the United States’ 
and NATO’s example.2002 In 2017 USCYBERCOM was elevated to a unified combat-
ant command and in 2018 it achieved ‘full operating capability’ with 133 teams of the 
Cyber Mission Force operational.2003 In the autumn of 2018 President Trump relaxed 
the constraints on conducting offensive cyber operations and the U.S. DoD adopted 
a doctrine of forward cyber defence even outside open conflicts.2004 However, already 
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in 2016 it was revealed that the USCYBERCOM had planned a massive cyber oper-
ation called ‘Nitro Zeus’ against Iran.2005 There is also evidence that the U.S. has used 
its new capabilities against state and non-state actors during the Obama era and has 
continued to do so under President Trump.2006 This development was noticed in Rus-
sia.2007 
 
The evolution of cyber warfare happened while the UN GGE process first showed 
great promise in 2009–2013 but then faced mounting problems and contradictions 
and failed altogether in 2016–2017. Russia’s and China’s efforts to form international 
consensus on banning cyber-weapons and transferring the control of the Internet to 
states failed.2008 Furthermore, in 2012 the ITU organized the World Conference on 
International Telecommunications (WCIT) in Dubai where Russia, China and some 
other states tried unsuccessful to push through state-centred Internet governance. 
Moreover, the SCO sponsored international cyber security treaties also failed to gain 
traction in the United Nations in 2011 and 2015.2009 The latest ‘information sover-
eignty based’ norm-building effort in the context of the UN by Russia (and China) 
was initiated in the autumn of 2018 and has produce a new UN GGE round, an 
alternative forum Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) and UN committee deci-
sion on drafting a new cybercrime treaty. A clear change is that this effort is not only 
parried by countries supporting non-sovereignty-based models but is also being chal-
lenged with counter proposals. The Russian and Chinese proposals have been mainly 
supported by developing semi-authoritarian or authoritarian states.2010 In addition to 
these state-led norm-building efforts, private companies and think tanks have put 
forth their own initiatives in the last couple of years.2011 
 
New threats to the information infrastructure upholding cyberspace and national ICT 
systems have developed or become more acute in the 2010s. First, China, Russia and 
the United States have advanced their anti-satellite programmes and the United States 
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established the Space Command in 2018. These developments have put space sta-
tioned Internet infrastructure under military threat.2012 Second, modern societies and 
militaries have become dependent on easily jammed satellite navigation systems and 
time-services.2013 Third, the growth of IoT infrastructure and the sophistication of 
exploitation methods has enabled the launching of massive DDoS attacks that can 
knock out parts of the Internet infrastructure—not to mention a single country’s 
DNS system.2014 Fourth, the infrastructure of the Internet can itself be weaponised 
through the manipulation of BGP routing, which can lead to the dropping of traffic 
or its rerouting through hostile networks.2015 Fifth, the increased tensions between 
great powers in the latter half of the 2010s has made supply-chain attacks a critical 
national security issue which is evident in the way in which foreign IT companies have 
fallen under sanctions and restrictions.2016 Sixth, the advances in artificial intelligence, 
quantum computing and cryptography, and blockchain based technologies all might 
have disruptive effects on the balance of power in cyberspace. The problem for Russia 
is that, at least according to one study, it is not among the forerunners in developing 
and deploying these technologies.2017 Seventh, in April 2016 the Russian elites became 
the object of an Internet leak for the first time as the Panama papers revealed infor-
mation about the corruption of Vladimir Putin and people close to him.2018 This was 
followed in 2019 by the “The Dark Side of the Kremlin” file released by human right 
advocacy groups.2019 Eighth, data localization and the possible access of foreign secu-
rity services to governmental, corporate, and personal data has become a national 
security issue, as has the question of using foreign cloud servers and other extraterri-
torial technology for critical services of societies.2020 Lastly ninth, old threats have not 
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gone away as the amount of cyber-crime, including more sophisticated attacks, has 
steadily increased. In 2016 the General Persecutor of the RF estimated the damages 
from cybercrime to be 0.25% of GDP.2021 Vladimir Putin himself has stated that 
cyber-attacks against the government have increased: in 2014–2015 there were a little 
more than one and a half thousand, in 2016 there were 12 thousand, in 2017 - about 
12.5 thousand, and in 2018 - already 17 thousand.2022 Of course, these declarations 
must be approached in the political context of the state policies analysed below. 
 
Now that Russia’s international and cyber environment have been examined, it is time 
to answer the question of whether the Russian strategic environment changed during 
the 2000s and 2010s in a way that required the Russian elites to reach for new ideas 
or rediscover old ones which might then have influenced or given reason for adopting 
particular policies. Arguably, the mid and late 1990s were the period when cyberspace 
as a part Russia’s strategic environment was born. At that point it did not present 
itself as a critical national security issue even though the Russian security services un-
derstood its potential for both offensive and defensive purposes. The exception was 
the information warfare against the Chechen separatists, but it was a piecemeal effort 
constituting of persecuting individual websites and disseminating counter-propa-
ganda mainly through other mediums than the Internet.2023  
 
During the 2000s and 2010s Russian domestic information technology research and 
hardware and software development and production lagged significantly behind the 
United States and increasingly that of China, and Russia became almost totally reliant 
on foreign technology. The United States’ perceived control over the Internet, its 
technological superiority and the eventual establishment of the Cyber Command af-
fected the strategic balance unfavourably for Russia. As Russia’s own information 
economy and society developed it was faced with the same problem of securing the 
critical information infrastructure, which maintained critical state, economic, and so-
cietal services, as it did for everybody else. Moreover, the Internet was becoming a 
social medium, enhancing the effects of globalization on Russian political and cultural 
spheres. The first ‘new Cold War’ in 2004-2009 was certainly a change for the worse 
in Russia’s security environment, although this was not because of new and unseen 
threats emerging. As its economy recovered, Russia began to challenge the roles, val-
ues, and norms that had been imposed upon it after the Soviet Union collapsed. Be-
cause the Internet’s influence was still marginal, these developments did not produce 
any significant efforts to control or shape the national cyberspace or its content by 
the Russian regime.  
 
Yet, in 2008-2009 as Russia ‘pivoted to the East’ it is quite possible that in the context 
of different economic forums, in the CSTO and the SCO there was an exchange of 
ideas and convergence of interests on the issues of information security. Perhaps 
more critically, although Russia’s economy recovered quickly in 2009-2012, 
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Medvedev (in fact Putin’s government) failed in reforming the Russian ‘digital’ econ-
omy. At the same time, the great power balance was changing. In the contest between 
a rising China and the status quo United States, Russia chose to ally itself with China 
which shared a similar authoritarian political system and compatible values. Moreover, 
as was noted above, the U.S. ‘Reset’ policy was only a tactical move and the underlying 
interest-conflicts between Russia and the United States remained.  
 
The way in which the militarization of cyberspace advanced and the Internet began 
to challenge the state-controlled media as a source of information in Russia also af-
fected the foundations of the Russian security environment. It is probable that the 
military reform and the rearmament programme that began in 2008-2011 heightened 
the sensitivity of the Russian defence and security elites to the performance gap be-
tween Russia and the U.S.—and increasingly China. Ever faster developing infor-
mation technology with its potentially disruptive effects and the possibility for rapid 
impacts on the balance of power made it imperative to enhance the domestic techno-
logical base. More so as the efforts to control the United States through arms control 
negotiations disguised as ‘information security norm-building’ repeatedly failed. The 
failure of the Russian initiative in the 2012 WCIT in Dubai demonstrated that inter-
national sovereignty-based cyber security was unattainable through global agree-
ments. Russia had to go ahead and make sovereignty a norm through its own actions 
and regional agreements. 
 
Around 2011–2012 the Internet had reached a significant portion of the Russian ur-
ban population, and arguably the 2011 Arab spring was an event that changed the 
calculus of the Russian elite.2024 It highlighted the power of social media and height-
ened the tensions between the ‘interventionist’ and ‘democratizing’ West and the ‘sov-
ereignty-respecting’ and ‘great-power status seeking’ Russia (and China). However, 
there was nothing new in the threat of regime change or the Russian vision on the 
multipolar world order. Moreover, the grounds for fearing a ‘colour revolution’ 
quickly faded as the Arab spring largely fizzled out by the end of 2012 and the demon-
strations inside Russia were over by the summer of 2012. More importantly, Putin 
had clearly decided to develop the Russian ‘pivot to the East’ even before the demon-
strations of 2011-2012 occurred. He built his re-election campaign on great-power-
ness, Eurasian alliances and he chose to retain his anti-Western stance even after the 
demonstrations had been suppressed.2025 As  the United States was withdrawing from 
Iraq and Afghanistan and itself ‘pivoted to the East’ to counter the rising China, the 
Russian military was regaining its strength. Thus, the global balance of military power 
was rapidly changing. This is not to argue that the Arab spring had no genuine effect, 
only that it was a prelude, not the defining moment. 
 
Geopolitical great power rivalry intensified in 2013 and the Snowden case forced 
states all around the world to take a good look at their national cyber security. The 
Russian economy began to falter just as the European Union was drawing Ukraine 
(and Georgia) away from Russia’s sphere of influence. Consequently, the real change 
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in Russian international environment occurred in 2014, first, as the result of the rev-
olution in Ukraine, and then with the diplomatic and economic confrontation with 
the West, which is still ongoing. By 2015 Russia had ended up with a latent conflict 
with the United States, NATO and European Union with little support from its so-
called allies from CSTO or SCO, while its military reform was still uncompleted. 
Moreover, Russia’s economic decline and the use of force against Ukraine had under-
mined its Eurasian integration policies. Thus, Russia’s security and economic envi-
ronment changed drastically to the worse. Moreover, the Russian digital economy was 
facing a triple crisis: intense competition from foreign companies, sanctions restrict-
ing financing and cooperation, and weak domestic markets. Through Russian and 
Western reactions and counter reactions the militarization of cyberspace accelerated 
and information became weaponized in state-to-state relationships, and Russia was 
under threat of further sanctions from the U.S., NATO and the EU.  Thus, the cy-
berspace had in fact become more dangerous for Russia at the same time as it has 
become reliant on foreign IT technology. Russia’s policies during 2015–2019 testify 
to this as it has tried to eliminate its technological vulnerabilities and build up its stag-
nating technological-scientific power base. 
 
Together with everything noted above, an American administration led by President 
Trump which clearly strives to rid itself from binding and unbeneficial international 
agreements, has made Russia’s strategic environment quite fluid.2026 Its vulnerability is 
increased by its slowly recovering economy, micro-level protests to the cuts on social 
benefits, and the dipping approval ratings of Putin and his party. It can thus be argued 
that the Russian elites have been looking for ideas after the spring of 2014 that might 
provide answers to Russia’s current situation which has been characterised by the  
perceived change in the balance of power, multiple outside and inside security threats, 
economic problems, and the forced reorientation to Eurasia and Asia—in addition to 
the need to control a society penetrated by the Internet. The Russian elite became 
acutely aware of the changes in the cyberspace between 2011-2012, particularly in the 
Internet, and most importantly of its effects on national security throughout the wider 
information space. This increased the demand for new and old ideas as the elite 
searched for creative and innovative ways to make sense of the confusing and threat-
ening environment from domestic epistemic communities but perhaps also from for-
eign sources. However, the true shift in the strategic environment necessitating novel 
policies and strategic choices happened in 2014. A new or at least updated strategy to 
confront the threats in and from cyber and information space was needed.  
 
6.2 Policies and ideas 
 
This chapter analyses the strategies, policies, and laws that have been adopted by the 
Russian regime to tackle the new security issues brought forth by the development of 
the international environment and the Internet in the period of 2000–2019. I will start 
by examining the national actors involved in developing, selecting, and implementing 
policies to understand how and through what kind of instruments cyberspace is 
shaped by the Russian state, and how cyber strategy is made and to examine how 
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ideas are transferred between the elites and epistemic communities. The second part 
of this chapter examines the international treatises Russia has either advocated or 
adopted concerning cyber and information security during 2000–2019. The third part 
examines the strategies, policies, and laws developed and adopted in the period of 
2000–2011 to give context for the next chapter. Throughout these parts I analyse how 
the strategic cultural ideas examined in Chapter 5 resonate with the adopted strategies, 
policies, and laws.  
 
6.2.1 Decision-making elites and institutions 
 
Russian security, defence and foreign policy behaviour has been explained through 
multiple different theories and variables—many of them domestic.2027 Russia has been 
variously described as authoritarian state, a Neo-Soviet Union, a ‘KGB state’, a klep-
tocracy and an ‘informational autocracy’.2028 Some have found persistent features like 
patron-client nomenclature, administrative silos, lack of investment, directly govern-
ment led strategic projects, non-transparency, lack of responsibility, and emphasis on 
campaigns and projects instead of development.2029 However, Russia’s political system 
has changed between 2000–2019 and thus any single theory describing the Russian 
political system under Putin will fail to capture the whole picture, which has changed 
over time.2030 Keeping that in mind I shall limit myself here to examining the current 
main Russian public and private decision-making elites or institutions, in short those 
actors taking part in developing and implementing policies towards the Russian na-
tional segment of the Internet. The actors and their responsibilities towards different 
networks of the Russian national segment are presented in Table I.2031 The categori-
zation of actors is based on mandates and functions as indicated by the references in 
the table. The categorization of the networks is based on Russian law. Public Internet 
refers to the ‘information-telecommunications network Internet’ defined by the Rus-
sian federal law. Government networks and the military Internet are different types 
of special networks also defined be law. Critical information infrastructure is a regu-
latory category central to understanding Russian national cyber security. Corporate 
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networks refer to ‘separated networks’ administered by non-governmental entities 
and possibly connected to the common telecommunications network.2032 
 
Table I. The Russian National segment of the Internet: Actors, Networks and Responsibilities2033 
 
Actors 
Networks 
Public 
Internet 
Govern-
ment 
networks 
Military 
Internet 
Critical infor-
mation infra-
structure 
Corporate 
networks 
The President of the Russian Fed-
eration  
SP 
AL 
SP 
AL 
SP 
AL 
SP 
AL 
SP 
AL 
The Security Council 
SP 
C 
DL&DP 
SP 
C 
DL&DP 
SP 
C 
DL&DP 
SP 
C 
DL&DP 
SP 
C 
DL&DP 
The Federal Assembly DL&AL DL&AL DL&AL DL&AL DL&AL 
The Ministry of Digital Develop-
ment, Communications and Mass 
Media of the Russian Federation 
DL&DP 
IP 
NR 
 
DL&DP 
IP 
NR 
 
  NR 
Rozkomnadzor 
NSC 
CM 
TC 
NSC 
CM 
TC 
  NSC 
(TC) 
Rossviaz’ 
TD 
TC 
PC 
RA 
TD 
TC 
PC 
RA 
   
Rospechat’ 
IP 
RA 
    
ANO Tsifrovaia Ekonomika 
C 
DP 
C 
DP 
  C 
DP 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
IP 
CD 
    
Think tanks and other forums 
CD 
DP 
TD 
DP DP DP DP 
TD 
The Ministry of Defence and the 
Armed Forces 
CD 
C 
C DP&IP 
RA 
NR 
TC 
CL 
CS 
  
The Federal Service for Technical 
and Export Control 
NR 
CL 
NR 
CL 
NR 
CL 
NR 
NSC 
CL 
CL 
The Defence-Industrial Complex 
  TD 
PC 
SS 
  
Ministry of Interior (Directorate 
K) 
LE LE   LE 
                                              
2032 Федеральный закон 2003; Федеральный закон от 27.07.2006 N 149-ФЗ (ред. от 18.03.2019) “Об ин-
формации, информационных технологиях и о защите информации” [Online]. Available: http://www. 
consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_61798/ [Accessed: 8th May 2019]; Федеральный закон 2017a. 
2033 Abbreviations: Strategic planning (SP), Coordination (C), Drafting laws (DL), Drafting policies (DP), 
Adopting laws (AL), Implementing policies (IP), Normative regulation (NR), Normative supervision and con-
trol (NSC), Cyber diplomacy (CD), Content monitoring (CM), Technical control (TC), Providing connectivity 
(PC), Technical development (TD), Resource administration (RA), Cyber security and incident response (CS) 
RU-CERT(a), GOV-CERT(b), Military SOCs (c), FSB (d), CERT-GIB / Private SOCs FIN-CERT (e), Certi-
fication and licences (CL), Systems and Services (SS), Law enforcement (LE). 
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Actors 
Networks 
Public 
Internet 
Govern-
ment 
networks 
Military 
Internet 
Critical infor-
mation infra-
structure 
Corporate 
networks 
Ministry of Industry and Trade and 
the Ministry of Economic Devel-
opment 
DP&IP DP&IP   DP&IP 
The Federal Security Service 
LE 
CM 
CL 
LE 
CM 
CL 
LE 
CM 
CL 
C 
LE 
CL 
TC 
CS(d) 
LE 
CL 
The Federal Protective Service  
TC 
PC 
CS 
SS 
   
Computer Emergency Response 
Teams 
CS(a) CS(b) CS(c) CS(d) CS (e) 
 
Coordination Centre of National 
Domain of Internet and Technical 
Centre Internet 
TC 
PC 
TC 
PC 
  PC 
State and private Internet Service 
Providers 
PC 
(TC) 
PC PC 
 
PC 
(TC) 
PC 
 
State and private software and 
hardware companies 
SS 
TD 
SS 
TD 
SS 
TD 
SS 
TD 
SS 
TD 
”The civil society” CM     
 
The President of the Russian Federation by the constitution and through Vladimir 
Putin’s personal power and through the political system is the highest decision-maker 
of Russian security, defence and foreign policy.2034 He approves all federal laws and 
has veto powers which have not been challenged after 2011.2035 This does not mean 
that he is omnipotent or a dictator, but he can, if he so chooses, ‘manually control’ 
issues he deems to be important.2036 He takes part in the strategic planning process as 
the Head of the Security Council, by influencing the legislative system through the 
presidential administration and the United Russia party, by issuing strategic directives 
like the May Edicts, by controlling the executive system through constitutional and 
personal power.2037 During his third and fourth term, Putin has relied more on semi-
formal gatherings or working groups and presidential advisers and representatives 
like: the Internet Ombudsman Dmitrii Marinichev, the Presidential Adviser on the 
Development on the Internet German Klimenko, and the Presidential Adviser on 
International Cooperation in the Area of Information Security Andrei Krutskikh.2038 
                                              
2034 Mankoff 2012, 55; Gvosdev & Marsh 2014, 34–36; Lo 2015, 7; Trenin 2015. 
2035 Pomeranz 2019. 
2036 Monaghan 2017; Treisman 2019. 
2037 Sakwa 2015; Lee 2015; Oliker 2017; Monaghan 2017; Treisman 2019. 
2038 Soldatov 2017; Monaghan 2017; Treisman 2019; Pomeranz 2019; Левченко, Григорий. Интернет-
омбудсмен и советник Путина открестились от защиты пользователей Сети. Republic, 11 января 2016 
[Online]. Available: https://republic.ru/posts/62291 [Accessed: 8th May 2019]; Указ Президента РФ 2018a; 
Посольство России в Республике Гана. Статья спецпредставителя Президента Российской Федерации 
по вопросам международного сотрудничества в области информационной безопасности, Посла по 
особым поручениям МИД России А.В.Крутских, опубликованная в газете "Коммерсант" 27 марта 2019 
года [Online]. Available: https://ghana.mid.ru/ru/press-centre/news/statya_spetspredstavitelya_prezidenta_ 
rossiyskoy_federatsii_po_voprosam_mezhdunarodnogo_sotrudniches/ [Accessed: 8th May 2019]. 
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The Security Council of the Russian Federation has the overall responsibility for the 
strategic planning process.2039 It is headed by the president and has approximately 30 
permanent and ordinary members including the prime minister, heads of key minis-
tries, head of the presidential administration, head of the Armed Forces, security ser-
vices, speakers of the Duma and Federal Council, and regional presidential represent-
atives. The Security Council has a secretariat headed by the ex-FSB Director and 
friend of Vladimir Putin, Nikolai Patrushev.2040 The Security Council functions as a 
national security coordination instrument at the highest level. It formulates policies, 
strategies and law drafts, monitors the national security situation and exercises over-
sight over the federal and regional executive power.2041 As Edwin Bacon has noted, 
the Security Council blurs the lines between the constitutional separation of pow-
ers.2042 The Security Council does much of its work through inter-departmental com-
missions, one of which is the Inter-Departmental Commission of Information Secu-
rity. It analyses and forecasts the information security situation in Russia, makes policy 
proposals for the Security Council and takes part in the strategic planning process. 
The Commission together with the Scientific Council of the Security Council has 
taken part in the formulation of the Digital Economy programme and the debates on 
information threats against Russia.2043 The membership of the Commission includes 
presidential representatives, representatives of ministries, security services (FSB, SVR, 
FSO), the military, the national guard, the federal agencies related to information se-
curity (Roskomnadzor, Rossviaz’, Rospechat’), the FSTEK, and representatives from 
Gasprom, Rosneft, Rosatom, and Sberbank among others.2044 The Scientific Council 
provides overall scientific-methodological support for the Security Council and its 
memberships includes 150 academicians from the leading think tanks and universities 
including: V. M. Burenok, S. N. Griniaev, S. G. Chekinov, A. A. Kokoshin, A. V. 
Krutskikh, A. V. Serzhantov and many representatives from the scientific military 
                                              
2039 Cf. Chapter 5; Федеральный закон от 28.12.2010 N 390-ФЗ (ред. от 05.10.2015) “О безопасности” 
[Online]. Available: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_108546/ [Accessed: 6th May 
2019]; Указ Президента РФ от 06.05.2011 N 590 (ред. от 25.07.2014) “Вопросы Совета Безопасности 
Российской Федерации” [Online]. Available: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_ 
113807/ [Accessed: 6th May 2019]; Vendil 2001; Bacon 2019. 
2040 Указ Президента РФ от 25.05.2012 N 715 (ред. от 18.02.2019) “Об утверждении состава Совета Без-
опасности Российской Федерации” [Online]. Available: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_ 
doc_LAW_130204/ [Accessed: 8th May 2019]. 
2041 Указ Президента РФ от 06.05.2011 N 590 (ред. от 25.07.2014) “Вопросы Совета Безопасности Рос-
сийской Федерации” [Online]. Available: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_ LAW_113807/ 
[Accessed: 6th May 2019]. 
2042 Bacon 2019. 
2043 Указ Президента РФ от 20 октября 1993 г. N 1686 “О совершенствовании деятельности межведом-
ственных комиссий Совета безопасности Российской Федерации” [Online]. Available: https://base.gar-
ant.ru/5348225/ [Accessed: 8th May 2019]; Совет Безопасности РФ. Вопросы информационной безопас-
ности при реализации национальной программы «Цифровая экономика России» обсуждены экспер-
тами Совета Безопасности РФ. 29 октября 2018 года [Online]. Available: http://www.scrf.gov.ru/news/all-
news/2493/ [Accessed: 8th May 2019]; Совет Безопасности РФ. В аппарате Совета Безопасности РФ рас-
смотрены вопросы развития цифровой экономики с точки зрения обеспечения национальной безопас-
ности. 30 июня 2017 года [Online]. Available: http://www.scrf.gov.ru/news/allnews/2245/ [Accessed: 8th 
May 2019]. 
2044 Указ Президента РФ от 10 ноября 2018 г. N 648 “Об утверждении состава Межведомственной ко-
миссии Совета Безопасности Российской Федерации по информационной безопасности по должно-
стям” [Online]. Available: https://base.garant.ru/72100350/ [Accessed: 8th May 2019]. 
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institutions.2045 The Security Council and its Committees have had a decisive role in 
how Russian information security has developed.2046 
 
The role of the Bicameral Federal Assembly, i.e. the State Duma and the Federal 
Council in the area of information or cyber security is mainly limited to drafting and 
approving laws and offering a platform for “elite battleground” on issues concerning 
rents and power.2047 Although many laws affecting the national segment of the Inter-
net are proposed by seemingly independent parliamentarians, they are more often 
than not based on the guidance of the Presidential Administration, the Security Coun-
cil, the government or corporation lobbyists.2048 Donaldson and Nadkarni argue that 
under the Putin regime the parliament may have shaped the tone, tactics, and political 
climate through discussion but not its directions.2049  
 
The Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media (in short 
Minkomsviaz’) is a federal executive organ responsible for, among other things, the 
development and implementation of state policy and regulatory framework in the field 
of information technology, telecommunications, radio spectrum, the Internet, and the 
provision of public services in the field of information technology. Basically, 
Minkomsviaz’ has the power to regulate public telecommunications and government 
networks, including the content and some aspects of security, and it administers cer-
tificates of electronic signatures and regulates their providers. It is also responsible 
for forming ‘a unified information space’ in the territory of CIS countries. 
Minkomsviaz’ takes part in mobilization and civil defence if so ordered.2050 
Minkomsviaz’ is the ministry responsible for the national programme of the Digital 
Economy which is one of national programmes based on Putin’s May Edicts 2018.2051 
It also maintains the register of Russian produced software (Unified Register of  Rus-
sian Programs for Electronic Computers and Databases) and may in the future with 
some other ministries manage a register of Russian produced hardware.2052 Federal 
                                              
2045 Указ Президента РФ 2011; Указ Президента РФ от 29 декабря 2018 г. № 771  ”Состав научного совета 
при Совете Безопасности Российской Федерации” [Online]. Available: http://www.scrf.gov.ru/about/ 
NS_spis_organ/sost_NS/ [Accessed: 8th May 2019]. 
2046 Cf. Chapter 4.1. 
2047 Noble & Schulmann 2018. 
2048 Treisman 2019; Конституция Российской Федерации (принята всенародным голосованием 
12.12.1993) (с учетом поправок, внесенных Законами РФ о поправках к Конституции РФ от 30.12.2008 
N 6-ФКЗ, от 30.12.2008 N 7-ФКЗ, от 05.02.2014 N 2-ФКЗ, от 21.07.2014 N 11-ФКЗ) [Online]. Available: 
https://base.garant.ru/10103000/ [Accessed: 6th May 2019]; Sakwa 2008. 
2049 Donaldson & Nadkarni 2019, 152-253. 
2050 Постановление Правительства РФ от 02.06.2008 N 418 (ред. от 07.02.2019) “О Министерстве циф-
рового развития, связи и массовых коммуникаций Российской Федерации” [Online]. Available: 
http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_77387/ [Accessed: 8th May 2019]; Закон РФ "О гос-
ударственной тайне" от 21.07.1993 N 5485-1 (последняя редакция) [Online]. Available: http:// www.con-
sultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_2481/ [Accessed: 8th May 2019]; Федеральный закон 2006. 
2051 Президиум Совета при Президенте Российской Федерации по стратегическому развитию и нацио-
нальным проектам от 24 декабря 2018 года “Паспорт национальной программы «Цифровая экономика 
Российской Федерации».” [Online]. Available: http://static.government.ru/media/files/ urKHm-
0gTPPnzJlaKw3M5cNLo6gczMkPF.pdf [Accessed: 7th January 2020]; Правительство Российской Федера-
ции. Заседание президиума Совета при Президенте Российской Федерации по стратегическому разви-
тию и национальным проектам, 24 декабря 2018 [Online]. Available: http://government.ru/news/ 35168/ 
[Accessed: 8th May 2019]. 
2052 On the register cf. Chapter 6.3.1. These are the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation, 
Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, and the Federal Antimonopoly Agency. (Фе-
деральный закон 2006; Кодачигов, Валерий. В России появится реестр отечественного телеком-обору-
дования. Реестр отечественного софта уже три года ведет Минкомсвязи. Ведомости, 14 января 2019 
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agencies under Minkomsviaz’ are responsible for the control and censorship of the 
Russian segment of Internet. The Ministry has been headed by Igor’ Shchegolev 
(2008–2012), Nikolai Nikiforov (2012–2018), Konstantin Noskov (2018–2019) and 
Maksut Shadaev (2020–).2053 In addition to Noskov, from 2018 to 2020 Vice-Premier 
Maksim Akimov has been responsible for transportation, communications, and digi-
tal economy.2054 Akimov’s position is a clear indication of the primacy the Kremlin 
sets for the controlling and developing of the national segment. He was replaced in 
January 2020 by Viktoriia Abramchenko. 
 
Rozkomnadzor or the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Infor-
mation Technology and Mass Media is the federal executive body responsible for, 
among other things, monitoring and supervising the mass media and electronic mass 
communications, information technologies and communications, the compliance of 
the processing of personal data with the requirements of the legislation of the Russian 
Federation, and the functions of organizing radio frequency service. Roskomnadzor’s 
powers extend to the so-called special networks if they affect the routing of public 
networks. Moreover, it manages the Register of Information Dissemination Organiz-
ers (ORI) which defines the status of Russian ISPs and Internet content providers in 
the context of the laws regulating the Internet.2055 Additionally, it maintains the regis-
ter of blocked Internet resources, i.e. the Unified register of domain names, websites 
on the Internet and network addresses that identify Internet sites containing infor-
mation the distribution of which is prohibited in the Russian Federation. The register 
obliges ISPs to block access to designated resources within a day of the promulgation 
of an order. Resources can be added to the register by Rozkomnadzor based on law 
or through a court decision.2056 Rozkomnadzor will be responsible for the system for 
ensuring the resilience, security and integrity of the Russian segment of the Internet 
beginning from December 2019.2057 This is a definite change in its responsibilities as 
it becomes a national security operator instead of being a supervisory and regulatory 
organ of state power. Under Roskomnadzor operates the Radio Frequency Service or 
Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Main Radio Frequency Centre” which has been al-
legedly responsible for monitoring the traffic of the national segment since 2014–
2015 to ensure the compliance of the ISPs with the Unified Register. The Service will 
most probably operate the “Centre for monitoring and management of public tele-
communications network” which will be used to disconnect the Russian segment of 
Internet from the global Internet if necessary.2058 
                                              
[Online]. Available: https://www.vedomosti.ru/technology/articles/2019/01/14/791362-reestr-otechestven-
nogo [Accessed: 8th May 2019]). 
2053 Википедия. Министерство цифрового развития, связи и массовых коммуникаций Российской Фе-
дерации [Online]. Available: https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Министерство_цифрового_развития,_ 
связи_и_массовых_коммуникаций_Российской_Федерации [Accessed: 8th May 2019]. 
2054 Ведомости. Кто вошел в новое правительство. Полный список. Десять вице-премьеров и двадцать 
один министр. Ведомости, 18 мая 2018 [Online]. Available: https://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/ 
2018/05/18/768949-pravitelstvo-polnii-spisok [Accessed: 8th May 219]. 
2055 Постановление Правительства РФ от 16.03.2009 N 228 (ред. от 28.02.2019) “О Федеральной службе 
по надзору в сфере связи, информационных технологий и массовых коммуникаций” (вместе с “Поло-
жением о Федеральной службе по надзору в сфере связи, информационных технологий и массовых 
коммуникаций”) [Online]. Available: https://base.garant.ru/195117/ [Accessed: 6th May 2019]. 
2056 Федеральный закон 2006. 
2057 Федеральный закон 2019. 
2058 Голунов, Иван, Горбачев, Александр, Туровский, Даниил. «Симона» в поисках мата и порно «Ме-
дуза» выяснила, как работают сотрудники Роскомнадзора, которые занимаются цензурой в СМИ. И 
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Rossviaz’ or the Federal Communications Agency is the federal executive body re-
sponsible for managing state property and providing public services in the field of 
telecommunications including communication networks and satellite services. It is 
responsible for managing the public telecommunications network of the RF during 
emergency situations.2059 The satellite fleet is operated by Kosmicheskaia sviaz’ com-
pany and consists of 12 satellites.2060 Emergency communications are offered by the 
Federal State Budgetary Organization “Industry Expertise Centre for Monitoring and 
Development in the Sphere of Info-Communication Technologies” for example 
through TETRA networks.2061 Furthermore, the SORM system was and is still devel-
oped by the FGUP TsNIIS under Rossviaz’.2062 The convergence of mobile commu-
nications and data traffic further promotes Rossviaz’s role.2063 
 
Rospechat’ or the Federal Agency for Press and Mass Communications is a federal 
agency which manages state property in the field of press, mass media and mass com-
munications including computer networks. It implements state information policy, 
for example, through the control of the main television channels and by supporting 
various patriotic events like the Premiia Runeta competition.2064 
 
The autonomous non-commercial organization (ANO) Digital Economy is one of 
the institutions created for the implementation of the national programme of the Dig-
ital Economy. Its main function is the coordination between the government and the 
state and private businesses. It monitors the development of the program, forms 
workgroups, comments on law drafts and participates in the goal setting of the pro-
gram. It is led by people from the leading Russian ICT companies.2065 Although it has 
no authority to allocate resources, it does provide a platform for debate and feedback 
                                              
сколько это стоит. Meduza, 8 декабря 2017 [Online]. Available: https://meduza.io/feature/2017/12/08/ si-
mona-v-poiskah-mata-i-porno [Accessed: 15th May 2019]; Роскомсвобода. Суверенное регулирование про-
должает обрастать «нормативками». Роскомсвобода, 21.6.2019 [Online]. Available: https://roskomsvo-
boda.org/47728/ [Accessed: 8th July 2019]. 
2059 Постановление Правительства РФ от 30.06.2004 N 320 (ред. от 25.09.2018) “Об утверждении Поло-
жения о Федеральном агентстве связи” [Online]. Available: http://www.consultant.ru/document/ 
cons_doc_LAW_48289/ [Accessed: 8th May 2019]. 
2060 Космическая связь. Спутниковая группировка. [Online]. Available: https://www.rscc.ru/space/seriya-
ekspress-am/ekspress-am44-11-zd/ [Accessed: 8th May 2019]. 
2061 ФГБУ Центр МИР ИТ. Устав ФГБУ Центр МИР ИТ, 22.6.2016 [Online]. Available: http://cen-
trmirit.ru/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Ustav-FGBU-TSentr-MIR-IT.pdf [Accessed: 8th May 2019]; 
Ландышв, Юлия. Ростове монтируют новую систему связи для чемпионата мира по футболу. Совре-
менная радиосеть позволит надежно общаться тысячам волонтеров. Комсомольская Правда, 20 апреля 
2018 [Online]. Available: https://www.rostov.kp.ru/online/news/3091086/ [Accessed: 8th May 2019]. 
2062 Центральный научно-исследовательский институт связи. СОРМ [Online]. Available: 
https://zniis.ru/focus/sorm [Accessed: 8th May 2019]. 
2063 Маркелов, Роман. В России предложили ввести платную регистрацию мобильных устройств. RG.ru, 
25 января 2019 [Online]. Available: https://rg.ru/2019/01/25/v-rossii-predlozhili-vvesti-platnuiu-registraciiu 
-mobilnyh-ustrojstv.html [Accessed: 8th May 2019]. 
2064 Постановление Правительства РФ от 17.06.2004 N 292 (ред. от 25.09.2018) “О Федеральном 
агентстве по печати и массовым коммуникациям” [Online]. Available: https://base.garant.ru/187125/ 
[Accessed: 22 January 2018]; Федеральное агентство по печати и массовым коммуникациям. Итоги 
премии Рунета 2017, 24 ноября 2017 [Online]. Available: http://www.fapmc.ru/rospechat/ 
newsandevents/newsagency/2017/11/item20.html [Accessed: 8th May 2019]. 
2065 Постановление Правительства РФ от 2 марта 2019 г. N 234 “О системе управления реализацией 
национальной программы “Цифровая экономика Российской Федерации” [Online]. Available: 
https://base.garant.ru/72190034/ [Accessed: 6th May 2019]; АНО «Цифровая Экономика». Наблюдатель-
ный совет АНО «Цифровая экономика» назвал законопроекты, которые требуют приоритетного одоб-
рения Госдумой, 04.12.2018 [Online]. Available: https://data-economy.ru/04122018 [Accessed: 6th May 
2019]. 
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and it its officially connected to the government. In addition to the ANO Digital 
Economy there are also investment and financing tools like the Internet Initiatives 
Development Fund (FRII) which channels energy-revenues into the ICT sector,2066 
and government–private business forums like the Internet Development Institute 
(IRI).2067 The Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP) also has a 
Committee of Digital Economy chaired by the President of Rostelekom.2068 Because 
venture-capitalism is poorly developed in Russia, these organizations facilitate the 
process of allocating state resources to national projects.2069 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has a distinct role in the international cyber 
norm-building effort of the Russian regime.2070 It must be noted that the MoD also 
has a role in this process as do some representatives from the security services. How-
ever, official international negotiations are conducted in the framework of the United 
Nations which is the territory of the MFA.2071 Because the MFA does not conduct 
independent policy its main function in the context of information security is the 
advancement of Russian national interests by promoting Russian ideas about infor-
mation security.2072 To these ends, it in 2019 established the 42nd Department of In-
ternational Information Security. It is headed by Andrei Krutskikh, a founding mem-
ber of NAMIB and a career diplomat.2073 
 
Independent, semi-independent, and subordinate think tanks and domestic and inter-
national forums provide a platform for developing technologies and policies related 
to the control and development of the national segment of the Internet.2074 These 
think tanks include, for example, many of those which have representatives in the 
Security Council and whose members’ writings have been analysed in Chapter 5 such 
as the PIR Centre, MGIMO, RISI, RIAC, the Centre of Strategic Estimations and 
Forecasts, the Centre for Military Strategic Studies of the General Staff, various insti-
tutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Russian Academy of Rocket and Artil-
lery Sciences, the Institute of Information Security Problems at the MGU, the Russian 
Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, the Skolkovo 
                                              
2066 Сухаревская, Алена. Нефтегазовый венчур: как работает Фонд развития интернет-инициатив. РБК, 
28 апреля 2016 [Online]. Available: https://www.rbc.ru/magazine/2016/05/570fa16e9a794781cb616fa0 [Ac-
cessed: 17th May 2019]. 
2067 IRI is connected to the Fond for Developing Internet-Initiatives (FRII) and ROTsIT which is a non-gov-
ernmental Internet development organization. IRI has faltered after its initiator Viacheslava Volodin left the 
presidential administration. (Богданов, Юрий. Институт развития интернета укрепит цифровой сувере-
нитет страны. ВЗГЛЯД, 12 марта 2015 [Online]. Available: https://vz.ru/society/2015/3/12/ 734014.html 
[Accessed: 9th May 2019]; Голицына, Анастасия. Институт развития интернета увольняет сотрудников. 
У организации начались проблемы с финансированием. Ведомости, 18 января 2017 [Online]. Available: 
https://www.vedomosti.ru/technology/articles/2017/01/18/673512-institut [Accessed: 17th May 2019].) 
2068 Российский союз промышленников и предпринимателей. Комитет по цифровой экономике 
[Online]. Available: http://www.rspp.ru/cc/news/60 [Accessed: 17th May 2019]. 
2069 Бутрин, Дмитрий. «Конкуренция должна происходить внизу, в экосистеме». Коммерсантъ, №227 от 
10.12.2019 [Online]. Available: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4187705 [Accessed: 6th January 2020]. 
2070 Cf. Chapter 4 and 5; Nocetti 2015; Ristolainen 2017a & 2017b; Tikk & Kerttunen 2018. 
2071 Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации. О принятии Генассамблеей ООН россий-
ской резолюции по международной информационной безопасности. 7.12.2018 [Online]. Available: 
http://www.mid.ru/mezdunarodnaa-informacionnaa-bezopasnost/-/asset_publisher/UsCUTiw2pO53/con-
tent/id/3437775 [Accessed: 6th May 2019]. 
2072 Donaldson & Nadkarni 2019, 138. 
2073 Черненко, Елена. МИД обзаведется новым департаментом. Коммерсантъ №56 от 01.04.2019 [Online]. 
Available: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3930510 [Accessed: 6th January 2020]. 
2074 CF. Иванов 2014; Vendil & Oxenstierna 2017. 
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technology park, and RAEK.2075 While some of the think tanks might conduct secret 
research, the forums are open and are meant for exchanging and promoting ideas 
publicly. These include, for example, the SOC-Forum, the 1T Forum, the Russian 
Internet Forum, and some foreign policy and security forums like the Valdai Club and 
the Moscow Conference on International Security.2076  
 
The Ministry of Defence is a federal executive organ which commands, controls and 
manages the Russian Armed Forces and coordinates its actions with other ministries 
and agencies. It develops and implements defence policy, coordinates with other fed-
eral organs on defence issues, and supports the military readiness of the Armed 
Forces. The MoD manages military procurement through a ‘unified information sys-
tem’, cooperates with the OPK and conducts defence-related scientific research. It 
develops plans for mobilization of the economy including the use of infrastructure, 
organises the strategic deployment of forces and enables the mobilization of military 
forces. The MoD supervises the development of the command and control system of 
the AF, ensures the information security of the AF, organizes federal cooperation on 
the use of communications networks for the defence of the country, certificates mil-
itary ICT, and conducts defence intelligence. The MoD also organizes the military-
political activity of the AF. The MoD has the power to conduct and order independ-
ent construction projects for defence needs. It can conduct foreign policy activities 
related to the defence and military security of the Russian Federation, including mili-
tary-technological cooperation. The minister of defence is directly responsible to the 
president. The MoD drafts, for example, the Defence Plan of RF, the Plan to Prevent 
and Deter Military Conflicts, the Mobilization Plan, and the Information Confronta-
tion Plan, and the Defence Command and Control (management) Plan.2077 
 
The Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces is the President. 
The AF is commanded by the Minister of Defence through the ministry.2078 The Gen-
eral Staff is subordinated to the Minister of Defence and is responsible for the oper-
ational activities of the AF. The GS and the Main Directorate of Communications of 
the AF are responsible for the organization and maintenance of the telecommunica-
tions networks and automated control systems of the Armed Forces and national 
command and control centres.2079 The MoD and the Armed Forces manage their own 
                                              
2075 RAEK is a commercial lobbying organization with tight relations with the government and the Digital 
Economy programme and publishes the yearly Economy of RuNet report (Ассоциация электронных 
коммуникаций  (РАЭК) [Online]. Available: https://raec.ru/statute/ [Accessed: 9th May 2019]. 
2076 SOC-Форум [Online]. Available: https://soc-forum.ib-bank.ru/ [Accessed: 9th May 2019]; ITForum. XI 
International it-forum with BRICS and SCO participation [Online]. Available: https://itforum.admhmao.ru/ 
2018/ [Accessed: 9th May 2019]; РИФ. 23-й Российский Интернет Форум [Online]. Available: 
https://2019.rif.ru/ [Accessed: 9th May 2019; Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. VIII Moscow 
Conference on International Security [Online]. Available: https://eng.mil.ru/ en/mcis/index.htm [Accessed: 
9th May 2019]. 
2077 Указ Президента РФ от 16.08.2004 N 1082 (ред. от 26.01.2019) “Вопросы Министерства обороны 
Российской Федерации” [Online]. Available: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_ 
48879/ [Accessed: 9th May 2019]. 
2078 Федеральный закон 1996. 
2079 Указ Президента РФ от 23.07.2013 N 631 (ред. от 01.07.2014) “Вопросы Генерального штаба Воору-
женных Сил Российской Федерации” (вместе с “Положением о Генеральном штабе Вооруженных Сил 
Российской Федерации”) [Online]. Available: http://www.consultant.ru/document/ cons_doc_LAW_ 
149773/ [Accessed: 9th May 2019]; Mil.ru. Главное управление связи Вооруженных Сил Российской Фе-
дерации [Online]. Available: https://structure.mil.ru/structure/ministry_of_defence/details.htm?id= 
9587@egOrganization [Accessed: 9th May 2019].  
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networks which are partly disconnected from the public Internet but at least partly 
rely on the civilian information infrastructure.2080 They are able to protect their net-
works through the operations of the Main (Intelligence) Directorate, Information 
troops, EW troops, science companies, military-scientific institutions, and military 
SOCs and CERTs.2081 
 
The Federal Service for Technical and Export Control Agency (FSTEK) functions 
under the MoD and is responsible for ensuring the protection of the critical infor-
mation infrastructure including super-computers, as well as countering foreign tech-
nological intelligence activities, ensuring the protection of state secrets, and conduct-
ing export control. In practice, the FSTEK regulates the actions of the federal, re-
gional and municipal organs and private actors. It also licenses approved information 
security actors and provides certificates for officially approved solutions and prod-
ucts—the exception is cryptography which belongs to the mandate of the FSB. The 
FSTEK has the right to supervise technological counter-intelligence activities and in-
formation security systems of public organs except the MoD, SVR, FSB, FSO and 
the General Directorate of Special Programmes for the President of the Russian Fed-
eration (GUSP).2082 The FSTEK and FSB must approve the security systems and cryp-
tography used in systems transferring secret information across Russia’s borders to 
foreign networks.2083 The protection of the CII is largely based on the responsibilities 
of the operators of the CII. They are monitored and regulated by the FSTEK which 
manages a register of the CII. The FSTEK is responsible for establishing require-
ments for the protection of the CII but must cooperate with, for example, 
Minkomsviaz’ and the Bank of Russia, in the case of systems related to their author-
ity.2084 The FSTEK’s responsibilities in the area of the CII are based on earlier regula-
tions on the protection of ASUs and critical objects.2085  
                                              
2080 Cf. Chapter 6.3; Carr 2012; Зыков & Рамм 2016. 
2081 Cf. Chapter 6.3; Независимое военное обозрение 2017; Иванов, Павел. Плакали ваши хакеры. ВПК, 
№ 18 (2017); Туровский Даниил. Российские вооруженные киберсилы Как государство создает военные 
отряды хакеров. Meduza, 7 ноября 2016 [Online]. Available: https://meduza.io/feature/2016/ 11/07/ros-
siyskie-vooruzhennye-kibersily [Accessed: 9th May 2019]; Рябов, Кирилл. Мультисервисная транспортная 
сеть связи для министерства обороны. Военное обозрение, 13 марта 2019 [Online]. Available: https://top-
war.ru/155340-multiservisnaja-transportnaja-set-svjazi-dlja-ministerstva-oborony.html [Accessed: 18th April 
2019]; Kjellén 2019. 
2082 Указ Президента РФ от 16 августа 2004 г. N 1085 “Вопросы Федеральной службы по техническому 
и экспортному контролю” (с изменениями и дополнениями) [Online]. Available: https://base.garant.ru/ 
12136635/ [Accessed: 6th May 2019]; ФСТЭК. Сведения о полномочиях ФСТЭК России; перечень нор-
мативных правовых актов, определяющих эти полномочия. 28 Марта 2016 [Online]. Vailable: 
https://fstec.ru/obshchaya-informatsiya/polnomochiya [Accessed: 6th May 2019]; Приказ Федеральной 
службы по техническому и экспортному контролю от 3 апреля 2018 г. N 55 “Об утверждении Положе-
ния о системе сертификации средств защиты информации” [Online]. Available: http://ivo. gar-
ant.ru/#/document/71942006/paragraph/1:0 [Accessed: 8th May 2019]. 
2083 Указ Президента РФ от 17.03.2008 N 351 (ред. от 22.05.2015) “О мерах по обеспечению информа-
ционной безопасности Российской Федерации при использовании информационно-телекоммуника-
ционных сетей международного информационного обмена” [Online]. Available: http://www.consult-
ant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_75586/ [Accessed: 6th May 2019]. 
2084 Федеральный закон 2017; Приказ Федеральной службы по техническому и экспортному контролю 
от 25 декабря 2017 г. N 239 “Об утверждении Требований по обеспечению безопасности значимых 
объектов критической информационной инфраструктуры Российской Федерации” (ред. от  9 август 
2019) [Online]. Available: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_294287/ [Accessed: 6th Jan-
uary 2020]. 
2085 Приказ Федеральной службы по техническому и экспортному контролю от 14 марта 2014 г. N 31 
“Об утверждении Требований к обеспечению защиты информации в автоматизированных системах 
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The military-industrial complex (OPK), understood as the private and state compa-
nies and corporations providing equipment and services to the MoD and its arma-
ments programme has a distinct role in providing the ‘military Internet’ with the con-
nectivity, resources and services it requires. These are mainly military solutions and 
meant exclusively for the Armed Forces. However, in the context of ICT and cyber 
security there is much overlap between the military and civilian technologies as dual 
use is becoming increasingly common. Furthermore, as there are dozens of research 
institutes operating under the MoD with various commercial connections the lines 
between the military and OPK become highly blurred.2086 Many of the think tanks 
listed above could be rightfully placed into the OPK but at least the 27th TsNII, 16th 
TsNII, 18th TsNII, 4th TsNII, TsNII EISU, and the Era technology park can be 
considered inherently part of the OPK.  
 
The Ministry of Interior’s role in controlling and developing the national segment of 
the Internet lays in its power of criminal investigation. Cybercrimes are investigated 
by Directorate K.2087 Other ministries like the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the 
Russian Federation and the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Fed-
eration affect the national segment mainly through import substitution policies which 
are meant to promote Russian domestic software and hardware development and 
production.2088 
 
The FSB or the Federal Security Service has an important role in controlling the na-
tional segment. Consequently, two of its main functions are counterintelligence and 
ensuring information security. Firstly, it manages the SORM system for criminal in-
vestigation, domestic intelligence, and counter-intelligence purposes and conducts 
criminal investigations into cybercrimes.2089 Secondly, it controls the GosSOPKA sys-
tem through the National Coordination Centre of Computer Incidents (NKTsKI).2090 
                                              
управления производственными и технологическими процессами на критически важных объектах, по-
тенциально опасных объектах, а также объектах, представляющих повышенную опасность для жизни 
и здоровья людей и для окружающей природной среды” (с изменениями и дополнениями) [Online]. 
Available: https://base.garant.ru/70690918/ [Accessed: 6th May 2019]. 
2086 Bitzinger, Richard A. and Popescu, Nicu. Defence industries in Russia and China: players and strategies. 
EU Institute for Security Studies, Report No 38 – December 2017 [Online]. Available: https://www.iss.eu-
ropa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Report_38_Defence-industries-in-Russia-and-China.pdf [Accessed: 
9th May 2019]; Связь. Связь в Вооруженных Силах Российской Федерации 2018. Москва: Информаци-
онный мост, 2018. 
2087 Keir 2011; Carr 2012; Министерство Внутренних Дел Российской Федерации. Управление «К» МВД 
России [Online]. Available: https://мвд.рф/mvd/structure1/Upravlenija/Upravlenie_K_MVD_Rossii [Ac-
cessed: 6th May 2019]. 
2088 Шмырова, Валерия. В России хотят запретить госзакупки иностранных СХД. CNews, 8 мая 2019 
[Online]. Available: http://www.cnews.ru/news/top/2019-05-08_v_rossii_zapretyat_goszakupki_ inostran-
nyh_shd?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop [Accessed: 9th May 2019]. 
2089 Федеральный закон от 03.04.1995 N 40-ФЗ (ред. от 07.03.2018) “О федеральной службе безопасно-
сти” [Online]. Available: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_6300/ [Accessed: 9th May 
2019]; Приказ Минкомсвязи России от 12.12.2016 N 645 “Об утверждении Правил применения обору-
дования систем коммутации, включая программное обеспечение, обеспечивающего выполнение уста-
новленных действий при проведении оперативно-розыскных мероприятий. Часть I.” 
(Зарегистрировано в Минюсте России 13.01.2017 N 45201) [Online]. Available: https://digital.gov.ru/ru/ 
documents/5413/ [Accessed: 9th May 2019]. 
2090 Федеральный закон 2017; Приказ ФСБ России от 24.07.2018 N 366 “О Национальном координаци-
онном центре по компьютерным инцидентам” (вместе с ”Положением о Национальном координаци-
онном центре по компьютерным инцидентам”) (Зарегистрировано в Минюсте России 06.09.2018 N 
52109) [Online]. Available: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_306334/ [Accessed: 18th 
April 2019]; Выписка. “Выписка из Концепции государственной системы обнаружения, предупреждения 
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Thirdly, the FSB functions as the national authority on certification of cryptographic 
means and licensing their development.2091 The FSB encryption certification and in-
vestigative powers extend to all government agencies. Moreover, the so-called Anti-
Terrorism laws require ‘organizations disseminating information’ to release their en-
cryption keys to the FSB.2092 The FSB’s main cybercrime investigation unit is the In-
formation Security Centre which was tarnished in an espionage scandal in 2017.2093 
The Communications Security Centre (8th Directorate) operates the NKTsKI and en-
sures security standards for government communications.2094 The Centre for Licens-
ing, Certification and Protection of State Secrets manages cryptography licences and 
certificates.2095 
 
The FSO or Federal Protective Service mainly provides and secures the confidential 
and secret communication of the Presidential Administration and the government or 
‘the Russian governmental segment of the Internet.’2096 The structure of the FSO in-
cludes the Special Communications and Information Service (Spetssviaz’) which in 
practise manages the FSO’s communications responsibilities. The Spetssviaz’ oper-
ates the government’s special networks, command and control posts, situation cen-
tres, and prepares communications for wartime.2097 Interestingly, the FSO is also re-
sponsible for gathering situation information on the federal level about political, so-
cietal and economic issues.2098 
 
Multiple CERTs are responsible for incident response in the public networks and in 
certain segments of private networks and coordinate actions between corporation 
                                              
и ликвидации последствий компьютерных атак на информационные ресурсы Российской Федерации” 
(утв. Президентом РФ 12.12.2014 N К 1274) [Online]. Available: http://www.fsb.ru/files/PDF/Vipiska_iz_ 
koncepcii.pdf. [Accessed 10 January 2018]; ГосСОПКА. Нормативные документы о безопасности КИИ 
[Online]. Available: http://gossopka.ru/law/ [Accessed: 6th May 2019]. 
2091 Приказ федеральная служба безопасности российской федерации № 41821 23 марта 2016 года 
[Online]. Available: http://www.fsb.ru/files/PDF/prikaz_182.pdf [Accessed: 6th May 2019]. 
2092 Федеральный закон от 06.07.2016 N 374-ФЗ “О внесении изменений в Федеральный закон “О про-
тиводействии терроризму” и отдельные законодательные акты Российской Федерации в части установ-
ления дополнительных мер противодействия терроризму и обеспечения общественной безопасности” 
(последняя редакция) [Online]. Available: http://www.consultant.ru/document/ cons_doc_LAW_201078/ 
[Accessed: 9th May 2019]. 
2093 Алехина, Маргарита. Хакер из «Шалтая-Болтая» заявил о сотрудничестве с ФСБ. РБК, 9 января 2019 
[Online]. Available: https://www.rbc.ru/society/09/01/2019/5c35fab59a7947185fe6da57?from=main [Ac-
cessed: 9th May 2019]. 
2094 Carr 2012; Жукова, Кристина. ГосСОПКА сдадут под ключ. Коммерсантъ №215 от 20.11.2017 
[Online]. Available: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3472959?from=four_tech [Accessed: 9th May 2019]. 
2095 Центр по лицензированию, сертификации и защите государственной тайны ФСБ России. Пере-
чень средств защиты информации, сертифицированных ФСБ России [Online]. Available: 
http://clsz.fsb.ru/files/download/svedeniya_po_sertifikatam_22.04.doc [Accessed: 9th May 2019]. 
2096 Указ Президента РФ от 07.08.2004 N 1013 (ред. от 27.02.2018) “Вопросы Федеральной службы 
охраны Российской Федерации” [Online]. Available: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_ 
LAW_48778/ [Accessed: 9th May 2019]; Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 22.05.2015 № 260 “О 
некоторых вопросах информационной безопасности Российской Федерации” [Online]. Available: 
http://www.consultant.ru/document/Cons_doc_LAW_179963/ [Accessed 11 January 2018]; Susiluoto 2006; 
Carr 2012. 
2097 Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 14 июля 2003 г. N 774 Вопросы службы специальной 
связи и информации при Федеральной службе охраны Российской Федерации [Online]. Available: 
http://www.agentura.ru/dossier/russia/fso/docs/polojeniespecvyaz/ [Accessed: 6th May 2019]. 
2098 Звездина, Полина. Охрана для нацпроектов: почему контроль за майским указом отдали ФСО. РБК: 
26 октября 2018 [Online]. Available: https://www.rbc.ru/society/26/10/2018/5bd1b4299a7947b26916a-
555?from=center_5 [Accessed: 6th May 2019]. 
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SOCs.2099 Moreover, at least some of them are connected to the GosSOPKA net-
work.2100 Admittedly, when it comes to the cyber security management of confidential 
government networks, the responsibilities of the FSB, FSO and CERTs are somewhat 
difficult to distinguish, although their cooperation is increasing.2101 
 
The Coordination Centre of National Domain of Internet and Technical Centre In-
ternet are responsible for the administration of the main ccTLD servers and managing 
.ru, .рф and .su domains. They provide connectivity and technical control on a na-
tional level and are the Russian national contact point for the Internet’s international 
multi-stakeholder governance.2102 Moreover, the Coordination Centre manages a na-
tional cybersecurity information platform ‘Netoskop’ which enables public and pri-
vate actors to share threat intelligence and, furthermore, to eliminate these threats 
though the Coordination Centre’s ability to remove hostile resources from national 
domains.2103 
 
The role of the ISPs and hardware and software companies is to provide connectivity, 
resources and services for the national segment of the Internet. They form the core 
of the segment and provide the infrastructure upon which the federal government 
and military networks are built. Many of the most critical companies are owned by 
state corporations.2104 The companies, be they private or public, do of course affect 
the national segment in multiple ways, but from the regimes point of view, they appear 
only as potential resources and tools of control. They form the backbone of digital 
sovereignty but also an environment that needs to be controlled and delineated from 
the rest of the cyberspace. However, as Rostelekom owns much of the critical infra-
structure of the national segment and many private companies are tightly connected 
to the regime, they also function as tools of indirect control. This category also in-
cludes the commercial and non-commercial, private and state-owned domain name 
registrars and IXP managers. The final actor affecting the control and development 
of the national segment is civil society. Although Russia has not developed the same 
                                              
2099 Коммерсантъ. Киберугрозы сажают на CERT. В России создают центр реагирования на инциденты 
в сфере информационной безопасности. Коммерсантъ №160 от 01.09.2016 [Online]. Available: 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3077603 [Accessed: 9th May 2019]; Коломыченко, Мария. Киберспец-
служба: Сбербанк предложил создать штаб борьбы с хакерами. РБК, 1 сентября 2017 [Online]. Available: 
https://www.rbc.ru/technology_and_media/01/09/2017/59a9799f9a7947375702db15?from=center_7 [Ac-
cessed: 9th May 2019]. 
2100 Грачȍв, Анатолий. Технические аспекты взаимодействия с НКЦКИ. SOC-Форум, 27 ноября 2018  
[Online]. Available: https://soc-forum.ib-bank.ru/files/files/SOC%202018/08_Grachev.pdf [Accessed: 9th 
May 2019]; Григорьев, Дмитрий. Решения от InfoTeCS. Защита от компьютерных атак, 2017 [Online]. 
Available: http://www.cio-sibir.ru/files/Meet/2017/10/GosSOPKA.pdf [Accessed: 10th May 2019]. 
2101 Нефȍдова, Мария. Эксперты Group-IB сообщают, что рунет стал чище. Хакер, 5.7.2019 [Online]. 
Available: https://xakep.ru/2019/07/05/runet-stats/ [Accessed: 7th July 2019]. 
2102 Cf. Chapter 6.1.1. 
2103 Координационный центр доменов .RU/.РФ «Национальный координационный центр по компью-
терным инцидентам (НКЦКИ)» стал новой компетентной организацией при Координационном цен-
тре доменов .RU/.РФ, 6 августа 2019 [Online]. Available: https://cctld.ru/media/news/kc/21309/ [Ac-
cessed: 7th August 2019]. 
2104 Chapter 3.1; Vendil Pallin 2017; Связь. Связь в Вооруженных Силах Российской Федерации 2017. 
Москва: Информационный мост, 2017; Связь 2018; Minkomzsiaz’. “Nikolay Nikiforov Presented Branch 
Plan on Import Substitution of Software,” (2015, Apr. 3rd). [Online]. Available: http://minsvyaz.ru/en/ 
events/32967/. [Accessed 12 January 2018]. 
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degree of aggressive voluntary civilian censorship as China, the League of Safe Inter-
net has similar characteristics.2105 
 
A few observations are necessary before moving on to laws and policies. First, there 
are some over-lapping functions that may hinder the control and shaping of the na-
tional segment of the Internet. For example, multiple actors are responsible for the 
monitoring and security of the segment or its distinct parts. However well-defined the 
policies derived from strategic planning are, the political and institutional system de-
scribed above combined with multiple actors and the possibility of gathering rents 
through licences, certificates, government orders etc. may lead to rent-seeking behav-
iour, corruption, and institutional infighting. Secondly, the whole system of responsi-
bilities described above is an effort to push top-to-bottom control on a network that 
has developed from the bottom-to-top. This will lead to resistance, friction, and com-
promise. Thirdly, all the different actors and networks lead to multiple systems which 
lead to multiple gateways between systems and which quite possibly may lead to mul-
tiple vulnerabilities. Russian cyber security actors are aware of this and centralization 
and dismantling of stove-piped organizations is understood as a necessity. However, 
this is much easier said than done. Thus, we should not be surprised if the strategic 
cultural ideas present amongst the epistemic communities and even found in strategic 
documents and policies do not resonate with the actual performance of the regime. 
Fourthly, the heavy presence of the security services or more inclusively ‘the power 
ministries’ in the managing of the national segment will probably affect the way in 
which policies are formulated and implemented. This presence is probably somewhat 
mitigated by the lobbying of Internet industry people whose business model is af-
fected by increased state control. Fifthly, the Russian concept of ‘state secret’ has a 
cross-cutting influence on all the actors and their responsibilities. The protection of 
the secrecy of information is well established in laws and regulations.2106 Moreover, 
state secrets have also their own highly secret agency.2107 And sixthly,  it is clear that 
some people discussed in Chapter 4 and 5 have moved into and out of the institutions 
developing and implementing policies. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that there 
will be some connection between their ideas and the way the Russian elites began to 
shape cyberspace in the 2000s and 2010s.  
 
6.2.2 International treatises and ideas 
 
This chapter provides an analysis of the way in which the strategic cultural ideas res-
onate with the international treatises on cyber or information security which Russia 
has promoted or adopted from 1998 to 2018. I will examine the treatises chronolog-
ically to investigate if and how the treatises correlate with changes in the Russian stra-
tegic environment.2108 
                                              
2105 Балашова, Анна, Посыпкина, Александра. Властям предложили штрафовать соцсети и поисковики 
за запрещенный контент. РБК, 22 октября 2018 [Online]. Available: https://www.rbc.ru/technology_ 
and_media/22/10/2018/5bcda8179a79471e45ad2d1e#ws [Accessed: 9th May 2019]. For China cf. Griffiths 
2019. 
2106 It is defined in the Law on State Secrets which designates three levels of secrecy of information – special 
importance, top secret, and secret. (Закон РФ 1993).  
2107 Кузнецов, Юрий. Сто лет на охране секретов государства. Красная звезда, 2.11.2018 [Online]. Availa-
ble: http://redstar.ru/sto-let-na-ohrane-sekretov-gosudarstva/ [Accessed: 17th May 2019]. 
2108 Previous studies on the subject cf. Popescu, Nicu and Secrieru, Stanislav (Eds.) Hacks, Leaks and Disrup-
tions: Russian Cyber Strategies. Chaillot Papers No. 148, October 2011. Paris: European Union Institute for 
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The ideas of interstate struggle, digital sovereignty, and information-technological 
warfare were explicitly present in the Russian proposals on drafting an international 
norm to ban ‘information weapons.’ The first proposal was delivered to the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1998.2109 Even before this the CIS countries had 
adopted an appeal “On the Prevention of Information Wars” which was presented 
to the UN, the OSCE and the Council of Europe in 1997.2110 In his letter to the 
Secretary-General of the UN the Russian ambassador to the UN Sergei Lavrov 
claimed that developments in the information field were being used for purposes in-
compatible with maintaining international stability and security, as well as the princi-
ples of the non-use of force and non-interference in internal affairs. This could lead 
to the emergence of a fundamentally new area of international confrontation, infor-
mation wars, which he understood as “actions taken by one country to damage the 
information resources and systems of another country while at the same time protect-
ing its own infrastructure.” A new arms race could develop as information weapons 
with destructive effects comparable to that of weapons of mass destruction ap-
peared.2111 Lavrov thus summarized the Russian negotiation position, which has re-
mained more or less unchanged from 1998 to 2018.2112  
 
In the context of drafting international cyber security norms, in 2001 Russia argued 
that information threats included the following: technological attacks against infor-
mation resources, telecommunications systems and critical structures of the state; the 
use of information to undermine the state’s economic and social systems and psycho-
logical manipulation of society for the purposes of destabilising society; illegal pene-
tration of information-telecommunications systems of the state; efforts to dominate 
the information space by imposing technological standards on less developed coun-
tries and restricting their access to advanced technology; the encouragement of the 
terrorist use of information; the adoption of doctrines aimed at waging information 
war; the use of information technologies to the detriment of human rights and free-
doms; the blurring of state borders and jurisdictions that normally delineate national 
security; and the manipulation of information flows and spreading of disinformation 
including the eroding of spiritual values.2113 Information security was defined for the 
information space, which included the consciousness of the people, infrastructure and 
information. Information weapons caused damage to the state interests on techno-
logical and psychological level.2114 The threats and definitions were clearly based on 
                                              
Security Studies, 2018; Giampiero 2014; von Heinegg, Wolff Heintschel: Legal Implications of Territorial Sov-
ereignty in Cyberspace. In Czosseck, C., Ottis, R. and Ziolkowski, K. (Eds.) 4th International Conference on 
Cyber Conflict. Tallinn: NATO CCD COE Publications, 2012, 7-20; Nocetti 2015; Eneken 2016; Eneken & 
Kerttunen 2017; Giles 2012. 
2109 United Nations General Assembly. Resolution adopted by the general assembly. Developments in the field 
of information and telecommunications in the context of international security. A/RES/53/70 4 January 1999 
[Online]. Available: https://undocs.org/A/RES/53/70 [Accessed: 10th May 2019]. 
2110 Матяшов, Виктор. Войны в информационном пространстве. Защита и безопасность, № 1 (2009), 
17-19. 
2111 Комов 2009, 144. 
2112 Eneken & Kerttunen 2017. Grisby, Alex. Russia and the U.S. Offer Competing Vision of Cyber Norms to 
the U.N. Defence One, October 29, 2018 [Online]. Available: https://www.defenseone.com/politics/ 
2018/10/russia-us-offer-competing-vision-cyber-norms-un/152382/?oref=d-river [Accessed: 25th February 
2019]. 
2113 Комов 2009, 189-199. 
2114 Ibid., 181-182. 
 
309 
the idea of territorial state sovereignty in information (cyber) space. The threat ‘cav-
alcade’ shows that both information-technological and the psychological aspects were 
present as distinct threats, although the objective, i.e. the destabilization of a state 
dominated the understanding. Moreover, information threats were explicitly con-
nected to strategic stability and the interstate struggle in the claim that the ‘denial of 
technology’ was used as a tool of domination. Information war was now part of the 
modern character of war also on the diplomatic level. 
 
In 1999 the CIS adopted the Concept of Information Security of the Members of CIS 
in the Military Sphere. It recognized a full spectrum of sources of information threats 
the main one of which was the espionage conducted by ‘foreign countries’ aimed at 
achieving unilateral advantages. It also recognized the use of exported hardware and 
software as a threat and argued for cooperation between the CIS countries in the 
confines of their national interests. The ultimate goal of the Concept was to form  a 
common information policy, to create “a unified information space [edinnoe infor-
matsionnoe prostranstvo]”, and to develop and implement measures to ensure the 
military information security of the member states.“2115 The strategic cultural ideas 
were thus present in the CIS concept also already at the beginning of the Putin regime. 
The presence of the EIP in the context of the CIS shows how the borders of the 
information space were inherently political. 
 
The effort to build norms in the context of the SCO began in 2006 when the heads 
of the SCO gave a declaration on the international information security which envi-
sioned information-communication technology as a military-political tool of states on 
a par with weapons of mass destruction.2116 Its argument was based on the view that 
“ICT forms the global information environment, upon which the state of political, 
economic, defence, socio-cultural and other components of national security and the 
general system of international security and stability directly depend.”2117 Information 
had thus become one of the most important political-economic resources, and, con-
sequently, ICT could be used to interfere in the internal affairs of states for terrorist 
purposes and for military-political ends. The heads of states argued that the develop-
ment and use of ICT should respect national and cultural traditions and declared their 
support for a state-centric and UN led process of international information security 
norm-building.2118 Based on the declaration, the strategic cultural ideas of Russia and 
China were quite well synchronized from the beginning. The declaration did not en-
vision an EIP inside the SCO and it was based on technology and military-political 
threats more than psychological threats. The declaration was probably connected to 
the ITU/UN led WGIG/WSIS process and was an effort to establish joint SCO 
views on the issues debated there—thus state sovereignty was a guiding idea.2119 
 
                                              
2115 СНГ. Концепция информационной   безопасности   государств-участников Содружества Независи-
мых  Государств  в  военной  сфере, 4 июня 1999 года [Online]. Available: http://www.e-cis.info/page. 
php?id=21396 [Accessed: 25th February 2019]. 
2116 ШОС. Заявление глав государств – членов Шанхайской организации сотрудничество по междуна-
родной информационной безопасности. Г. Шанхай, 15 июня 2006 года [Online]. Available: 
http://rus.sectsco.org/ [Available: 2nd April 2019]; Комов 2009, 219-222. 
2117 ШОС 2006. 
2118 Ibid. 
2119 Cf. Chapter 6.1.3. 
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In 2008 the CIS adopted the Concept of Cooperation of the States Parties of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States in the Field of Information Security.2120 It de-
fined information security through threats and was quite state-centric. The threats 
emanated, for example, from other states trying to destabilize the social-political sit-
uation of other countries, from criminals and terrorists, from unsanctioned access to 
state information, and from states trying to dominate the information space. The con-
cept of space was not defined but the CIS was described as having its own information 
infrastructure. The objects of threats were, among other things, the interstate coop-
eration of the CIS states, the information infrastructure of the CIS, the interstate in-
formation systems including telecommunications networks and ASUs of military 
forces, and the services and systems based on those systems. The common tools of 
the CIS to counter these threats would be legal, organization-technological, and or-
ganization-economic.2121 The Concept was an effort to define many central concepts 
of information security, but it is clearly a result of compromise and partly vague and 
partly quite technical. There is a clear tension between proposed technological and 
technical methods of security and the view that the information threats are partly 
psychological and highly political. However, there is little in the document that does 
not resonate with the strategic cultural ideas. 
 
In 2009 the SCO adopted the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of International 
Information Security between the Governments of the Member States of the Shang-
hai Cooperation Organization.2122 The Agreement did not enter into force until 2012. 
It was a defining agreement offering a much clearer vision of information security 
than Russia’s previous international treatises. Information threats were categorized 
into the use of information weapons to wage information war (informatsionnaia 
voina), which was understood as a confrontation (protivoborstvo) between states in 
the information space (informatsionnoe prostranstvo), terrorism, crime, the efforts 
to use a dominant position in the information space to cause damage to others, dis-
seminating harmful information to the political, social, economic, spiritual and cul-
tural systems of other states, and threats to the global information infrastructure. The 
Agreement defined the protection of information resources and critically important 
infrastructure as belonging to the state interest. Each party to the agreement had the 
right to protect its own information resources and structure.2123 Information re-
sources were defined as the infrastructure and information itself, and critical struc-
tures were objects, systems and institutions which if damaged could threaten national 
security.2124 This duality resonated with the Russian technological-psychological IW 
categorization. However, the information-technological and psychological threats, 
means, and objectives of IW are perhaps more intertwined than in the previous trea-
tises. This resonates with the idea of strategic deterrence which was developing at that 
                                              
2120 СНГ. Решение о Концепции сотрудничества государств – участников Содружества Независимых 
Государств в сфере обеспечения информационной безопасности и о Комплексном плане мероприятий 
по реализации Концепции сотрудничества государств – участников Содружества Независимых Госу-
дарств в сфере обеспечения информационной безопасности на период с 2008 по 2010 год [Online]. 
Available: http://www.e-cis.info/page.php?id=20229 [Accessed: 25th February 2019]. 
2121 Ibid. 
2122 ШОС. Соглашение между правительствами государств-членов Шанхайской организации сотрудни-
чества о сотрудничестве в области обеспечения международной информационной безопасности. 16 
июня 2009 года. Екатеринбург. [Online]. Available: https://base.garant.ru/2571379/ [29th March 2019]. 
2123 Ibid. 
2124 Ibid. 
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time. The idea of sovereignty over and in information space is present but is not 
mentioned directly. The threats described in the Agreement are connected to the idea 
of the interstate struggle and information superiority, although on a strategic level. 
The SCO Agreement raises the question of how much the Russian elites were affected 
by domestic ideas and what role Chinese ideas played. The SCO affirmed its commit-
ments to the 2008 Agreement in the 2017 Astana declaration.2125 
 
In 2011 and 2015 the members of the SCO and some others submitted their joint 
proposals for the International Code of Conduct for Information Security for the UN 
Secretary-General.2126 They proposed that states would recognize “norms governing 
international relations that enshrine, inter alia, respect for the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and political independence of all States, respect for human rights and funda-
mental freedoms and respect for the diversity of history, culture and social systems of 
all countries.”2127 States should not use information and communication technologies 
to carry out hostile actions, should reaffirm the right of states to protect their infor-
mation space and should promote multilateral, transparent and democratic govern-
ance of the Internet.2128 To the listed hostile actions, the 2015 version added “inter-
ference to internal affairs” and “undermining political, economic and social stability” 
and emphasised the role of states in the governance of the Internet.2129 The last point 
is probably connected to the failed effort of Russia in the WCIT meeting in 2012 
Dubai to push through ITU control over IANA/ICANN.2130 In the proposals the 
Russian strategic cultural ideas are presented as the building blocks of international 
norms. Sovereignty was positioned in the information space as new international 
norms would build borders for it. Interstate struggle and information superiority in 
the form of strategic balance, i.e. ‘equality’ were present. Security is the security of 
states. On this level, the lines between information-technological and psychological 
warfare are most blurred. The EIP is present as the global and common information 
space which needs to be regulated—it is however distinct from the idea of how na-
tional information spaces should be ordered. Both the 2011 and 2015 proposals 
should be understood through strategic deterrence as they are meant to prevent 
threats from materializing and to weaken and restrain powerful opponents. 
 
In 2012 the CIS adopted the Agreement on the Cooperation of the State Members of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States in the Field of Information Security which 
                                              
2125 ШОС. Астанинская декларация глав государств – членов Шанхайской организации сотрудничества 
9 июня 2017 года [Online]. Available: http://kremlin.ru/supplement/5206 [Accessed: 10th May 2019]. 
2126 For a comparison of the 2011 and 2015 version cf. McKune 2015. 
2127 United Nations General Assembly. Letter dated 12 September 2011 from the Permanent Representatives 
of China, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-
General. A/66/359, 14 September 2011. [Online]. Available: https://undocs.org/A/66/359 [Accessed: 2nd 
April 2019]. 
2128 Ibid. 
2129 United Nations General Assembly. Letter dated 9 January 2015 from the Permanent Representatives of 
China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations ad-
dressed Secretary-General. A/69/723, 13 January 2015 [Online]. Available: https://undocs.org/A/69/723 
[Accessed: 2nd April 2019]. 
2130 Julian Nocetti argues that the ITU-WCIT 2012 in Dubai was a sign of a new, more contentious phase in 
Internet governance (Nocetti 2015, 121-125).  
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updated the 2008 Concept.2131 It defined practical goals for CIS information security 
cooperation based on state interests. The object of cooperation was information and 
‘the interstate information system.’ The 2012 Agreement implicitly called for the cre-
ation and control of the CIS information space through governance, encryption, cyber 
security systems, regulation of cross-border traffic, and standardization of technolog-
ical solutions. As was the case with the 2008 Concept, the strategic cultural ideas are 
implicitly present. The most interesting point is the drive to shape the CIS EIP into 
being through cooperation on information security. Still, the CIS agreement demon-
strates the tension between the idea of sovereignty and the EIP when they are trans-
ferred to a regional context. 
 
In 2013 Russia adopted the Basics of Government Policy in the Area of International 
Information Security.2132 Its substance correlated with the 2011 and 2015 International 
code of conduct for information security initiatives. The document was also in line 
with the Russian overall foreign policy as it promotes a regional approach in norm-
building. The objective of the Russian policy was the achievement and retaining of 
technological parity with leading world great powers and ensuring the strategic stabil-
ity. The policy should secure ‘the technological sovereignty’ of Russia.2133 The policy 
represented a clear indication of the move from sovereignty in information space to-
wards full digital sovereignty. It was also explicitly related to interstate struggle and 
information superiority. 
 
In addition to the SCO, Russia promoted cyber security norms in the CSTO which 
adopted the Protocol On the Interaction of the State Members of the Collective Se-
curity Treaty Organization in Combating Criminal Activities in the Information 
Sphere in 2014.2134 The most interesting aspect of the Protocol are the definitions of 
‘information space’2135 and ‘information sphere’2136 and the use of the concept of ‘the 
national segment of the Internet’ when referring to the part of information space 
under state jurisdiction. As was noted in Chapter 5 this concept appeared in the con-
text of the CIS and more precisely in Belarussian documents around 2010. The Pro-
tocol was a clear move towards territorially defined information sovereignty and an 
acknowledgement that the Internet should be divided into sovereign segments. Alt-
hough the Protocol is officially about combatting criminal activities it emphasises the 
‘destructive effects’ against the constitutional order and national security which hardly 
                                              
2131 Распоряжение Правительства РФ от 28 мая 2012 г. №856-р. О подписании Соглашения о сотрудни-
честве государств – участников Содружества Независимых Государств в области обеспечения инфор-
мационной безопасности [Online]. Available: https://digital.gov.ru/ru/documents/3729/ [Accessed: 29th 
March 2019]. 
2132 Основы 2013. 
2133 Ibid. 
2134 ОДКБ. Протокол О взаимодействии государств – членов Организации Договора о коллективной 
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mation itself.” (ОДКБ 2014). This same definition was used in the Russia–China Information Security Agree-
ment in 2015 (Правительство Российской Федерации 2015a). 
2136 “A set of information, information infrastructure, entities engaged in the collection, formation, dissemina-
tion and use of information, as well as a system for regulating the resulting public relations.” (ОДКБ 2014). 
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sound like criminality.2137 Nevertheless, the crime-aspect silences the influence of 
some strategic cultural  ideas and gives room only to the centrality of sovereignty and 
the EIP in the form of the national segment of the Internet. 
 
Russia and China signed the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of International 
Information Security in 2015.2138 It expressed the now already established view that 
information and communications technology could be used for military ends and “to 
undermine the sovereignty and security of states and interfere in their internal affairs, 
violate the privacy of citizens, destabilize internal political and socio-economic situa-
tion, incite ethnic and religious hatred.” The information infrastructure on a state’s 
territory, including the Internet, was under its sovereign rights, and the governance of 
the Internet should be ‘democratised’ and ‘internationalised’. The Agreement added 
to the threats expressed in the 2009 SCO Agreement threats to economy and the 
interference in the internal affairs of states.2139 The Agreement was clearly based on 
the idea of information sovereignty and struggle in information space manifested in 
the notion that some actors had attempted to gain dominance over Russia and China. 
The wide range of threats resonates with strategic deterrence. The additions to the 
threat list meant that now information security cut across all spheres of state interests. 
The 2015 Agreement used the same wording as the 2009 SCO agreement which is 
further proof that Chinese and Russian ideas have interacted. 
 
The declarations given in the conclusion of the BRICS summits in 2015 and 2017 
reflected the views presented in Russia’s UN Code of Conduct initiatives and the 
Basics of Government Policy document. However, their tone was not as confronta-
tional as in the CIS and SCO treaties. Moreover, the aspects of territorial sovereignty 
and national segments of the Internet were overshadowed by the idea of an open, 
common, and secure Internet in 2015 and a peaceful, secure, open, cooperative, sta-
ble, orderly, accessible and equitable ICT environment in 2017.2140 The declarations 
were the result of negotiations between Russia, China, Brazil, India, and South Africa 
so their substance was based on the interaction between strategic cultural ideas from 
different nations—as well as cold-blooded realpolitik and compromise. 
 
The Strategy of Collective Security of CSTO for 2025 adopted in 2016 is perhaps the 
most confrontational of the treatises discussed thus far. It recognized that infor-
mation and communication technology can be used to pressure states, to interfere in 
their internal affairs, to inflict destructive socio-political and socio-economic, to and 
manipulate the public consciousness. It even mentions ‘colour revolutions’ and ‘hy-
                                              
2137 It is possible that Russia wanted to avoid the ‘militarization’ of the ‘information sphere’ as it was contrary 
to its international cyber security norm-building project. Thus, the Protocol concentrated on criminality. 
2138 Распоряжение Правительства Российской Федерации от 30 апреля 2015 г. N 788-р О подписании 
Соглашения между Правительством Российской Федерации и Правительством Китайской Народной 
Республики о сотрудничестве в области обеспечения международной информационной безопасности 
[Online]. Available: http://www.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc&base=EXP&n=620700# 
0463235836450268 
2139 Ibid. 
2140 БРИКС. VII саммит БРИКС Уфимская декларация (Уфа, Российская Федерация, 9 июля 2015 года) 
[Online]. Available: http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150709-ufa-declaration-ru.pdf [Accessed: 10th May 
2019]; БРИКС. Сямэньская декларация руководителей стран БРИКС (Сямэнь, Китай, 4 сентября 2017 
года) [Online]. Available: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55515 [Accessed: 10th May 2019]. 
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brid wars.’ To counter these effects, it was seems as necessary to create a secure in-
formation space and a system of information security of the CSTO member states.2141 
The Strategy mentions non-state threats, i.e. terrorism, separatism, and criminality but 
it is definitely state-centric in its approach emphasising the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of the member states. All strategic cultural ideas are present in the CSTO 
Strategy: The idea of struggle now takes new forms; information is used to degrade 
sovereignty; multifaceted deterrence is needed to counter multifaceted threats; poten-
tial adversaries are seen to strive towards superiority through technology; and a system 
is required to counter threats. However, information threats are described as societal-
political and societal-economic and directed against societal consciousness—not so 
much technological. In June 2019 the Russian MoD proposed that the CSTO should 
adopt a common information policy and General Kartapalov even compared infor-
mation-psychological weapons to weapons of mass destruction.2142 
 
In 2018 Russia and a group of other countries (including Syria, China, North Korea) 
submitted their latest initiative for an international code of conduct in the UN. It 
basically repeated the statements of the 2011 and 2015 proposals. It was more precise 
in that states should not allow their territory to be used for wrongful acts using infor-
mation and communications technologies, should not use proxies, and should seek 
to ensure that non-state actors do not commit such acts from their territory. The role 
of the private sector and civil society is mentioned once.2143 Russia claims that its 
initiative is supported by its ‘partners’ in BRICS, SCO and CSTO.2144 It can be argued 
that little has changed in the Russian approach and that the UN initiative is now al-
most fully synchronized with the 2015 Russia-China agreement. 
 
The reactivation of Russian cyber diplomacy in 2018 after the failure of UN GGE in 
2017 is connected to the National Programme of the Digital Economy. The Pro-
gramme includes direct tasks for the ‘cyber diplomacy team’.2145 The current Russian 
worldview was summarized by Sergei Lavrov in the 73th General Assembly of the 
UN in September 2018 when he claimed that there was a collision under way between 
the rising centres of power which demanded individual models of political and eco-
nomic development and the Western status quo powers who were using all means in 
their possession to slow the inevitable ‘progress’.2146 The Minkomsviaz’ argued that 
the United States and EU countries did not support Russia’s latest initiatives because 
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ную политику. ТАСС, 20 июня 2019 [Online]. Available: https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/6573842 [Accessed: 
8th July 2019]. 
2143 United Nations General Assembly. Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in 
the context of international security. A/C.1/73/L.27/, 22 October 2018 [Online]. Available: https://undocs. 
org/pdf?symbol=en/A/C.1/73/L.27 [Accessed: 2nd April 2019]. 
2144 Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации. О принятии Генассамблеей ООН россий-
ской резолюции по противодействию информационной преступности, 18.12.2018 [Online]. Available: 
http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/mezdunarodnaa-informacionnaa-bezopasnost/-/asset_publisher/ UsCU-
Tiw2pO53/content/id/3449030 [Accessed: 14th May 2019]. 
2145 Распоряжение Правительства РФ 2017. 
2146 Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации. Выступление Министра иностранных дел 
России С.В.Лаврова на 73-й сессии Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН, Нью-Йорк, 28 сентября 2018 года 
[Online]. Available: http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/general_assembly/-/asset_publisher/lrzZMhfoyRUj/ 
content/id/3359296 [Accessed: 14th May 2019]. 
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they tried to preserve the digital inequality between the members of the world com-
munity.2147 Moreover, Russia did not support the alternative cyber security proposal 
as they went against the principles of state sovereignty or implicitly accepted the use 
of ICT technology in warfare.2148 When the UN General Assembly in December 2019 
voted in support of drafting the Russian cyber-crime treaty, the Russian MFA claimed 
the treaty would validate the principle of digital sovereignty.2149 
 
To summarize. The international treatises on information security resonate strongly 
with the idea of territorial state sovereignty. The connection has developed over time, 
but by 2013–2015 it had reached the level of information sovereignty, i.e. state sov-
ereignty defined by information space on a par with other aspects of sovereignty. The 
interstate struggle is also present and indeed provides the reasoning for the treatises 
as Russia’s great power competitors try to dominate it and its allies through the infor-
mation space with superior technology to achieve information superiority or domi-
nance in peacetime. Strategic deterrence is present in the regional agreements as mil-
itary threats and nuclear parity give way to multiple different information-related state 
and non-state threats which must be prevented and deterred. However, the agree-
ments are more defensive and passive than Russia’s own strategic planning docu-
ments were. The idea of a unified information space is expanded to include the CIS 
and CSTO in the documents. This raises the interesting question of where the borders 
of the Russian national segment of the Internet begin and where they stop. Clearly, 
the EIP can also be an inclusive concept when politico-militarily or for economic 
reasons appropriate or culturally feasible. This means that any ‘single cause’ explana-
tion, like ‘the besieged fortress syndrome’ cannot fully explain Russian policies toward 
cyberspace. Information-technological warfare is lost its distinctiveness in the 2010s, 
which correlates with the appearance of ‘Western hybrid and information warfare.’ 
However, there remains a purely technological aspect which is related to the security 
and functioning of critical information infrastructure, and the destructive effects of 
information weapons. As the treatises are high-level political documents automated 
command and control systems do not really feature in them—excluding the mention 
of CIS information security system, which was probably a more organizational than 
technological concept. The idea of asymmetric response was not part of international 
treatises.’ 
 
To be analytically accurate, terrorism, separatism and extremism are persistent threats 
in the documents—especially in the context of the SCO. Moreover, the official texts 
did not explicitly use the terms digital or information sovereignty. The agreements 
between the CIS, CSTO and SCO reflect a like-minded and negotiated approach to 
information security. Thus, Russia is not the sole author of the documents or the sole, 
                                              
2147 Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации 2018c. 
2148 Комментарий Департамента информации и печати МИД России о российских оценках француз-
ской инициативы «Парижский призыв к доверию и безопасности в киберпространстве», 20.11.2018 
[Online]. Available: http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/mezdunarodnaa-informacionnaa-bezopasnost /-/as-
set_publisher/UsCUTiw2pO53/content/id/3413302 [Accessed: 14th May 2019]. 
2149 Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации. Об итогах голосования в Генассамблее 
ООН по российскому проекту резолюции по противодействию киберпреступности, 30.12.2019 
[Online]. Available: https://www.mid.ru/organs/-/asset_publisher/AfvTBPbEYay2/content/id/3988579 
[Accessed: 6th January 2020]. 
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or even original, source of all of the ideas.2150 Russian ideas most probably interacted 
with Chinese ideas and ideas from Post-Soviet countries. The international treatises 
demonstrate that the part of the strategic cultural ideas analysed in this study were 
already part of the Russian decision-making elite’s worldview in 2000–2011. However, 
Russian policies concerning cyber or information space were largely directed outside 
of Russia—to change the rules of the international system to balance the perceived 
disbalance in power between Russia and the United States.2151 The idea of a Russian 
national segment of the Internet was already present before 2014 but the elites con-
centrated mainly on shaping and controlling its external normative borders, not so 
much its internal elements and functions. After 2014 this project intensified and 
gained urgency. 
 
6.2.3 The early policies and laws of 2000–2011 
 
This chapter looks at the Russian strategies, policies and laws promulgated and im-
plemented during 2000–2010 to provide a context to the change that occurred after 
2010. The basic principles of the government policy concerning information security 
were established in the Information Security Doctrine of 2000.2152 Manoilo, Petrenko 
and Frolov have argued that a long-term programme for coordinating the actions of 
federal bodies of state power for the development and implementation of state infor-
mation policy and information warfare was designed in a meeting of the Security 
Council of the Russian Federation held in July 2000.2153 As the Doctrine has been 
analysed previously, and there are few public sources available to trace the policy re-
ferred by Manoilo et al., I shall start my analysis on the first public government efforts 
to shape the Russian cyber and information space.  
 
As was argued above, the Russian regime allowed the Russian Internet to develop 
largely without state control in the 2000s. In 2002 the Russian government adopted 
the federal Electronic Russia Programme for 2002–2010. It was meant to ensure the 
development of the public information infrastructure and services of the government, 
and to enhance intragovernmental cooperation for the needs of the state authorities 
throughout the Russian Federation. This included adopting measures aimed at cost-
effectiveness, reducing bureaucracy and increasing the transparency of the public ad-
ministration. The Programme was the government’s answer to the digitalization of 
society and the economy. ‘A unified information space’ was considered to be an im-
portant component in the building of a strong federal state as Russia was character-
ized by the vastness of its territory and sparseness of the population. In principle, it 
did not differ from the eGovernment programmes adopted by other governments at 
                                              
2150 For example, in 2010 the president of Belarus already gave an edict titled: On the Measures to Improve the 
Use of the National Segment of the Internet, and in 2019 the county adopted the Concept of Information 
Security of the Republic of Belarus, which defined such concepts as ‘information sovereignty’ and ‘national 
segment of the Internet’ which are both concepts that Russians have consistently used but never officially 
defined. (Указ Президента РБ 2010; Постоновление Совета Безопасности Республики Беларусь от 18 
марта 2019 № 1 “О Концепции информационной безопасности Республики Беларусь” [Online]. Avail-
able: http://president.gov.by/uploads/documents/2019/1post.pdf [Accessed: 2nd April 2019]). Soldatov and 
Borogan have claimed that Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazabayev called for electronic borders and e-
sovereignty already at the SCO summit in Astana in June 15, 2011 (Soldatov & Borogan 2013, 29-30). 
2151 For a similar conclusion cf. Giacomi 2014; Nocetti 2015. 
2152 CF. Chapter 4. 
2153 Манойло, Петренко & Фролов 2012, 456. 
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that time.2154 However, it envisioned ‘a unified, vertically integrated state automated 
information system of ‘Management’ (upravlenie)’ which would be based on regional 
databases and the sharing of information between all federal institutions. This system 
differed from programmes of other governments and resonated strongly with Soviet 
‘kibernetik’ ideas.2155 The Electronic Russia Programme also included the establish-
ment of regional information-analytical centres and situation centres for ‘higher or-
gans of the government’. These new systems would be based on automated infor-
mation systems harmonized and integrated through federal and municipal levels. In 
principle, the Programme should have produced a unified federal and municipal gov-
ernment information system based on common computer systems and protected 
communication channels operated by a single operator.2156 
 
According to Ilmari Susiluoto, the Electronic Russia Programme was followed by a 
push to develop techno parks, centres and cities modelled after the success of the 
Silicon Valley but based on Soviet ‘science cities.’ Susiluoto argues that these ideas 
were connected to the utopian Soviet thinking. They were efforts to control infor-
mation society without understanding its creativity.2157 Moreover, they were an effort 
to fix the decline of the Russian information scientific and industrial civilian and mil-
itary base through the government support.2158 
 
Although this first state-led push to create the information society in Russia in 2002–
2008 was dominated by liberal and progressive economic thinking, it also included 
the first restrictions to Internet freedoms. This was not a surprise as the Information 
Security Doctrine published in 2000 had practically made information security a na-
tional security issue.2159 In 2003 Russia got a new Federal Law on Communications 
which strived to regulate the changing information landscape. It included licensing 
procedures and monopolistic tendencies that tried to give the regime the ability to 
control the telecoms market.2160 Ultimately, in 2006 the ISPs were ordered to provide 
the FSB real-time access to their customer databases.2161 This development culminated 
in the Federal Law on Information, Information technology and the Protection of 
Information, which was adopted in 2006.2162 Although its first version included only 
                                              
2154 Schware, Robert (ed.) E-Development: From Excitement to Effectiveness. Washington D.C.: The World 
Bank Group, 2004 [Online]. Available: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/261151468325237852/ 
pdf/341470EDevelopment.pdf [Accessed: 13th May 2019]. 
2155 The “Management” system is a unified territorially distributed state information system which offers ana-
lytics and decision-making support, enables the monitoring of the implementation of federal and municipal 
programmes and the evaluation of their effectiveness, the monitoring of economic, financial and social situation 
in the country, and supports strategic planning.   (Постановление Правительства Российской Федерации 
от 25 декабря 2009 г. № 1088 (В редакции от 02.02.2019 № 77) Положение о государственной автомати-
зированной информационной системе “Управление” [Online]. Available: http://pravo.gov.ru/ 
proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102134940 [Accessed: 13th May 2019].) 
2156 Постановление Правительство Российской Федерации от 28 января 2002 г. №65 “ФЦП «Электрон-
ная Россия (2002–2010 годы)” [Online]. Available: http://minsvyaz.ru/ru/activity/programs/6/ [Accessed: 
4th March 2019]. 
2157 Susiluoto 2006. 
2158 Roffey 2013; Locksley 2001; Golts, Alexander M. and Putnam, Tonya L. State Militarism and Its Legacies: 
Why Military Reform Has Failed in Russia. International Security, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Fall 2004), 121-158. 
2159 Cf. Chapter 4. 
2160 Alexander, Marcus. The Internet and Democratization: The Development of Russian Internet Policy. Dem-
okratizatsiya, The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2004), 607-627. 
2161 Susiluoto 2006, 393-394. 
2162 Федеральный закон 2006. 
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basic provisions to bring the Internet into the sphere of legal regulation, it later be-
came ‘the law of Internet state control’, as will be shown below. 
 
The Russian regime’s thinking on critical infrastructure develop during the 2000s with 
international trends but also with national characteristics. Katri Pynnöniemi and Irina 
Busygina have argued that Russian views began to change in 2003 after a Security 
Council meeting.2163 The planning and preparing for emergency situations developed 
towards the protection of certain critical objects, and the conceptual basis to protect 
critical infrastructure was formulated in 2006.2164 However, at this point the issue was 
still connected to internal security and emergency situations- The ensuring of resilient 
and secure functioning of information-telecommunications systems of ‘the dangerous 
objects’ was only one of the measures proposed to protect CI. Interestingly, in a sim-
ilar manner to the Electronic Russia Programme, the concept called for the creation 
of ‘a unified state system for the prevention and elimination of emergency situations.’ 
It also demanded the creation of a national control centre for crisis situations as well 
as a decision support system, and automated information and forecast-analytical sys-
tems for identifying and assessing possible threats. Is also required a certification sys-
tem for the ICT and software of critical objects.2165 This system was later named the 
Unified State System of Emergency Prevention and Response (RSChS).2166 Sergei 
Shoigu later managed to construct this system during his post as the Minister of Emer-
gency Situations 1994-2012.2167 
 
Although the public and official policies do not mention the subject, the issue of 
informatization of the society touched also mobilization in the 2000s. Julian Cooper, 
who has studied the mobilization planning of Russia, claims that the Ministry of Eco-
nomic Development and Commerce sponsored a federal level integrated system 
called EMAPU which would have connected 10 000 local government organizations 
and 25 000 enterprises.2168 Furthermore, as noted in Chapter 5, the Russian military 
began to develop concepts for its own unified information space from the early 2000s. 
Previous studies on the Russian military reform have shown that automated com-
mand and control systems and digital communications were at the core of the new 
armaments programme launched in 2011.2169 The military-industrial complex had its 
own strategies and concepts for development.2170 However, the results would begin 
to materialize only in the 2010s when there was enough financing and the worst prob-
lems of the armament program had been ironed out.2171 
                                              
2163 Pynnöniemi & Busygina 2013. 
2164 Pynnöniemi 2012; Pynnöniemi & Busygina 2013. 
2165 Президент РФ 28 сентября 2006 г. № Пр-1649 Основы государственной политики в области обес-
печения безопасности населения Российской Федерации и защищенности критически важных и по-
тенциально опасных объектов от угроз техногенного, природного характера и террористических актов 
[Online]. Available: https://base.garant.ru/198664/ [Accessed: 13th May 2019]. 
2166  Поручение Президента РФ от 15.11.2011 N Пр-3400 Основы государственной политики в области 
обеспечения безопасности населения Российской Федерации и защищенности критически важных и 
потенциально опасных объектов от угроз природного, техногенного характера и террористических ак-
тов на период до 2020 года [Online]. Available: https://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/ 
70041358/ [Available: 13th May 2019]. 
2167 Roffey, Roger: Russia’s EMERCON: Managing emergencies and political stability, FOI, 2016. 
2168 Cooper 2016, 17. 
2169 Bartles 2011; McDermott 2011; Blank 11; McDermott 2015. 
2170 Растопшин 2004. 
2171 McDermott 2011; McDermott 2015; Renz 2018. 
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The next push for the informatization and digitalization of the Russian economy and 
government came with Dmitri Medvedev’s presidency. However, the 2008 Strategy 
for the Development of Information Society in the Russian Federation was adopted 
already under the reign of Vladimir Putin.2172 Its main objective was to ensure for 
Russia ‘a worthy place among the leaders of the global information society.’ Its tasks 
included the formation of modern information and telecommunications infrastruc-
ture, the development of economy based on the use of ICT, the protection of culture, 
and strengthening of patriotism, and the thwarting the use of information and tele-
communications technologies to threaten Russia’s national interests. The ensuring of 
national security and the enhancement of military defence were a constant theme in 
the Strategy. The emphasis of national interests was a clear departure from earlier 
eGovernment initiatives. It demanded the creation of ‘a unified information space’ 
inter alia for the needs of the national security and the protection of the information 
and telecommunications systems of key infrastructure facilities. Despite this ‘securit-
ization’, the economy, society and government services were the main targets of the 
Strategy. It promoted public private cooperation, indirect government support in-
stead of state-led projects, and international cooperation.2173 
 
The new government adopted in the November of 2008 the Concept of Long-period 
Social-Economic Development of the Russian Federation until 2020 declared that 
Russia was yet again becoming an economic great power.2174 The Concept acknowl-
edged the importance of scientific and technological development and the lag of Rus-
sia in this respect, which could increase Russia’s vulnerability in the context of grow-
ing geopolitical rivalry. Economic development was explicitly connected to combat 
readiness of the Armed Forces and thus deterrence. Moreover, financial competitive-
ness was the basis for ‘economic sovereignty’. The transformation towards economy 
of knowledge from energy-based economy was a priority and it included investments 
to human capital and scientific research. The part of the Concept discussing ICT 
mentioned the need to develop a unified information space, to stimulate domestic 
hardware and software production, to create technology parks, and to counter the use 
of ICT against Russia’s national interests. The Concept also called for systems of 
management to be created to manage different sectors of the Russian economy in the 
framework of strategic planning.2175 It was one of the first official references to stra-
tegic planning in national policy setting context. Moreover, it echoed the emphasis of 
sovereignty which Putin had elevated to almost an official ideology.2176 
 
                                              
2172 Стратегия. Стратегия развития информационного общества в Российской Федерации (утв. 
Президентом РФ 7 февраля 2008 г. № Пр-212) [Online]. Available: https://rg.ru/2008/02/16/informacia-
strategia-dok.html [Accessed: 13th May 2019]. 
2173 Ibid. 
2174 Распоряжение Правительства РФ от 17.11.2008 N 1662-р “О Концепции долгосрочного социально-
экономического развития Российской Федерации на период до 2020 года” (вместе с "Концепцией дол-
госрочного социально-экономического развития Российской Федерации на период до 2020 года"): 
http://www.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc&n=82134&base=LAW&from=308069-
1847&rnd=0.6960341791725004#0577375847182553 [Accessed: 13th May 2019]. 
2175 Распоряжение Правительства РФ 2008a. 
2176 Lo 2015, 31-32; Mankoff 2012, 81-82. 
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The Strategy and Concept of 2008 were put into practice in the Government Pro-
gramme on Information Society (2011—2020) adopted in 2010.2177 The Concept has 
been significantly updated during 2010-2013 and I will refer here to the original 2010 
version. The implementation of the Concept was the responsibility of Minkomsviaz’ 
and a group of other ministries, the FSO, and the FSB. It recognized many future 
problems and challenges of “ensuring the security of the national segment of the In-
ternet”. It had six subprogrammes.2178 The priority of the programme was to create a 
unified information space which was a composition of other unified or single systems. 
The subprogramme of e-state included the creation of state system of electronic iden-
tification and the state information-analytical system to support state economic and 
societal policies, and the development of a protected Russian segment of the Internet 
for government use. It also called for the integration of government services and the 
continuing development of the Management System (Upravlenie). The subpro-
gramme of basic infrastructure included, for example, the construction of modern 
national backbone communication network. The security subprogramme concen-
trated on preventing terrorism but also included the creation of national software and 
supercomputer production.2179 The Concept was meant to enhance Russian infor-
mation society and economy with limited state intervention. It dispensed almost com-
pletely with the national security language of its guiding Strategy and Concept. How-
ever, the Concept did retain the drive to integrate, synchronize, and harmonize gov-
ernment networks, and the idea of collecting information on nation-wide basis for 
the efficient management of the state. 
 
In 2008 the Russian government also adopted the Concept on Forming Electronic 
Government in the Russian Federation until 2010.2180 It was drafted by the Ministry 
of Communications, the Ministry of Economic Development, and the FSO. The 
Concept noted the technological lag of Russia compared to developed countries and 
stated that forming a unified information infrastructure between government agencies 
had failed. The Concept repeated the objectives and tasks of the 2002 Electronic Rus-
sia program and thus it was basically an admission of a failed policy. The Concept did 
not include the national security issues mentioned in the 2008 Strategy.2181  
 
During the term of President Medvedev Russia also redefined the roles and tasks of 
some of its central actors in the information space. Minkomsviaz’ and Roskomnadzor 
got new provisions in 2008 and 2009, and the Federal Law on Security was modified 
in 2010.2182 The MoD adopted in 2010 the Regulations on the Information Support 
Bodies of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The subject of this order were 
                                              
2177 Распоряжениие Правительства Российской Федерации от 20 октября 2010 г. N 1815-р Государствен-
ная программа Российской Федерации "Информационное общество (2011-2020 годы)” [Online]. Avail-
able: http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102142714 [Accessed: 11th April 2019]. 
2178 The quality of life of the citizens and the conditions for the development of business in the information 
society; the e-state and government effectiveness; the Russian market of information and telecommunication 
technologies; the basic infrastructure of the information society; the security in the information society; and the 
digital content and cultural heritage. 
2179 Ibid. 
2180 Распоряжение Правительства РФ от 6 мая 2008 г. N 632-р Концепция формирования в Российской 
Федерации электронного правительства до 2010 года [Online]. Available: http://www.garant.ru/products/ 
ipo/prime/doc/93274/ [Accessed: 13th May 2019]. 
2181 Распоряжение Правительства РФ 2008b. 
2182 Постановление Правительства РФ 2008; Постановление Правительства РФ 2009a; Федеральный за-
кон 2010. 
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public relations, not information or cyber security or defence.2183  It did however point 
to the fact that the Russian Armed Forces took information warfare increasingly se-
riously. 
 
Although the 2008 Strategy and Concept did include the element of national interest 
and a view that Russian was in a geopolitical competition in which it was in danger of 
being left behind, the early Putin and Medvedev era documents are decidedly techno-
cratic, optimistic, cooperative, and liberal in their character. However, the issue of 
sovereignty appeared as ‘technological independence’ or ‘technological sovereignty’ 
and so did the claim that information society was connected to hard national security. 
The issue of technological dependence on the West did not escape the attention of 
the commentators at that time.2184 This zero-sum approach was compatible with the 
idea of interstate struggle, great powerness, and the balance of power. As the threats 
in the information space are mainly crime and terrorism, deterrence comes up only in 
the margins. Additionally, the idea of asymmetric response does not really appear as 
the overall tone is that of catching up with developed countries not finding ways to 
counter or surpass them. Nevertheless, the idea of information superiority on strate-
gic level guides the need to develop domestic technology. Information-technological 
warfare was eclipsed by crime and terrorism which were the main threats directed 
against the information society and the state, but the concept of critical information 
infrastructure began to form a basis for an understanding of national cyber security. 
The most important element was the continuing Russian fascination with the idea of 
a unified, centralized, vertically integrated automated management system on a na-
tional level and the related information-analytical systems and situation centres. These 
systems were explicitly connected to the concept of the national segment of the In-
ternet, although what that segment entailed, remained vague. So, there was already 
before 2012 a tension between the idea of free and liberal development of the Internet 
to gain maximum economic benefits and the reflexive need of the elites to control 
that same Internet and use it to micromanage the society and the economy. As was 
shown in Chapter 5, similar ideas circulated amongst the Russian military, although, 
the policies of the MoD and the Armed Forces concentrated first on survival and 
then from 2008 onwards on military reform.  
 
6.3 The developments of 2012–2019 
 
In 2012 the Russian defence and security elites changed their approach to the Internet. 
Reasons for this have been examined in Chapter 6.1. This change manifested in a 
group of laws directed against the political opposition which had used the Internet to 
mobilize first against the fraudulent Duma election and then against Vladimir Putin’s 
re-election. The Russian regime first reacted to the demonstrations by tightening the 
regulation on the freedom of assembly and freedom of speech, by staging show trails 
of the opposition leaders and by mounting a domestic propaganda campaign against 
                                              
2183 Приказ Министра обороны РФ от 11 февраля 2010 г. N 70 "Об утверждении Положения об органах 
информационного обеспечения Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации" [Online]. Available: 
http://base.garant.ru/55170392/ [Accessed: 13th May 2019]. 
2184 Крикунов, Александр, Королȍв, Александр. Информационные войны будущего. О необходимости 
адекватной защиты отечественной информационной инфраструктуры от кибератак. Военный дипло-
мат, № 1 (2009), 94-103. 
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the opposition.2185 The Internet censorship followed after the elite had properly ana-
lysed the situation and reoriented itself.2186 
 
6.3.1 The laws 
 
The laws aimed at controlling the Internet have mostly been amendments to existing 
laws such as the Federal Law on Information, Information Technologies and Infor-
mation Protection, the Law on Mass Media, the Law on Communications or the 
Criminal Code—the first of which has virtually become a law on Internet censor-
ship.2187 In 2012 Federal Law № 139-FZ “On Introducing Amendments to the Law 
on the Protection of Children from Information Harmful to Their Health and Devel-
opment” was adopted.2188 The law introduced an Internet blacklist managed by the 
Roskomnadzor.2189 The register includes the domain names, IP -addresses, and URLs 
of banned web sites and services. Providers hosting banned sites need to notify the 
owner of a site displaying banned information to take down the material or restrict 
the access to it themselves in 24 hours. Providers include social media companies and 
any services that offer platforms for user generated material. Failure to restrict access 
to the banned resources will result in legal prosecution and/or fines. Initially and of-
ficially the register was introduced to protect children from harmful material. How-
ever, the ‘Unified register’ has been used to ban services like the Telegram and Zello, 
and websites of opposition politicians like Alexei Navalnyi.2190 In 2013 the so-called 
“Lugovoi Law” gave the authorities the power to block Internet sites and resources 
disseminating calls for “mass unrest, extremist activities, and participation in mass 
events held in violation of the established procedure.” This law made it administra-
tively much easier, based only on the order of the General Prosecutor’s office, to 
quickly block information about a political event.2191 Moreover, the authority of Ros-
komnadzor to independently add sites to the blacklist–blocking has to otherwise be 
based on law or court order–has increased incrementally and it has begun to ‘advise’ 
                                              
2185 Pomeranz 2019, 156-157. 
2186 FIDH. Table Illustrating Legislative Crackdown on Rights and Freedoms of the Civil Society in Russia 
since 2012 (2018) [Online]. Available: https://www.fidh.org/en [Accessed: 14th May 2019]; Freedom House 
2018; Агора 2016. 
2187 By censorship here is meant: “The suppression or prohibition of any parts of books, films, news, etc. that 
are considered obscene, politically unacceptable, or a threat to security.” (Censorship. Oxford English Diction-
ary. [Online]. Available: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/censorship [Accessed: 14th May 2019]. 
Cf. also Prakash, Pranesh, Rizk, Nagla and Souza, Carlos Affonso (eds.) Global censorship Shifting Modes, 
Persisting Paradigms. New Haven: Yale Law School 2015 [Online]. Available: https://law.yale.edu/sys-
tem/files/area/center/isp/documents/a2k_global-censorship_2.pdf [Accessed: 14th May 2019]. 
2188 Федеральный закон от 28.07.2012 N 139-ФЗ (последняя редакция) “О внесении изменений в Феде-
ральный закон “О защите детей от информации, причиняющей вред их здоровью и развитию” и от-
дельные законодательные акты Российской Федерации” [Online]. Available: http://www.consultant.ru/ 
document/cons_doc_LAW_133282/ [Accessed: 14 May 2019]. 
2189 Федеральная служба по надзору в сфере связи, информационных технологий и массовых коммуни-
каций. Единый реестр [Online]. Available: https://eais.rkn.gov.ru/ [Accessed: 14th May 2019]. 
2190 Webb, Isaac. Russian Web Censor Cracks Down Ahead of Next Anti-Corruption Protests. Global Voices, 
31 March 2017 [Online]. Available: https://globalvoices.org/2017/03/31/russian-web-censor-cracks-down-
ahead-of-next-anti-corruption-protests/ [Accessed: 14th May 2019]; Кантышев, Павел. Роскомнадзор 
добивается блокировки IP-адресов Amazon. Ведомости, 23 марта 2018 [Online]. Available: 
https://www.vedomosti.ru/technology/articles/2018/03/23/754777-roskomnadzor-amazon [Accessed: 14th 
May 2019]; Lenta.ru. Роскомнадзор отказался от попыток веерно заблокировать Telegram. Lenta.ru, 25 
апреля 2018 [Online]. Available: https://lenta.ru/news/2018/04/25/telega/ [Accessed: 14th May 2019]. 
2191 Федеральный закон от 28 декабря 2013 г. N 398-ФЗ “О внесении изменений в Федеральный закон 
“Об информации, информационных технологиях и о защите информации” [Online]. Available: 
https://rg.ru/2013/12/30/extrem-site-dok.html [Accessed: 14th May 2019]. 
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ISPs on how to best restrict access to banned sites such as by using highly intrusive 
DPI technology.2192 The somewhat crude procedures and technology behind the 
blocking efforts have negatively affected the functioning of the Russian segment of 
the Internet and generated losses for the Internet service and content providers.2193  
 
The “Blogger’s Law” adopted in April 2014 was a step towards self-censorship as it 
required bloggers with more than 3,000 visits per day to register as ‘organizers of the 
dissemination of information’ (ORI).2194 ORI became the main regulatory category in 
the Russian Internet. It was defined as a legal entity or a person who uses computers 
and/or computer programs for receiving, transmitting, delivering and (or) processing 
electronic messages of Internet users. The ORIs were required to store information 
about the reception, transmission, delivery, and (or) processing of voice data, written 
text, images, sounds or other electronic messages of Internet users and information 
about these users for six months. They are also required to provide law enforcement 
and secret services access to it under the threat of banning their sites and receiving 
fines.2195 
 
In July 2016 a federal law was adopted which made Internet news aggregators with 
over a million users (such as Yandex, Rambler, VKontakt) and disseminating news in 
Russian, or other languages of the Russia Federation, responsible for the authenticity 
and legality of the information and links on their sites. These news aggregators were 
to be registered by Rozkomnadzor to a special register which would monitor the vis-
itor count of the news aggregators.2196 In 2017 the controlling effort extended to mes-
saging apps and proxy services. Organizers of messaging services were required to 
identify their users by their cell phone numbers, i.e. abolishing anonymity, and to 
restrict the use of their services if ordered by the officials. Information about the users 
                                              
2192 Зыков, Владимир, Кондратьев, Александр. Роскомнадзор будет оперативно получать решения судов 
о блокировках Для этого будет создана система электронного взаимодействия. Известия, 2 февраля 2017 
[Online]. Available: https://iz.ru/news/662031 [Accessed: 14th May 2019]; Известия. Роскомнадзор обно-
вил рекомендации операторам по фильтрации трафика. Известия, 27 июня 2017 [Online]. Available: 
https://iz.ru/611620/2017-06-27/roskomnadzor-obnovil-rekomendatcii-operatoram-po-filtratcii-trafika [Ac-
cessed: 14th May 2019]. 
2193 Брызгалова, Екатерина. Роскомнадзор начал блокировать страницу «МБХ медиа» в «Яндекс.Дзене». 
Ведомости, 23 февраля 2018 [Online]. Available: https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2018/02/22/ 
751870-roskomnadzor-zablokiroval-mbh-yandeksdzene [Accessed: 14th May 2019]; Сухаревская, Алена. 
Роскомнадзор заблокировал почти триста доменов Google. Ведомости, 11 апреля 2018 [Online]. Availa-
ble: https://www.vedomosti.ru/technology/articles/2018/04/11/766420-roskomnadzor-zablokiroval-google 
[Accessed: 14th May 2019]. 
2194 The mention about bloggers was later removed cf. Федеральный закон от 29 июля 2017 года № 276-ФЗ 
“О внесении изменений в Федеральный закон “Об информации, информационных технологиях и о 
защите информации” [Online]. Available: https://rg.ru/2017/07/30/fz276-site-dok.html [Accessed: 14th 
May 2019]. 
2195 Федеральный закон от 05.05.2014 N 97-ФЗ (ред. от 29.07.2017) ”О внесении изменений в Федераль-
ный закон “Об информации, информационных технологиях и о защите информации” и отдельные 
законодательные акты Российской Федерации по вопросам упорядочения обмена информацией с ис-
пользованием информационно-телекоммуникационных сетей” [Online]. Available: http://www.consult-
ant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_162586/ [Accessed: 14th May 2019]. 
2196   Федеральный закон от 23.06.2016 N 208-ФЗ “О внесении изменений в Федеральный закон “Об 
информации, информационных технологиях и о защите информации” и Кодекс Российской Федера-
ции об административных правонарушениях” [Online]. Available: http://www.consultant.ru/document/ 
cons_doc_LAW_200019/ [Accessed: 29th May 2019]. 
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of the services must be stored in Russia.2197 Moreover, services that provided access 
to the blacklisted websites from Russia i.e. public proxy and VPN servers, were re-
quired to cease their actions if ordered by the Roskomnadzor.2198 Thus, at least in 
theory, all public and some private Internet communication were put under legal state 
control by the end of 2018. This was by no means a waterproof mechanism as the 
attempt to block the messaging service Telegram has proved.2199 Moreover, the Rus-
sian regime has had only limited success regulating the international Internet compa-
nies like Google, Facebook and Twitter—although many of the them do follow the 
Russian law. The banning of LinkedIn in 2016 proved that the regime was serious.2200 
Google began complying with the blacklisting requirements in 2019 in its transpar-
ency report declared that the Russian government accounted for 75 percent of all 
global requests to delete content in January–July 2018.2201 
 
Along with blacklisting sites, monitoring and blocking content, regulating news and 
social media platforms, and outright banning of whole services, the Russian regime 
has sought to restrict the foreign ownership of information resources located in Rus-
sia. In October 2014 Russia adopted a law that restricted the permissible percentage 
of foreign ownership of any print media, registered online media, television, or radio 
broadcasters to 20 percent.2202 In December 2015 a follow-up law ordered media com-
panies to declare any foreign financing they received once every quarter.2203 These 
were amendments to the Law on Mass Media whereas the ownership of major tele-
communications, television, radio and newspaper companies is regulated by the Law 
on Foreign Investments in Strategic Assets.2204 Admittedly, it would have been some-
what difficult to designate Internet sites as strategic assets. However, only Russian 
companies or citizens could own Internet news aggregators (ORI).2205 The major Rus-
sian telecommunications companies which provide the backbone for the Russian In-
ternet are ‘strategic assets.’ So are the state-owned television companies the websites 
of which are amongst the most popular in the RuNet.2206 Moreover, as many major 
Russian companies are either directly stated owned or owned by the oligarchs, the 
                                              
2197 Федеральный закон от 29.07.2017 N 241-ФЗ “О внесении изменений в статьи 10.1 и 15.4 Федераль-
ного закона “Об информации, информационных технологиях и о защите информации” [Online]. 
Available: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_221183/ [Accessed: 14th May 2019]. 
2198 Федеральный закон 2017c. 
2199 Роскомсвобода. Telegram: год под «блокировкой». Роскомсвобода, 16.4.2019 [Online]. Available: 
https://roskomsvoboda.org/46556/ [Accessed: 14th May 2019]. For the case of Telegram cf. Griffiths 2019. 
2200 Soldatov & Borogan 2015; Rambler News Service. Итоги года: рунет 2016 [Online]. Available: 
https://rns.online/articles/Itogi-goda-runet-2017-01-02/ [Accessed: 14th May 2019]; Freedom House 2018. 
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7, 2019 [Online]. Available: https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/02/07/google-began-censoring-search-
results-russia-reports-say-a64423 [Accessed: 29th May 2019]. 
2202 Федеральный закон от 14.10.2014 N 305-ФЗ (последняя редакция) ”О внесении изменений в Закон 
Российской Федерации ”О средствах массовой информации” [Online]. Available: http://www.consultant. 
ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_169740/ [Accessed: 14th May 2019]. 
2203 Федеральный закон от 30.12.2015 N 464-ФЗ “О внесении изменений в Закон Российской Федерации 
“О средствах массовой информации” и Кодекс Российской Федерации об административных право-
нарушениях" [Online]. Available: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_191539/ [Ac-
cessed: 14th May 2019]. 
2204 Федеральный закон от 29 апреля 2008 г. N 57-ФЗ “О порядке осуществления иностранных инвести-
ций в хозяйственные общества, имеющие стратегическое значение для обеспечения обороны страны 
и безопасности государства” [Online]. Available: http://ivo.garant.ru/#/document/ 12160212/para-
graph/3780:0 [Accessed: 14th May 2019]. 
2205 Федеральный закон 2016a. 
2206 Федеральный закон 2008. 
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state influence on the national segment is quite solid even without tight legal regula-
tion of the ownership of the Internet services. This has not stopped the introduction 
of a draft law on restricting the foreign ownership of ‘Internet resources.’2207 
 
Data localization is another issue that the regime has pursued through law-making. In 
July 2014 the Law on Personal Data was amended so that the personal data of Russian 
citizens had to be stored inside Russian borders. Subsequently, Roskomnadzor was 
mandated to monitor that this law was followed by the foreign and Russian ISPs.2208 
The law entered into force in September 2015 but Roskomnadzor’ was still pushing 
international Internet companies like Facebook and Twitter to comply with at in the 
end of 2019.2209 Data localization has been driven by both economic and security in-
terests. By insisting that international companies store their data on Russian citizens 
in Russia, the government creates demand for the ICT sector. It also makes Russian 
laws applicable to that data and gives the law enforcement and security services access 
to it. Moreover, personal data would be, from the Russian state’s point-of-view, better 
protected than if it was stored in ‘the cloud’ i.e. under some other state’s jurisdiction. 
 
The so-called Iarovaia Laws or Anti-Terrorism laws which were signed by Putin in 
July 2016 and entered into force in July 2018 take the data localization to the extreme 
in the form of massive data retention.2210 Originally, the laws demanded that the tele-
communications companies and the ISPs retained all text messages, voice, data, and 
images for six months and metadata about the time, location, and sender and recipi-
ents of messages for three years. All this data had to be stored in Russia. Moreover, 
the companies were ordered to give the law enforcement and secret services access 
to that data including the means to decrypt it. Later, the demands have been slightly  
modified.2211 The Russian ISPs have tried to get the requirements of the laws eased 
and complained that they will be either impossible or exceedingly costly (17 trillion 
roubles) to implement—as the ISPs themselves are required to provide the equipment 
for the data storage.2212 Furthermore, there were no certified domestic equipment or 
government guidelines available when the law entered into force. The use of foreign 
equipment was, in principle, banned as it was seen as a security risk, or was considered 
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варю.  ТАСС сентября [Online]. https://tass.ru/obschestvo/6921980 [Accessed: 6th January 2020]. 
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обеспечения общественной безопасности” [Online]. Available: http://www.consultant.ru/document/ 
cons_doc_LAW_201087/ [Accessed: 14th May 2019]. 
2211 Трунина, Анна. Интернет-сервисы в России обязали хранить трафик пользователей полгода. РБК, 
5 фебраля 2019 [Online]. Available: https://www.rbc.ru/technology_and_media/28/06/2018/5b34f9-
4f9a79476cbd07e0e8?from=main [Accessed: 14th May 2019]. 
2212 Тишина, Юлия. «Закон Яровой» вписали в инфляцию. Объемы хранения данных и затраты опера-
торов могут вырасти. Коммерсантъ, №61 от 10.04.2017 [Online]. Available: https://www. kommer-
sant.ru/doc/3267272 [Accessed: 14th May 2019]; Тишина, Юлия. «Закон Яровой» сводят с реальностью 
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a competitor to the Russian domestic ICT industry.2213 In addition to being a domestic 
security measure, the ‘Iarovaia laws’ have become a tool for building digital sover-
eignty. Data does not just flow through Russia but, in principle, resides there on Rus-
sian servers under state jurisdiction. 
 
Although the laws discussed above are important tools of political control, their rele-
vance comes from some other laws enacted between 2012–2018, and from the Ros-
komnadzor’s, FSB’s and other officials’ use of those laws. These laws designate what 
kind of information and actions in the information space can be regulated and by 
whom, and they all leave enough room for discretion in the implementation so that 
they can be used against any politically undesirable action on the Internet.2214 Alt-
hough, the censorship laws have mainly empowered Roskomnadzor, the powers of 
the FSB were increased in December 2013 as its mandate on criminal intelligence and 
surveillance operations was extended to the ‘information security’ of the Russian Fed-
eration.2215 The  Agora organization has claimed that the failure to deploy effective 
Internet censorship in 2016–2017 has led to the side-lining of the Roskomnadzor as 
the FSB uses its increased powers and new laws to pursue ‘illegal’ web resources and 
activities through criminal investigation instead of censorship.2216 
 
One additional legislation effort that has not yet succeeded to gather enough support 
is mandatory state certified encryption. From 2016 the FSB has published adminis-
trative orders (prikaz) which demand that the Internet companies relinquish their 
crypto keys to the FSB.2217 This policy escalated to the total ban of Telegram in Russia 
in April 2018 when the company refused to hand over its keys and user data.2218 More-
over, as the use of the HTTPS protocol increased in the Russian segment, the FSB 
and Roskomnadzor pushed for a mandatory national SSL certificate in 2016 which 
would give them the ability to conduct MITM attacks on all encrypted traffic in the 
national segment using the national certificate.2219 This would have been possible, for 
                                              
2213 Lenta.ru. «Закон Яровой» оказался неисполним. Lenta.ru, 3 июля 2018 [Online]. Available: 
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example, through the use of Russian web browsers and by establishing national certi-
fication authorities. The domestic Sputnik browser and state websites began the test 
trial of Russian SSL certification in 2017.2220 It seems that this policy is incorporated 
into the new ‘Law on Sovereign Internet’ although the cryptography part will only 
come into an effect in 2021.2221 The Security Council has also authorized the FSB to 
created national encryption for mobile networks called “Konus” which includes SIM 
cards with Russian crypto keys, hardware security modules on the network side, and 
authentication of users through national register connecting SIM cards to natural or 
judicial persons.2222 Moreover, in December 2019 Putin signed a law that obliged the 
electronic devices sold in Russia to have pre-installed Russian applications.2223 
 
If the development of censorship laws is compared to the changes in Russia’s strategic 
environment, it is obvious that the efforts to control the substance of the national 
segment of the Internet were based in the domestic and international events of 2011–
2012. The tone of those efforts changed slightly in 2014 and became more resolute 
as the perceived information war with the West intensified and the Ukrainian revolu-
tion was interpreted as a Western regime change operation. The direct control of the 
Internet through regulation became increasingly pronounced. It was important to re-
strict the ability of the opposition to collective action, but it became ever more im-
portant to push the outside influence in the Russian information space to a minimum. 
Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that the Russia regime did not initially 
pursue the kind of total censorship that, for example, China was using by the 2010s. 
Developments were incremental, opposed by civil society and the private sector, and 
a system like China’s “Great Firewall” was probably technologically impossible to 
achieve in the timeframe of 2012-2019.2224 Nevertheless, the laws adopted in 2011-
2019 make concrete the strategic cultural ideas as information sovereignty is given 
substance, and the EIP borders, strategic deterrence and interstate information strug-
gle is provided means, asymmetric response and information superiority enhanced by 
denying the opponent’s the freedom of action, and the legal basis for automated sys-
tems of information-technological security and defence are created. 
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The critical information infrastructure and the regulations and systems created to pro-
tect it constitute another element of normative control. The Russian concept of CII 
grew out of the laws and regulations on emergency situations and the protection of 
critical objects of the energy and transportation sector in the period of 2003-2011.2225 
In 2012 the Fundamentals of the State Policy in the Field of Ensuring the Safety of 
the Population of the Russian Federation and the Protection of Critical and Poten-
tially Dangerous Objects from Natural Threats, Man-made and Terrorist Acts for the 
Period up to 2020, drafted by the Security Council, for the first time defined the CII 
as “a set of automated control systems and interaction-enabling information and tel-
ecommunications networks of the critically important objects that are designed to 
meet the challenges of public administration, defence, security and law and order, the 
disruption (or termination) of which may cause serious consequences.”2226 The docu-
ment also introduced the concept of the future national cyber security system Gos-
SOPKA (Gosudartsvennia sistema obnaruzheniia, preduprezdeniia i likvidatsii 
posledsvii komp’iuternykh atak) (cf. Chapter 6.4.1). Furthermore, the document prac-
tically introduced the official Russian language of information-technological security 
concerning the CII. It did not, however, include the term cyber. 
 
According to the Fundamentals, the reasons for protecting the CII were the blurred 
and vulnerable boundaries between ‘the national segments of telecommunications 
networks.’ The main task of the government was to develop a system of government 
management and control over the CII, to ensure the resilience of the national segment 
of the global information network, to create a system of protection of the CII, to 
prevent the flow of information critical for the CII through foreign countries, and to 
promote domestic ICT industry and import substitution. After a preparatory period 
in 2012–2016, the policy would be implemented in 2017–2020.2227 In the absence of 
a national cyber security strategy, the Fundamentals provide a substitute. It resonates 
quite significantly with the idea of digital sovereignty and the unified information 
space. It also incorporates the concept of ASUs to the CII and creates an interesting 
dichotomy between them. Most importantly, it defines the framework and language 
for the defensive side of strategic level information-technological security and de-
fence. The protection of the CII is a task of national level cyber defence and the 
authority concerning it is given to the FSB. 
 
The project to protect the CII was largely frozen between 2014–2017 as 
Minkomsviaz’, the FSTEK, and the FSB fought over the power to control the CII 
through various draft laws. In 2017 the Law on Critical Information Infrastructure 
was finally adopted and it affirmed the leading role of the FSB.2228 It defined the CII 
as “information systems, information and telecommunications networks, automated 
control systems of critical information infrastructure subjects [state administration, 
                                              
2225 Комаров, Алексей. Нормативные документы по безопасности АСУ ТП, АСУ ПиТП, КСИИ, КВО, 
КИИ [Online]. Available: https://www.securitylab.ru/blog/personal/zlonov/144489.php [Accessed: 15th May 
2019]; Pynnöniemi 2012; Pynnöniemi & Busygina 2013. 
2226 Основные направления. Основные направления государственной политики в области обеспечения 
безопасности автоматизированных систем управления производственными и технологическими про-
цессами критически важных объектов инфраструктуры Российской Федерации (утв. Президентом РФ 
03.02.2012 N 803) [Online]. Available: http://www.scrf.gov.ru/security/information/document113/ [Ac-
cessed: 18th April 2019]. 
2227 Ibid. 
2228 Ristolainen 2017a & 2017b. 
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persons or firms].”2229 The critical aspect was linked to the infrastructure related to 
the health care, science, transport, communications, energy, banking and other areas 
of the financial market, the fuel and energy complex, the field of atomic energy, de-
fence, rocket and space, mining, metallurgical and chemical industries. The security 
of CII meant its resilient functioning under computer attack.2230 The law on the CII is 
decidedly state-centric, materialistic, and technology-oriented in its approach. It 
makes a distinction between electronic communication networks and the CII/ASUs. 
The former was regulated by the Law on Communication and belonged to the au-
thority of Minkomsviaz’. However, as the GosSOPKA system was envisioned to 
cover both, and the authority to define and regulate what exactly belonged to the CII 
was given to the FSTEK, tensions between institutions were inevitable. The ‘signifi-
cant objects’ of CII were to be categorized by the operators of CII objects themselves 
and then submitted to the FSTEK for approval. The categories were based on social, 
political, economic, ecological, and defence and security significance, and the degree 
of criticality was based on three levels of damaging effects from minor to catastrophic. 
The criteria for the categorization of the ‘significant objects’ of CII are provided in a 
government decree published in 2018 and they are based on the indicators of human 
casualties, economic losses, territorial magnitude, and the hierarchy of state power.2231 
The FSTEK approves the categorizations and designation, and places the CII in a 
special register. However, the operators are themselves responsible for the protection 
of CII objects, and must react to incidents in a way defined by the FSTEK/FSB. They 
must also share information with them and must ensure the access of the FSB to the 
objects of CII under their control.2232 The monitoring and security systems of these 
objects could be connected, if operators so wished, to the GosSOPKA (cf. Chapter 
6.4.1). 
 
Based on the above it can be argued that, the Russian state cyber security understand-
ing focuses around the concept of CII. To protect its ‘significant objects’ a vertical, 
hierarchical, and centralized system is being built which has the possibility to connect 
all strategic sectors of the nation to a system of cyber security operated by the FSB. 
The CII is the infrastructural part of the unified information space and thus digital 
sovereignty and its defence resonates quite strongly with strategic deterrence and with 
retaining the information superiority. The laws and directives concerning the CII and 
GosSOPKA state quite clearly that the control of the infrastructure is a source of 
sovereignty and material and technological power, and that the CII must be protected 
primarily from foreign actors and influence. Moreover, the CII is central to nation 
level information-technological warfare combining the vulnerabilities and strengths 
of ASUs for a new era. GosSOPKA with its multilevel centres and systems is a clear 
manifestation of the information security system of systems that Russian information 
warfare theorists were promoting from the 2000s. Thus, it combines the idea of the 
EIP and ASUs. 
 
                                              
2229 Федеральный закон 2017a. 
2230 Ibid. 
2231 Постановление Правительства РФ (2018a) от 8 февраля 2018 г. № 127 Об утверждении Правил ка-
тегорирования объектов критической информационной инфраструктуры Российской Федерации, а 
также перечня показателей критериев значимости объектов критической информационной инфра-
структуры Российской Федерации и их значений (с изменениями от 13 апреля 2019 г.) [Online]. Availa-
ble: https://fstec.ru/component/attachments/download/1917 [Accessed: 15th May 2019]. 
2232 Ibid.  
 
330 
6.3.2 The strategies 
 
Parallel and concurrently with the censorship policies, law enforcement, and protec-
tion of critical infrastructure, the Russian regime has implemented its information 
society strategy and doctrine. The Russian government led again by Dmitri Medvedev 
in November 2013 published the Development Strategy of the Information Technol-
ogy Industry in the Russian Federation for 2014–2020 and for the Future up to 
2025.2233 It was based on the 2008–2009 Strategy and Concept. It would contribute to 
ensuring the information security and high quality of Russia’s defence through new 
technologies and by neutralizing global information threats. The Strategy recognized 
the problems of Russian ICT sector but was quite optimistic about the global pro-
spects of Russian companies. It stated the main civilian and military technologies that 
must be pursued were to be AI, quantum technologies, and robotics. Information 
security required the production of domestic technologies. The objective was to en-
sure the sovereignty of the information technology sector.2234 Although the Strategy 
incorporated the ideas of sovereignty and great power struggle, it was decidedly busi-
ness-oriented and information security was almost an afterthought. However, infor-
mation technology was now accepted as a defining element of state and military 
power. 
 
The new Government Programme of Information Society (2011–2020) was adopted 
in 2013.2235 It was based on previous strategic documents and emphasised economic 
and technological competition. It consisted of four ‘directions’ (napravlenie) of infor-
mation and telecommunications infrastructure and services, information environ-
ment, security in information society, and information government. The objective of 
the first was to modernize the Russian ICT infrastructure. The second included both 
domestic and international strategic communication and public affairs projects like 
support for the Russia Today TV-channel. The third direction was based on creating 
resilient information infrastructure, on counterterrorism and extremism efforts, and 
on controlling and monitoring of communications. The fourth direction was about e-
government and the removal of domestic ‘digital inequality’. Overall, the 2013 Pro-
gramme did not diverge very much from the direction set by the earlier governments. 
It still included the Management System and the protected government segment, the 
information-analytical system for special purposes, and the unified information space 
in the sphere of technological and information-communication management of the 
government, and multiple unified and single subsystems. The term unified infor-
mation space, as a main principle, was however dropped.2236 
 
The Programme was decidedly revised in March 2017 and has been revised multiple 
times after that. It was now based on the 2016 Information Security Doctrine. Under 
                                              
2233 Распоряжение Правительства РФ от 01.11.2013 N 2036-р (ред. от 18.10.2018) “Об утверждении Стра-
тегии развития отрасли информационных технологий в Российской Федерации на 2014 - 2020 годы и 
на перспективу до 2025 года” [Online]. Available: https://digital.gov.ru/common/upload/ Strate-
giya_razvitiya_otrasli_IT_2014-2020_2025.pdf [Accessed: 15th May 2019]. 
2234 Ibid. 
2235 The comparisons of different versions was done using the Consultant.ru service. For the latest version cf. 
Постановление Правительства РФ от 15.04.2014 N 313 (ред. от 29.03.2019) “Об утверждении государ-
ственной программы Российской Федерации "Информационное общество” [Online]. Available: 
http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_162184/ [Accessed: 15th May 2019]. 
2236 Ibid. 
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priorities and targets, for example, it mentions, strategic deterrence and the preven-
tion of military conflicts that may arise as a result of the use of information technol-
ogy; countering the use of information technology to promote extremism, xenopho-
bia and nationalism; and eliminating the dependence of the domestic industry on for-
eign information technologies. The third ‘direction’ was now about “the prevention 
of threats in the information society” and was based decidedly on blacklisting and 
content monitoring but also on data privacy protection and counter-terrorism. It 
lacked any mention of fighting cybercrime, but as responses to nation level cyber 
security threats it promoted the creation of a national routing information register and 
‘the cybersecurity of the microprocessors of transportation.’ The fourth direction was 
still about e-government but emphasised the information infrastructure and services 
the government required, not so much the services it was supposed to offer.2237 Na-
tional security issues clearly gained importance, but it would be exaggeration to claim 
that the Programme was militarized, securitized, or had a ‘mobilizing’ character. It 
combined many older projects but placed the emphasis on security and domestic pro-
duction of hardware and software. One important detail is that between 2017-2019 
versions of the program the national segment of the Internet replaced the EIP as a 
guiding concept.2238 
 
The change in the tone of the Programme was related to the domestic political debate 
on the information sovereignty and the suspected foreign plans to ‘disconnect the 
Russian Internet’, a threat promoted perhaps most vocally by the Minkomsviaz’. The 
idea of information or digital sovereignty was embraced by some Russia politicians 
already in 2012. The Federal Council drafted in 2012–2013 a Concept of Cyber Secu-
rity of the Russian Federation which was never approved. The Concept introduced 
the concepts of cyberspace2239, cyber security2240 and cyber war, but tried as well to 
include the information-psychological aspects of previous doctrines and strategies.2241 
The advocate of the failed Russian cyber security strategy in the Federal Council, 
Ruslan Gattarov, stated in 2012 that the goal of the document was to shape the 
county’s ‘digital sovereignty’.2242 Ruslan Gattarov argued that “an infrastructure must 
be created so that the system [infrastructure of security] does not depend on a single 
cable, and in the case of a state of emergency it could redistribute the load for the 
smooth operation of the Russian Internet […] That is, the strategy should guarantee 
                                              
2237 Ibid. 
2238 The comparison of different versions was done with Consultant.ru service.  
2239 “Cyberspace is a sphere of activity in the information space, formed by a set of communication channels 
of the Internet and other telecommunication networks, technological infrastructure ensuring their functioning, 
and any forms of human activity carried out through their use (person, organization, state).” (Концепция. 
Концепция Стратегии Кибербезопасности Российской Федераци [Проект], 2013 [Online]. Available: 
http://council.gov.ru/media/files/41d4b3dfbdb25cea8a73.pdf [Accessed: 27th February 2019].) 
2240 “a set of conditions under which all components of cyberspace are protected from the maximum possible 
number of threats and impacts with undesirable consequences.” (Ibid.) 
2241 Ibid. 
2242 Совет Федерации Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации. Проект стратегии кибербезопас-
ности России направлен на формирование цифрового суверенитета страны, 27 фебраля 2013 [Online]. 
Available: http://council.gov.ru/events/news/14575/ [Accessed: 27th February 2019]; Иванов, Максим. Со-
вет федерации занялся цифровым суверенитетом: Стратегии кибербезопасности наметили основные 
направления. Коммерсантъ № 209 от 06.11.2012 [Online]. Available: https://www.kommersant. 
ru/doc/2060832 [Accessed: 4th December 2018]; Рябухина, П. П., Бондуровского, В. В., Перекопского, Г. 
И. (Под ред.) Законодательство государств - членов ОДКБ в сфере обеспечения информационной без-
опасности: опыт, проблемы и перспективы гармонизации. Материалы международной научно-практи-
ческой конференции. СПб.: Секретариат МПА СНГ. 
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“digital sovereignty”.”2243 Dennis Davydov the Director of the League for a Secure 
Internet claimed in response to Gattarov that “Digital sovereignty is part of our state 
sovereignty, part of absolute and complete autonomy in determining policies and set-
ting any rules. Globally, only three powers have the digital sovereignty: The United 
States, China and, to a lesser extent, the Russian Federation. Here, from the point of 
view of digital sovereignty one can speak about the presence of one’s own search 
engines, one’s own social networks, browsers and operating systems.”2244 Russia’s 
Minister of Telecommunications Nikolai Nikiforov (2010–2018) was also a supporter 
of the idea of ‘information sovereignty’. For him, sovereignty meant domestic hard-
ware and software production i.e. independence from foreign technological solu-
tions.2245 Consequently, the concept of sovereignty was associated with ICT and the 
Internet in the names of government workgroups and projects. For example, in 2016 
a working group titled ‘Internet + sovereignty’ was established in the presidential ad-
ministration to draft a road map for “ensuring sovereignty in the field of information 
technology and telecommunications.”2246 
 
The war in Ukraine and the Western reactions to it brought about a real policy change 
instead of just philosophical debates.2247 In July 2014 the Minkomsviaz’, the FSB, the 
FSO, the Ministry of Defence and Rostelekom (including the Coordination Centre of 
National Domain of Internet and the Technical Centre) conducted an exercise to as-
sess the security and stability of the national segment, the degree of its connection to 
the global infrastructure, its potential vulnerabilities, and the level of readiness for 
joint work of industry organizations, telecom operators and situation centres of the 
federal executive bodies.2248 According to Oleg Demidov, the scenario of the exercise 
was based on the ENISA Threat Landscape of Internet Infrastructure report pub-
lished in 2008 and it involved threats against the DNS, BGP and IP routing, DDoS 
attacks, and the disconnection of traffic to and from Russia by foreign actors. Demi-
dov claims that the exercise proved that the segment was resilient but the cooperation 
between different actors had serious problems.2249 However, the Security Council 
adopted a statement that argued that the exercise had shown that the national segment 
was vulnerable. Minkomsviaz’ was probably given a task to draft a proposal on how 
to ensure the resilience of the national segment, and yearly cyber exercises including 
the Minkomsviaz’, the FSB and the MoD were announced.2250  
                                              
2243 Иванов 2012. 
2244 Хизриев, Арсен, Балтачева, Марина. «Используют тактику «выжженной земли». ВЗГЛЯД, 27 
сентября 2013 [Online]. Available: https://vz.ru/politics/2013/9/27/652418.html [Accessed: 27th February]. 
2245 Латухина, Кира. Спецфонд безопасности. Российская газета 25.09.2014 [Online]. Available: 
https://rg.ru/2014/09/24/putin-site.html [Accessed: 28th February 2019]. 
2246 Анненков, Андрей. «Интернет+суверенитет» рабочей группы по Интернету рассмотрела проект до-
рожной карты. D-Russia.ru 29 сентября 2016 [Online]. Available: http://d-russia.ru/podgruppa-internetsu-
verenitet-rabochej-gruppy-po-internetu-rassmotrela-proekt-dorozhnoj-karty.html [Accessed: 28th February 
2019]. 
2247 Резчиков, Андрей. Избежать отключения от интернета России поможет Китай. ВЗГЛЯД, 29 декабря 
2016 [Online]. Available: https://vz.ru/society/2016/12/29/744236.html [Accessed: 16th May 2019]. 
2248 Минкомсвязь. Минкомсвязь, ФСБ и Минобороны провели учения по защите российского сегмента 
интернета. 28 июля 2014 года [Online]. Available: https://digital.gov.ru/ru/events/31441/ [Accessed: 16th 
May 2019]. 
2249 Демидов & Махукова 2016. 
2250 Совет Безопасности Российской Федерации 2014; Голицына, Анастасия. Совет безопасности обсу-
дит отключение России от глобального интернета. Ведомости, 19 сентября 2014 [Online]. Available: 
https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2014/09/19/suverennyj-internet [Accessed: 16th May 2019]; 
Кантышев, Павел, Болецкая, Ксения, Никольский, Алексей. Россия не будет отключена от интернета. 
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Ex-minister of Communications Igor Chshegolev and the then advisor of the presi-
dent on information technology claimed in October 2014 that the Security Council 
considered the functioning of the Internet to be a national security issue and that 
Russia was being isolated from the outside. The critical services of the national seg-
ment resided outside Russia and it did not control them. Russian ccTLDs could be 
removed from DNS root-files or its AS and IP -address spaces from RIPE registries 
and/or from the routing policies of neighbouring networks. Moreover the leading 
Internet companies were American and their data was in the disposal of American 
intelligence services.2251 Later, in May 2015 Chshegolev claimed that the national se-
curity of states would be secured if they had the sovereign right to control their na-
tional segments, domestic laws to regulate global Internet companies were formu-
lated, and the governance of the Internet was established on equal grounds.2252 These 
views were shared by the President’s advisor on the Internet German Klimenko who 
in December 2016 claimed that Russia had to be ready for it to be disconnected from 
the Internet from the outside and this required laws to regulate the national segment 
of the Internet.2253 Klimenko also argued in a meeting of the General Staff in 2017 
that the only way to secure the Russian Internet was to copy the information security 
system of China. This policy is nowadays called ‘kitaizatsiia’ or Sinicization.2254 It is 
thus safe to argue that the views later manifested in the government programs and 
laws were quite widely shared by the security and defence elite of Russia by 2015-
2016. 
 
Minkomsviaz’ drafted a proposal for securing the resilience and security of the na-
tional segment which was ‘leaked’ in March 2015. It included measures such as taking 
state control of the MSK-IX, the Coordination Centre of National Domain of Inter-
net and the Technical Centre, implementing a ban on using cross-border connections 
by commercial companies, and the duplication of ccTLD DNS architecture and na-
tional AS/IP -registries managed by the RIPE/ICANN.2255 Minister Nikiforov 
planned to bring his ideas on information sovereignty to the government and Putin 
in April 2015, but for reasons unknown he did not publicly present his report and the 
                                              
Ведомости, 02 октября 2014 [Online]. Available: https://www.vedomosti.ru/technology/articles/ 
2014/10/02/na-strazhe-interneta [Accessed: 16th May 2019]; ТАСС. Глава Минкомсвязи пообещал прово-
дить ежегодные учения по обеспечению устойчивости рунета. ТАСС, 19 ноября 2014 [Online]. Available: 
https://digital.gov.ru/ru/events/32136/ [Accessed: 16th May 2019]. 
2251 Анненков, Андрей. Игорь Щȍголев: «Учения подтвердили недостаточную устойчивость Рунета при 
недружественных «целенаправленных действиях». D-Russia.ru, 17.10.2014 [Online]. Available: http://d-
russia.ru/ucheniya-podtverdili-nedostatochnuyu-ustojchivost-runeta-pri-nedruzhestvennyx-celenapravlennyx-
dejstviyax.html [Accessed: 29th May 2019]. 
2252 Анненков, Андрей. Игорь Щȍголев: безопасность Интернета и безопасность граждан должны обес-
печиваться суверенитетом государств в киберпространстве. D-Russia.ru, 12.5.2015 [Online]. Available: 
http://d-russia.ru/igor-shhyogolev-bezopasnost-interneta-i-bezopasnost-grazhdan-dolzhny-obespechivatsya-
suverenitetom-gosudarstv-v-kiberprostranstve.html [Accessed: 16th May 2019]. 
2253 Ведомости. Клименко предупредил россиян о возможном отключении от мирового интернета. 
Ведомости, 29 декабря 2016 [Online]. Available: https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2016/ 
12/29/671725-klimenko [Accessed: 16th May 2019]. 
2254 Интерфакс. Советник президента Клименко предложил ограничить в России интернет. Интерфакс, 
26 января 2017 [Online]. Available: https://meduza.io/news/2017/01/26/sovetnik-putina-nazval-kitayskiy-
variant-edinstvennym-sposobom-obespechit-informatsionnuyu-bezopasnost-rf [Accessed: 17th May 2019]; 
Роскомсвобода. «Китаизация» Рунета входит в активную фазу и начнȍтся с точек обмена трафиком. 
Роскомсвобода, 18.8.2017 [Online]. Available: https://roskomsvoboda.org/31224/ [Accessed: 17th May 
2019]. 
2255 Голицына & Серьгина 2015. 
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discussion on sovereignty was put aside.2256 However as will become clear below, the 
ideas in the Minkomsviaz’ report were included in the National Programme of the 
Digital Economy adopted in 2017. Minkomsviaz’ tried to push its views into law dur-
ing 2015-–2018 but it ultimately failed as first the new Information Security Doctrine 
was adopted in December 2016 and then the FSB managed to get its own law on 
critical information infrastructure accepted in July 2017.2257 However, Minkomsviaz’ 
gained control of the Digital Economy Programme which incorporated almost eve-
rything Nikiferov had promoted. Moreover, Rostelekom took control of the critical 
services listed by the Minkomsviaz’ between 2017–2018.2258 
 
Consequently, in 2018 Nikiforov begun to use the term ’digital’ instead of ’infor-
mation’ sovereignty.2259 The term ’digital sovereignty’ was also used by Natal’ia 
Kasperskaia who stated in 2017 that ”Digital state sovereignty is the right and the 
ability of a country to independently determine what is happening in its information 
space […] The components of digital sovereignty are its own hardware platform, its 
own software platform, its own enterprise and state management systems, its own 
Internet infrastructure, its own online payment system and electronic commerce sys-
tem with the remote identity verification subsystem, its own media structure of the 
Internet, and its own information management system.”2260 She also stated that only 
the Unites States is currently digitally sovereign. For Kasperskaia digital sovereignty 
obviously included both the psychological or, more precisely, content aspect of infor-
mation and the technological or infrastructural aspect.2261 For her, digital sovereignty 
was a system of systems run over common platform. 
 
The above examined discussions were reflected in the new Strategy of the Develop-
ment of Information Society for 2017—2030 which was signed by the President in 
May 2017.2262 It was an official strategic planning document and incorporated fully the 
guidance of 2015 NSS and 2016 Information Security Doctrine. It offered many def-
initions of central concepts and defined, for example, information space (infor-
matsionnoe prostranstvo) as “a set of information resources created by subjects of 
the information sphere, means of interaction of such subjects, their information sys-
tems and the necessary information infrastructure.” The basic premise was that new 
                                              
2256 Голицынаб Анастасия. Правительство не планирует рассматривать вопрос о суверенитете рунета. 
Ведомости, 31 марта 2015 [Online]. Available: https://www.vedomosti.ru/technology/articles/2015/03/31/ 
pravitelstvo-ne-planiruet-rassmatrivat-vopros-o-suverenitete-runeta [Accessed: 16th May 2019]. 
2257 Ristolainen 2017a & 2017b; Голицына, Анастасия, Серьгина, Елизавета, Козлов, Петр. Государство 
хочет контролировать маршруты интернет-трафика в стране. Ведомости, 11 февраля 2016 [Online]. 
Available: https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2016/02/11/628508-gosudarstvo-hochet-kontroliro-
vat-rossiiskii-zarubezhnii-internet-trafik-strane [Accessed: 16th May 2019]; Балашова, Анна, Коломыченко, 
Мария. Власти предложили новые ограничения для владельцев точек обмена трафиком. РБК, 16 август 
2019 [Online]. Available: https://www.rbc.ru/technology_and_media/16/08/2017/ 59942b429a-
794794dd46800c [Accessed: 16th May 2019].  
2258 Cf. Chapter 6.1. 
2259 АиФ 2018. 
2260 Бирюлин, Роман. Стремление к цифровому суверенитету. Кразная звезда, № 136 6 декабря 2017. 
2261 Kasperskaia is the leader of the work group on information security in ANO Digital Economy. She is also 
the President of the InfoWatch group of companies, co-founder of Kaspersky Lab, a member of the Grant 
Committee of the Skolkovo Foundation, Chairman of the Board of the Association of Software Developers 
“Otechestvenniy Soft”, member of the Expert Council on Russian Software at the Ministry of Communications 
and Mass Media. (Цифровая экономика. Информационная безопасность [Online]. Available: https://data-
economy.ru/security#rec34030444 [Accessed: 28th February 2019].) 
2262 Указ Президента РФ 2017a. 
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and future technologies2263 would create a national digital economy which would pro-
vide a source of wealth but also protect the country from vulnerabilities and outside 
attacks. The way in which information technologies had developed, especially the In-
ternet, gave states with developed technologies the possibility to influence the popu-
lations of other countries to advance their own interests. The Strategy stated that “to 
effectively manage the communication networks of the Russian Federation, to ensure 
their integrity [tselostnost’], unity [edinstvo], resilient [ustoichivyi] operation and se-
curity [bezopasnost’], it is necessary to: a) create a centralized system for monitoring 
and managing the unified telecommunications network of the Russian Federation; b) 
to create systems enabling stable, safe and independent functioning of the Russian 
segment of the Internet; c) ensure the reliability and availability of communication 
services in Russia, including in rural areas and inaccessible localities; d)  create state 
bodies and organizations for expanding the use of domestic telecommunications 
equipment and software in communication networks; e) maintain the infrastructure 
of traditional communication services (postal services, telecommunications).”2264 To 
these requirements were added the uniformity of state regulation,  e-government ser-
vices, the use of Russian crypto algorithms, ensuring information technological inde-
pendence, the deployment  of the GosSOPKA, and ensuring data localization and 
privacy.2265 The concepts of technological independence and competitiveness were 
derived from the Strategy of Scientific-Technological Development of the Russian 
Federation which was adopted in 2016.2266 The Strategy reflects the increasing im-
portance of sovereignty and information struggle which were observed already above 
in the way the Programme of Information Society developed between 2013—2017 
and the Russian internal information and cyber security debate proceeded between 
2013—2016. 
 
The Strategy used the concept of ’the national segment of the Internet’ to emphasis 
the sovereign right of the state to control its information space. The national segment 
implicitly consists of the national information infrastructure (software and services, 
information systems, data centres and networks), mainly but not altogether under-
stood as a part of the Internet. Interacting upon and with it are political, military, 
economic, and information (cultural) spheres of life which are under the state juris-
diction. The concept of ‘information space’ was used to denote a Russian value, lan-
guage and culture-based space while critical infrastructure was the material and tech-
nological base of the national segment. Thus, the Strategy incorporated both infor-
mation-technological and psychological aspects of information. According to the 
Strategy, Russian interests included, amongst increased competitiveness, strengthen-
ing of economy and the protection of private and business interests, ‘technological 
independence’, and the securing of Russian public and private information. Import 
restrictions would protect its developing industry.2267 The Strategy resonates with the 
idea of struggle and information superiority through the strategic technological-scien-
tific advantage it pursues.  The emphasis of future breakthrough technologies and the 
                                              
2263 Nano- and biotechnologies, optical technologies, data analytics and storage (big data, IoT, and cloud-based 
services), artificial intelligence, and alternative energy sources. 
2264 Указ Президента РФ 2017a. 
2265 Ibid. 
2266 Указ Президента РФ от 01.12.2016 N 642 “О Стратегии научно-технологического развития Россий-
ской Федерации” [Online]. Available: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_ 207967/ [Ac-
cessed: 16th May 2019]. 
2267 Ibid. 
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simultaneous protection of own industry and society is compatible with an asymmet-
ric response. The whole Strategy is a means to produce measures for strategic deter-
rence and to create substance for digital sovereignty. 
 
6.3.3 The policies 
 
The main implementation policy document related to the national segment of the 
Internet is the government programme and later national programme of Digital Econ-
omy. It is based on the Strategy of the Development of Information Society and, to 
a lesser extent, the Information Security Doctrine.2268 It is thus part of the strategic 
planning process of the state and has both socio-economic and (military) security as-
pects.2269 
 
The Programme of Digital Economy sets its objectives and tasks in the context of 
five directions (napravlenie): normative regulation, cadres and education, research and 
technical reserves, information infrastructure, and information security. The last two 
are of interest when examining how Russia is shaping cyberspace and trying to control 
the national segment of the Internet. Information infrastructure and security related 
objectives and tasks are based on external and internal challenges and threats, and the 
main objective is: “ensuring the unity [edinstvo], resilience [ustoichivost’] and security 
[bezopasnost’] of information-telecommunications infrastructure of the Russian Fed-
eration on all levels of information space.”2270 The Programme combines security with 
economy by emphasising the use of domestic software, hardware, and cryptographic 
solutions. Most interestingly, the Programme presents a ‘road-map’ which states that 
in 2020 Russia will ensure its ‘digital sovereignty’ and in 2024 all the objectives of the 
Programme will be achieved. In relation to this, according to the Programme, in 2024 
only 10% of internal traffic of the ‘Russian segment of Internet’ will be routed through 
foreign servers.2271 
 
Between December 2017 and February 2018 ‘the Government Commission on the 
Use of Information technology to Improve the Quality of Life and Business Condi-
tions’ approved action plans for the five ‘directions’ of Programme of the Digital 
economy.2272 According to the action plans the total budget of ‘the Digital Economy’ 
would be 522 billion roubles.2273 However, the Programme was updated to a status of 
a national programme in May 2018 and its budget was raised first to 3,5 trillion roubles 
                                              
2268 Распоряжение Правительства РФ 2017.  
2269 Распоряжение Правительства РФ 2017; Указ Президента РФ 2016b; Федеральный закон от 2014a. 
Another important document is the Strategy of Scientific-Technological Development of the Russian Federa-
tion (Указ Президента РФ 2016a). The following examination of the Digital Economy Programme is taken 
from a previously published research paper and updated (Kukkola, Juha. New guidance for preparing Russian 
‘digital sovereignty’ released, Finnish Defence Research Agency, Research Bulletin 01 – 2018). 
2270 Распоряжение Правительства РФ 2017. 
2271 Ibid. 
2272 Правительство Российской Федерации. О «дорожных картах» по направлениям программы «Циф-
ровая экономика Российской Федерации». 9 января 2018 [Online]. Available: http://government.ru/or-
ders/selection/401/30895/ [Accessed: 16th May 2019]; Правительство Российской Федерации. Утверждȍн 
план мероприятий по направлению «Кадры и образование» программы «Цифровая экономика Россий-
ской Федерации» 21 февраля 2018 [Online]. Available: http://government.ru/news/31428/ [Accessed: 22 
March 2018]. 
2273 Тишина, Юлия, Жукова, Кристина. Оцифрованные миллиарды. Правительство утвердило проекты 
«Цифровой экономики». Коммерсантъ №2 от 10.01.2018 [Online]. Available: https://www.kommersant. 
ru/doc/3515334 [Accessed: 22 May 2018]. 
 
337 
and then by December 2019 lowered to 1,7—1,8 trillion roubles of which 1 trillion 
would be designated from the federal budget for 2019—2024 and the rest would 
come from the private sector.2274 For comparison the whole budget of the national 
programmes initiated by Putin’s 2018 May Edicts is 25,7 trillion roubles.2275 In com-
parison the budget of arms procurement programme GPV 2018— is approximately 
19 trillion roubles.2276 The responsibility for implementing ‘directions’ of ‘information 
infrastructure’ and ‘information security’ was given to Minkomsviaz’, and a non-com-
mercial organisation ‘Digital Economy’ was created to coordinate the public and pri-
vate activities and to monitor the realization of the state programme.2277  
 
Practically all state power ministries and security agencies are listed as responsible 
actors for ‘the direction of information infrastructure.’2278 The same applies to major 
IT-companies which are listed as participating contractors. The main objectives of 
‘the direction’ are: Adequate national communication network; domestic infrastruc-
ture for data storage and processing which provides affordable, sustainable, safe, and 
cost-effective services; and adequate digital platforms for the needs of citizens, busi-
ness and the government. In practice, the first objective includes, for example, creat-
ing normative base for the use of information technology, high-speed Internet 
(100Mb/s) to almost every household and government institution by 2024, speech 
and data connection to all priority objects of transport infrastructure, the implemen-
tation of 5G technology by the economic sector, developing state-wide narrow-band 
IoT network (LPWAN), and state-wide (including the Arctic EEZ) satellite services. 
The second objective includes, for example, the establishment of federal datacentres 
(eight by 2024)2279 and unified cloud services for the government. The third objective 
includes, for example, e-government services and their management systems, space 
based remote sensing system and geodetic control network, and services based on 
these systems. ‘The direction of information infrastructure’ is the most expensive one 
and amounts to circa 436 billion roubles (7,6$ mrd). The FSB, FSO and FSTEC have 
a definite role in planning these projects but implementation is left to state corpora-
tions and private sector. 
 
Russia is planning, as a part of Sfera which is a more comprehensive satellite pro-
gramme including navigation and communication services, to either participate or 
clone the OneWeb, SpaceX and Telsat LEO satellite mega-constellations projects to 
provide Internet regionally and globally to ‘friendly’ countries. This project has faced 
                                              
2274 Шмырова, Валерия. «Цифровая экономика» исполняет бюджет хуже всех нацпрограмм, потому что 
обо всем советуется с бизнесом. CNews, 11.11.2019 [Online]. Available: https://cnews.ru/news/top/2019-
11-08_tsifrovaya_ekonomika_ispolnyaet [Accessed: 6th January 2020]. 
2275 Баленко, Евгения, Кузнецова, Евгения. Исполнение законопроекта о суверенном Рунете подоро-
жало до ₽30 млрд. РБК, 26 мая 2019 [Online]. Available: https://www.rbc.ru/technology_and _me-
dia/26/03/2019/5c98f1bd9a79476ea86fc631?from=center [Accessed: 16th May 2019]. 
2276 Connolly & Boulégue 2018. 
2277 Постановление Правительства РФ 2019a. 
2278 Правительственная комиссия. План мероприятий по направлению “Информационная инфраструк-
тура” программы “Цифровая экономика Российской Федерации” (утв. Правительственной комиссией 
по использованию информационных технологий для улучшения качества жизни и условий ведения 
предпринимательской деятельности (протокол от 18.12.2017 N 2)) [Online]. Available: http://static.gov-
ernment.ru/media/files/DAMotdOImu8U89bhM7lZ8Fs23msHtcim.pdf [Accessed: 16th May 2019]. 
2279 Situated in the Central Federal Okrug, North-Western Federal Okrug, Uralskii Federal Okrug, Siberian 
Federal Okrug , Privolzhzkii Federal Okrug , and the Far-Eastern Federal Okrug , and probably two more to 
ensure resiliency of the system. 
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opposition from parts of the government and domestic companies.2280 Most im-
portantly, the FSB has opposed the project demanding that it must have access to all 
data traffic going through the Russian national segment of the Internet, and the MoD, 
which controls the frequency allocation in Russia, has been unwilling to provide up- 
and downstream frequency bands for the satellites.2281 The plans to deploy 5G IoT 
and SmartCity and SmartGrid networks in the biggest Russian cities has also faced 
resistance from the FSO and the MoD.2282 The most important challenge to all these 
projects has been the lack of financing and technology which has led Russia to partner 
with China.2283 However, the demands that the Digital Economy projects should be 
based on Russian hardware and software might make this cooperation challenging.2284 
The other member of the EEU have already complained about Russian protectionist 
ICT policies.2285  
 
‘The direction of information security’ does not include the Ministry of Defence in 
its list of responsible actors, although, it is consulted in some of the projects. All the 
other security ministries and agencies are present. The main objectives of information 
security are: ensuring the integrity (tselostnost’), resilience (ustoichivost’) and security 
(bezopasnost’) of information-telecommunications infrastructure of the Russian Fed-
eration on all levels of information space; ensuring organizational and legal protection 
of individual, business and state interests in the framework of the digital economy; 
and the creation of conditions for Russia’s leading position in the export of infor-
mation security services and technologies, as well as the integration of national inter-
ests in the international documents on information security issues.2286 
                                              
2280 Джорджевич, Александра. Сферический триллион в «Эфире»ю Как «Роскосмос» конкурирует с 
Илоном Маском за глобальный спутниковый интернет. Новая газета, № 140 от 13 декабря 2019 [Online]. 
Available: https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2019/12/12/83136-sfericheskiy-trillion-v-efire [Accessed: 7th 
January 2020]. 
2281 Балашова, Анна, Сидоркова, Инна, Коломыченко, Мария. Правительству предложат создать гло-
бальную спутниковую сеть за ₽299 млрд. РБК, 22 ноября 2017 [Online]. Available: 
https://www.rbc.ru/technology_and_media/22/11/2017/5a159bdb9a79476a55456d2b?from=center_4 [Ac-
cessed: 15th April 2019]; Сафронов, Иван. «Группировка будет развернута в любом случае: с нашим уча-
стием или без него». Коммерсантъ №33 от 25.02.2019 [Online]. Available: https://www.kommer-
sant.ru/doc/3894154?from=author_tech [Accessed: 15th April 2019]. 
2282 Репин, Андрей. «Новинки Smart City» будет достраивать АО «СЗ НО «Дирекция по строительству». 
Коммерсант, 12 декабря 2018 [Online]. Available: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3827866 [Accessed: 
15th April 2019]; Чурапченко, Евгения, Семашко, Наталья. Энергетика цифры. Коммерсанть, 2 октября 
2018 [Online]. Available: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3758627?query=smart%20grid [Accessed: 15th 
April 2019]; Кодачигов, Валерий. Минобороны отказалось передавать операторам частоты для 5G. Без 
этого появление в России связи пятого поколения невозможно. Ведомости, 28 марта 2019 [Online]. 
Available: https://meduza.io/news/2019/03/29/minoborony-otkazalos-peredavat-operatoram-svyazi-
chastoty-dlya-5g [Accessed: 15th April 2019]; Балашова, Анна, Сидоркова, Инна. Роскомнадзор выступил 
против выдачи частот для глобальной сети OneWeb. РВК, 14 апреля 2018 [Online]. Available: 
https://www.rbc.ru/technology_and_media/14/04/2018/5ad0ac9d9a794746645fa041?from=main [Ac-
cessed: 15th April 2019]. 
2283 Балашова, Анна, Кирьянов, Роман. Акимов объявил о создании российско-китайского конкурента 
OneWeb. РБК, 17.9.2019 [Online]. Available: https://www.rbc.ru/technology_and_media/17/09/2019/ 
5d80eea69a794755e1c48c87 [Accessed: 7th January 2020]; Bendett & Kania 2019. 
2284 Балашова, Анна, Баленко, Евгения. Операторов 5G переведут на российские серверы. РБК, 2.9.2019 
[Online]. Available: https://www.rbc.ru/technology_and_media/02/10/2019/5d9363d59a7947b1a00cd012 
[Accessed: 7th January 2020]. 
2285 Кинякина, Екатерина, Жукова, Кристина. Соседи России раскритиковали закон о предустановке 
российского софта. Ведомости, 22 декабря 2019 [Online]. Available: https://www.vedomosti.ru/ technol-
ogy/articles/2019/12/22/819374-raskritikovali-zakon-po [Accessed: 7th January 2020]. 
2286 Правительственная комиссия. План мероприятий по направлению “Информационная безопас-
ность” программы “Цифровая экономика Российской Федерации” (утв. Правительственной комиссией 
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The first objective is defined by its indicators to mean reducing the percentage of 
domestic traffic routing through foreign servers to 10% by 2024, the almost total 
replacement of foreign produced hardware and software by domestic versions in fed-
eral and local administrative organizations, state corporations and corporations con-
nected to state, and the comprehensive implementation of Russian standards of in-
formation security by those same actors by 2024. In practice, the resilience and secu-
rity (ustoichivost’ and bezopasnost’) of ‘the unified telecommunications network of 
RF is guaranteed by establishing a ‘centralized system of monitoring and managing 
the public communication networks’. This is an organizational and technological pro-
ject, which is managed by a designated operator, and includes the Ministry of Defence. 
It functions in cooperation with NKTsKI. The system should be up and running by 
2020. Stability and security also include the creation of standards for domestic cloud, 
fog, and quantum technology, and for systems of augmented reality and artificial in-
telligence.2287 As part of the security ‘direction’ the Russian government is ordering 
the federal organs to buy Russian office software etc.2288 
 
The manageability and reliability (upravliaemost’ and nadezhnost’) aspect of the first 
objective concentrates on the ‘Russian segment of Internet’ and circuiting 
(zamykanie) its network traffic exclusively inside the territory of the Russian federa-
tion. The objective is achieved by establishing a register of routing-address infor-
mation (Internet Number Registry), a monitoring system of routing information (In-
ternet Routing Registry), nationally controlled DNS root-servers, a national certificate 
authority centre, through blocking of unlawful content, and cooperation with 
NKTsKI. These ‘subsystems’ should be managed by a designed operator. Further-
more, the ‘technological independence’ and security of data processing infrastructure 
and systems should be guaranteed.2289  
 
The second objective of ‘the direction of information security’ emphasises the au-
thentication and identification of the subjects of the national segment.  Moreover, 
information security is not only a technological issue but also a normative one and 
cloud service providers’ use of data should be regulated, security standards for big 
data management should be enforced, criminal code should be updated, and users of 
communication networks should be identified. The ‘Digital economy’s’ security con-
cept also reflects the Russian understanding of information threats by including the 
prevention of the appearance of ‘unlawful information’ (protivopravnaia infor-
matsiia). In practice, information security is based on information sharing and net-
worked systems. One of the systems, probably GosSOPKA, should provide indica-
tors of harmful activity to Central and Regional Coordination Centres of Computer 
Incidents (NKTsKI and RKTsKI). The substance of another system called ‘the cen-
tralized system of monitoring and managing the public communication networks’ was 
unclear until 2019 when ‘the Law on Sovereign Internet’ was approved and a similarly 
                                              
по использованию информационных технологий для улучшения качества жизни и условий ведения 
предпринимательской деятельности (протокол от 18.12.2017 N 2)) [Online]. Available: http://static.gov-
ernment.ru/media/files/AEO92iUpNPX7Aaonq34q6BxpAHCY2umQ.pdf [Accessed: 16th May 2019]. 
2287 Ibid. 
2288 Жукова, Кристина. Росгвардия купила российский офисный софт на 60 млн рублей. Ведомости, 30 
октября 2019 [Online]. Available: https://www.vedomosti.ru/technology/articles/2019/10/30/815092-
rosgvardiya [Accessed: 7th January 2020]. 
2289 Правительственная комиссия 2017b. 
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named national system of traffic filtering operated by the Minkomsviaz’ was estab-
lished.2290 There is also a plan to enforce domestic anti-virus software on all personal 
computers in Russia—this software would probably send data on the hosts to cen-
trally controlled system.2291 
 
The third objective of information security has a definite foreign policy character, 
although exporting Russian IT-solutions is at the forefront. The term ‘cyberphysical’ 
(kiberfizicheskii) system is introduced and it is connected to IoT (Internet of Things) 
and to critical information infrastructure. The term’s definition is left open, but it is 
preliminary put into a legal-normative framework where unauthorized interference of 
‘cyberphysical’ systems should be prohibited. This new term has a clear connection 
to the previous Russian endeavours in the United Nations to ban the hostile use of 
ICT. The foreign policy element is emphasized by stating that the international infor-
mation security standards should be developed in accordance with Russian interests, 
cooperation within the Eurasian Economic Union should be advanced2292, and the 
Russian norm proposal on international information security should be approved by 
the UN by 2020.2293 Thus, the Digital Economy Programme has also incorporated the 
Russian cyber diplomacy initiative. 
 
A document stating the specific targets and indicators of the Digital Economy was 
released in December 2018.2294 It redefined ‘the directions’ for projects for the nor-
mative regulation of the digital environment, information infrastructure, cadres for 
the digital economy, information security, digital technology, and digital governmental 
services. There were some changes and adjustments. For example, the government 
and presidential administration should acquire a network of distributed situation cen-
tres, and the communication satellite network Ekspress-RV and the secure govern-
ment segment RSNet should be operational by 2024. Rostelekom and Rosenergoatom 
should build a distributed network of catastrophe resilient datacentres by 2021. The 
project concerning cadres included the education of over a hundred thousand spe-
cialists and the creation of tens of ‘digital universities’ to teach mathematics, infor-
matics, and technology. GosSOPKA should be operational and the CII categorized 
by 2021. Moreover, a national fibre optic network should be secured by quantum 
cryptography by 2021.2295 The digital economy and technology parts of the pro-
gramme now concentrated on identifying a group of leading Russian research institu-
tions and companies and providing state support for them to pursue the so-called 
cross-cutting (skvoznyi) technologies.2296 Consequently, in February 2019 Vladimir 
                                              
2290 Федеральный закон 2019. 
2291 Правительственная комиссия 2017b. 
2292 In this context common normative regulation and standards, joint exercises, and ‘a zone of digital trust’ are 
mentioned. 
2293 Правительственная комиссия 2017b. 
2294 Президиум Совета при Президенте Российской Федерации 2018. 
2295 It is unclear if this means the deployment of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) or quantum key distribution 
(QKD). 
2296 These were big data, neurotechnology and artificial intelligence, distributed registry systems, quantum tech-
nologies, new manufacturing technologies, industrial internet, components of robotics and sensorics, wireless 
technology, virtual and augmented reality technology. 
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Putin ordered the government to come up with a national strategy on artificial intel-
ligence which it did in October 2019.2297 For Putin the development of AI technology 
is the key to ‘technological dominance and technological sovereignty’, but Russia’s 
ability to create an ecosystems that supports the adoption and adaptation of AI tech-
nologies is suspect.2298 Furthermore, the Security Council has taken part in the policy 
formulation related to the Digital Economy which demonstrates that digital economy 
and sovereignty really are a national security issue.2299 
 
The ‘Digital Economy’ is being implemented initially through laws. The so-called 
‘Law on the Sovereign Internet’, was adopted in April 2019 and entered into force in 
December 2019.2300 The law draft claimed it ensured the autonomous functioning of 
the Russian segment of Internet against the threat of disconnection from the outside, 
i.e. the threat which the new ‘active-defence’ based Cyber Strategy of the United States 
presented. Basically, the law requires ISPs to install DPI -equipment controlled by the 
Roskomnadzor into their networks. This equipment will be used to filter traffic based 
on the ‘Unified register’ or blacklist of banned sites and to cut the Russian segment 
of Internet from the global Internet if Russian critical information infrastructure is 
faced with a critical threat. These measures will ensure the resilience (ustoichivost’), 
security (bezopasnost’), and integrity (tselostnost’) of that part of the Internet that 
functions on the territory of the Russian Federation.2301 
 
The law mandates the duplication of critical services, i.e. the national system of do-
main names, envisioned by the Minkomsviaz’ already in 2015. It prohibits the use of 
foreign databases or equipment by state organs or corporations. Moreover, it dictates 
that state organs and corporations must ensure the possibility of using state sanc-
tioned encryption.2302 The Committee of Information Politics of Duma tried to get 
mandatory national SSL certification into the law but did not succeed.2303 The law is 
already being implemented as the government has approved the funding of the Centre 
                                              
2297 Рябова, Вика. Владимир Путин поручил правительству обеспечить разработку национальной стра-
тегии в области ИИ. D-Russia.ru, 27.2.2019 [Online]. Available: http://d-russia.ru/vladimir-putin-poruchil-
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рации” (вместе с “Национальной стратегией развития искусственного интеллекта на период до 2030 
года”) [Online]. Available: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_335184/ [Accessed: 7th 
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2299 Совет Безопасности РФ 2017. 
2300 Мартынов, Кирилл. Откуда втекает интернет Парламентарии Клишас и Луговой предлагают рос-
сиянам самоизолироваться от глобальной сети. Новая газета, 15 декабря 2018 [Online]. Available: 
https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2018/12/15/78947-otkuda-vtekaet-internet [Accessed: 28th February 
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2301 Федеральный закон 2019. 
2302 Ibid. 
2303 Коломыченко 2019. 
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of Monitoring and Managing of the Public Communication Networks (Tsentr moni-
toringa i upravleniia setiu sviazi obshchogo polzovaniia) (TsMUSSOP).2304 This Cen-
tre is planned to be operational in January 2020 and its task is to  ensure the security 
of the Russian segment of the Internet.2305 In the autumn of 2019 Russia began testing 
and exercising the disconnecting of the national segment from the global Internet, 
although, at that time these test had an experimental and technical nature.2306 Addi-
tionally, a set of national cyber security exercises have been planned for 2020.2307 
These annual exercises are required by a government degree.2308 Additionally, 
Minkomsviaz’ awarded Rostelekom a contract to construct a ‘cyber-poligon’, or an 
exercise platform, for nation level cyber exercises and training of specialists.2309 
 
Minkomsviaz’ presented a draft law in May 2019 “On the approval of the procedure 
for centralized management of a public telecommunications network.” It is meant to 
regulate how the threats permitting the activation of the ‘centralized management’ will 
be defined and when individual ISPs (actors operating lines of communication or 
autonomous systems crossing state borders) are required to act. The mandate to de-
fine the relevance of threats is given to Minkomsviaz’ and the FSB, the probability of 
threats to Rozkomnadzor, and the operation of the system when the threat is deemed 
high to the Radio Frequency Service which belongs to Rozkomnadzor. Perhaps the 
most important part of the legal draft are the three definitions of threats to integrity, 
resilience and security to public networks which basically defines the official Russian 
view on cyber security. Integrity is about the ability of communication networks to 
interoperate and connect clients to resources, resilience is the ability of networks to 
operate under internal and external disturbances and to return to their initial state, 
and security is the ability to deny unauthorized access and intentional disruption of 
communication networks.2310 In addition to Minkomsviaz’s draft, multiple other ad-
                                              
2304 Постановление Правительства Российской Федерации от 30.04.2019 № 528 “Об утверждении Пра-
вил предоставления из федерального бюджета субсидии на создание и функционирование Центра мо-
ниторинга и управления сетью связи общего пользования, а также создание, эксплуатацию и развитие 
информационной системы мониторинга и управления сетью связи общего пользования” [Online]. 
Available: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_324051/ [Accessed: 17th May 2019]. 
2305 Панов, Павел, Галанина, Ангелина. Написано связью: правительство начнет контролировать интер-
нет. За трафиком будет следить специальная государственная структура. Известия, 22 февраля 2019 
[Online]. Available: https://iz.ru/848412/pavel-panov-angelina-galanina/napisano-sviaziu-pravitelstvo-na-
chnet-kontrolirovat-internet [Accessed: 17th May 2019]. 
2306 Роскомсвобода. Чему научили учения по Суверенному Рунету? Роскомсвобода, 24.12.2019 [Online]. 
Available: https://roskomsvoboda.org/53902/ [Accessed: 7th January 2020]; Стадник, Илона. Ошибка сети: 
что показал учебный запуск «суверенного Рунета». РБК, 26.12.2019 [Online]. Available: 
https://www.rbc.ru/opinions/technology_and_media/26/12/2019/5e046d649a794756d9e55596 [Accessed: 
7th January 2020]. 
2307  
2308 Приказ Министерствa цифрового развития, связи и массовых коммуникаций оссийской Российской 
Федерации от 12.12.2019 № 839 ”Об утверждении графика проведения плановых учений” [Online]. 
Available: https://digital.gov.ru/ru/documents/7002/https://digital.gov.ru/ru/documents/7002/ [Ac-
cessed: 7th January 2020]. 
2309 Роскомсвобода. Ростелеком создаст киберполигон, 06.12.2019 [Online]. Available: https://roskomsvo-
boda.org/53137/ [Accessed: 10th January 2020]. 
2310 Минкомсвязь. Об утверждении Порядка централизованного управления сетью связи общего поль-
зования [Проект] 23 мая 2019 г. [Online]. Available: https://regulation.gov.ru/projects#npa=91558 [Ac-
cessed: 15th May 2019]. 
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ministrative orders are being drafted which aim to create multiple registers and regu-
lations.2311 Many of these orders will not be subjected to a public discussion or parlia-
mentary overview. 
 
The developments of 2012–2019 can be summarized as follows. The laws adopted in 
2013–2016 were primarily a reaction to the events of 2011–2012 but by 2016 the need 
for direct control over the national Internet and information in it and its protection 
from outside influence became pronounced. By 2017 the concept of the CII had ma-
tured to provide the basis for the Russian understanding of national cyber security. 
After the of Digital Economy Programme was approved, laws were used to define 
what was meant by the national segment of the Internet.  On the strategy level a 
definite change occurred between 2015-2017 following the reorientation of 2014 with 
the release of the new Information Security Doctrine in 2016 and Strategy of the 
Development of Information Society in 2017.2312 This changed much of the language 
and made national security a priority issue in building information society and econ-
omy. The Doctrine and Strategy were reactions to the events of 2014, not 2011, but 
combined many of the parallel developments: the Internet as a source of political 
challenge to the regime, the influences from the Chinese state control over the Inter-
net, the militarization of cyberspace, the growing importance of the CII, the fear of 
new threats towards the vulnerabilities of the Russian Internet, and the new overall 
geopolitical situation. Elite reactions to these developments were guided by the stra-
tegic cultural ideas. Digital or information sovereignty is a central concept guiding the 
2015–2017 documents. The information space as a sphere of politico-military action 
is connected to strategic deterrence and the great power balance. An asymmetric re-
sponse due to new technologies and by denying opponents the ability to exploit Rus-
sian vulnerabilities. Information superiority on the strategic level is ensured through 
scientific-technological and educational potential and on operational level by multiple 
systems of information collection, analysis and response. The EIP will become the 
national segment of the Internet and will be populated by ASUs in the form of sys-
tems and systems-of-systems. The CII provides the framework for national infor-
mation-technological security, i.e. cyber security. 
 
The National Programme of the Digital Economy synthesised these developments 
and ideas into a single whole although the regulation of the CII and cyber diplomacy 
efforts remained largely independent vectors. A strategy for controlling the national 
information space was thus planned and implemented, and continuously updated as 
the change of policy level documents have demonstrated. This strategy has been used 
to shape the national cyberspace to increase state control over a bottom-to-top de-
veloped network. However, it is important to note that the making of strategy is not 
unidirectional process and the National Programme of the Digital Economy has al-
ready faced serious doubts concerning the ability of the Russian economy to reach 
                                              
2311 Роскомсвобода. «Суверенный Рунет» продолжает обрастать подзаконными актами, 29.05.2019 
[Online]. Available: https://roskomsvoboda.org/47342/ [Accessed: 30th May 2019]; Эшер II. Проекты нор-
мативных правовых актов по устойчивому Рунету [Online]. Available: https://usher2.club/ helpers/stable-
runet-npa-list [Accessed: 7th January 2020]. 
2312 This view is supported by Leonid Levin, the Chair of the Information Policy, Technology and Communi-
cations of the Duma (Левин, Леонид. О законодательных мерах по обеспечению информационной без-
опасности Российской Федерации. Федеральный справочник 2015 [Online]. Available: http://federal-
book.ru/files/BEZOPASNOST/soderghanie/NB_2/NB2-2015-LevinLL.pdf [Accessed: 17th May 2019].) 
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the objectives set to it.2313 Moreover, in 2018 the direction of security reportedly re-
ceived only 5% of the planned financing.2314 However, as the last minute implemen-
tation of the last May Edicts in January 2018 demonstrated, financing is only a ques-
tion of political will.2315 
 
6.4 The systems 
 
This chapter examines what kind of civilian and military information systems and 
networks the Russian regime has built and is building or directing the private sector 
to build. It introduces the systems which, in principle, form the Russian segment of 
Internet and which will be used in Chapter 7 to construct the model of system of 
systems of information security and defence.2316 
 
6.4.1 Civilian systems 
 
The strategies, doctrines and policies drafted and adopted by the Russian regime have 
produced multiple information systems, although the first 2002 eGovernment policy 
had a halting start and produced few results. As part of Medvedev’s liberalization and 
informatization agenda, the Russian government established its public portal for elec-
tronic services in 2009 which began to support services requiring authentication in 
2010. These developed in 2011–2013 into the Single System of Identification and 
Authentication (ESIA) and the Single Portal of State and Municipal Services 
(EPGU).2317 70.5 million people had registered to ESIA in 2017 and 46.6 million had 
used electronic public services in 2017. The number was up from 20.3 million in 2015 
and 31.7 million in 2016. Since 2012 the number of citizens using the EPGU had 
increased twenty-fold.2318 Thus, Russian e-governance did not start to develop, despite 
official declarations, until during Putin’s third term.  
 
In 2015 President Putin ordered federal government institutions to connect their in-
formation resources to ‘the Russia government segment of the Russian information-
telecommunications network Internet’ (known as the GIS Internet). The task to es-
tablish this segment was given to the FSO.2319 In 2016 the FSO gave an administrative 
order to develop a governmental segment named RSNet. The idea of RSNet was to 
                                              
2313 Российский союз промышленников и предпринимателей. На заседании Комитета РСПП по циф-
ровой экономике обсудили меры господдержки импортозамещения программного обеспечения. 23 
апреля 2019 [Online]. Available: http://www.rspp.ru/cc/news/60/16247 [Accessed: 17th May 2019]. 
2314 Бодрик, Александр. Кибербезопасность в России: итоги 2018 года и стратегии для 2019-го. IT-Week, 
4.2.2019 [Online]. Available: https://www.itweek.ru/security/article/detail.php?ID=205189 [Accessed: 17th 
May 2019]. 
2315 OSCE. Russian Federation Presidential Election 18 March 2018. ODIHR Election Observation Mission 
Final Report [Online]. Available: https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/383577?download=true [Accessed: 
17th May 2019]. 
2316 This chapter is partly based on Kukkola, Juha. Civilian and Military Information Infrastructure and the 
Control of the Russian Segment of the Internet. Presented in the International Conference on Military Com-
munications and Information Systems (ICMCIS) Warsaw, Poland, May 22.-23., 2018. 
2317 РАЭК. Интернет в России 2014: Состояние, тенденции и перспективы развития. Москва, 2015 
[Online]. Available: http://www.fapmc.ru/rospechat/newsandevents/newsagency/2015/08/item1/main/ 
custom/00/0/file.pdf [Accessed: 10th April 2019]. 
2318 РАЭК 2018. 
2319 Указ Президента РФ 2015. 
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connect state information systems to the Internet and to offer public services to citi-
zens through a web-portal. RSNet is operated by the Spetssviazi of the FSO. It is 
connected to Internet through a gateway and has its own IP-address space and do-
main zone (gov.ru).2320 Basically then, RSNet is a Russian government secure Intranet 
with an Internet gateway. However, at the same time, Minkomsviaz’ together with 
Rostelekom have been developing a Unified Data Network (ESPD) for government 
agencies which is also a data network.2321 Its technical monitoring and administration 
is the responsibility of the Federal Situation Centre of the Electronic Government.2322 
It would seem that RSNet and ESPD are supposed to be part of the same government 
backbone network with data-centres and multiple layers.2323 ESPD and RSNet support 
the System of Interdepartmental Electronic Interaction (SMEV) which is basically a 
service platform based on a network of seven data centres hosting the services and 
data for the federal government, agencies and subjects.2324  
 
As was noted in Chapter 6.2.3, the Russian government began to develop the Uprav-
lenie system in 2002 which was at first an information sharing platform.2325 However, 
Upravlenie was redefined in 2015 as the digital platform for strategic planning to-
gether with multiple other information systems like the Unified Intradepartmental 
Information-Statistical System, the Electronic Budget, and the information-analytical 
system for monitoring the national security of the Russian Federation. Upravlenie 
would be based on sharing data between authorities and it would provide a digital, 
                                              
2320 Приказ ФСО России от 07.09.2016 N 443 “Об утверждении Положения о российском государствен-
ном сегменте информационно-телекоммуникационной сети “Интернет” (Зарегистрировано в Миню-
сте России 14.10.2016 N 44039) [Online]. Available: http://www.gov.ru/ rsnet/pr_fso_443_07092016.pdf 
[Accessed: 15th April 2019]; Правительство Российской Федерации. Временные правила администриро-
вания домена gov.ru 2018. [Online]. Available: http://www.gov.ru/ main/rsnet/page541.html. [Accessed 11 
January 2018]; Правительство Российской Федерации. Информация администрации сети RSNet 
[Online]. Available: http://www.gov.ru/main/page5.html [Accessed: 15th April 2019]; Указ Президента РФ 
2015. 
2321 Минкомсвязь. Единую сеть передачи данных в 2016 году будут использовать 14 госорганов, 20 ян-
варя 2016 [Online]. Available: https://digital.gov.ru/ru/events/34535/ [Accessed: 15th April 2019]. 
2322 Приказ Министерства связи и массовых коммуникаций Российской Федерации от 16.08.2017 г. № 
422 “О порядке функционирования и подключения к федеральной государственной информационной 
системе “Федеральный ситуационный центр электронного правительства” и признании утратившим 
силу приказа Министерства связи и массовых коммуникаций Российской Федерации от 1 июля 2014 г. 
№ 184” [Online]. Available: https://rg.ru/2017/10/04/minsvyaz-prikaz422-site-dok.html [Accessed: 15th 
April 2019]. 
2323 Минкомсвязь. Единая информационнотелекоммуникационная инфраструктура органов власти 
[Online]. Available: https://digital.gov.ru/uploaded/presentations/prezentvopros-2tebenkovedinaya-inform-
telekinfr.pdf [Accessed: 15th April 2019]. 
2324 Udomlia, Ekaterinburg, Novosibirsk, St. Petersburg, Nizhnii Novgorod, Khabarovsk and Rostov-na-Donu. 
These are the data centres envisioned by the Digital Economy program (Минкомсвязь. Система межведом-
ственного электронного взаимодействия (СМЭВ) [Online]. Available: https://digital.gov.ru/ ru/activity/di-
rections/49/ [Accessed: 15th April 2019]; Ростелеком. Облачные сервисы в Цифровой трансформации, 
20.2.2017 [Online]. Available: http://www.rtk-dc.ru/upload/iblock/66b/66b7243122a76c89f8f1be681-
cc5f0fb.pdf [Accessed: 15th April 2019]; Tadviser. Система межведомственного электронного взаимодей-
ствия (СМЭВ) [Online] . Available: http://www.tadviser.ru/a/71478 [Accessed: 15th April 2019].) 
2325 Постановление Правительства Российской Федерации от 27 ноября 2015 г. N 1278 О федеральной 
информационной системе стратегического планирования и внесении изменений в Положение о госу-
дарственной автоматизированной информационной системе "Управление" [Online]. Available: 
http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&prevDoc=102134940&backlink=1&&nd=102383211 
[Accessed: 13th May 2019]; Постановление Правительства РФ от 2009b. 
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cross departmental platform for cooperation.2326 Consequently, it would make re-
gional and local administration more transparent and controllable to the federal centre 
of power. 
 
 ‘Upravlenie’ operates over the SMEV and consists of an open Internet portal, a semi-
closed portion based on the RSNet, and secure (Kontur) parts, an information-ana-
lytical subsystem for monitoring, analysing and manipulating information, a subsys-
tem for data management (registers, directories and classifiers) and the central infor-
mation subsystem ‘Federatsiia’ which includes databases and modules for collecting 
and storing data.2327 The secure Kontur part is reserved for the presidential admin-
istration and the government and is not directly connected to the Internet. However, 
it enables the regime to access all data entered into the ‘Upravlenie’. A subsystem of 
‘Federatsiia’ is used to securely input situation data from federal and regional organs 
into shared databases.2328 Upravlenie is based on a network of territorially distributed 
data centres.2329 Its current operational status, besides official declarations, is un-
known. The Digital Economy Programme has added the National System of Infor-
mation Management (NSUD) to the above described system of systems. It should 
integrate different government databases and provide interfaces to them by 2024.2330 
In 2019 it was announced that a secure intranet ETsP OGV would be created for the 
Presidential Administration, the Security Council, the Government and the Federal 
Assembly in the context of Digital Economy.2331 Moreover, in December 2019 the 
government degreed that a ‘national information management system’ would be cre-
ated which would, in effect, be a national, unified and single statistical service.2332 
 
It is quite possible that Upravlenie is envisioned as the basis for the system of situation 
centres highlighted by Julian Cooper. In 2012 Cooper claimed that 100 of these cen-
tres from the presidential down to the regional level were in existence, their function 
being the monitoring of the socio-economic and national security situation of the 
country for the interests of strategic planning.2333 In 2013 a system of distributed sit-
uation centres was set up which was supposed to improve the current system with 
integrated and coordinated information systems (SRSTs) and services.2334 The respon-
sibility of this system was given to the FSO and its most important centres currently 
                                              
2326  Постановление Правительства РФ 2009b. 
2327 ГАС Управление. Государственная автоматизированная информационная система “Управление” 
Прикладное программное обеспечение государственной автоматизированной информационной си-
стемы «Управление» Регламент подключения и интеграции с ГАС «Управление» [Online]. Available: 
http://gasu.gov.ru/rest/documents/file/download?fileId=9681 [Accessed: 26th March 2019]. 
2328 ГАС Управление. Государственная автоматизированная информационная система “Управление” 
[Online]. Available: http://gasu.gov.ru/about [Accessed: 26th March 2019]. 
2329 ГАС Управление. Прикладное программное обеспечениегосударственной автоматизированной ин-
формационной системы «Управление» [Online]. Available: http://gasu.gov.ru/preview?fileId=9681 [Ac-
cessed: 15th April 2019]. 
2330 Краснушкина, Надежда. Госданным прописали архитектуру. Единая информсреда объединит сотни 
ГИС. Коммерсантъ" №221 от 30.11.2018 [Online]. Available: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3814604 
[Accessed: 17th May 2019]. 
2331 Королев, Игорь. ФСО и ФСБ получат 1,8 миллиарда на цифровую поддержку Путина и Медведева. 
Cnews, 21.10.2019 [Online]. Available: https://www.cnews.ru/news/top/2019-10-18_fso_i_fsb_poluchat_ 
18_milliarda [Accessed: 7th January 2020]. 
2332 Распоряжение Правительства РФ от 17 декабря 2019 года №3074-р “Концепция создания цифровой 
аналитической платформы предоставления статистических данных” [Online]. Available: http://static. 
government.ru/media/files/4YejV8mvcCSeGWTg2kXprmthtNbWyfrU.pdf [Accessed: 7th January 2020]. 
2333 Cooper 2012, 6-7. 
2334 Cooper 2018a. 
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include the Presidential Administration’s and Security Council’s centres and the Na-
tional Defence Management Centre. In 2018 Cooper argued that the SRSTs were an 
“echo of past Soviet aspirations.”2335  
 
Federal systems are supplemented by sectoral systems. One of these is the State In-
formation System of Fuel and Energy Complex which, according to the law, should 
automate the collection and distribution of information on the status of the state 
owned fuel and energy industry and provide forecasts on its development.2336 The 
system’s development began in 2011 and was still incomplete in the spring of 2019. 
It could, at least in theory, enable Soviet like micromanagement of the energy sec-
tor.2337 Another system was developed as a response to the fears of Russia being dis-
connected from the global financial system. In 2014 Russia deployed its own national 
version of the SWIFT financial messaging service—the Financial Reporting System 
(SPFS). In 2018 it had 396 Russian customers whereas SWIFT had 398.2338 SPFS ac-
quired its first foreign customer bank in late 2018 from Belarus and in 2019 Russia 
negotiated with China, India, Iran and Turkey about the joint use of the system.2339 
The grandiose plans of the Russian e-government are, however, faced by the multiple 
challenges posed by Russia’s vast territory, legacy systems, bureaucratic stove piping, 
and corruption. Starting from 2009–2010 the governmental systems have largely been 
built and probably operated by the stated owned Rostelekom. It has acquired smaller 
private companies as their services and products have become critical for the govern-
ment networks.2340  
 
The government also supports the domestic production of software to create a truly 
Russian information ecosystem. In 2015, the Register of Russian Software was estab-
lished to control computer programs and services, which could be used by the federal 
and regional administration and be promoted as domestically produced products. The 
Register was part of an import substitution programme but also an intentional effort 
to create competitors to Western (and perhaps Chinese) products.2341 Officially, the 
Register included by 2019 over 5,000 programs and supplied 65% of  government 
                                              
2335 In principle, the situation centres might connect all the power ministries and their regional and vertical 
organizations. The system is supported by multiple information-analytical systems which monitor develop-
ments, conduct multifactor analyses of situations, model, forecast and plan, build scenarios, and offer support 
for effective and timely management. Cooper claimed that this kind of ‘automated’ system of monitoring and 
analysis could lead to economic. (Cooper 2018a). 
2336 Федеральный закон от 03.12.2011 N 382-ФЗ (ред. от 5 июля 2018) “О государственной информаци-
онной системе топливно-энергетического комплекса” [Online]. Available: http://pravo.gov. 
ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102152618 [Accessed: 17th April 2019]. 
2337 Tadviser. Государственная информационная система топливно-энергетического комплекса [Online]. 
Available: http://www.tadviser.ru/a/248699 [Accessed: 17th April 2019]. 
2338 Михеева, Анна. ЦБ снизит тарифы в своем аналоге системы SWIFT. РБК, 13 фебраля 2018 [Online]. 
Available: https://www.rbc.ru/finances/13/02/2018/5a82f3019a79472864bb5ada?from=main [Accessed: 
17th April 2019]; Чернышова, Евгения, Михеева, Анна. В российском аналоге SWIFT появился первый 
зарубежный участник. РБК, 22 ноября 2018 [Online]. Available: https://www.rbc.ru/finances/ 
22/11/2018/5bf6bbd09a79476d3e8100d5?from=main [Accessed: 17th April 2019]. 
2339 Reuters. Russia backs global use of its alternative SWIFT system. Reuters, March 19, 2019 [Online]. Avail-
able: https://uk.reuters.com/article/russia-banks-swift/russia-backs-global-use-of-its-alternative-swift-system 
-idUKL8N2163BU [Accessed: 17th April 2019]. 
2340 РАЭК 2015; Ростелеком. Роль ПАО «Ростелеком» в цифровой экономике. Май, 2017 [Online]. Avail-
able: https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Regional-Presence/CIS/Documents/Events/2017/06_Saint_ Peters-
burg/Presentations/ITU%20Workshop%2019.06%20-%20Alexei%20Borodin%202.pdf [Accessed: 17th May 
2019].  
2341 Воейков 2018. 
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orders.2342 In 2018 Rostelekom announced that it would develop a smartphone OS 
Sailfish for the Chinese Inoi R7 phone for secure use for public officials.2343 Moreo-
ver, Astra Linux has been developed and approved in 2019 as a secure operating sys-
tem for the federal government and other public officials.2344 
 
National information security is provided by SORM (Sistema tekhnicheskikh sredstv 
dlia obeshpecheniia funktsii Operativno-Rozysknykh Meropriiatii), GosSOPKA and 
the still incomplete system centralized management of the public telecommunications 
network.  SORM consists of multiple systems. SORM-1 was deployed during the So-
viet era and captures landline and mobile phone communications. SORM-2 was de-
ployed in 1998 and intercepts TCP/IP traffic. SORM-3 was deployed officially by 
Minkomsviaz’ in 2015 and “collects information from all forms of communication, 
providing long-term storage of all information and data on subscribers, including ac-
tual recordings and locations.”2345 The FSB uses the system for targeted monitoring 
and intercepting data traffic in the national segment of the Internet. According to 
Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, SORM is based on control centres that are con-
nected directly to ISP’s and telecom operators’ computer servers. Control centres is-
sue commands to intercept certain traffic, which the operators implement automati-
cally. “This system is replicated across the country. In every Russian town, there are 
protected underground cables, which connect the local FSB bureau to all Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs) and telecoms operators in the region.”2346 SORM-3 has DPI 
functionality and can track traffic in all generation mobile networks.2347 FSB requires 
a court order to eavesdrop on traffic but does not have to present the order to the 
ISPs.2348 Soldatov and Borogan claim that Belarus, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan have sim-
ilar systems.2349 According to the law, the ISPs are responsible for paying for the 
SORM equipment and for installing it, and the two biggest manufacturers of the 
SORM equipment earn 5-6 billion roubles per year (the total business is around 10 
billion roubles).2350 According to some sources, Tsidatel’, a company owned by the 
holding corporation USM of oligarch Alisher Usmanov, owns MFI SOFT, Signatek 
and Tekhapros Spetssistemy which together are the main producers of the SORM 
equipment—other companies being Norsi-trans and Orion.2351 The SORM system 
has been deployed to gather data on mass events like demonstrations with blanket 
                                              
2342 РБК 2019. 
2343 Жукова, Новый & Скоробогатько 2018. 
2344 Tucker, Patrick. Russia’s Would-Be Windows Replacement Gets a Security Upgrade. Defense One, May 
28th, 2019 [Online]. Available: https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/05/russias-microsoft-knock-
off-gets-security-upgrade/157310/?oref=d-skybox [Accessed: 9th July 2019]. 
2345 Приказ министерства связи и массовых коммуникаций Российской Федерации от 16 апреля 2014 г. 
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зыскных мероприятий. часть iii. [Online]. Available: https://rulaws.ru/acts/Prikaz-Minkomsvyazi-Rossii-ot-
16.04.2014-N-83/ [Accessed: 14th May 2019]; Susiluoto 2006, 303. 
2346 Soldatov & Borogan 2012, 25. 
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2348 Ibid. 
2349 Soldatov & Borogan2012, 30. 
2350 Ermoshina & Musiani 2017. 
2351 Кантышев, Павел. Партнер Усманова по киберспорту поучаствует в законе Яровой. Ведомости, 31 
января 2018 [Online]. Available: https://www.vedomosti.ru/technology/articles/2018/01/31/749576-part-
ner-usmanova [Accessed: 17th April 2019]; Ястребова, Светлана. Партнер Усманова может контролировать 
еще одну компанию для исполнения закона Яровой. Ведомости, 13 июля 2018 [Online]. Available: 
https://www.vedomosti.ru/technology/articles/2018/07/13/775384-sorm-yarovoi [Accessed: 17th April 
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authorization.2352 It is somewhat unclear how SORM is connected to the data reten-
tion and localization requirements of the so-called ‘Iarovaia laws’, nevertheless, the 
FSB needs an interface to the data maintained by the ISPs.2353 The system is develop-
ing and in 2019 Minkomsviaz’ proposed to expand SORM to IoT devices and their 
databases and data flows.2354 Despite the slightly mythical reputation of SORM, its 
implementation has been sometimes haphazard and ineffectual mainly because the 
telecoms companies have tried to cut costs or otherwise circumvent the regula-
tions.2355 The FGUP TsNIIS is responsible for analysing, monitoring and, developing 
the SORM system.2356 
 
The GosSOPKA system has been officially described as “a unified state system for 
detecting and preventing computer attacks on critical information infrastructure and 
assessing the level of objective and real-time security of its elements which include a 
centralized, hierarchical, geographically distributed structure that includes the forces 
and means of detecting and preventing computer attacks, as well as organs of control 
at various levels, whose powers include the ensuring of the security of the automated 
control systems of the elements of the critical information infrastructure.”2357 The or-
der for the creation of GosSOPKA and its delegation to the FSB was given by Pres-
ident Putin in 2013.2358 The structure of GosSOPKA was defined in 20142359 and its 
final conceptual form was specified in the Law on Critical Information Infrastructure 
adopted in 2017.2360  
 
GosSOPKA is basically a nation-level System of Incident and Event Management 
(SIEM) combined with protection systems, threat intelligence databases, and infor-
mation sharing platforms designed to protect information systems, information-tele-
communications systems, and ASUs designated as objects of CII by law and based 
on the evaluation of their importance.2361 Although the FSB was given the authority 
over the GosSOPKA, the FSTEK was later given the responsibility to manage the 
regulation and licensing related to the CII. The roles of the FSB and FSTEK have 
                                              
2352 Freedom House. Freedom on the Net 2014 - Russia [Online]. Available: https://free-
domhouse.org/sites/default/files/resources/Russia.pdf [Accessed: 17th April 2019]. 
2353 Роскомсвобода. Итоги госрегулирования Рунета в 2018 году. Роскомсвобода, 28.12.2018 [Online]. 
Available: https://roskomsvoboda.org/44118/ [Accessed: 17th April 2019]. 
2354 Роскомсвобода. Интернет вещей подключат к СОРМ. Роскомсвобода, 27.03.2019 [Online]. Available: 
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раторами связи. РБК, 09 ноября 2017 [Online]. Available: http://www.rbc.ru/technology_and_ me-
dia/09/11/2017/5a03187e9a7947d88f988f53?from=center_1 [Accessed: 17th April 2019]. 
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2358 Указ Президента РФ от 15 января 2013 г. № 31с “О создании государственной системы обнаружения, 
предупреждения и ликвидации последствий компьютерных атак на информационные ресурсы Россий-
ской Федерации” [Online]. Available: http://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/70199068/ [Ac-
cessed: 15th May 2019]. 
2359 Выписка 2014. 
2360 Федеральный закон 2017a. 
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become somewhat blurred, and thus, there has been some confusion on how CII and 
GosSOPKA relate to each other and who has the overall authority over them.2362  
 
GosSOPKA consists of main, regional, and territorial centres that are managed by 
the FSB and are connected to government department centres and corporate centres 
of state corporations, operators of communications networks, and private companies 
licensing GosSOPKA equipment. Licensing is based on the responsibility to protect 
certified objects of CII as the Law on Critical Information Infrastructure dictates.2363 
The operators etc. are required to connect their networks to the main, regional and/or 
territorial centres of GosSOPKA, thus enabling the monitoring  of their networks by 
the FSB (limited due to the available incident data). Failure to protect the CII will lead 
to legal consequences (up to six years in prison). GosSOPKA enables a centralized, 
nation-level response to cyber threats and facilitates technical information sharing 
with corporations, the state administration, the FSB, and the CERTs.2364 The main 
centre of the system is the FSB’s NKTsKI.2365 The Solar Security and Positive tech-
nology companies will develop the departmental and state-corporation corporate cen-
tres of GosSOPKA but other private firms offer technological solutions to private 
actors for connecting their networks to the GosSOPKA.2366 In March 2018 Rostele-
kom bought Solar Security.2367 An equivalent to GosSOPKA might be the American 
Einstein E3A, although the Russian system, due to its connection to the federal law, 
incorporates both the public and private sector and includes all strategic sectors of 
the economy, and is mandatory in its approach.2368 Thus the borders between the 
public and private sectors are hazy and indirect state ownership and control of the 
whole system is much wider than it would seem at the first glance. 
 
The system for the centralized management of the public telecommunications net-
work is still under development. It will be controlled from the Centre of Monitoring 
and Managing of the Public Communication Networks (TsMUSSOP) by the Radio 
Frequency Service. ISPs are required to install certain equipment into their networks 
which can monitor and filter traffic and if needed completely block it. This would, in 
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theory, disconnect the Russian segment of Internet from the global Internet. In addi-
tion to protecting the segment from outside attacks it will be used to centrally imple-
ment and enforce the blacklist maintained by the Roskomnadzor.2369 
 
Foreign and international LEO massive satellite constellations threaten all the con-
trolling systems the Russian regime has been developing. In 2019 it seemed that the 
Russian regime was prepared to sponsor its own constellation. From the perspective 
of digital sovereignty, the location of satellite ground stations is more important than 
the orbits of the satellites and this will be a challenging issue to resolve in the future. 
Perhaps an even more pressing issue is that the constellations of LEO satellites may 
be used for military purposes.2370  In addition to satellites, SORM, GosSOPKA, 
TsMUSSOP and other similar systems will have problems with technologies like 5G, 
LPWANs, an IoT where systems connect and communicate autonomously—which 
just shows that the ability to control and shape cyberspace is always tempered by 
technology. 
 
The systems described in this chapter demonstrate that the strategic cultural ideas of 
unified information space, information-technological warfare, and automated com-
mand and control systems resonate with the concrete ways in which the Russian elites 
strive to shape cyberspace and control the national segment. Kibernetik ideas provide 
reason to construct centralized, vertically controlled, and horizontally integrated sys-
tem of systems. Information is collected and forwarded to the centre and decisions 
are transmitted down to the subsystems. As such there is nothing particularly ‘Rus-
sian’ in the technological systems themselves—it is the scope and the state-centric 
political, social and economic agenda which defines these systems and gives them 
purpose. 
 
6.4.2 The Military 
 
The concrete policies, procurement, and construction concerning military infor-
mation networks and systems are largely secret. However, some information can be 
gained from public sources. The only official public conceptual document on cyber 
and information warfare produced by the military is titled: Conceptual Views on the 
Activities of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation in the Information 
Space and was released in late 2011.2371 Arguably, the document may not genuinely 
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reflect the views of the MoD or the Armed Forces as it is related to Russia’s interna-
tional efforts to ban or restrict the use of information weapons.2372 The document 
adopts the language and terms of information space (prostranstvo), information 
weapons (oruzhie) and information war (voina). It associates the military aspects of 
information issues to the use of information weapons and defines information war 
as: “A confrontation between two or more states in the information space in order to 
damage information systems, processes and resources, critical and other structures, 
undermine the political, economic and social systems, to massively psychologically 
affect the population to destabilize the society and the state, as well as forcing the 
state to decisions in the interests of the opposing side”2373 The document defines the 
activities of the Armed Forces in the information space to consist of intelligence, 
maskirovka (deception), electronic warfare, communications, covert and automated 
command and control, as well as the protection of Russia’s own information systems 
from electronic, computer and other attacks.2374 The activities of the Armed Forces 
are part deterrence and prevention of conflicts as well as the resolution of conflicts. 
These tasks have an active information-psychological aspect on the part of the Armed 
forces.2375 Despite its ‘diplomatic’ approach, the Conceptual View succeeds to reso-
nate with all the strategic cultural ideas, with the exclusion of asymmetric response. 
 
The Conceptual Views document is in line with the current strategic planning docu-
ments.2376 Perhaps the most important aspect of all of these documents is that they 
recognize a distinct sphere of military information warfare, i.e. the military-political 
use of ICT—although with fuzzy borders because of the increased emphasis on in-
tragovernmental cooperation, the whole-of-government approach, and mobilization 
issues. The distinct EIP of the military mentioned by multiple sources forms concep-
tual borders for the military’s authority and responsibilities—it is a special network or 
a collection of them recognized by Russian law. Nevertheless, as was argued in Chap-
ter 6.2.1 the mandate of the FSB and the FSTEK also reach into military networks. 
The MoD has influence outside its own information infrastructure. It has, for exam-
ple, blocked the opening of some frequency bands to 5G networks.2377 It has also 
strived to regulate the use of mobile phones and social media of the conscripts and 
the military staff to maintain operational security.2378 
 
The drive to create an NCW capable force which was noted in Chapter 5 has affected 
the organization of the Armed Forces and EW troops were established in 2009.2379 
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The drive towards jointness, integration, and synergy led to the creation of the Aero-
space Defence Forces in 20112380 and then the Aerospace Forces in 2015.2381 Further-
more, as Professor and Retired Lieutenant General V. V. Barbinenko argued in 2015,  
these new organizations  also required networks, ASUs, and technological support to 
operate in accordance with the principles of the NCW.2382 Thus, already by 2011 the 
Russian Ground forces allegedly had two ASUVs in experimental use: ESU TZ on a 
tactical level and Akatsiia-M on an operative-strategic level. Airborne troops devel-
oped Andromeda-D. Furthermore, there were branch-based systems like the air de-
fence force’s Poliana-D4 and Barnaul-T. Many of these systems, however, were not 
compatible with each other.2383  The progress in the development of ASUs has been 
slower than was hoped for but they remain a high priority for the Armed Forces.2384 
According to General Gerasimov, the long-waited ESU TZ was being distributed to 
the forces in 2018.2385 Moreover, in 2019 a new army (operational) level ASUV based 
on Akatsiia was allegedly deployed which doubled the speed of ‘the cycle of com-
mand’ and integrated all branches and command levels in accordance with the prin-
ciples of the NCW.2386 
 
On a more strategic level ‘the military Internet’, i.e. ‘closed data segment’ (Zakrytii 
segment peredachi dannykh) was declared operational in 2016.2387 Its infrastructure is 
partly leased from Rostelekom and partly based on the infrastructure of the MoD. 
Military units have their own servers and routers which encrypt information and 
transmit it using packet-based protocols. The network is air-gapped from the Internet 
and hosts are special workstations certified and controlled by the MoD. The use of 
flash drives is restricted. The ‘military Internet’ has its own second and third level 
DNS domains (domain.mil.zs).2388 It is possible that the operating system, at least on 
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a tactical level, is Astra Linux and some of the hardware is based on Russian compo-
nents manufactured by Voentelekom.2389 The main provider of communications and 
control systems to the Armed Forces is the United Instrument Manufacturing Cor-
poration (under state corporation Rostek) which includes, for example, the TSNII 
EISU.2390 
 
The infrastructure of ‘the military Internet’ most probably refers to the ‘Integrated 
Automated Digital Communication System’ or OATsSS which was discussed in 
Chapter 5. It is characterized as an integrated system of communications for military 
purposes. According to sources, it ensures the resilience, continuity, operationality 
and secrecy of the operations of joint forces. It provides the Armed forces and the 
MoD with information-telecommunications services on a global scale under any ad-
verse conditions. Additionally, it ensures the security, reliability and integrity of the 
information circulating in the system during its transmitting, storage and pro-
cessing.2391 In 2014 the system was characterised by Colonel General Khalil Arslanov, 
the Chief of the Main Directorate of Communications of the GS, to be composed of 
digital satellite, radio, radio-relay, tropospheric and optical communications systems. 
It was based on standardized and secure solutions. The role of domestic components 
was highlighted.2392 Arslanov repeated his characterization word-to-word in 2018.2393 
Civilian academicians Likhachev, A. Abramovich and A. Prisiazhniuk wrote a paper 
in 2016 proposing a conceptual solution for the automated control system (ASU) of 
OATsSS.2394 It would control OATsSS’ technical parameters, manage its stability and 
security and offer information-analytical services during different phases of conflict. 
The authors argued that the system should be based on the principles of centralization 
and specialization of management, unification, constant monitoring and direct con-
trol. The ASU OATsSS would be a system of systems,  and different systems could 
be further divided into subsystems, some of which could be regionally distributed, for 
example, on the basis of military districts.2395 In 2018 the OATsSS was characterized 
by its developers as a communications system that would unite all functions, echelons, 
i.e. domains (air, sea, land, space), and commands of the Armed Forces under a uni-
fied information-telecommunications space. It would have a unitary management and 
its structure would be flexible.2396 According to the representatives of Voentelekom, 
the fixed component of the OATsSS was envisioned as quite similar to other modern 
WANs where the data traffic of the Armed Forces was virtually routed over leased 
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tent/201704091018-4ygi.htm [Accessed: 18th April 2019]; Tucker 2019. 
2390 Рамм 2014. 
2391 Мейчик, Евгений Робертович. Перспективы развития системы связи и автоматизированных систем 
управления вооруженных сил. Российской Федерациию Федеральный справочник. Оборонно-про-
мышленный комплекс России, Том № 3, 2009, 379-384 [Online]. Available: http://federalbook.ru/ 
files/OPK/Soderjanie/OPK-6/III/meychik.pdf [Accessed: 6th March 2019]. 
2392 Арсланов2014. 
2393 Арсланов, Халил. На острие технического прогресса. Красная звезда, 19 октября 2018 [Online]. Avail-
able: http://redstar.ru/na-ostrie-tehnicheskogo-progressa/ [Accessed: 6th March 2019]. 
2394 Лихачев, А. М., Абрамович, А. В., Присяжнюк, А. С. Концептуальные основы создания и развития 
автоматизированной системы управления ОАЦСС ВС РФ. Информация и космос, №2 (2016), 6-21. 
2395 Ibid. 
2396 Элькин, Г. И., Казанский, А. Г. Перспективы развития системы связи Вооружȍнных Сил Российской 
Федерации. Итоги деятельности Совета главных конструкторов системы связи ВС РФ. Связь в Воору-
женных Силах Российской Федерации 2018. Москва: Информационный мост 2018, 28-29. 
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information-telecommunications infrastructure to nodes controlled by the Armed 
Forces.2397  
 
When fully developed, the OATsSS should provide automated command and control 
of communications for the Russian Armed forces in space, air, ground, and sea envi-
ronments. It interconnects all military command posts from the battalion level up to 
the NDMC and is based on standardized digital technology. Its core is a fixed en-
crypted packet-routing based backbone network probably partially built upon the 
leased transport networks of state and private ISPs. The core networks are connected 
to military field networks and other special communication networks. Military dis-
tricts are very likely the administrative organizations of this network.2398 The network 
is probably protected by a system developed specifically for the MoD.2399 Some of the 
main developers based on articles written about the OATsSS are the 16th TSNII, 
Voentelekom and NII Rubin. OATsSS should provide centralized command and 
control of forces from the MoD through the military districts down to the formation 
level, and the decentralized control of networks if needed. It is part of the effort of 
the Russian armed forces to homogenize the communications and command and 
control systems of armed forces. 
 
In addition to leased capacity, the communications infrastructure of the Armed 
Forces is based on optic fibre, satellite, and microwave relay networks operated by 
the MoD. By 2017 the T8 corporation claims to have laid 67,000 km of fibre optic 
cable, of which 15,000 km is based on the 100 Gbit/s DWDM system “Volga”, alt-
hough it is unclear how much of this is dedicated to the Armed Forces.2400 The Armed 
Forces plan to lay 24,000 km of optic cable as part of GPV 2018-2024.2401 The MoD 
is also constructing its own network of data centres called the Territorial Disaster-
Resistant Data Centres (TrKTsOD) which should offer secure cloud services for the 
Armed Forces. The services of ‘the military Internet’ will be transferred to the 
TrKTsOD when it becomes operational in 2020.2402 It seems that the above men-
tioned physical and logical solutions are to be combined in a multiservice transport 
network (MTSS) which will be operational in 2021. The MoD claims that the system 
will be detached from the Internet traffic exchange points and will have dedicated 
                                              
2397 Сухотеплый, А. П., Жилков, Е. А. Цифровая экономика. Цель номер один — технологический и 
цифровой суверенитет. Связь в Вооруженных Силах Российской Федерации 2018. Москва: Информа-
ционный мост 2018, 112-114. Also, Харченко, Сазыкин & Лысенков 2017. 
2398 Мейчик 2009; Арсланов 2014; Лихачев, Абрамович & Присяжнюк 2016; Элькин & Казанский 2018; 
Сухотеплый & Жилков 2018; Харченко, Сазыкин & Лысенков 2018; Арсланов, Халил, Лихачев, Алек-
сандр. Актуальные научно-практические проблемы развития ОАЦСС ВС РФ. Связь в Вооруженных 
Силах Российской Федерации 2015. Москва: Информационный мост 2015, 29-36. 
2399 ТАСС. Система защиты Минобороны РФ от кибератак завершила тестовые испытания и будет рас-
ширена. ТАСС, 24 октября 2016 [Online]. Available: https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/3728399 [Accessed: 18th 
April 2019]. 
2400 Слепцов, Михаил. DWDM-системы связи для Вооружȍнных сил РФ. Связь в Вооруженных Силах 
Российской Федерации 2017. Москва: Информационный мост 2017, 124. 
2401 Независимое военное обозрение. Тыл становится передним краем Минобороны. В структуре несек-
ретной части расходов социальная часть потеснила военную. Независимое военное обозрение, № 16 
(947) 2017. 
2402 Масленников, Олег. Территориальнораспределенный катастрофо-устойчивый центр обработки 
данных Вооружȍнных Сил Российской Федерации. Связь в Вооруженных Силах Российской Федера-
ции – 2018. Москва: Информационный мост 2018, 30-31; Круглов, Рамм & Степовой 2018; Бец, Кисе-
ленко, Орлов 2017. 
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physical lines of communication—including a new Arctic cable—which will be di-
vided into zonal communication channels.2403 Based on the articles published in sci-
entific and professional journals, the backbone and access networks of the Russian 
OATsSS or MTSS are based on NGN IP/MPLS technology.2404 Moreover, by using 
field communications the core network can be expanded to other regions of the globe 
to support Russian expeditionary operations.2405 This claim rests on signal units with 
satellite communication capabilities and a network of high-bandwidth communica-
tion satellites. 
 
Communication satellites are necessary for military communications because the Rus-
sian geography restricts the operability of nationwide fibre connections. The Russian 
military operates its own satellite fleet which consists of at least thirty ‘store-and-
dumb’ communication satellites and approximately twenty-seven GLONASS -navi-
gation satellites. The Armed Forces probably also use commercial SATCOM satel-
lites.2406 There are also a couple of nuclear strike early warning satellites.2407 The Rus-
sian military also uses terrestrial radio relay links on HF/UHF/SHF frequencies 
which provide varied data transmission capacity.2408 Because of the multiplicity of sys-
tems and the continued use of legacy systems, the Armed Force’s communications 
may not be as efficient as Russian commercial systems, but there is, however, a clear 
interest in maintaining a distinct, redundant, and resilient military data network. 
 
The OATsSS/MTSS enables the functioning of the National Defence Management 
Centre.2409  The Centre analyses the situation in strategic directions and problematic 
regions and offers short-term prognoses; it coordinates the activities of federal organs 
on the operational level in matters of national defence; and it enables the day-to-day 
management of the Armed Forces and their operational command and control in-
cluding the strategic nuclear forces.2410 To enable these functions, subordinate centres 
                                              
2403 Рамм, Алексей, Козаченко, Алексей, Степовой, Богдан. Военный, красивый, суверенный: армия РФ 
создает закрытый интернет. Вся важная информация будет храниться только на серверах Минобороны. 
Известия, 12 марта 2019 [Online]. Available: https://iz.ru/854961/aleksei-ramm-aleksei-kozachenko-bog-
dan-stepovoi/voennyi-krasivyi-suverennyi-armiia-rf-sozdaet-zakrytyi-internet [Accessed: 18th April 2019]; 
Рябов 2019. 
2404 Легков 2013; Будко, Чихачев, Баринов & Винограденко 2013; Легков К.Е. Организация и модели 
функционирования современных инфокоммуникационных сетей специального назначения. T-Comm 
Vol.9. #8-2015, 14-19. 
2405  Валагин, Антон. Россия испытала в Сирии высокоскоростной военный интернет. RG.RU, 7 апреля 
2016 [Online]. Available: https://rg.ru/2016/04/07/rossiia-ispytala-v-sirii-vysoskorostnoj-voennyj-internet. 
html [Accessed: 3rd May 2019]. 
2406 Union of Concerned Scientists, ”UCS Satellite Database,” 2017. [Online]. Available: http://www.ucsusa. 
org/nuclear-weapons/spaceweapons/satellite-database#.Wg0WlUpl9PY. [Accessed 16 November 2017]; 
Владыкин, Олег. Интернет доступен на российских кораблях. Система действует на девяти судах. Неза-
висимое военное обозрение № 23 (954) 2017. 
2407 Мясников Виктор. Единая космическая система предупредит о ядерном нападении. Независимое 
военное обозрение, № 37 (826) 2014 [Online]. Available: http://nvo.ng.ru/nvo/2014-10-17/1_shojgu.html 
[Accessed: 18th April 2019]. 
2408 Малюков, Вадим. Современным войскам — современную связь. Связь в Вооруженных Силах Рос-
сийской Федерации 2013. Москва: Информационный мост 2013, 14-16. 
2409 Арсланов & Лихачев 2015; Гаврилов, Юрий. Глава Генштаба объяснил, как будет работать Центр 
управления обороной. Российская газета, 1.11.2014 [Online]. Available: https://rg.ru/2014/11/01/center-
site.html [Accessed: 18th April 2019]. 
2410 Monaghan 2017, 71; Владыкин, Олег. Путин: Российская армия должна быть оснащена лучше зару-
бежных. Независимая газета, 20 декабря 2014 [Online]. Available: http://www.ng.ru/armies/2014-12-
20/100_collegium.html [Accessed: 6th March 2019]. 
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of command, control and management were being created on strategic, the opera-
tional and tactical level and in services and branches in the timeframe of 2015–
2018.2411 The Centre is supported by an ASU of national defence, the functions of 
which would be duplicated in the regional level data centres. The Centre is also con-
nected to the military-industrial complex and monitors the fulfilment of weapons pro-
curement.2412 It physically brings together all Russian security agencies and ministries 
and collects information from various secret and public sources to create a common 
national situation picture.2413  In 2019 Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu stated that 
Centres for the Coordination of Security Agencies in Crisis Situations would be es-
tablished in all federal regions and these would connect local (municipal) administra-
tion to the MoD and the Armed Forces.2414 
 
It is probable that the ‘military Internet’ and most of the networks used by the NDMC 
are physically and/or logically distinct from the communication networks used by the 
strategic nuclear forces for obvious security reasons.2415 Additionally, there are other 
branch and service specific networks that require special gateways for connecting to 
‘unified information space’.2416 There is also a ‘unified cosmic system’ (Edinaia Kos-
micheskaia Sistema), which refers to the ballistic missile early warning system which 
is a network of satellites, long-range radars, and command and control centres.2417 
Additionally, the CIS has a partly completed project to create a common air defence 
network.2418 Moreover, the CSTO has adopted a resolution to enhance common in-
formation (technological and psychological) security.2419 Because there is a theoretical 
threat of penetration of Russian military networks through these allied systems, the 
connections are highly probably implemented through controlled gateways—or they 
are possibly even air-gapped. On the cross-sectoral side, Voentelekom has been con-
structing a separated closed network for the needs of the OPK called ‘System of Pro-
tected Communications’ (SZS). This should combine the OPK with ministries, agen-
cies, and armed forces during peacetime and in crises situations and can be accessed 
                                              
2411 Тихонов, Александр. К единому информационному пространству. Красная звезда № 173 (2015); 
Хомутов 2015, 17-22. 
2412 Владыкин 2014. 
2413 Тихонов, Александр. К единому информационному пространству. Красная звезда № 173 (2015). 
2414 Сидоркова, Инна, Дергачев, Владимир, Антонова, Елизавета. В регионах появятся центры на случай 
военного положения. РБК, 09 апруля 2019 [Online]. Available: https://www.rbc.ru/politics/09/ 
04/2019/5caca4919a79475d5519d425?from=center [Accessed: 18th April 2019]. 
2415 The National Defence Management Centre combines and centralizes the governmental and military com-
mand under the General Staff already during peace time to provide unified strategic leadership for national 
defence, strategic nuclear weapons, and joint strategic military formations (OSK/military districts) based on 
resilient and effective command and control communications and also allows the independent action of military 
formations. The system was based on the lessons learned during the Great Patriotic War and on the analysis of 
the U.S. ‘instant global strike’ doctrine. (Герасимов 2015). These command and control networks of early-
warning and ballistic missile defence and strategic nuclear weapons are in principle vulnerable to cyber-attacks. 
On nuclear forces command and control networks cf. Cimbala 2015; Acton, James M. Escalation through 
Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of Command-and-Control Systems Raises the Risks of an Inadvertent 
Nuclear War. International Security, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Summer 2018), 56-99. 
2416 Ланчев, Василий. АСУ ВКО: модель для сборки. Учебные командные пункты должны лечь в основу 
подготовки специалистов ВКО. ВПК, № 39 (605) 14 –20 октября 2015 года.  
2417 Мясников 2014; Соколов, Анатолий. Новый космический щит России. Русская Планета, 18 ноября 
2015 [Online]. Available: http://rusplt.ru/society/novyiy-kosmicheskiy-schit-rossii-19771.html [Accessed: 5th 
March 2019]. 
2418 Plopsky, G. Russia’s Big Plans for Air Defense in Eurasia: Big plans, indeed, but will they materialize? The 
Diplomat (2017, Apr, 7). [Online]. Available: https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/russias-big-plans-for-air-de-
fensein-eurasia/. [Accessed 11 January 2018]. 
2419 Рябухина, Бондуровского, & Перекопского 2014.  
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only by using special equipment.2420 This kind of arrangement should, in principle, 
ensure the horizontal and vertical integration of all elements of the mobilization sys-
tem that some military scientists have called for.2421 Currently, the Russian Armed 
Forces operates an ASU of Mobilization Deployment the component systems of 
which have reached operational status gradually during 2008–2017.2422 Compared to 
the United States armed forces’ concept2423 of the ‘military Internet’ the clear differ-
ence with the Russian version is that the Russian approach is more rooted in the idea 
of total and territorial defence in which all state security organizations are connected 
by the same command, control and communications systems.  
 
The Russian military cyber actors have been and still are an ‘open secret’. It is quite 
difficult to find information about them in open sources but based on the strategic 
cultural ideas analysed in Chapter 5, it is inconceivable (reasonable) that the Russian 
military would not have a dedicated cyber force for espionage, sabotage, and subver-
sion and deterrence. In 2014 an anonymous source stated that the MoD  had created 
information operation forces to defend its own networks from cyber-attacks.2424 In 
2017 Defence Minister Shoigu declared that information troops had been created, 
although their tasks were characterised more as strategic communications than cyber 
warfare.2425 Moreover, there are at least five science companies, the 4th, 7th, 6th, 9th, 11th  
out of sixteen established between 2013–2018 which conduct research and train cyber 
security specialists for the Armed Forces.2426 Then there are the proper scientific-tech-
nological institutions under the MoD like 16th, 18th and 27th TsNII.2427 It is also quite 
possible that EW Troops have an operational-tactical role in cyber warfare.2428 Infor-
mation warfare forces have taken part in operational-strategic exercises since 2016.2429 
                                              
2420 Зыков & Рамм 2016; Воентелеком. Глава “Воентелекома”: технология блокчейн может появиться в 
армии России. Воентелеком, 22.08.2017 [Online]. Available: https://voentelecom.ru/news/novosti-kom-
panii/glava-voentelekoma-tekhnologiya-blokcheyn-mozhet-poyavitsya-v-armii-rossii/ [Accessed: 18th April 
2019]. 
2421 Легков, К.Е. Основные теоретические и прикладные проблемы технической основы системы управ-
ления специального назначения и основные направления создания инфокоммуникационной системы 
специального назначения. T-Comm #6 2013, 42-46; Будко П.А., Чихачев А.В., Баринов М.А., Виногра-
денко А.М. Принципы организации и планирования сильносвязной телекоммуникационной среды сил 
специального назначения. T-Comm #6 2013, 8-12. 
2422 Ермаков, А. А., Ткачук, А. В., Мишенев, А. М. Опыт создания единой автоматизированной системы 
управления мобилизационным развертыванием Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации. Военная 
мысль № 7 2019, 77-80. 
2423 Joint Staff J6. The Global Information Grid (GIG) 2.0 Concept of Operations Version 1.1, 11 March 2009 
[Online]. Available: https://info.publicintelligence.net/DoD-GIG2-CONOPS.pdf [Accessed: 7th January 
2020]. 
2424 ТАСС. Источник в Минобороны: в Вооруженных силах РФ созданы войска информационных опе-
раций. ТАСС, 12 мая 2014 [Online]. Available: https://tass.ru/politika/1179830 [Accessed: 18th May 2019]. 
2425 Независимое военное обозрение 2017. 
2426 Thomas 2015; ТАСС. Минобороны РФ: научные роты пополнили 300 призывников по итогам осен-
ней кампании 2018 года. ТАСС, 12 декабря 2018 [Online]. Available: https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/5902450 
[Accessed: 18th May 2019]; Boltenkov, Dmitry. Russian MoD’s “Science Companies”. Moscow Defense Brief, 
No. 6 (2017), 10-12. 
2427 Cf. Chapter 5 footnotes of descriptions. 
2428 McDermott2017; Kjellén 2019. 
2429 In 2016 General Gerasimov stated that IW had been part of the Kavkaz-2016 strategic command and staff 
exercise. It had been conducted by an Information Warfare Group and its tasks had been akin to fire missions. 
The group consisted of the elements of the Operational Directorate of the GS and its subunits, i.e. centres of 
information warfare that had been created under military districts, and of the forces of information operations, 
forces and means of EW, and units of the State Secrets Protection Service ТАСС. Военные РФ впервые 
отработали информационное противоборство на учениях “Кавказ”. ТАСС, 14 сентября 2016 [Online]. 
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Based on Western reports, the Main Directorate of the General Staff or GRU is 
mostly responsible for active military-strategic level espionage, sabotage, and subver-
sion operations during peacetime—although it is not the only active Russian offensive 
cyber actor.2430 The Russian cyber security company Zekurion Analytics claimed in 
2017 that Russia had the world’s fifth largest cyber force with 1,000 operators and a 
budget of 300$ million.2431  
 
Despite of the declarations about the operability of OATsSS and MTSS, it is safe to 
argue that the Russian military networks remain fragmented in 2019, perhaps exclud-
ing some dedicated vertical lines of command. However, the desired end-state is hor-
izontal and vertical integration across the AF according to the principles of NCW.2432 
The development of military networks and command and control systems remains a 
priority in the context of GPV 2018–2027.2433 The idea of information superiority 
achieved through the unified information space, information-technological means, 
and ASUs resonates strongly with the Russian military approach to cyber and infor-
mation warfare. The military EIP is a prerequisite for national defence and security 
and, thus, to sovereignty. Nevertheless, the military also sees the information-psycho-
logical aspect of warfare as at least as important as the technological aspects and fully 
supports the patriotism and militarism promoted by the regime and is itself an active 
participant in shaping the wider information space of Russia.2434 For the military, the 
technological and psychological aspects of information warfare are part both part of 
strategic deterrence. An asymmetric response is present in the ever-continuing infor-
mation weapon–counter-weapon struggle. The problem is how to keep this process 
in the framework of a cost-effective and innovative (cunning) track, and not to fall 
into the trap of C4ISR procurement bureaucracy.  
 
6.5 The system of systems of information security and defence 
 
In this chapter I will draw on the previous Chapters and present a model of the Rus-
sian national segment of the Internet as a system of systems of information security 
and defence in a continuum of interstate relations and in the context of military threats 
to understand how a closed national network could function. It was argued in Chapter 
                                              
2430 The U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Enhanced Analysis of GRIZZLY STEPPE Activity. Refer-
ence Number: AR-17-20045 February 10, 2017 [Online]. Available: https://assets.documentcloud.org/ docu-
ments/3469157/Document-12-National-Cybersecurity-and.pdf [Accessed: 18th May 2019]; National Cyber Se-
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дерации от 7 мая 2012 года N603, 604 и развития Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации. Военная 
мысль, № 12 (2017), 7-21. 
2434 Golts 2018; Сафронов, Иван, Джорджевич, Александра. На главном политическом направлении. 
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3.5 that the military strategic reasoning behind the shaping and controlling of the 
Russian national segment of the Internet is that it can provide a decisive advantage. 
A closed national network, that is a disconnected but internally functioning national 
segment, might even provide an asymmetrical advantage in relation to nations leaving 
their networks open. In this Chapter I propose one approach to understanding how 
the Russian national network could function in practice as a closed national network. 
The approach is based on an abductive interpretation of Russian strategic cultural 
ideas examined in Chapter 4 and 5 and the theories on cyberspace and the closed 
national segment presented in Chapters 3.2435 
 
It was previously argued that cyberspace can be understood as a digital territory con-
sisting of functional, normative, and political elements which can be shaped by tech-
nology, governance, norms, and politics. Digital territory can be mapped on a case-
by-case basis. In this case I choose to map the Russian national segment as a system 
of systems. This approach resonates with the ideas proposed by Russian information 
warfare scholars who envision the unified information space as a system or a system 
of systems, information warfare as a struggle between systems, and the control of that 
struggle as the function of a national system of information command, control and 
management.2436 This system of systems is composed of subsystems which are not 
exclusively technological. They should be understood more as political, governance, 
normative, organizational, economic, technological, and security and military entities. 
These subsystems have been created based on the influence of the strategic cultural 
ideas implemented through strategies and government policies to create a national 
segment of the Internet. 
 
The most influential idea is the idea of a national, unified information space controlled 
through a system of systems of command, control and management. This EIP is 
based on vertical control and horizontal integration, centralization, the delimitation 
of borders and technological and scientific self-sufficiency. The result is a delineated, 
technologically independent, and functionally self-sufficient national segment. More-
over, the idea of information struggle necessitates the ability to control one’s own 
information space or system while simultaneously influencing the opponent’s space 
or system. As information has become a part of strategic deterrence there is also a 
military strategic logic to denying an adversary’s freedom of action, to deny its objec-
tives through resilient networks, and to threaten it with retaliation from behind “un-
breakable” walls. The system’s theoretical rationality to create such a construct is that 
to protect one’s own system and to deny the information superiority of an opponent 
one can move away from the threat, remove the source of threat, control information 
channels including setting barriers, control information itself, and engage in self-mod-
ification. Because the first two are not possible to achieve in the short or medium 
term, the last three provide strategic solutions. 
 
                                              
2435 Most specifically Kukkola, Nikkarila & Ristolainen 2017; Kukkola 2017a & 2018b. The model of system of 
systems was first proposed in Kukkola 2018c. 
2436 These scholars include, for example, E. A. Derbin, S. A. Komov, E. G. Shalamberidze, D. Chereskin, G. 
Smolian, V. Tsygichko, I. Sheremet, A. Ia Cherysh, V. V. Popov, A. A. Sidak, V. V. Tsyganov, Iu. G. Bochka-
reva, V. K. Novikov, S. I. Makarenko, Kh. I. Saifetdinov, V. Kruglov, V. V. Tsyganov, S. N. Bukharin, A. V. 
Manoilo, S. P. Rastorguev, and Igor Panarin.  
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The national segment of the Internet could be examined though many different ap-
proaches. It could be considered as a part of larger cyberspace and thus its effects on 
this space could be analysed. The subject of analysis could be the alleged asymmetry 
created by a closed national network. The segment could be approached as an eco-
nomic or a cultural system and the analysis could concentrate on the building of tech-
nological independence or cultural identity. Moreover, it could be approached as the 
basis of information and digital sovereignty and thus political processes would be at 
the heart of the analysis. I choose to approach the Russian national segment through 
a military strategic framework which consists of multiple elements. Firstly, it includes 
the continuum of interstate relations as understood by the Russians. Secondly, differ-
ent national and military security threats and the Russian understanding of them are 
included. Thirdly, a systems thinking approach to information security in applied. 
Fourthly, the integrity, resilience and security of national segment, including the CII, 
understood as the core of Russian national cyber security thinking, are incorporated 
into the framework. Sixthly, the different Russian information and cyber security ac-
tors and their responsibilities, are used to examine how the segment could be operated 
as a closed national segment.  
 
The continuum of interstate relations is based on the analysis presented in Chapter 
5.2 and it includes the phases of peacetime, intensified competition, conflict including 
the initial phase of war, and war. The different national security threats are based on 
official and unofficial Russian military threats and the basic premises of national se-
curity thinking and were analysed in Chapter 5.2 and 5.3. The threats include, on a 
scale from least to most destructive, espionage and terrorism, local conflicts and in-
ternal disturbances, full-scale colour revolutions and regional wars, and great power 
wars including conventional, high-tech, non-contact warfare and total nuclear war. 
These do not correspond to official Russian threat scenarios but are interpretations 
of Russian strategic thinking in the context of cyber and information warfare.  The 
basic premises of the Russian understanding of national and military security threats 
are interpreted through the concepts of strategic planning, territorial defence, and the 
whole-of-state management as analysed in Chapter 5.1-5.3. Thus, an approach, which 
includes centralized management and control, territorial approach to cyber security 
and defence, and all state organs as active participants in information and cyber secu-
rity, is adopted. The interpretation of the national segment as system of systems is 
argued in Chapter 3.5. The elements and functions of different subsystems, and ex-
plicitly the functioning the whole system of systems, is based on the material pre-
sented in Chapters 5 (ideas) and 6 (systems). The Russian understanding of national 
cyber security and defence is based on the integrity, resilience and security of the na-
tional segment, including its CII. The information-technological element forms the 
basis of broader information security as has been discussed in Chapter 6.1.3. Lastly, 
the analysis of the Russian security actors and their responsibilities presented in Chap-
ter 6.2.1 provides means to examine who is responsible for the functioning, and com-
mand and control of the national segment. 
 
The above defined military strategic framework sets the prerequisites for constructing 
a model of the Russian national segment as a national system of systems of infor-
mation security and defence. It is, thus, a system of systems of information, not cyber, 
security and defence because it is directed against both technological and psycholog-
ical threats and its systems have legal, economic, intelligence, law enforcement, and 
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military functions, which function through peacetime to wartime. It is arguably an 
interpretation and an ideal type, and no claims are made that the model fully corre-
sponds to the thinking of the Russian defence and security elites, but it nevertheless 
fits the aspirations of many Russian scholars and officers and is reasonable from the 
point of view of strategic cultural ideas. Consequently, my analysis proceeds as fol-
lows. First, I will analyse the different subsystems of the national segment. Secondly, 
this system of systems is put into a context of a continuum of conflict and different 
military threats. And thirdly a synthesis of the functioning of the Russian national 
segment as a closed national network is presented. 
 
The subsystems of this system of systems can be grouped in many ways. One way 
would be to delineate the systems through their military functions: intelligence, offen-
sive, defence, command and control, support etc. However, this would emphasize 
warfare and would not correspond to the Russian ideas concerning the information 
struggle. Here, the subsystems are grouped based on their distinct purpose, compo-
nents, functions, principles, and objectives into seven subsystems. Previous chapters 
provide descriptions of the individual components mentioned below. It is assumed 
that the principle relations between the subsystems go through the seventh, monitor-
ing and controlling, subsystem. Thus, the analysis on the interdependencies and in-
teraction between the subsystems is left out of this examination. However, they are 
an important subject for further research. 
 
The first subsystem is an economic and scientific mechanism based on import sub-
stitution, autarkic economic policies, and investment in education and science. It aims 
to replace foreign information technology, i.e. both hardware and software in the 
Russian public and private spheres with domestic products and to modernize the Rus-
sian information infrastructure with state-led projects. The subsystem is also used to 
finance scientific-technological research to discover future, disruptive technologies. 
Subsystem’s primary function is to create domestic digital economy and thus to im-
prove the Russian economy and the stability of society, and to shape national cyber-
space towards a direction beneficial to the regime. It creates potential cyber power 
and the basis for sovereignty. Its secondary function is to find asymmetric responses 
in the information-technological sphere if the balance-of-power cannot be achieved 
symmetrically. Thirdly, together with the subsystem of national encryption, in princi-
ple, it offers national security through obscurity. It limits the threat of supply-chain 
attacks and provides tools for the security services to install their own backdoors or 
to create secret vulnerabilities in domestic products and services. If successful, it of-
fers a means to project Russian power by exporting Russian ICT solutions and thus 
creating dependencies. 
 
The second subsystem is state authentication and encryption. It is based on the man-
datory national encryption systems and authentication certificates which make all data 
traffic in the national segment transparent to the security services—excluding, per-
haps, transiting encrypted foreign data. Web traffic of users residing in Russia, data 
transmitted through backbone networks, and data residing in storage is encrypted and 
decrypted with keys which are under state control. The subsystem achieves security 
through secrecy and inversely through transparency as the security services have ac-
cess to the crypto keys and certificates. It is an important part of the idea of digital 
sovereignty as a state can only be sovereign if it can exercise its powers in relation to 
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information. The function of the subsystem is to enable unhindered counterintelli-
gence, law enforcement, political control, and to strengthen national security. 
 
The third subsystem is composed of administrative and technical measures to remove 
from and restrict access to unwanted content on the Internet through blacklisting, 
including banning foreign Internet services. Additionally, ISPs are made legally re-
sponsible for the content of their services and the right to disseminate information is 
restricted. This subsystem includes the efforts to remove anonymity from the Russian 
Internet by restricting the use of VPNs, by introducing digital identification and reg-
istries of mobile users. It also includes denigrating foreign information sources as 
‘foreign agents.’ The subsystem includes self-censorship and ‘citizen vigilance groups’ 
who monitor the national segment for ‘unlawful’ content. This subsystem provides 
tools for the information struggle in the national segment. The function of this system 
is primarily political control based on removing content and restricting access, and 
secondarily law enforcement. 
 
The fourth subsystem consists of the targeted surveillance system SORM2437 and the 
massive Internet data traffic localization and retention conducted by the ISPs as or-
dered by the state. This enables traffic and content-based analyses of security threats 
and appropriate actions inside and outside cyberspace by the security services. The 
subsystem makes the digital information in transit and in store in the national segment 
available to the security services and enables advanced methods of big data analysis 
and forecasting. It is based on massive, distributed data centres and networked mon-
itoring systems. The information struggle and strategic deterrence requires intelli-
gence on possible threats. The functions of this system are counterintelligence, law 
enforcement, and political control as access to data can be used for political purposes. 
 
The fifth subsystem is the critical information infrastructure and its regulation. This 
designates and categorises the national information infrastructure that needs to be 
controlled by the state either through state-owned companies or through the manda-
tory responsibilities of private companies supervised by the security services. It is also 
based on the national duplication of the critical Internet services, most importantly 
DNS, which are supposed to ensure the integrity, resilience, and security of the na-
tional segment. Consequently, it enables the functioning of the national segment in 
the case it is disconnected from the global Internet, and it ensures the segment’s re-
silience against information-technological threats. In the future, the CII might even 
include ‘information resources’ that is websites and content providers. The CII is an 
example of a Russian version of public-private partnership were the state makes the 
private sector pay for its own protection. The CII creates a distinct subsegment of the 
national segment where state interests are paramount and transfers the control of 
some parts of the bottom-to-top evolved Russian Internet to the state, thus creating 
borders for digital sovereignty. Information superiority in any conflict is only possible 
to achieve if the state controls its own information space—in this case its technolog-
ical, i.e. cyber side. The subsystem’s function is mainly related to national cyber secu-
                                              
2437 SORM could be placed in the seventh subsystem as it is a monitoring system. However, SORM is primarily 
a targeted eavesdropping system with specific function of law enforcement and, thus, belongs to the system 
that is used to get access to the substance of information. 
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rity as it legitimizes, empowers, and organizes the state control over the Internet, en-
ables its shaping along territorial state borders, orders the social relationships, and 
provides a common understanding of security. 
 
The sixth subsystems consist of the various Russian cyber diplomacy efforts and the 
organizations promoting them. Its purpose is to advance the Kremlin’s agenda which 
is based on making state sovereignty the guiding principle of Internet governance, the 
use of information weapons proscribed, and promoting Russia’s status as an interna-
tional norm-setter. The cyber diplomacy efforts are coordinated on a national level, 
have a consistent message and resources to support them. They are advanced on both 
the international (UN) and regional level (EEU, SCO, CSTO, BRICS). This subsys-
tem’s function is to shape cyberspace through politics and norms to create interna-
tionally recognized territorial borders for the national segment and to prevent infor-
mation and cyber threats from materializing. 
 
The seventh subsystem consists of feedback, monitoring, control, and management 
systems. It includes GosSOPKA2438, TsMUSSOP, the Upravlenie (and other state in-
formation systems), the network of CERTs functioning in different public and special 
networks, and civilian and the military networks of situation centres. This is the sub-
system provides, in principle, the vertical control and horizontal integration of the 
national segment. It is admittedly a system of systems but here for simplicity’s sake it 
is considered as one subsystem. It provides information on the national segment, and 
the whole society, a threat analysis of all information threats, not just cyber, and ena-
bles the control of information flows in the segment and its borders. From a cyber-
netic point of view, it is used to maintain the homeostasis of the whole system. This 
subsystem is the materialization of the ideas of the unified information space, infor-
mation superiority, and automated management systems on a national level. However, 
the interconnectivity of its many elements may only be theoretical as organizational 
stove-piping and technical incompatibilities are likely. Its functions are related to the 
national security in information space through preparation, defence, and the control 
of the battlespace. 
 
The system of systems of information security and defence consisting of seven sub-
systems has different uses and modes in different phases of interstate struggle and in 
the context of different threats. All subsystems are active in every phase, but their 
importance differs. The first and fifth subsystems provide the basis for the state’s 
ability to function in cyberspace and thus its ability to shape cyberspace as a battlefield 
in all phases. They are the source of potential cyber power. During the first phase of 
peacetime or peaceful competition, states primarily use non-violent and non-military 
means of struggle. The second, third and fourth subsystems provide intelligence and 
make espionage and exploitation more difficult and as such increase the costs for 
would-be aggressors. They enable the resilience against information-psychological in-
fluence operations which might be used to foster colour revolutions or separatist and 
terrorist actions. The sixth system proactively prevents threats from materializing. 
The seventh system is used to resolve everyday cyber security issues and the integrity 
                                              
2438 GosSOPKA could be placed in the fifth subsystem as it is related to the protection of CII. However, as it 
is part of a larger network of national cyber security systems and a tool of monitoring and controlling (respond-
ing to threats), I choose to place it in the seventh system. 
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of networks. At this point the national segment can be considered ‘monitored’. The 
whole system of systems forms part of the strategic deterrence in peacetime as it sig-
nals deterrence by denial and possibly punishment. Russia can disconnect itself from 
the global network, protect its strategic systems, and strike back with any means nec-
essary—at least in theory. 
 
During a phase of intensified competition, a clear and present military danger will 
have emerged, and operations directed against the elements of the national segment 
of the Internet have increased. The means used in the interstate struggle are still cov-
ert, indirect, and non-military. The situation might call for ‘a state of emergency’ or at 
least increased intervention of the state to enable the functioning of the Internet. The 
nature of the threat affects the way in which the state control is deployed. Internal 
disturbances and terrorism, local conflict with a smaller state, or imminent attack from 
another great power require different solutions. The second, third and fourth subsys-
tems are probably fully activated to provide maximum intelligence and control over 
the substance of the information circulating in the national segment. Moreover, the 
fifth subsystem is enforced and the seventh is used in a centrally coordinated and 
controlled manner. Its elements are used to monitor, counter and attribute aggressive 
operations. Defence-in-depth is used on a national scale and traffic might be restricted 
although not yet fully disconnected. This increases the resilience of the national seg-
ment but additionally allows Russia to, in the best case, attribute the attackers. This 
enables the sixth system to name-and-shame attackers. It is also used to incur diplo-
matic pressure on the adversary. The ability to monitor rising threats against critical 
infrastructure and to counter exploitation operations—intended to enable future at-
tack—gives the state a definite advantage when individual private sector actors are 
not left alone to fend off attacks. This also provides better situation awareness and 
thus helps the state to prepare for potential future cyberattacks. At this point the 
national network is ‘controlled’ and has been prepared to withstand a wider and more 
aggressive attack, and both technological and psychological effects are kept in check. 
 
During a phase of conflict, the military danger has become a real threat and the inter-
state struggle has acquired an overt, direct and military form and the aggressor has 
been very likely identified. In the case of a colour revolution or local military uprising, 
a foreign state or alliance aggressor is most likely indicated with or without any basis 
on facts. The phase includes the initial phase of war which will be decisive as it prob-
ably includes a massive, high-tech, aerospace attack. If the aggressor is a state, it has 
probably shifted from espionage and exploitation to direct attacks against the CII and 
the Armed Forces, and the psychological element in the attacks might have lessened 
in relation to the technological element. A non-state actor might use sabotage attacks 
against the government, the Armed Forces and other security services, or the civilian 
infrastructure with terrorist intent. However, a non-state actor would be likely to try 
to get external and internal support for its cause through information-psychological 
means. At this point all subsystems are functioning at full strength. They produce 
information, forecasting, support planning, and enable the control and management 
of the mobilized society, economy and military. Cyber diplomacy becomes part of the 
overall diplomatic effort to contain and, in the case of a colour revolution, to isolate 
the conflict. If the system fails to provide adequate protection or if the aggressor tries 
to undermine the basis of the Russian information society by bringing down or dis-
connecting the whole national segment of the Internet from the outside, subsystem 
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seven is deployed to disconnect the segment in a controlled manner. This significantly 
reduces the possible attack vectors and outside psychological information operations 
are greatly restricted—at least temporarily. Additionally, the traffic inside the segment 
is heavily controlled and monitored which increases the protection against insider at-
tacks. Thus, the ability of an internal non-state actor to coordinate its actions or reach 
foreign audiences is hampered. However, the disconnection is an escalatory measure 
and a signal that softer means of deterrence have failed. The state now has full control 
of the national segment of the Internet and the private sector is mobilized to sustain 
critical services needed for the functioning of the government, the military, and the 
basic services for the citizens. Adaptation and recovery are provided by the interaction 
of all subsystems. At this point the national network is ‘closed’. 
 
During the fourth phase of interstate struggle, i.e. war, the Russian state has been 
mobilized for total war. A great power aggressor is using all means available to disrupt, 
degrade, and destroy the Russian CII using both non-kinetic and kinetic direct means. 
Non-state actors at this point are considered part of the forces of the state aggressor 
whatever their motives might be. Some of the subsystems will probably lose their 
functionality because of the damage inflicted by the aggressor. The first and fifth sub-
systems enable the Russian state to withstand this phase of confrontation—as the 
Internet, in fact, was originally supposed to do.2439 Satellites, fibreoptic cables, radio 
frequency-based technologies, physically distinct special networks of the government 
and the military, and dispersed server farms enable the national segment of the Inter-
net to fragment but still function in a coherent, territorially based manner. The mili-
tary is provided with connectivity in separate theatres or directions of war and nuclear 
weapons can be launched in a controlled manner. Although integrity on a national 
level is lost, separated parts of the national segment are still resilient and secure to a 
certain extent thanks to the modular nature of the subsystems. It is quite possible that 
these fragments will be divided along the borders of military districts or federal re-
gions. At this point the national network is ‘fragmented’ but still resilient in its parts. 
After a conflict or war is over, the parts of the segment that have survived can be 
used to start rebuilding the communications and the nation. A summary of the sub-
systems and phases of interstate relations is presented in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
                                              
2439 Kaplan 2016. 
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Figure 3. The national system of systems of information security and defence in the context of 
interstate relations. 
 
 
The system of systems perspective combined with the concepts of territorial defence 
and whole-of-state approach helps to understand which state institutions are respon-
sible for the control of the national segment of the Internet and offers insights into 
how the state authority in the Russian segment is organized. The military strategic 
aspect of this issue is the spatial and temporal border between the security services 
and the military. Arguably, during peacetime the FSB is the main national cyber secu-
rity actor, supported in the government networks by the FSO. The MVD has a limited 
role in fighting cybercrime. However, the Roskomnadzor operates important ele-
ments of the seventh subsystem and the FSTEK regulates the CII. There is also some 
‘manual control’ from the Kremlin. During intensified competition and the early 
phases of conflict and especially in the colour revolution scenario the Security Council 
manages cooperation between all power ministries. This cooperation requires peace-
time strategic planning, exercises, and most importantly information sharing between 
multiple special networks and their operators. It also requires well-planned, geograph-
ically distributed, and redundant networks and services. The Radio Frequency Service 
under Roskomnadzor becomes an essential actor, as it controls the flow of traffic in 
the segment, although the threat analysis is still based on the assessment of the secu-
rity services. War is the domain of the military and its supreme (political) command. 
Because a great power war is still a threat guiding the Russian strategic planning, the 
military strives to create separate networks, protects them and uses its capabilities 
primarily to support military efforts. The military is also given authority over civilian 
networks in a state emergency or war. However, regional and larger wars are a whole-
of-state and nation effort, and thus the military might not be able to operate as inde-
pendently as it wants. It is unlikely that it has the competence and resources to operate 
national networks without comprehensive cooperation with the ISPs. 
 
Arguably then, the national segment as a system of systems provides information-
technological and information-psychological integrity, resilience and security for the 
Russian national segment of the Internet. In principle, it is quite flexible and enables 
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the mobilization of the resources of the whole state to protect the Russian national 
interests in cyberspace. The concepts of whole-of-state security, territorial defence, 
and mobilization give it some of its distinct Russian characteristics. There are some 
issues though. The governance of the national segment is still fragmented between 
different government organs, which will lead to friction. Satellite communications and 
the future 5G networks with billions of IoT devices make controlling and closing a 
highly connected and geographically vast national segment a challenge. Quantum 
technologies, blockchain and AI might provide support, but also produce new vul-
nerabilities. The civilian government’s mandate to filter and disconnect Internet traf-
fic might damage the operability of military command and control networks domes-
tically and particularly the communications of forces operating abroad, depending on 
the technical solution adopted. Moreover, in the Russian political system the authority 
given to the state institutions to decide what systems must be used to protect the 
networks and by whom may lead to corruption and rent-seeking behaviour. If the 
private sector is forced to protect the CII, the result might not be optimal. Allied 
nations who rely on Russian datacentres would lose their services in the event of dis-
connection—to say nothing about economic damage to international corporations—
so filtering traffic would be a highly political act. In fact, the Russian protectionist 
ICT policies are already affecting its allies. The disconnection of the national segment 
could even be considered preparation for a surprise attack and thus cause a preventive 
counterattack. Lastly, the whole national segment with different networks and ele-
ments could be considered a highly complex and tightly coupled system with an acci-
dent is waiting to happen—an accident that could disconnect Russia from the Internet 
unintentionally and without warning.2440 Moreover, the multiplicity of systems and 
networks will lead to multiple gateways and interfaces that might provide vulnerable 
points of attack.  
 
What does the case of the Russian national segment of the Internet tell us about 
closed national segments when approached as a system of systems of information 
security and defence? The most important argument is that closed national networks 
are much more than just the ability to ‘shutdown the Internet.’ A true closed national 
network should be able to function independently and self-sufficiently. Still, it is not 
a ‘unified network’ but a collection of relatively separated networks, services, re-
sources, organizations, and policies. Thus, it is beneficial to approach it as a system 
of systems with internal processes which may sometimes be contradictory. Most 
surely, the network will be centrally and vertically controlled to enable the cooperation 
and integration of the multiple systems operated by different actors. This seeming 
simplicity might, however, result in a complex system as the data flows required for 
controlling a whole nation intertwine. 
 
Closed national networks would probably tend towards homogenised hardware and 
software solutions as they are required by the implicit economic policies driving the 
construction of the closed networks and the needs of centralized control. Thus, some 
effort will be made to develop proprietary or domestic protocols and encryption, 
which will make the network and the information in it opaque. These domestic solu-
                                              
2440 On these kind of system cf. Perrow. Charles Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1999. 
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tions will be offered (or forced) on allies as an alternative to the international com-
mercial and open-source solutions and will, in all likelihood, be forced upon own the 
administration and major sectors of industry. The infrastructure will be based on do-
mestic datacentres and backup centres and a national backbone network. Its critical 
parts will be operated by state companies. They, and private companies allowed to 
operate such resources, will be monitored, controlled, and tightly regulated by the 
government and the security services. Technologies such as the SDN and the DPI 
and protocols such as the BGP offer the easiest way to regulate the data traffic in 
those networks. The closing of a national network would not be an all or nothing 
affair. It could be based on data traffic type, source, destination, amount, time, and 
geography. Some parts of the network could be disconnected while others remained 
open to the global network. This manipulation requires the duplication of the basic 
infrastructure services of the Internet, so national DNS, time, location, and routing 
services are required. It is probable, that the military would have its own logically and 
physically separated networks. The complexity of the national or civilian system is too 
unpredictable to give the military the reliability needed for its operations. Moreover, 
connections to strategic allies and forces operating abroad would have to remain open 
despite the closing of networks. A closed national network would benefit from the 
use of defensive machine or artificial intelligence. Its complexity and security require-
ments go beyond human capabilities and AI could be used for testing and analysing 
the system, forecasting, and for decision-making, in addition to command and control 
support.2441  
 
To summarize, a closed national network is not just a piece of territorially segmented 
the Internet, or a disconnected network. Its functioning requires multiple systems 
and, directly or indirectly, it involves many state and private actors. It requires gov-
ernance, norms, economic, and technological-scientific and educational policies to 
function. A closed national network requires an industrial information and techno-
logical-scientific domestic base. Moreover, it requires a political culture that is willing 
to limit basic freedoms and still be able to force high levels of cyber security aware-
ness. Furthermore, its complexity means that it will take various forms depending on 
the nation deploying it. Here one is reminded of Alfred T. Mahan’s definition of sea 
power which included geography and territory, the size and character of the popula-
tion and the character of the government.2442 Consequently, a closed national network 
requires a national strategy to become reality. The Russian version is the product of 
Soviet era kibernetik dreams interacting with information era threats and technolo-
gies. As a system of systems, it emphasizes the centralized state control of a territori-
ally extensive nation through information, the nation’s preparation for war, and the 
continuous interstate struggle in the meantime.  
  
                                              
2441 Cf. Scharre 2018, 220-221. 
2442 Mahan, Alfred T. The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783. Dover edition. Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1890. 
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7  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
he aim of this thesis was to understand why the Russian Federation is creating 
a national segment of the Internet and how this segment as a closed national 
network could function. I decided to divide this problem into a theoretical 
and analytical part. The theoretical part concentrated on the ideas behind the making 
of strategy, and on the concepts of cyberspace, cyber power, cyber warfare, cyber 
strategy, and closed national networks. The analytical part concentrated on the Rus-
sian strategy to control and shape a part of cyberspace into ‘a national segment of the 
Internet’ as a case of a state creating a theoretical closed national network. I ap-
proached the research problem through six auxiliary research questions or subprob-
lems which formed the structure of my thesis. This final chapter provides a summary 
of the main findings of the thesis and a conclusion. I demonstrate how the strategic 
cultural ideas have developed and interacted with Russian policies in a certain strategic 
environment to produce the national segment of the Internet as a reasonable strategic 
answer to perceived challenges. I review the composition and role of the most im-
portant epistemic communities involved in this process. Furthermore, I summarize 
the nature of the national segment of the Internet as constructed by Russia. Addition-
ally, I summarize my interpretation of the national segment as a national system of 
systems of information security and defence, and the relationship of this system of 
systems to the theoretical closed national segment. This is followed by a discussion 
on the Russian understanding of cyberspace, power, and warfare, and national seg-
ments strategic meaning and possible future. I will end by reflecting upon my own 
research and I will present possible avenues for further research. 
 
7.1 Strategic cultural ideas 
 
The strategic cultural idea of an interstate struggle is related to the Russian under-
standing of the character of war. Its roots reach back at least into the Soviet era and 
it has acted as a causal or perhaps even a principled belief by providing a framework 
for understanding international relations. During the Soviet era it was perceived as a 
competition between two different political, economic, and social systems with the 
ultimate form of competition being a total war using strategic nuclear weapons in an 
eschatological war. This idea of constant competition or struggle between systems 
shifted in the post-Cold War era to a struggle between multiple great powers. In the 
1990s ‘information confrontation’ became one of its forms.  During peacetime this 
confrontation was considered as a constant struggle to influence the opponent’s po-
litical elites, society, and economy with technological and psychological means. If in-
terstate relations had moved into the initial period of war and war proper the techno-
logical and more destructive means would gain primacy. 
 
The idea of an information struggle was defined and refined by a group of civilian 
and military theorists in the 2000s. Their views were affected by a geopolitics-based 
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hope of state control over globalization, a belief in a future eschatological confronta-
tion, and a worldview based on a struggle between political, social and economic 
‘kibernetik’ systems with the emphasis on historical continuity. For these scholars, the 
information struggle became the defining form of competition between states and 
great powers. Information could have strategic effects and to counter those effects 
state-level organizational and technological information security systems must be cre-
ated. The scholars did not advocate comprehensive security in the sense of broaden-
ing the sources and objects of threats but it was comprehensive in the sense of the 
means and actors of state power—a whole-of-state, territorial, and strategically 
planned response was required. Information warfare was divided into technological 
and psychological aspects the importance of which has fluctuated. The interstate 
struggle requires the mobilization of all state resources through the vertical of power.  
 
In this view, the reward of the information struggle would be information superiority 
which could be achieved even in peacetime. Some theorists argued that future war 
would be characterised by indirect means and high tempo and would thus be resolved 
already in the initial phase of war. Others emphasised managed chaos or colour rev-
olutions. Whatever the case, the technological and psychological aspects of warfare 
would be decisive. There were at least three different approaches to information and 
warfare. There were those who studied the issue in its strategic and geopolitical con-
text—they are those whom Western scholars have called ‘holistic’. But there were also 
those who approached IW from a systems theory point of view and those who con-
centrated on the operational and tactical issues—much like their Western counter-
parts. Furthermore, information-technological warfare has a distinct role in warfare 
in the Russian military thought, which is akin to the role cyber means have in Western 
thinking, although the Russian version includes a wider repertoire of means. 
 
Although the Soviets had their own ideas about how military force and strategic nu-
clear weapons could be used to prevent military aggression, only in the 1990s did 
Russian and Western theoretical ideas began to converge into policies with similar 
basic understandings of the issue of deterrence. The concept of ‘strategic deterrence’ 
was already introduced in the 1990s but its official elaboration would be left until the 
2000s. Initially and preliminary it related to strategic nuclear weapons. However, de-
terrence had a clear connection to the concept of the interstate struggle and its sub-
concept of the information struggle. In fact, even the Soviet era ‘deterrence’ thinking 
had included the use of information to prevent aggression and denial of information 
to protect the regime. 
 
Strategic deterrence was given a more substantial form by General Gareev and others 
around 2006–2008. It was to be a continuum of creating defensive power, preventing 
threats from materializing, deterrence through denial and retaliation based on a com-
plex system of state diplomatic, economic, technological, and information measures. 
Strategic deterrence involves all state actors. It is based on the idea of total war and 
thus requires the integrated functioning of strategic intelligence, political leadership, 
military-industrial complex, civilian administration of territorial defence, the mobili-
zation system etc. The importance of the ideas of strategic deterrence, strategic plan-
ning, and territorial defence stems from current and future military threats, territorially 
bound views on security, and whole-of-state responses on a continuum of interstate 
struggle. This forms a framework for how the Russian defence and security elites 
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understand military security. Most recent definitions of strategic deterrence include 
information and cyberspace in its sphere. Threats against the morale of the civilian 
population and armed forces need to be deterred. The critical information infrastruc-
ture of the information society in addition to conventional and nuclear forces must 
be protected. The idea of strategic deterrence thus develops and reflects the way in 
which the idea of interstate struggle changes. 
 
An asymmetric response began as a solution to a strategic problem generated by the 
interstate struggle of the 1980s. It was an answer to the United States SDI programme 
via more efficient offensive weapons, preventive defensive measures, and diplomatic 
efforts. Moreover, it reflected the way the Soviets understood military power through 
the measurable strategic balance of power and cost-effective measure-countermeas-
ure dialectics. These components have remained largely unchanged in the Russian 
strategic thought. During the 2000s and 2010s, the asymmetric response has been 
revitalized and offered as a kind of miracle cure to the Russian weaknesses contra the 
United States. In the contest of these proposals an asymmetric response can be de-
scribed as overcoming the adversary’ offensive and defensive systems while at the 
same time protecting one’s own systems. It can be a cost-effective solution and/or an 
innovative technological breakthrough in the spirit of  dialectical weapon–counter-
weapon progress. An asymmetric response is a prime example of a strategic cultural 
idea which is carried by epistemic communities and which resurfaces from time to 
time to be fitted to the current needs and environment. 
 
From a purely military point of view, asymmetric responses have often meant ways 
to neutralize an adversary’s superiority through technology or creative, innovative ac-
tion including deception. The concept of an asymmetric response is usually related to 
political and strategic issues whereas asymmetric actions and the related concept of 
indirect means are used on the operational and tactical level. The core of the latter 
ideas is to evade direct use of military force against an enemy’s military strengths. 
Military objectives can be achieved by multiple different means through the contin-
uum on interstate relations. For most of the Russian military scholars there was little 
point in conclusively defining asymmetry as there were no universal asymmetric ac-
tions because conflicts differed and opponents adapted to previously used methods. 
Therefore, asymmetric responses and actions are not some magical tool to understand 
Russian strategic thinking. Moreover, the Russians are as inclined to adopt military 
theoretical fads as Western militaries are. Lastly, when Russians are somehow seen as 
inherently different, cunning, devious, and aggressive there is a fair amount of mirror-
imagining, ‘othering’ and enemy-image building going on which does not necessarily 
contribute to better academic research or policy making.  
 
The respect for state sovereignty, at least Russian sovereignty, has been a guiding 
principle of the Soviet and later Russian political thought. It found its expression in 
the information sphere as information sovereignty already in the late 1990s. However, 
this information sovereignty remained undefined well into the 2000s. Before it be-
came an idea related to Russian internal sovereignty, it developed in the context of 
the Russian cyber diplomacy effort to create an international information security 
treaty that would have banned both the use of information and information systems 
as means (officially ‘weapons’) of an interstate struggle. It was also most probably 
discussed in the sphere of the post-Soviet security organizations where the military-
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political, terrorist, and criminal threats, and the threats against sovereignty intermin-
gled with realist, geopolitical and even liberal views on state role and sovereignty. By 
the beginning of the 2010s the process began to produce definitions of information 
sovereignty and then of digital sovereignty. Information sovereignty began to denote 
the state’s authority over information and its users on its territory and under its juris-
diction, while digital sovereignty denoted the systems, infrastructure, and economic 
and scientific-technological base of information sovereignty—also sometimes called 
technological independence. They were defined based on freedom from threats and 
control over national resources. As digital sovereignty has been adopted as an official 
concept in state documents from around 2017 it can be argued that digital sovereignty 
has developed from sovereignty over the information space to sovereignty in the in-
formation space and in the end to information or digital sovereignty, that is, to one 
of the aspects of state sovereignty.  
 
Information and digital sovereignty are based on the idea of a unified information 
space and, more broadly, on the kibernetik dreams of Soviet scientists kept alive in 
the minds of the Russian siloviki and academicians of the scientific-technological re-
search institutes. The societal and economic system of OGAS(U) and, on the other 
hand, the Soviet principles of continuity and uninterruptedness of military command, 
control and communications meshed in the 1990s with the Western ideas of RMA, 
NCW and the birth of the information society. At the same time, RuNet developed 
as a social and cultural space from the bottom to the top with a definite anarchical 
character and freedom of user which was unknown in the Soviet system. The EIP 
proposed a way to shape and organize these competing and sometimes conflictual 
processes into a state-controlled information space. This space should have deline-
ated, controlled and protected borders, a vertical hierarchy and horizontally integrated 
networks. It should be a system of systems where information is gathered vertically 
through a feedback mechanism for the governing elites who use the information to 
control the state and the society. During the 2000s and 2010s the EIP continued to 
produce both military and civilian visions of command, control and management net-
works.  
 
As was already mentioned above, the objective and prize of the information struggle 
is information superiority. Information superiority was already a part of the Soviet 
theory of a circle of command and control developed sometime in the 1970s and 
1980s. Like the Western idea, the Soviet and Russian concept was initially about speed 
but later it emphasised knowledge and efficiency of command and control. Moreover, 
the Russians have developed their own theory of command and control warfare based 
on denying the NCW its advantage in modern warfare. The concept of information 
superiority is important for the Russians because it seems to explain what the West 
did to the Soviet Union through psychological operations and is still doing to Russia 
and other countries, and so it has offered an explanation and solutions for future 
warfare and the broader interstate struggle. Thus, the binary view on information as 
technological and psychological has also penetrated the idea of information superior-
ity. However, the official documents of strategic planning or the statements of polit-
ical leaders do not explicitly use the term ‘information superiority’ in a positive sense. 
It is related to domination, which is something that others pursue and can be legiti-
mately challenged. Officially, Russia aims for parity and thus stability. 
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The idea of information-technological warfare was recognized by the Soviets as com-
mand and control warfare, and later in the 1990s the Russian military theorists became 
almost obsessed with the Western notions of NCW. During the 1990s, information 
warfare was generally defined by its novel means, but as time went by, the definitions 
began to emphasise the objective, which was the will of the opponent. This high-
lighted the possibility of a victory without the use of direct force. Thus, the techno-
logical component ended up as ‘supporting means’ in the geopolitical struggle for 
power. However, the military never gave up on thinking about the information-tech-
nological means in the context of preparing and fighting a war. 
 
Arguably, Western views on the Russian understanding of IW do suffer from a certain 
bias. The claim that Russian IW is somehow more holistic and systematic than the 
Western approach is based on the implicit claim that Western IW is based on individ-
ual, fractured operations, directed against specific targets and agendas, and conducted 
in a relatively uncoordinated fashion. Even a cursory reading of Russian official and 
unofficial texts shows that this is not how Russians perceives the Western IW. The 
claims about the holistic and systematic nature of IW are related to only one of at 
least three different ways the Russians understand IW. Arguably, these claims serve 
certain political agendas more than an objective, scientific study of the Russian IW. 
However, I do not dispute the claim that outside of direct conflict the Russian infor-
mation-technological activities and warfare are in theory subordinated to the infor-
mation-psychological objectives.2443 What I disagree with, based on the sources used 
in this study, is the claim that the Russians have managed to solve the theoretical and 
practical problems of IW and have built a system of perfectly functioning IW upon 
them. 
 
The Russian understanding of an information-technological offensive has consoli-
dated around a group of means which by the late 2010s includes kinetic (precision), 
software, hacking, electromagnetic, EMP, laser and other exotic means of attack. 
Consequently, the discussion has increasingly centred around what institution should 
be responsible for information security and what the tasks of the new ‘information’ 
troops should be. Critical information infrastructure and its resilience, integrity and 
security have provided substance for the Russian understanding of national infor-
mation-technological or cyber defence. The concept of resilience is clearly a Western 
idea although its component parts were already present in the Soviet thinking. Ulti-
mately, the protection of CII has become part of the interstate struggle. 
 
                                              
2443 The Russian emphasis on the psychological aspects of information warfare is the result of at least three 
different factors. First, as noted in this study, they interpret the fall of the Soviet Union as a result of Western 
IW. Secondly, this interpretation is supported by the KGB/FSB culture of ‘active measures’ and psychological 
operations, which has influenced theorists and especially geopolitically minded writers (Pynnöniemi 2019a & 
2019b). And thirdly, information-psychological warfare is easier to present as an actual, foreign threat when 
one is needed to unite the nation. Thus, it can be argued that because Western ideas (ideology) and identities 
were not initially under threat after the ‘victory’ of the Cold War but ‘cyber’ (technology) was something new 
and interesting, Western scholars have concentrated on the technological aspects of IW. Conversely, the Rus-
sians have adopted the role of the underdog. They have approached information warfare as a Western ‘tech-
nology’ of the interstate struggle and, thus, as a weapon of the great power struggle. The legacy of Marxist-
Leninist material dialectics might have an influence (Lalu 2014; Jonsson 2019). This stance points to one inter-
esting and perhaps highly influential issue at the core of Russian strategic culture; namely its lack of critical self-
reflection, fixation with history, and ‘othering’ all negative traits to the West. 
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The concept of an automated command and control or management system, under-
stood in its most basic form as a system with inputs, outputs, feedback and controlling 
subsystems which is able to produce analysis and foresight and intended to produce 
faster and more efficient decisions, was introduced into the Soviet strategic thinking 
in the late 1950s. ASU became more than just a calculating machine. It promised to 
be a ‘kibernetik’ way of control over the human condition albeit a rigid, hierarchical 
and mechanistic one. During the Soviet times and later in the 1990s the idea of ASU 
tended to provided solutions based on integration, centralization, and control where 
the subject or controller would be the unitary state power. 
 
ASUs have been conceptualized as tools but also as infrastructure and later as univer-
sal systems combining control mechanisms with the space in which they are used. 
Their function is based on the automation of parts of the ‘cycle of command’ but not 
on displacing humans from the loop. Creativity or the human factor has remained 
important for Russian military scholars, although their enthusiasm has sometimes 
been a bit over-interpreted by some Western scholars.2444 The relationship of ASU to 
the concept of AI and related technologies, is still an open question in the sources 
analysed in this thesis—although there are reasons to suspect that ASUs might not 
fare well in future theoretical discussions. 
 
The strategic cultural ideas discussed above for the most part had Soviet roots and 
were continuously developed throughout the time period under analysis. The 1990s 
were a defining period for modern Russia. The strength of some ideas, like the asym-
metric response, has fluctuated over time. There was a period of emulation of West-
ern ideas which was however replaced in the late 2000s with mounting criticism and 
a search for Russian substance for strategic cultural ideas. It is quite possible that 
during the 2000s and especially 2010s the Russian epistemic communities and elites 
turned to other sources than the West for ideas—mainly China. External events, in-
teraction with foreign ideas, and interaction between the ideas themselves shaped the 
strategic cultural ideas. The Russian military and security communities did not write 
in a vacuum but were in constant communication with internal and external influ-
ences. When all is said and done, the main source of ideas have been the writings of 
American NCW and IW scholars. There might have been something inherently fa-
miliar in their texts for the Russian theorists, and, of course, they promised to offer 
‘a recipe for success’.  
 
7.2 The national segment as a reasonable answer 
 
The development of the relationship of the state and the Russian Internet can be 
divided into separate phases. The first phase (1991–1997) was characterized by a ba-
sically hopeful, liberal, and hands-off relationship. The Internet and ‘informatization’ 
at large was considered mostly beneficial or the government did not have the will or 
the resources to affect its development. The second phase (1998–2002) began when 
the Internet started to develop rapidly, and information warfare became an acute, 
although marginally understood question, mostly because of the second war in Chech-
                                              
2444 Cf. Grau, Lester and Bartles, Charles. The Russian Way of War. Fort Leavenworth, KS.: FMSO, 2016, 57-
58. 
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nya. Russia’s relationship with the West went through crises and the government be-
came aware of the need to regulate the ‘information space.’ Russia began to experi-
ence its information revolution during this time period. The basic tenets of Russian 
state policy towards the international cyber and/or information security were defined. 
They were based on territorial state sovereignty and ideas borrowed from nuclear 
arms control negotiations, and on the views of people affiliated with the security ser-
vices. The basic forms of all strategic cultural ideas except digital sovereignty were 
already present. The Soviet tradition of state surveillance was re-established in cyber-
space as SORM-2 was launched. The cybernetic tradition was also reflected in the 
proposed projects for national information management and command and control 
systems. 
 
The third phase (2003–2010) was characterized by the government’s efforts to man-
age and benefit from the informatization of the economy and the society. At the same 
time the regime tried to control the most negative aspects of the Internet mainly by 
updating and introducing new laws. Society and private industry managed to stop the 
most intrusive regulation and monitoring of the Internet, although other media were 
subjugated to the Kremlin or its oligarch allies’ control. The Internet developed 
mostly on its own and was guided by private interests, and the state’s development 
policies were largely dismissed or failed. The military began to pursue its own visions 
of the information space. The Russian regime continued to push state sovereignty as 
the basis for international regulation in cyberspace and classified information as a 
weapon. Sovereignty was also applied to domestic politics as a proto-ideology and the 
Soviet past began to be rehabilitated. Many of the central concepts of the latter phases, 
such as information sovereignty and the national segment of the Internet, were de-
veloped during this period in the context of Russian regional cyber diplomacy. The 
military developed the concepts of the information struggle, asymmetric response and 
strategic deterrence. The concept of critical infrastructure began to develop from 
planning and preparing for emergency situations to the protection of certain critical 
objects and the critical infrastructure. Moreover, Russia chose not to follow the ex-
amples set by the other great powers: It resisted the open militarization of cyberspace 
driven by the United States and the all-pervasive state censorship driven by China. 
 
The fourth phase (2011–2013) began when external and internal events activated the 
regime to push for tighter control of the Russian Internet. The increased demand for 
new and old ideas grew as the elite searched for creative and innovative ways to make 
sense of the confusing and threatening environment and adapt to it. By 2011 the In-
ternet had reached a significant portion of the Russian urban population and a distinct 
Russian Internet had formed. Before the demonstrations of 2011–2012, RuNet was 
mainly a platform of social interaction but it had slowly begun to challenge the regime-
controlled sources of official news. Control was established mainly through laws and 
was in principle a vehicle for political control and censorship directed against domes-
tic opposition. It also reflected the worsening great power relationships and the Rus-
sian negative view on the open militarization of cyberspace. During this time the abil-
ity and will of the Russian private Internet sector to resist government control began 
to erode. Those who did not comply were made to leave the country just as in the 
early 2000s. The Russian Internet was arguably beyond legal control and this was a 
time when the elites searched for a Russian approach to controlling it. The political 
debate on information and digital sovereignty arose and the idea began to be adopted 
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into a policy, but sovereign state control was not yet a national security issue. Russia 
activated its global and especially regional cyber security norm diplomacy, although, 
at the same time some representatives of the elite began slowly to adopt Western ideas 
of cyber security. The increased understanding of cyber threats led to the adopting of 
the concept of critical information infrastructure. This trend was countered by the 
Chinese model, the appeal of which was partly the result of Putin’s earlier ‘pivot to 
the East’. The military pursued the development of communications, command and 
control systems as part of a military reform and arms procurement programme. Soviet 
policies of strategic planning, state mobilization, and state control over the economy 
were flexibly readapted. 
 
The fifth phase (2014–) was initiated by the war in Ukraine and a definite change in 
the strategic environment, which led the Russian regime to seek a centralized control 
of the implicit manifestation of the EIP, ‘national segment of the Internet’, and to 
protect it from outside technological and psychological threats and also from internal 
subversion. Arguably, Russian actions were influenced by the changing global balance 
of power, militarization of cyberspace, their own perceived vulnerability, new tech-
nological threats, and the failure to create international cyber security norms to con-
trol the emerging threats in line with Russian interests. Multiple threats seemed to 
materialise at once in 2014–2015 and the West seemed poised to punish Russia for its 
actions—through isolation if needed. The economic and technological sanctions, 
stagnating economy and repeatedly failed efforts to initiate state-led growth of the 
ICT sector highlighted the vulnerability and weakness of Russian information-tech-
nological, or cyber, power. 
 
Ultimately, information reached maturity and acceptance as an aspect of sovereignty, 
a sphere of state action and interests, and as politico-military means, ways and ends. 
This policy was enshrined in a series of strategic planning documents culminating in 
the National Programme of the Digital Economy which includes military, political, 
economic, and cultural aspects and which aims to shape into being a truly independ-
ent, self-sufficient, competitive, integrated, resilient and secure Russian national seg-
ment of the Internet. Russia strives to create international borders for this space 
through its ever-continuing cyber diplomacy initiative. In a great power interstate in-
formation struggle the national segment provides power, means for information su-
periority, and perhaps an asymmetric response to balance Russia’s economic and tech-
nological weakness. Ideas developed in the Eurasian and Chinese context have gained 
influence. The regime continues to adopt laws that strengthen its control of the na-
tional information space, now with the aim of controlling information assets and in-
formation more than political activity. It has adopted the concept of integrity, resili-
ence, and security of critical information infrastructure as the basis for a Russian un-
derstanding of national cyber security. The legacy of kibernetik ideas is merged with 
the Western ideas of resilience. The military has continued to develop its systems 
while considering both information-technological and information-psychological as-
pects of information security. The ultimate products of this phase are GosSOPKA, 
TsMUSSOP, Upravlenie, the network of SRSTs and other management networks. 
Which, if combined and centralized to the Kremlin, will form a modern era 
OGAS(U). 
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The above presented history raises the question as to why the elites did not really 
implement the ideas offered by the security services and others already in the late 
1990s or 2000s? A lack of resources and a non-incentive strategic environment might 
have been reasons. Moreover, some members of the epistemic communities encour-
aged the creation of a new institutional power, the ‘Ministry of Information Security’, 
inside the regime, which the elite might not have preferred. There is no clear single 
point in time when the strategic cultural ideas penetrated the policies of the Russian 
defence and security elites. They were present already in the unofficial debates and 
official documents of the 2000s, however, they were not acted upon in the domestic 
arena in any efficient manner. The events of 2011–2012 provided the first stimulus 
which started the search for and reformulation of ideas to more concrete policies. 
The elites first deployed the ideas to solve issues of internal security and to secure 
their power. After 2014, as the strategic environment changed, the control of the na-
tional segment became a national security issue and the elites acted based on perceived 
critical security issues informed by strategic cultural ideas. Thus, I disagree with the 
notion that the policies of the Russian regime are just meant for internal political 
control. They are part of strategy to create power, prevent war and win it, if necessary. 
 
What is then the relationship between the national segment of the Internet and the 
strategic cultural ideas? The idea of the interstate struggle, or more precisely the cur-
rent version of the information struggle or confrontation guides Russia’s approach to 
the national segment of the Internet. The national segment of the Internet is a at least 
partly the result of interaction between the ideas of an interstate struggle, digital sov-
ereignty, strategic deterrence, a unified information space, and perhaps also of the 
asymmetric response. It was formulated as a response to a change in the strategic 
environment as the interstate struggle moved into the global information space. In-
formation and digital sovereignty is a normative tool to control the new threats arising 
from that struggle.  Sovereignty requires borders and these have to be defended, so 
the information space became the object of national security. The idea of a unified 
information space offered substance for this delimited and protected space. The tech-
nological protection of this space is related to the ideas concerning the critical infor-
mation infrastructure and ASUs. Lastly, the unilateral disconnection, protection, and 
nationalization of a segment of Internet can be considered an asymmetric response 
to the perceived Western information-technological dominance. 
 
The segment is directly related to Russia’s national security interests. The politics re-
lated to its borders, resilience, and economic, technological, and cultural potential 
make sense only in the context of great power competition. Russian cyber diplomacy 
incorporated in the Digital Economy Programme is also a civilizational and world-
order project. It is an effort to create an alternative system of Internet governance 
based on alternative values and power centres and thus it is an attempt to strengthen 
Russia’s power, status, and independence. This is apparent in the way Russia is build-
ing regional norms through the CIS, CSTO and SCO. The national segment is a po-
tential source of power as it offers a platform for scientific-technological advances, 
even breakthroughs, which might affect the balance-of-power between the great pow-
ers and offers Russia ways to change the current status quo. However, because the 
information space has so far lacked borders and, thus, juridical and practical state 
control, it has also been a source of danger and threats. In the Russian view, this space 
must be shaped and controlled so it can function as a source of power instead of a 
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source of vulnerability. The Russian perception of the character of war is changing 
ever more towards a version where the borders between war and peace become in-
creasingly blurry, and the potential enemy tries to win conflicts without the use of 
conventional force. The will of the population and decision-makers, and the economy 
have become military-political targets. Therefore, state control of the national infor-
mation space and its component part, the national segment of the Internet, is imper-
ative to succeed in the continuous great power, zero-sum struggle. 
 
Information confrontation as part of the interstate struggle thus gives reason to build 
such systems as GosSOPKA, TsMUSSOP, and Upravlenie, and to adopt laws re-
stricting the flow of information and ownership of the infrastructure in which that 
information resides. Information is power and, thus, critical information infrastruc-
ture is either a component part of that power or its source. No great power can leave 
this source unprotected or unharnessed. This means also that the 2017 Strategy of the 
Development of Information Society and the Programme of the Digital Economy as 
a state-led, national economic project makes sense as a national security strategy. The 
development of the national segment cannot be left to private companies, non-gov-
ernmental organizations, and individuals. Although the information struggle is admit-
tedly more about the information and its consumers than infrastructure, the services 
enabling the creation and dissemination of information must still be controlled. If the 
regulation and its autarkic tendencies improve the competitiveness of Russian ICT 
companies, even better—if not, that is the cost of regime security.  
 
The increased measures to protect the national segment of the Internet and the ulti-
mate option of disconnecting it from the global Internet are quite reasonable means 
of strategic deterrence. If future wars will begin with delegitimizing the enemy already 
in peacetime—and this includes the delegitimization of the regime in the eyes of its 
citizens—disconnecting the Internet makes sense. Enemy propaganda and attacks 
against critical infrastructure are thus denied their main attack vector. A successful 
deterrence by denial includes the communication to the potential opponents that their 
use of force and threat of it will not succeed. Moreover, as China has demonstrated 
with its ‘Great Cannon’, a state-controlled Internet, especially as interconnected as 
the Russian segment is, can be used to launch massive attacks against individual ser-
vices or infrastructure of the Internet.2445 These kinds of attacks and attacks launched 
from third countries can be combined with kinetic precision strikes and special forces 
operations to achieve strategic effects. The Russian leadership most certainly under-
stands that the Internet can be weaponized. As informatization and digitalization pro-
ceed, Russia becomes as vulnerable to these attacks as any other state. 
 
The current Russian understanding of avoiding war as a continuum of creating de-
fensive power, preventing threats from materializing, and deterrence through denial 
and retaliation in a whole-of-state approach combining diverse means at the state’s 
disposal provides good reason for shaping cyberspace. It is based on strategic level 
preparation of battlespace and deterrence signalling. The information space and its 
infrastructure need to be controlled already in peacetime because that is when infor-
mation superiority is achieved on a strategic level, or at the latest in the first moments 
                                              
2445 The Citizen Lab. China’s Great Cannon. Research Brief, April 2015 [Online]. Available: https://citi-
zenlab.ca/2015/04/chinas-great-cannon/ [Accessed: 20th May 2019]; Demchak & Shavitt 2018. 
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of the initial phase of war. The strategic deterrence fails if the potential enemy’s su-
periority is not already denied in peacetime. This idea is present in all strategic plan-
ning documents from the Information Security Doctrine to the Digital Economy pro-
gramme. The building of deterrence requires the education of cadres, building of in-
frastructure, improving security and management, scientific-technological research, 
economic development, and international normative regulation to prevent threats and 
to legitimize Russian countermeasures in the case of ‘the hostiles use of ICT.’  Fur-
thermore, this deterrence must be projected to outer space as the information space 
is ever more reliant on satellite communications. Different spheres of human action 
intermingle in the context of strategic deterrence. 
 
The military-strategic reorientation of the Russian regime regarding the Internet in 
2014 was not only defensive in nature. As the idea of an asymmetric response can be 
described as overcoming an adversary’s systems while at the same time protecting 
one’s own systems in an innovative and cost-effective manner, the control of the na-
tional segment and its disconnection from the global Internet makes sense. This is a 
way to shape the battlespace in such a way that a potential enemy loses its advantage 
and remains vulnerable. In fact, the current United States cyber strategy argues that 
while the United States is a superpower it is also vulnerable to cyber threats.2446 An 
asymmetric response also resonates with the scientific-technological and high tech-
nology import substitution programmes and policies the Russian regime has initiated 
in the context of the 2014–2018 strategies and programmes. Future and disruptive 
technologies are at the forefront of the agenda of national scientific research. Similar 
efforts have been undertaken in the military sector, which proves that the Russian 
regime is searching for disproportionate advantages in the security sphere. The idea 
of an asymmetric response has thus at least two dimensions: the denial of the use of 
information space from advanced opponents and the search for counter-weapons. 
This is almost the same ‘recipe’ that the Soviet Union implemented in 1986-1989. 
However, as the history of the idea of asymmetric response has shown, it is both a 
tactical and political tool, promising decisive impact on the battlefield or on the bal-
ance of power. The latter can be discarded when other solutions present themselves—
either a secure defence or a comfortable balance of power. Therefore, if the national 
segment proves to be an inefficient solution or the strategic environment changes, it 
might be abandoned.  
 
The idea of information sovereignty was codified as the policy of digital sovereignty 
in 2017 at same time the national segment of the Internet became to denote the ter-
ritorial borders of the Russian state in cyberspace. However, as was noted above, 
information and digital sovereignty are not synonyms. Digital sovereignty centres 
around the national control of the information infrastructure and technological inde-
pendence. Information sovereignty requires both but is not limited to them. Infor-
mation sovereignty is about the state control of information and the integrity and 
inviolability of the space in which that information circulates. Thus, the building 
blocks of information sovereignty include all the international treatises and initiatives, 
domestic censorship laws, doctrines, strategies, concepts and programmes adopted 
                                              
2446 The President of the United States. The National Cyber Strategy of the United States of America, Septem-
ber, 2018 [Online]. Available: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-
Strategy.pdf [Accessed: 20th May 2019]. 
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after 2011, and particularly after 2014, and their political, cultural, economic, societal, 
and military results. Perhaps the difference between external and internal sovereignty 
clarifies the roles of information and digital sovereignty. Information sovereignty is 
more about the right of the state to be free of outside interference whereas digital 
sovereignty is more about the state’s i.e. the ruling elite’s right to exploit its ‘natural 
cyber resources’. State sovereignty is the one idea that resonates through all Russian 
policies and gives them undeniable reason. Information sovereignty legitimizes the 
top-to-bottom state control of the bottom-to-top evolved Internet. Thus, infor-
mation sovereignty becomes a new aspect of state sovereignty, and the national seg-
ment anchors it to a ‘physical’ space. 
 
Information sovereignty has legitimized the state-led development of the national 
segment of the Internet. As sovereignty is based on the balance-of-power thinking, 
the increased sovereignty of some implicates decreased sovereignty for others. It is 
then reasonable that Russian policies promote information security, and the develop-
ment of infrastructure and the domestic ICT sector. A state without certain infor-
mation technological resources such as a national system of encryption, domestic op-
erating systems, and communication satellite fleet is not truly sovereign. Any depend-
ency is a possible disproportionate and exploitable vulnerability, and thus a potential 
source of asymmetry. It needs to be emphasised that this aspect of information sov-
ereignty was not always as strong as it currently is. During Medvedev’s era and well 
into Putin’s third term, Russia’s dependency on foreign technology grew—and is still 
growing in some sectors as Chinese products enter Russian markets. Clearly then, 
sovereignty must be understood in a context of a question: sovereignty in relation to 
whom, and, thus, how much? 
 
The development of the national segment is not only based on technological and 
economic potential. As Ristolainen and I have argued, through ideas presented by 
Russian scholars, digital sovereignty requires the delineation, control, and protection 
of digital borders.2447 These functions are present in the Russia’s cyber diplomatic 
norm-building efforts, the Information Security Doctrine, the Law on Critical Infor-
mation Infrastructure and in the new so-called Law on the Sovereign Internet. Their 
implementation can be observed in how the state-owned companies acquire critical 
information infrastructure and in how the part of the infrastructure left in private 
hands is put under mandatory regulation and state surveillance. Moreover, data sov-
ereignty is constructed through data localization and retention laws, and with TsMUS-
SOP, GosSOPKA and SORM, the  borders are finally erected. In this scheme, critical 
information infrastructure is the physical element of the national segment of the In-
ternet which itself is the basis for digital sovereignty. Therefore, to summarize the 
current Russian approach to ‘digital sovereignty’, it can be understood as the exten-
sion of the authority and control of a territorial state to the national segment of the 
Internet, which consists of the infrastructure of the Internet and other network re-
lated ICT systems located on its territory or under its jurisdiction. A wider concept is 
‘information sovereignty’ which additionally includes the information residing or 
flowing through those ICT systems and the interaction of its users, i.e. a sphere of 
activity.  
                                              
2447 Kukkola, Juha and Ristolainen, Mari. Projected Territoriality: A Case Study of the Infrastructure of Russian 
‘Digital Borders’, Journal of Information Warfare, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2018), 83-100. 
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The national segment of the Internet replaced the unified information space as a cen-
tral term as the importance of digitalization and the Internet grew. The EIP was never 
truly defined in the official documents and it variously included both technological 
and psychological aspects of information. Somewhat surprisingly, ‘information space’ 
was first defined in the international agreements in the late 2000s and early 2010s and 
those definitions included infrastructure, information as well as the consciousness of 
users. The distinction was the lack of the term ‘unified’ which referred to a certain 
way of arranging and delimiting space. Thus, the need to establish state sovereignty 
over a certain part of the global information space and the technology-infrastructure 
oriented policies of the 2010s required a more precise concept than the EIP. The 
national segment of the Internet, which had first referred to the domain name system 
and then been developed in the framework of CIS/CSTO into a political concept, 
was adopted for official use in the 2017 Strategy. The national segment of the Internet 
combined the internal way of shaping national cyberspace and the external necessity 
to define its borders. This is also the reason RuNet was not accepted as an official 
concept as it does not follow Russian territorial state borders. The national segment 
of the Internet is not an exclusively technological or material concept because it is 
also a place or sphere of activity. Therefore, the arguably Russian way of understand-
ing infrastructure, information, and its users as a system is also present in the concept 
of the national segment. Thus, both digital and information sovereignty can be un-
derstood to function as systems. The idea of EIP still influences the way the optimal 
way of controlling and structurally arranging the national segment is understood. The 
technological and psychological nature of the EIP is apparent in the way that strategic 
planning and policy documents incorporate diplomacy, strategic communications, 
public affairs, economy, education, science, security and infrastructure under the con-
cept of information. Consequently, the EIP is about the shaping of information space, 
not just about how the infrastructure or organizations should be arranged. This ap-
proach enables effective resilience against all information threats and enables the mo-
bilization of the society and economy to produce potential power. 
 
The ‘unified, vertically integrated, automated, state information system’ Upravlenie 
and the networks supporting it are the concrete manifestation of EIP and ASUs. It, 
and other more recent systems such as TsMUSSOP, GosSOPKA, ESPD, NSUD, the 
energy-sector and OPK information systems, and networks of NKTsKI and 
RKTsKIs, as well as national situation centres, follow the same principles of vertical 
control and horizontal integration. Information flows towards the national decision-
making elites to establish total situation awareness and knowledge, and orders flow 
downwards in accordance with strategic planning and control. These systems form a 
system of control, not only of the information space, but also of the Russian state. 
The EIP and its Soviet roots resonate strongly with how these systems are being en-
visioned and built, although the results might deviate somewhat from the ideal. 
 
The efforts to build the OATsSS or MTSS, and the whole system of military com-
mand and control with its hierarchical structure of command centres, a system for 
mobilization and territorial defence, and a system for controlling the OPK are quite 
reasonable if understood through the idea of EIP. Both the civilian and military solu-
tions have definite similarities with the concepts proposed by the Russian information 
security theorists already at the beginning of the 2000s. A system, or more precisely a 
system of systems, is being built to control political, military, and economic aspects 
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of the state and society. The systems are used as a tool for forcing the ‘power vertical’ 
onto cyberspace as the separated networks of different ministries and agencies are 
collected under one management. A national system of cryptography, domestic oper-
ating systems and other software solutions, and a control system over the borders of 
the national segment of the Internet would enforce the unity of Russian information 
space contra other segments of Internet. 
 
Aspirations, intent and reality should be separated from each other. Unity is an idea, 
an aspiration. Any computer network where information flows freely is by its nature 
unified and single. The ‘Russianness’ of the EIP is thus a complex question. The 
‘shutting down’ of the Internet was debated in the United States already in 2010, as 
has been a national monitoring systems, and the Clipper chip, i.e. a national encryp-
tion system was proposed already in the 1990s.2448 China’s ‘Great Firewall’ has been 
operational since the late 1990s.2449 Furthermore, the idea of increasing intragovern-
mental cooperation, information sharing, resilience of national systems, and the 
whole-of-government approach all sound much like the ideas that circulated in the 
Western policy circles in the 2010s. The argument however is that the EIP is some-
thing more. ‘Upravlenie’, OATsSS etc. are more than computer networks offering 
information sharing and services—they are a means to control and shape cyberspace 
into a national segment or kibernetik system of state management. They have a dis-
tinct political, economic and social function. Furthermore, they are based on different 
ideas. 
 
One reason to control and shape cyberspace according to the EIP is information 
superiority. This intertwining of the ideas of the EIP and information superiority was 
noted in Chapter 5. The information-technological and psychological aspects of this 
superiority are both present in Russian policies from 2011 onwards. The laws adopted 
against foreign media holdings, foreign supported NGOs, registration of ORIs and 
state blacklisting are proof of the psychological, or moral, cultural and political as-
pects. The technological aspect is present in import substitution and domestic pro-
duction support policies, state ownership of critical information infrastructure, and in 
the search for scientific-technological breakthroughs. The search for superiority and 
its denial from potential opponents legitimizes state investment in the backbone net-
works, satellite communications, super and quantum computers, AIs, and encryption. 
It also makes it reasonable to search for allies and to create networks with them which 
enable the sharing of information, common situation awareness, and the joining and 
synchronization of assets. Information superiority has its geopolitical characteristics 
which become ever more important as the idea of information sovereignty spreads. 
 
The idea of information superiority is related to military issues and the doctrine, par-
adigm or theory of NCW. According to this doctrine, no future conflict or war can 
be won without information superiority. The arms procurement programme shows 
that the Russian military has accepted this idea although with its own national char-
acteristics.2450 The idea of information superiority emphasises the need for real-time, 
processed knowledge made available to the decision-makers at the highest levels of 
                                              
2448 Rid 2016, 274-276. 
2449 Inkster 2016. 
2450 Cf. Persson 2016; Westerlund, Fredrik and Oxenstierna, Susanne (eds.) Russian Military Capability in a Ten-
Year Perspective – 2019. Stockholm: FOI, 2019. 
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national and military command. NDMC, OATsSS and MTSS are a proof of how this 
idea has reached the Russian military and security elites. Because of the criticality of 
information superiority, it makes sense for the military to construct its own networks 
from the physical level upwards. On the issues of national security, public-private 
partnerships can only be a temporary solution. The military of a great power needs to 
control its own networks, like it has its own blue water navy, nuclear weapons and 
satellites. It can be argued that the urgency of information superiority can be confused 
with the prestige, status, and the trappings of a great power. A more critical issue is 
that there is a certain tension between constructing a delineated national segment of 
the Internet and the requirements of strategic military communications. What will 
happen to military communications, to a state’s own and allied forces, if the national 
segment is disconnected? It is therefore understandable that the military has been 
interested in the implementation of Digital Economy Programme. 
 
The technological and psychological aspects of the information space and warfare 
appear side-by-side in Russian policies, which has made it difficult to analyse the na-
tional segment as a purely technological phenomenon. However, they are distinct as-
pects of the same phenomena producing distinct policies and state behaviour. The 
concept of information security (informatsionnaia bezopasnost’) in the information 
society and economic policies refers in part to the same real issues as the Western 
concept of cyber security. The Russian laws on the ensuring of integrity, resilience, 
and security of the CII can be read by any Western cybersecurity expert and be un-
derstood to concern cyber, not information issues. This version of cyber security has 
some Russian characteristics. It is state-led and controlled but depends on a Russian 
version of public-private partnerships. The ISPs are required by law to protect their 
infrastructure, share all relevant information with the state, and release control of their 
systems and networks to the state if the situation so requires. Moreover, they will pay 
for this protection themselves. The main information and cyber security actors are 
however the FSB, the FSO, the FSTEK and the Minkomsviaz’ with its agencies. They 
monitor, supervise and control the federal subjects and private actors. This is cyber 
security with mandatory compliance and state verification. 
 
The Russian military recognises information-technological warfare as a collection of 
technologies and means of using them. This mixture of more conventional means, 
such as computer attacks and EW, and exotic and future technologies is a distinctly 
Russian approach. It might produce interesting combinations, unexpected synergy, 
and new paths of thinking. However, military power is used based on available tech-
nology, organization, and doctrine. Based on the examination of military issues above 
it is safe to argue that the military has its strategic cyber forces in the GRU, and op-
erational-tactical forces under the General Staff in the directorates, scientific institu-
tions and the EW troops, and tactical forces in troops of various services. The Armed 
Forces also have psychological warfare directorates and troops which are ever more 
pervasive in the military organizations and resembling the Soviet era political com-
missar system. The ideas of information-technological warfare promoted by the mil-
itary academicians resonate with how the military conducts itself. The OATsSS, 
MTSS, satellite communications, and field communications are built upon the princi-
ples of resilience, continuity, efficiency, and secrecy. Moreover, instead of adopting a 
passive defensive doctrine the Russian military has experimented with the denial of 
information space with its electronic ‘A2/AD’ capabilities and anti-satellite weapons. 
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Moreover, information-technological warfare has its role in mobilization, strategic de-
ployment, and the initial phase of war—and in extraterritorial operations. It can have 
strategic effects, comparable to nuclear weapons, and needs to be incorporated in 
strategic and operational planning. Although the Armed Forces have their own tasks 
and probably concentrate on protecting military networks and services, the whole-of-
state and government approach manifested in strategic planning and the concept of 
territorial defence gives reason to suspect that the military could take part in protect-
ing civilian or at least military-industrial objects. However, the FSB’s role is dominant 
in the peacetime.  
 
The way the Russian decision-makers seem to promote systems and systems of sys-
tems in the area of information security becomes understandable through the Soviet 
tradition of ASUs. The idea of centralized systems of control is a repeating theme in 
the way the Russian regime has tried to shape the cyber and information space in the 
2000s. After 2011, information became an object of control and automated or semi-
automated systems began to be built to enable the subject, i.e. the state, to exercise 
that control. Networks of information collection (more than sharing) and situation 
centres were envisioned to manage society and the economy. A system of systems has 
started to take shape. Arguably, it might be just a result of a common, but not shared, 
idea pursued by different sectors of the government for their own ends. However, 
the idea has been carried over from the Soviet times by the scientific institutions now 
with new resources, financing, and avenues of influence at their disposal. The princi-
ples of efficiency, continuity, readiness, stability, reliability (resilience), and secrecy 
characterize this system of systems. It is goal-oriented and constructed for a purpose. 
There is friction between these principles and others upon which an information so-
ciety could be built such as the efficient flow and sharing of information and the 
creative formation of knowledge.2451 The dialectics of Soviet ideas and modern tech-
nology and values will most probably produce novel and unpredictable results. 
 
The ASUs and kibernetik thinking behind these aspects have promoted the idea of 
systemic confrontation. Although it is difficult to find traces of this kind of theoretical 
thinking in the Russian policies of the 2000s and 2010s, it is arguably present in the 
way the defence and security elite have promoted Russia or Eurasia as a distinct entity. 
This entity should have its own norms, systems and information flows, and a united 
stance against others (the West) on how the international cyber and information space 
should be shaped. In practise, the borders of this system are fuzzy and the component 
parts i.e. states have had their own contradictory agendas. Systems theory might help 
to understand how the Russian elite sees the Post-Soviet space and tries to control it. 
If the EIP is understood as a system, then it should be defended as a system. In this 
context, systems theory might help to explain the Russian active and offensive actions 
as the interaction between systems. However, to characterize the Russian policies as 
based on an already ongoing information war where the borders of war and peace 
have blurred is at least slightly doubtful.2452 This view excludes the presence, nature, 
and interaction of the other systems (great powers) in the international system. More-
over, the view offers a very particular interpretation of ‘war’ and interprets Russian 
elites’ rhetorical statements as true beliefs. 
                                              
2451 Castells 2010. 
2452 As Oscar Jonsson does (Jonsson 2019, 157). 
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Based on the above summary of the interaction of strategic cultural ideas, strategic 
environment and Russian policies I argue that the national segment of the Internet is 
a reasonable strategic answer to perceived challenges. However, it is necessary to 
point out that the group of strategic cultural ideas I have chosen to analyse in this 
study was not exhaustive. At least the idea of geography or territoriality and the ideas 
of how the Russian state should be organised, governed and secured have had an 
influence. The information security policy, territorial defence and strategic planning 
are policy prescriptions derived from these. Moreover, history is itself an idea which 
has been constantly used to legitimize policies. These have now been included in the 
analysis implicitly. Moreover, politics, and history can be considered more as 
worldviews than causal and principled beliefs, although the borders are admittedly 
fuzzy.  There have also been ‘fads’ or ideas that have come and gone out of favour, 
like the liberal economic ideas. Their influence has been perhaps more important in 
areas which were not the focus of this thesis. 
 
7.3 Epistemic communities 
 
Where did the ideas for the national segment of the Internet come from? Many of the 
ideas examined in Chapters 4 and 5 have long historical roots and their influence on 
the decision-making elites has waxed and waned over time. However, as Andrei Solda-
tov and Michael Rochilitz have demonstrated in one of the latest analysis of the se-
curity services’ influence on Russian politics, it is quite difficult to tell when the actions 
of the Russian elites fit the ideas kept by certain communities.2453  Did the elites really 
hold the same ideas or did the events and actions just support the views of those 
communities? The importance of ‘the siloviki’ cannot be dismissed, but there have 
also been many other sources of reasons for action. Some of them reside outside 
Russian borders and outside the purview of any one group or community of people. 
Liberal economic ideas have, for example, constantly challenged strategic cultural 
ideas in national planning documents. This might explain why the idea of controlling 
the Internet did not break through around 2006–2009 during Putin’s patriotic, sover-
eignty-based and traditionalist great power policy and the high tide of the power of 
the siloviki. Although, it might have been the case that in the 2000s the Russian In-
ternet was not yet perceived by the elites as a significant political space or a source of 
power and welfare. Perhaps the Russian elites were still reluctant to identify with the 
Chinese ‘Eastern choice’. It is also possible that the Russian ideas interacted with the 
ideas held by epistemic communities and elites of other post-Soviet countries. In this 
sense the 2000s were a kind of incubation period of old Soviet ideas. During this time 
the Russian reactions to Western ideas, their assimilation or refutation, was the most 
import source of new ideas. This process made it possible to define what was meant 
by sovereignty and the national segment by contrasting them with Western ideas. As 
Russia turned away from the West, Chinese ideas and deep-rooted Soviet memories 
were ready to provide answers. Although, it must be pointed out, that evidence of the 
presence of Chinese ideas in the texts of epistemic communities chosen for this study 
was hard to find. 
 
What about the people with the ideas? The most obvious case of an epistemic com-
munity providing ideas for the elites is the establishment of the cyber diplomacy team 
                                              
2453 Soldatov & Rochlitz 2018. 
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and the composing of the first Information Security Doctrine. Here, ex-FSB/KGB 
officers and military men brought with them Soviet era ideas, and by fitting new and 
old ideas together a reaction to the changing environment the Russian understanding 
of information space was established. These people were incorporated into the elite 
themselves in the 2000s. A second, but a related group of people were the information 
theorists, many with security services backgrounds, but also including civilian cyber-
netists, who promoted systems theoretical approach for the control of the new infor-
mation space. They were also partly incorporated into the elite. A third distinct group 
are the military academicians, whose ideas about the changing character of war have 
been highly influential. Some of them have risen from the institutions to the Security 
Council. A fourth group are the (legacy) nuclear arms control people like Andrei Ko-
koshin who brought with them the idea of the asymmetric response as they became 
part of the decision-making elite or leading academicians in the 1990s. There have, of 
course, been other groups influencing Russian policies directed at shaping cyberspace. 
The civilian institutions, economic think tanks and forums, and lobbyist organizations 
quite probably have had their effect. Perhaps a cross simplification would be to argue 
that the siloviki carried ideas about state security and struggle, information theorists 
ideas about systems, military academicians ideas about deterrence, warfare and supe-
riority, and nuclear arms control people ideas about balance and asymmetry.  
 
Epistemic communities provided a theoretical device to legitimate the selection of 
sources for this thesis. They also provided a theory of how ideas held in a society 
transfer into the policies of the ruling regime. Although, it has not been in the centre 
of the thesis I have been able to demonstrate that there have been definite ‘circles’ of 
people who have offered their ideas concerning information security to the elites. 
Although others have pointed out the role of cybernetists, kagebists, gereushniks and 
institutchikis my analysis highlights the group of ex-KGB/FSB cryptologists and IW 
operators, some ex-military officers, and the cybernetists in the surviving military and 
civilian research institutes who have penetrated the Security Council, the diplomatic 
corps, and academia. Still, the secrecy of the world these men (and men they mostly 
are in Russia) occupy makes it difficult to claim anything specific about their influence. 
Moreover, it is difficult to define where an epistemic community ends and a state elite 
begins when the people, in addition to ideas, move back-and-forth between the aca-
demia and the halls of power. These observations point out the need to tailor any 
cultural approach to the political system under study. 
 
What can be claimed is that the Russian military and civilian security communities 
have been in constant communication with internal and external influences. They 
have been quite ready to adopt foreign ideas at least in the security and defence 
spheres. They have been highly interested in American operations, doctrines and the-
ories and have drawn their own conclusions from them. Sometimes Western ideas are 
presented as Russian ideas. On the other hand, there are those scholars who use West-
ern primary sources and, in fact, manage to refer to somewhat obscure Western works 
to make their point. Thus, they offer a venue for studying the West through foreign, 
and sometimes revealing, eyes. Overall, there has been a constant flow of Western 
ideas into Russia. Some of these have been adopted, others adapted, and the rest 
discarded. Interestingly, Chinese ideas (expect Sun Tzu’s) are rarely if ever mentioned. 
The same issue can be observed with ideas from post-Soviet countries. This does not 
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mean that there are no influences. Just that the sources used in this thesis rarely men-
tion Chinese or post-Soviet sources. As the interest in the Russian military strategic 
thinking has reawakened, it is quite possible that the tide of influence of ideas is yet 
again turning, this time from Russia to the West. 
 
It must be noted that only a few of the texts analysed in this thesis are critical of the 
official policies or offer something that is not initially based on official concepts. 
Moreover, the border between independent epistemic communities and the elite is 
somewhat vague in the area of security policy where the political allegiance to the 
regime is a source of resources and legitimacy and many scholars and journalist are 
serving or ex-officers. However, Russian scholars and officers have been left with 
plenty of room to discuss the substance of the officially adopted ideas at least up until 
2014. It needs to be also highlighted that the adoption of ideas by the elites, under-
stood as their appearance in strategic documents or speeches of national decision-
makers, does not mean that the Russian state has acted upon those ideas. It is possible 
to argue that everything the strategies and programmes of the late 2010s include were 
already proposed in earlier documents. Therefore, the relationship between the epis-
temic communities, elites, policies, actual state behaviour and its efficiency is highly 
complex and affected by the states’ ability to mobilize resources, by the elite’s two-
level games, and the strategic environment, among other things. 
 
7.4 The segment as a closed national network  
 
The national segment of the Internet is being implemented through the Doctrine of 
Information Security, the Strategy of the Development of Information Society and 
the National Programme of the Digital Economy influenced by strategic cultural ideas 
carried by the epistemic communities and, consequently, by the Russian security and 
defence elites. The deadline for ‘digital sovereignty’ is 2020, and for a state-controlled 
Internet and ‘digital economy’ it is 2024. Currently, the interaction of strategic cultural 
ideas, technology and the bottom-to-top evolved Russian Internet has produced the 
Russian segment of Internet which is based on a resilient, highly connected and inter-
connected national network with increasing state control over infrastructure. A top-
to-bottom control is being forced on the bottom-to-top evolved Internet. State con-
trol consists of multiple systems to monitor, protect, and control the national net-
works, and systems for providing the state the means to gather information and to 
use that information to control the society and the economy. The systems are used as 
a tool for forcing ‘power vertical’ on cyberspace as the separated networks of different 
ministries and agencies are collected under one management scheme. Moreover, state 
owned firms are building a network of state datacentres and acquiring the CII of the 
Russian Internet. The Armed Forces and the MoD, together with other power min-
istries, are building a network of nationwide, whole-of-state situation and command 
centres. In principle, this project has similarities to the one unsuccessfully pushed by 
the Soviet cybernetists from the 1960s to 1980s. 
 
However, this system of control is being planned and implemented by a multitude of 
actors with the security services in the lead—thus security overrides economic con-
cerns.  The segment is in practise a collection of barely interconnected networks, and 
system and services, regulation, and policies. Some of them have been in the works 
from the 1990s onwards. Overlapping functions, friction from trying to force control 
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over already established networks, problems with integrating non-compatible legacy 
systems, crippling secrecy based on the influence of the security services, rent seeking 
and organizational rivalries all hinder the achievement of the ‘kibernetik’ dreams. The 
result is a Russian way to shape cyberspace, and thus it might be unique. As was 
argued in Chapter 3.2.2, the space Russia is shaping is malleable, but it is also resistant 
and contested. No single state can impose its will and power upon the whole of cy-
berspace for an infinite time. Soviet ideas cannot be applied in their exact old forms 
in the context of new technology and post-industrial economic systems. There are, 
however, no theoretical obstacles for building national territorial political, military, 
and economic management networks based on the Internet. The critical issue is 
whether these systems provide any kind of advantage. Can the Russian concept of 
ASUs, for example, provide a breakthrough synthesis with modern AI technology?  
Because the interplay of ideas, technology and power in the context of cyberspace 
continues, it is safe to argue that the policies and systems described in Chapter 6 will 
change and evolve in the coming years. 
 
In Chapter 6.5 I interpreted the Russian national segment of the Internet as a national 
system of systems of information security and defence based on the Russian strategic 
cultural ideas. This segment does not yet fully exist. It is currently being shaped into 
being by Russian strategies, policies and laws. This approach resonates with the ideas 
proposed by Russian information warfare scholars who envision information space 
as a system, information warfare as a struggle between systems, and the controlling 
of that struggle as the task of a national system of command, control and manage-
ment.  This system of systems is composed of subsystems which are not exclusively 
technological. They should be understood more as technological, governance, norms, 
organizational, economic, and security and military instruments and functions to con-
trol and shape the technological and psychological aspects of the whole system. Ad-
mittedly, such a system of systems is an interpretation and an analytic concept, but as 
was argued in Chapter 6, it is something that the scholars whose writings have been 
analysed in this thesis, and perhaps even the elites informed by them, would recognize 
and understand. 
 
I have analysed the Russian national segment as a system of systems of information 
security and defence through the continuum of interstate relations and threats. The 
system consists of seven subsystems each with their own elements, functions, and 
objectives. These systems include the scientific-technological basis, the national au-
thentication and encryption system, the administrative and technical measures to re-
move from and restrict access to unwanted content on the Internet, targeted surveil-
lance systems and massive Internet data traffic localization and retention systems, 
critical information infrastructure and its regulation, and the Russian cyber diplomacy 
efforts and its organizations. The seventh system controls all the others, so the system 
is centralized and hierarchical. I have left the analysis of the interaction between the 
subsystems beyond the scope of this study. 
 
Based on my analysis I argue that the system of systems could provide a flexible and 
centralised way to ensure information-technological and information-psychological 
integrity, resilience and security of the Russian segment of Internet, and that it might 
even work as a deterrent. The systems theoretical logic behind this argument is that 
as Russia cannot move itself or destroy its opponents, it can only protect itself by 
 
391 
building borders and by modifying itself. Systems thinking also highlights that the 
system of systems is a constant and fundamental part of Russian state security oper-
ating already in peacetime. Information threats can be controlled and prevented from 
materializing as the elite sees necessary. The system’s defensive importance is not 
diminished if others adopt similar systems as its borders are only territorial represen-
tations in the constantly changing cyberspace which cannot be conquered. Most im-
portantly, once this system has been planned, constructed, tested, and exercised it is 
basically an autonomous and independent part of the Internet. Its partial or full dis-
connection can be achieved with known, controllable, and acceptable risks. In 2020 
Russia underwent a phase of testing and preliminary exercising. 
 
It is important to consider this model against the reality of the Russian national seg-
ment. Thus, it becomes obvious, that there are many ways in which this Russian sys-
tem of systems might fail or be vulnerable. It is also important to set this system of 
systems in its international context and in the context of global cyberspace. Russian 
cyber strategy, even its military part, cannot be disconnected from its political and 
economic alliances or the ways the cyberspace constantly evolves. Thus, it becomes 
obvious that the national segment cannot be equated with total isolationism or that 
Russia will not find a lasting solution to protect its information space. The way in 
which I have conceptualized the national segment in this thesis always leaves some-
thing outside the controlled segment. There are parts of the Russian Internet that the 
seventh subsystem of information security and defence system will never reach. 
 
I have argued in Chapter 6.5 that if the Russian national segment is considered as a 
representation of the theoretical closed national network, a state controlled segment 
of the Internet that can be technically disconnected from the global Internet, that 
network should be able to function independently and self-sufficiently. Moreover, to 
function properly this network needs to be centrally and vertically controlled. How-
ever, if we compare the Russian system of systems of information security and de-
fence to the arguments presented in Chapter 3.5 it is clear that closed national seg-
ments cannot be understood only as static technological cyber security or defence 
systems and technical models. They help us understand the military strategic logic of 
constructing them but our analysis of them will be very limited if it excludes political, 
normative, organizational, cultural, economic structures, elements and functions. 
These systems produce the substance of independence and self-sufficiency of the net-
works and the practical advantages or disadvantages in situation awareness, decision-
making, freedom of action, and resilience. They are mobilization systems as much as 
they are cyber and information security systems. Moreover, closed national networks 
need to be analysed in the context of time, as flexible, changing, controlled and con-
tested constructs. It is then useful to analyse them as systems of systems and to com-
pare models between cases. Arguably, every case has its own framework which con-
ditions the systems and their functions. From a military point of view, it is, however, 
important not to lose sight of the strategic issues at play. Whatever the composition 
and character of these systems are, the objective is to understand their military impli-
cations. 
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7.5 Russian cyber strategy 
 
Based on my theoretical approach which is based on analytic realist pragmatism and 
modified neoclassical realism I have claimed that the ways in which a state uses power 
to pursue its interests, including creating more power, are influenced by ideas and it 
is thus that ideas shape reality through power.  In other words, ideas shape the under-
standing of the environment, give meaning to material power, indicate acceptable and 
unacceptable strategic choices, and affect the interpretation of one’s own and others’ 
use of power. They give reasons for certain courses of action. Elites get their ideas 
primarily from epistemic communities who are the carriers of ‘all knowable and pro-
posed ideas’ in a society. This system of ideas is open and changing. Furthermore, 
new ideas must be ‘fitted’ to old ones—they must make sense in the context of the 
old. The elites can choose the ideas which they make use of but are at the same time 
prisoners of their previous choices. The strategic environment might present new and 
threatening situations which requires the elites to find new ideas and solutions. 
 
Cyberspace is an environment in and through which power informed by ideas can be 
used. It is a new environment with unknown or poorly understood potential threats. 
It is a man-made and governed global domain within the information environment 
whose distinct and unique character is framed by the use of electronics and the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum to create, store, modify, exchange, and exploit information via 
interdependent and interconnected networks using information-communication 
technologies. Human action can change cyberspace in ways it cannot change the land, 
air, sea or outer space. Because the object of study of my thesis was a certain way to 
use power, I decided to define cyber power as an ability that empowers an actor to 
influence others in or through cyberspace and to control and shape cyberspace to its 
advantage according to its preferences. This power is relative and contextual. Cyber 
power is defined by its resources and the environment through which it is used. It is 
not in any inherent way ‘military’ power, and only the way it is utilized, and its effects 
and outcomes give it a military character. Through strategy certain resources at the 
state’s disposal can be used, among other things, to control and shape cyberspace. 
This strategy is a process and a policy with emergent properties as it is carried out in 
cyberspace and against cyberspace and other actors in it through the continuum of 
interstate relations. Therefore, even though a cyber strategy is not inherently military 
it can have intentional and unintentional military effects.  
 
There are multiple ways that cyber power could be used in state to state relations in a 
military context. I tentatively defined cyber warfare as the use of force based on cyber 
power in or through cyberspace with a coercive intent to make political gains in the 
context of the continuum of interstate relations. In this thesis I chose to concentrate 
not on the more traditional compelling, coercive, deterring and brute force aspects 
but on the shaping of cyberspace as a strategic-level battlefield. More precisely, I was 
interested in the utilization of cyber power to control and shape cyberspace into a 
closed national network. A closed national network has the potential to provide a 
disproportionate and exploitable military advantage in cyberspace as the battlefield is 
shaped to favour one side or state. The military strategic importance of the shaping 
of cyberspace through national segments is based on the possibility of creating asym-
metry. Without asymmetry, national segments would be only instruments of domestic 
political control and protectionist economic policies. Therefore, the connection of 
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cyber power to warfare is two-fold: it is the potential to use force and it is also the 
potential to shape the space in which that force is used. 
 
How do the Russian ideas and policies examined in Chapter 4, 5 and 6 fit the theo-
retical understandings of cyberspace, cyber power, cyber warfare and strategy? The 
drive to control and shape the national segment of the Internet, its structure, borders 
and the information in it conforms to the characteristics of Russian cyber power pre-
sented in Chapter 5.10. By shaping and controlling cyberspace in a technologically 
independent national segment, Russia, in principle, would create a measurable poten-
tial for power, negate its own vulnerabilities and weaknesses and exploit the vulnera-
bilities of its opponents. Power is created through the creative use of power. If the 
United States controls the global cyberspace, Russia must create its own space. No 
great power can survive in the future interstate information struggle and warfare with-
out its own information society and economy, the ability to protect it and, conversely, 
without challenging the United States in its own space. The national segment of the 
Internet must be ordered and controlled in accordance with the principles of man-
agement, vertical control and horizontal integration ensuring the state sovereignty and 
power. Inside delineated, protected, and controlled information space a scientific, 
technological, economic and human potential can be fostered. This is a cyber strategy 
to create power by controlling and thus shaping cyberspace. Parity or even superiority 
is achieved already in peacetime which provides a deterrent and a decisive advantage 
in a possible, future conflict. Thus, in the light of strategic cultural ideas and policies 
analysed in this thesis, what Russia is currently doing in the framework of its strategies 
and programmes, makes sense. 
 
The Russian ideas related to the phenomena called cyberspace, cyber power, cyber 
warfare and cyber strategy are ultimately not so different from the Western ones. The 
information infrastructure is composed of information, systems, and resources, and 
sometimes of users. It is as material as electromagnetic emissions can be. It forms the 
basis of an information space which includes the substance of information, human 
minds, and societies. Power in information space is measurable, relational, and can be 
created through human action. Power lies in  the control over systems, flows, infor-
mation and the opponent. It is characterised by effectiveness, efficiency, resilience 
(reliability and stability), flexibility and secrecy. It is based on scientific, technological, 
creative, spiritual, economic, and human potential. It is state power related to the 
continuous interstate struggle. Russian views of information-technological IW are 
somewhat different from the Western ones as there are at least three ways to under-
stand IW: geopolitical, systemic, and operational-tactical. These understandings are 
informed by the persistent measure-countermeasure logic, derived perhaps from ma-
terial dialectics. Moreover, the Russian views on IW rely on the same approach as 
most of the Russian public thinking on warfare as a total great power war either pre-
vented or fought based on geography for the defence of the Motherland. In this con-
text, the idea of plain cyber strategy is nonsensical as it is better understood and served 
as a part of strategic planning process. 
 
Based on the effects of the strategic environment and the influence of strategic cul-
tural ideas, I disagree with the interpretation that Russian policies are just tools of 
censorship or political control. The national segment is a response to at least the fol-
lowing threats: the use of the information space for terrorist and criminal purposes, 
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interference into the internal affairs of states, the military-political use of the infor-
mation space, attempts to dominate the information space and to limit the techno-
logical sovereignty of other nations. Therefore, Russian policies include aspects of 
building sovereignty in a new space, or sphere of activity, and thus shaping the inter-
national environment. This occurs through new digital borders, through the concept 
of a critical information infrastructure and resilience, through shaping and controlling 
the national information space in a certain way and creating military capabilities for 
future conflicts and warfare. It was the change in the strategic environment which 
made Russia strive to shape cyberspace to protect itself and to even-the-odds with 
more powerful adversaries supporting different political and cultural worldviews. The 
change of policy was not simply an autocratic reflex of Vladimir Putin and his sup-
porters in the face of political opposition.2454 Consequently, Russia has shifted to 
shaping its own national cyberspace to create power while still pursuing changes of 
the rules through international norm building after 2014. However, it is quite possible 
that the same process would have taken place without the war in Ukraine, although 
more slowly. 
 
The Russian approach leads to a certain amount of friction between civilian and mil-
itary strategies. As was argued above, a closed national network requires the mobili-
zation of a wide range of state institutions and multiple different sources of potential 
power. Its effects are so broad that a purely military approach will fail. Conversely, a 
purely civilian approach will also fail as military networks are part of cyberspace, or 
more precisely, part of the information infrastructure that forms the backbone of the 
digital territory. If the battlespace changes unexpectedly under the feet of friendly 
forces a catastrophic failure awaits. Moreover, every closed national network is shaped 
into being in accordance with nation-specific strategic cultural ideas. If the ideas of 
the military and the defence and security elites correlate and support each other all is 
well. If not, then the civil-military relationships start to affect the way a closed national 
network is constructed and functions. 
 
Although the Russian cyber strategy utilizes a whole-of-state approach it also has a 
definite military aspect. The creation of an EIP for the Armed Forces is at the heart 
of Russian military policy. Additionally, an asymmetric response is present in the un-
derstanding of an ever-continuing information weapon counter-weapon struggle. 
New technologies and creativity will hopefully provide positively disruptive solutions. 
The problem is how to keep this process in the framework of a cost-effective and 
innovative policy. Without an information-technological industrial base, it is difficult 
to produce cheap, secure and game changing military technologies. Moreover, with-
out ‘cyber wars’ to prove testing fields for new weapons and defences on the strategic 
level their development is necessarily based on visions and conjecture. All this demon-
strates that the use of cyber power for warfare, either as force or to shape the battle-
field, is a complex issue. The Russian approach may be the new doctrine of deep 
battle and operations or it might be another Maginot line. 
 
                                              
2454 Furthermore, it shows a certain lack of imagination to think that a state’s way to prepare and fight a war in 
the age of cyber warfare can be derived from how its secret services conduct espionage, subversion and sabo-
tage operations. 
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Although, the Russian policies are for the most part threat-based, as are by definition 
all security policies. To approach them as an expression of a Soviet fortress mentality, 
or interpreting the national segment as a besieged fortress, risks missing some im-
portant features of the Russian strategy. Firstly, it is possible that Russian policies are 
directed by ideas with roots much farther back in history than the Soviet times. The 
ways to arrange state power in Russia have developed in the context of a vast, multi-
ethnic, imperial Russia over hundreds of years. Secondly, to argue that Russia sees 
itself in a constant state of warfare or in active containment by the West restricts the 
understanding of the many directions and interests of Russian foreign and security 
policies. Thirdly, Russian cyber strategy has an outward directed aspect which is not 
focused on the West. It aims to shape the cyberspace on a global scale. The strategy 
is inclusive as it is expanding to Eurasia and China, possibly beyond. It promotes 
regional norm-building. In addition to security issues this aspect is related to the cul-
tural, economic and social interests of a great power. Fourthly, the national segment 
is not only a space but a system of integrated and standardized communication net-
works and data resources, a system of security and management, and a system of 
operational, political, social and or economic control and management. It is a way to 
organize state sovereignty in cyberspace and, therefore, it is no more isolationist than 
any claim of sovereignty.  
 
There are thus many reasons why the dreams of John Perry Barlow never came to be. 
In addition to the suspicion of authoritarian leaders towards the free flow of infor-
mation, and the arguably Western desire to make cyberspace a domain of war, the 
Soviet ‘kibernetik’ dreams of hierarchical and centrally state controlled networks 
where power flows in the form of information provide one further explanation. I do 
not claim that Berg, Kitov, Liapunov and others dreamed of complete totalitarian 
control, just that their ideas have been finally adopted by those in power and fitted to 
their own needs. Based on the research conducted in this thesis I argue that Russia is 
creating a national segment of the Internet because it makes sense for the epistemic 
communities and the security and defence elites in the context of the current strategic 
environment to create a system of systems of information security and defence to 
manage and control their society and economy and to protect the state against internal 
and external threats. This system aims to produce cyber power and possibly military 
strategic advantages. Although the system is being built in the 21st century, it is still 
based on the dreams, memories, and beliefs of the people who witnessed the unex-
pected and unfair demise of the Soviet Union. The Russian national segment is then, 
at least partly, an effort to right a historical wrong with new tools—to create a digital 
Soviet Union that will survive the machinations of its enemies.  
 
7.6 Reflections 
 
How do the findings in this thesis add to or differ from the findings in previous stud-
ies on Russian information warfare? First, I have produced substance for the claim of 
Demchak and Dombrovski who have argued that the fragmentation of the Internet 
has a military aspect and that this fragmentation might benefit states seeking sover-
eignty. I have analysed some of the reasons behind Russia’s policy of promoting in-
formation sovereignty and I have dug deep into the concept of information sover-
eignty to add to the research of, among others, Eneken Tikk, Mika Kerttunen and 
Julian Nocetti. I have shown that although the ideas of the siloviki have had a major 
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impact on Russian cyber policies, as Soldatov and Borogan argue, the living legacy of 
cybernetics has had at least as powerful an influence. I have further developed the 
ideas of Katri Pynnöniemi on the Russian critical infrastructure. I argue that the in-
tegrity, resilience and security the CII now forms the basis of Russian understanding 
of state cyber security. I have added a new way to use cyber power on a strategic level, 
the controlling and shaping of cyberspace, to the theories advocated by Nye, Libicki 
and others. Furthermore, through the analysis of strategic cultural ideas I have com-
plemented the research of Gerovich, Peters, Adamsky and Forsström by demonstrat-
ing continuity, filling in some gaps and introducing new ideas. Finally, through the 
study of strategic cultural ideas and theory of cyber power I have produced an alter-
native and more comprehensive explanation of Russian defensive cyber policies than 
Martti J. Kari.  
 
It is either a sign of insightful scholarship or a sign of persistence in Russian strategic 
thought that in 1998 Timothy Thomas could list ten characteristics of Russian IW 
that are still more or less present.2455 Thomas, however, studied ideas almost exclu-
sively, not their implementation. Moreover, the claims by scholars like Giles, Ad-
amsky, Heickerö, Jonsson, Blank about the ‘holism’ and constant continuity of the 
Russian IW have some truth in them but should not be taken as the whole truth. As 
this study brackets Russian offensive operations, I do not claim that Russian offensive 
information policies might not be ‘holistic.’ However, on the defensive side the mul-
tiplicity of actors and agendas make this claim highly suspect. Moreover, by claiming 
that some state thinks that it is at war with us based on the writings of academia is a 
claim based on false evidence. I also argue, that only by looking at Russian aggressive 
actions against the West, we fall prey to a multiple biases and errors of judgement. 
 
My aim has been to capture as broad a picture of the Russian strategic cultural ideas 
as is possible in the context of available sources. I claim that I have succeeded well 
enough, but some difficult choices had to be made. For example, I have almost com-
pletely left out the statements and speeches of the elite. They are a legitimate source 
but would have broadened the already extensive source material even further. There 
is also the issue of translation. All the translations presented in this thesis are mine. 
There have been some difficulties in translating certain terms and I might have erred 
on the side of expediency—a case in point being the use of the terms struggle and 
confrontation. However, I believe that I have offered a more precise and comprehen-
sive approach to these terms than previous studies. 
 
I have tried to challenge some of the prevailing Western understandings of Russian 
cyber strategy or actions. The Western approach has been based on what Russia is 
doing to others, not on what Russia is doing to information or cyberspace or to pro-
tect itself. This ‘active’ and ‘offensive’ approach has obscured the Russian perception 
of ‘deterrence’ as constant struggle and competition. When half of the picture is miss-
ing there can be no full knowledge of the issue. Moreover, the premises of the Russian 
use of information security terms needs to be understood. There is a lot of intentional 
political maskirovka but also issues related to how the Russian scholars and the elite 
perceive the Western use of information against themselves.  
 
                                              
2455 Thomas 1998b. 
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Although I have claimed that the Western and Russian thinking on cyber security is 
quite similar, I do not claim that they are the same. For example, Russian ideas about 
information-technological warfare might produce interesting combinations, unex-
pected synergies and new paths of thinking. What is clear is that the Russians are 
susceptible to Western theoretical fads. The NCW and hybrid wars are a case in point. 
When reading Russian military and civilian journals one needs to always bear in mind 
that as the Russians are discussing themselves through Western examples they might 
get caught up in double mirror-imagining themselves. 
 
The texts analysed in this thesis refer to China only passingly. In the 2000s some 
Russian authors recognized China as a possible adversary, but in the 2010s it has been 
mentioned only as a partner, if mentioned at all. On the official side Russia presents 
itself as belonging to the same political and cultural bloc with China when it comes 
to international information security. This would suggest some additional affinity with 
China in addition to rational realpolitik calculations. The problem with pointing out 
the Chinese influence is that the sources chosen for this study are silent on the issue. 
I have taken the liberty to mention China perhaps more often than the sources permit 
because there is enough circumstantial evidence presented in Chapter 6 of infor-
mation security cooperation between the two countries. The reality of that relation-
ship aside, I have come to believe that the Russian understanding of cyber issues 
cannot be understood outside the triad of the United States, China and Russia rela-
tions, and thus this thesis should be complemented with comparative studies. 
 
I have legitimized my methodological approach in Chapter 2. The main theme char-
acterizing my choices is the bracketing of Positivist causality. The theoretical and 
methodological framework of this thesis is by its nature ‘eclectic’. It combines differ-
ent theories and concepts of IR and Strategic Studies to study a specific problem. As 
such, it is vulnerable to criticism, for example, about parsimony and underlying as-
sumptions. My answer to this challenge is an analytic realist pragmatic approach to 
the subject of my thesis. Thus, I take a pragmatic approach to my inquiry: I have 
initially engaged the subject of my study to construct a theory that has descriptive 
relevance to the problem at hand. I have engaged in self-reflection through dialogue 
with previous theoretical literature—including ontological and epistemological dis-
courses. Furthermore, I have been open about my normative assumptions and pro-
fessional interest in the subject of this thesis. 
 
My interpretive epistemological and methodological approach can also be criticized. 
One could ask, what is it that makes strategic cultural ideas so enticing that they have 
historical staying power and have such an influence that Russia tries to shape cyber-
space in a distinctly different way than other states? The problem with this approach 
is that there are any number of answers as previous research on ideas has shown. 
Russian actions could be related to, for example, Russian authoritarian political sys-
tem, geopolitical factors, historical experiences or economic incentives.  My approach 
can be challenged by all of these through empirical study. My humble goal is to un-
derstand how a set of strategic cultural ideas resonates with the policies of Russian 
security and military elites to create power in cyberspace by shaping the cyberspace 
itself.  
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I am cognisant of the way that I have used abduction to build a synthesis of Western 
and Russian ideas. Perhaps my interpretation has been distorted by the Western the-
ories and concepts used to build my theoretical framework. Perhaps there is no system 
of systems of information security and defence—only fragmented bureaucratic pro-
jects informed by similar historical ideas. However, after analysing over 1,000 Russian 
articles I believe that there is something that makes sense in theorizing about systems 
and control. Moreover, I have referred to sources in Chapter 5 which explicitly refer 
to such systems. I do not claim that the interplay of ideas and material reality will 
provide a certain result, only that it makes sense from a point of view of the strategic 
cultural ideas to approach the Russian national segment as a system of systems of 
information security and defence.  
 
Furthermore, making generalizing claims about such ideas as power is, of course, full 
of challenges, starting with the validity of such claims. Ideas must be understood in 
their temporal and political context, and the fact that they are ultimately carried and 
acted upon by human individuals must be recognized. The interpretations I have of-
fered in this thesis are based on immersing myself on Russian ideas though texts pro-
duced by a distinct collection of people. My interpretations are subject to the judge-
ment of the scientific community. 
 
There might exist some important ideas I have left out of the analysis or incorporated 
incorrectly in other ideas in Chapters 4 and 5. For example, the interstate struggle 
includes the character of war, continuum of conflict, comprehensive security, territo-
rial defence, and strategic planning. I have presented these as components of policy 
prescriptions, but they might be strategic cultural ideas of their own. I have bracketed 
ideas I have deemed to represent ideologies or worldviews, such as the ‘besieged for-
tress’ complex. Additionally, I have left the Russian theory of command and control 
largely unexplored as it is a subject of study on its own. The concepts of surprise and 
maskirovka as the roots of asymmetry have been studied by others, although only 
briefly and superficially. My thesis is not a comprehensive study of the Russian stra-
tegic thought, but I hope I have captured some important aspects of it. 
 
I have had to leave some important issues concerning closed national networks and 
asymmetry beyond the scope this thesis because there was no room for them. A crit-
ically important issue for further study is the concept of structural cyber asymmetry 
and its analysis. Additionally, the development of the multitude of civilian systems 
and the vulnerability of the EIP of the Armed Forces to the possible disconnection 
from the global Internet of the national segment must be studied. The possibility to 
shape into being a closed national network with national characteristics raises multiple 
military strategic questions related to deterrence and escalation control which are be-
yond this thesis. The model of the Russian national segment as a system of systems 
of information security and defence provides a tool for pursuing comparative studies 
of other national segments. Moreover, the themes explored in this thesis should guide 
IR and Strategic Studies to pay more attention to the political, economic and military 
aspects of the shaping of cyberspace by state actors. Dominating narratives should be 
challenged and hidden, silent processes should be brought into the daylight. 
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